

CRUSADING and the CRUSADER STATES

SECOND EDITION

Andrew Jotischky



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Crusading and the Crusader States

Crusading and the Crusader States explores how the idea of holy war emerged from the troubled society of the eleventh century, and why Jerusalem and the Holy Land were so important to Europeans. It follows the progress of the major crusading expeditions, offering insights into initial success and subsequent failure, charts the development of new attitudes towards Islam and its followers, and shows the effects of the Crusades on society and culture in the Near East.

Providing analysis and discussion of this vital period of medieval history, Andrew Jotischky discusses key questions such as how crusading evolved in theory and practice, how crusading expeditions were planned and carried out, why they were considered such an essential part of medieval society, and why their popularity endured despite military failures.

This new edition takes into account the wealth of rich and varied recent research to show why crusading should be seen as central to the European experience in the Middle Ages. It engages with key historiographical debates of the past decade, including how Crusades were formed, the political culture and social networks of crusading, and the effects of crusading on western religious and aristocratic culture. It now extends into the fifteenth century to discuss the lasting ramifications of the Crusades, and illustrate their legacy into the early modern period.

It is essential reading for all students of the Crusades and medieval history.

Andrew Jotischky is Professor of Medieval History at Royal Holloway University of London. His previous publications include *The Crusades: A Beginner's Guide* (2015), *A Hermit's Cookbook: Monks, Food and Fasting in the Middle Ages* (2011), *The Penguin Historical Atlas of the Medieval World* (2005), with Caroline Hull, and *The Carmelites and Antiquity: Mendicants and their Pasts in the Middle Ages* (2002).



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Second edition

Andrew Jotischky

This edition published 2017
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

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First edition published by Pearson Education 2004

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Jotischky, Andrew, 1965– author.

Title: Crusading and the crusader states / Andrew Jotischky.

Description: Second edition. | Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge,
2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016033822 | ISBN 9781138808058 (hardback : alk. paper) |

ISBN 9781138808065 (pbk. : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781315271057 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Crusades. | Middle Ages. | Church history—Middle Ages,
600–1500.

Classification: LCC D157 .J68 2017 | DDC 909.07—dc23

LC record available at <https://lccn.loc.gov/2016033822>

ISBN: 978-1-138-80805-8 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-138-80806-5 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-27105-7 (ebk)

Typeset in Sabon

by Florence Production Ltd, Stoodleigh, Devon, UK

Contents

<i>List of illustrations</i>	vii
<i>Preface to the second edition</i>	ix
<i>Preface to the first edition</i>	xi
<i>Chronology of main events</i>	xiv
1 Problems in crusading historiography	1
2 The papacy, the knighthood and the eastern Mediterranean	23
3 Crusade and settlement, 1095–c.1118	49
4 Politics and war in the Crusader States, 1118–87	77
5 The Islamic reaction, 1097–1193	111
6 Crusader society	133
7 Recovery in the East, new challenges in Europe: crusading, 1187–1216	167
8 Varieties of crusading from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries	197
9 Crusading and the Crusader States in the thirteenth century, 1217–74	229
10 Crusading and the Holy Land in the later Middle Ages	255
<i>Bibliography</i>	281
<i>Index</i>	303



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Illustrations

Figures

2.1	Holy Sepulchre	35
2.2	Pilgrim crosses	36
3.1	Battle outside Antioch	59
3.2	Election of Godfrey of Bouillon	65
4.1	Aqua Bella	84
4.2	Safita	86
4.3	Mistreatment of Aimery, patriarch of Antioch	98
4.4	Discovery of Baldwin IV's leprosy	102
5.1	Damascus citadel	120
5.2	Dome of the Rock	128
6.1	Holy Sepulchre exterior	148
6.2	Jerusalem Ethiopian monastery	149
6.3	Mar Sabas	155
6.4	Monastery of Temptation	156
7.1	Walls of Constantinople	181
10.1	Famagusta	268

Maps

3.1	The Crusader States, 1099–1187	64
8.1	Iberian peninsula during the <i>Reconquista</i> , c. 1109	201
8.2	The Baltic Crusades	217
8.3	Frankish Greece, 1204–61	224
9.1	Crusading in Egypt, 1217–21 and 1248–50	231

Genealogical tables

Royal house of Jerusalem and Cyprus	xiii
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Preface to the second edition

The invitation to revise this book for a second edition has enabled me to do two important things: first, to correct the faults and errors in the first edition, but second, and more important, to reflect on how the subject has changed in the twelve years since it first appeared. If it was difficult to produce a single-volume analysis of the subject based on current research in 2004, it is even more challenging in 2016, because the extent and range of new interpretations of the Crusades and the pace at which they are published has increased. Historians interested in crusading are still pre-occupied with many of the fundamental questions that informed my approach to the first edition; more important, students and newcomers to the field, whom I hope will be my readers, still want to know how we can usefully define and understand the Crusades. For this reason I have resisted the temptation to revisit the fundamental approach taken in the first volume, and tried instead to use this opportunity to show the richness and texture of recent research. Besides updating the literature on the subject, I hope that this new edition will capture for readers the complexity of crusading studies today. Far from being a discrete and easily defined field within medieval history, crusading studies encapsulate the disciplinary fluidity that characterises the approach of many medievalists. Archaeologists, art historians, legal and literary scholars, liturgists, numismatists and theologians as well as historians all contribute to a holistic view in which crusading is seen not only as a characteristic facet of medieval society but as a motor of change. Rather than an extraordinary activity carried out at the margins of Europe, crusading should be understood as central to the European experience in the Middle Ages.



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Preface to the first edition


When I was approached a few years ago to write this book for the series 'Recovering the Past', my initial reaction was to wonder whether another general introductory book on the Crusades was really necessary. Crusading as a subject of study has always attracted a wide range of writing from the popular as well as the academic end of the spectrum. Scores of introductory books on the Crusades are already available, many of them reproducing the same information. Could anyone add anything to a story already so familiar? Could anyone retell the events as vividly as Runciman or Grousset, or survey the field with the magisterial gaze of Mayer or Richard? More worryingly, was it possible to write a single-volume study of such an expanding and complex field of scholarly study as the Crusades has now become without misleading readers by faults of omission or flaws in balance? These fears are still real enough, but I am grateful, for all that, to have been given the opportunity by Edward Acton and Eric Evans, the Series Editors, to try my hand at this book. Writing it, though every bit as difficult as I had feared, has been more fun than I had expected. It has also been more helpful than I could have imagined for my own understanding of the Crusades to have had to explain them within the parameters of a book designed for readers new to the subject. These, however, are selfish reasons for writing a book, and I hope that the tale told here will also prove to be of some value to others, for the following reasons. First, because no matter how familiar the tale, if a series of historical events is important enough in the development of human societies, it can stand any number of retellings. The essence of historical writing is that it is, after all, a personal reflection on the meaning of events and evidence, and for this reason no two historians will ever write quite the same book on the Crusades. Second, my purpose is not to write a narrative history of the Crusades, but to provide an analysis of the overall picture that is at the same time concise and as comprehensive as possible. For this reason, readers who are expecting detailed reconstructions of battles, political intrigues or stirring acts of heroism may be disappointed. I hope they will feel recompensed, however, by the relation of individual events and personalities to the broader currents within the history of crusading. I have tried to put myself in the position of an intelligent reader who comes

unprepared to the subject and who would like to understand, as succinctly as possible, how crusading as a practice and theory evolved; how Crusades were planned and executed; why they were considered to be so essential a part of medieval society; how crusading produced a distinctive western society in the Near East and how that society sustained itself; and, not least, why crusading continued to exercise an appeal to European society despite repeated military failures. A third reason for attempting this book is that the subject has never been so crucial to our understanding of the future, as well as the past, of western society. When I first started to study the Crusades as an undergraduate, more than twenty years ago, it was regarded by my contemporaries as a signally antiquarian pursuit. Nobody I have spoken to in the last few years shares this belief. The idea of religiously justified violence, so far from being, as Gibbon assumed, consigned to a pre-Enlightenment past, is a fact of contemporary, no less than it was of medieval, society. An earlier generation of crusader historians could look back at medieval holy war, both Christian and Islamic, with the distant gaze of rational scepticism. At the time of writing, conflicts justified, if not explained, by religious differences are taking place on almost every continent. Many of those engaged in such conflicts use the language of holy war and crusading, whether accurately or not, to appeal to a moral justification for violence. In perception if not in historical fact, there is a direct correlation between the Crusades and current conflicts, especially but by no means exclusively in the regions in which crusading ideals were first applied. Solutions to such conflicts can only come from understanding of both the historical realities and the emotive responses generated by partial knowledge of those realities.

The help and encouragement of several people have been invaluable in writing this book. I would like to thank Eric Evans for suggesting it to me, my editor, Heather McCallum, for friendly but firm encouragement, and Julie Knight for her efficiency in seeing it through the Press. I would also like to thank Jonathan Phillips for suggestions and improvements to the text. Thanks are also due to my colleagues in the History Department at Lancaster University, for reading drafts and for lightening administrative burdens during the final stages of the book. Support in other ways has come from my family: from my parents, from my wife Caroline, and from my children, who have become alarmingly familiar with Tancreds, Baldwins and Innocents. Finally, I would like to thank all the students in my Crusades courses at Manchester, Oxford and Lancaster since 1992, from whom I have learned so much.

Andrew Jotischky
July 2004

Royal house of Jerusalem and Cyprus



Chronology of main events

- 1071 Seljuqs defeat Byzantine army at Manzikert
- 1074 Gregory VII's 'crusading' proposal
- 1085 Alfonso VI of Castile takes Toledo
- 1095 Pope Urban II launches First Crusade at Clermont
- 1096 Crusaders at Constantinople
- 1097 June: Nicaea taken by crusader/Byzantine army
July: Crusaders defeat Kilij Arslan at Dorylaeum
- 1097–8 Siege of Antioch
- 1098 Baldwin takes control of Edessa
- 1099 Crusaders take Jerusalem
- 1100 Baldwin I becomes king of Jerusalem
- 1101 Second crusading contingent defeated
- 1108 Bohemond's invasion of Balkans ends in defeat; Treaty of Devol
- 1118 Alfonso I of Aragon captures Zaragoza
- 1119 Turks defeat Antiochenes at the 'Field of Blood'
- 1122–3 Venetian expedition helps to capture Tyre
- 1129 Council of Troyes confirms Templar Rule; Franks attack Damascus unsuccessfully
- 1144 Zengi captures Edessa
- 1145 Pope Eugenius III launches Second Crusade
- 1146–7 Bernard of Clairvaux preaches crusade in France, Germany and the Low Countries
- 1147 October: Crusaders capture Lisbon
December: German crusaders defeated in Asia Minor
- 1148 Franco-German crusading army and Franks of Jerusalem fail to capture Damascus
- 1149 Raymond of Poitiers, prince of Antioch, killed at Inab; rebuilt Church of Holy Sepulchre consecrated
- 1153 Kingdom of Jerusalem captures Ascalon
- 1154 Nur ad-Din becomes ruler of Damascus
- 1169 Franco-Byzantine invasion of Egypt stalled by Shirkuh
- 1171 Saladin suppresses Fatimid caliphate

- 1174 Saladin usurps Nur ad-Din's heir in Damascus;
Accession of Baldwin IV in Jerusalem
- 1180 Sybil marries Guy of Lusignan
- 1186 Sybil and Guy mount *coup* for throne of Jerusalem
- 1187 July: Saladin defeats Franks at Hattin
October: Jerusalem falls to Saladin
- 1189 Guy of Lusignan begins siege of Acre
- 1191 May: Richard I conquers Cyprus
June: Acre falls to crusading army
September: Richard I defeats Saladin at Arsuf
- 1192 Richard secures coastline, returns to West
- 1193 Death of Saladin
- 1202 Fourth Crusade sacks Zara
- 1203 Fourth Crusade installs Alexios IV on Byzantine throne
- 1204 Fourth Crusade sacks Constantinople
- 1208 Albigensian Crusade launched against Cathar heretics
- 1212 Castilian–Aragonese victory over Muslims at Las Navas de Tolosa
- 1215 Fourth Lateran Council
- 1217 Fifth Crusade launched
- 1219 Fifth Crusade captures Damietta
- 1221 Fifth Crusade defeated
- 1225 Emperor Frederick II marries heiress to Jerusalem, Yolanda
- 1229 Frederick II's peaceful recovery of Jerusalem
- 1239 Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall secure Jerusalem
- 1244 August: Jerusalem falls to Kharazmian Turks
October: Franks defeated at La Forbie
- 1245 Pope Innocent IV launches crusade against Frederick II
- 1249 Louis IX of France captures Damietta
- 1250 Louis IX's army defeated at Mansurah; Louis captured
- 1258 Baghdad sacked by Mongols; Abbasid khalifate ends
- 1260 Mamluks defeat Mongols at 'Ain Jalud
- 1265 Baibars captures Caesarea
- 1268 Antioch falls to Mamluks
- 1270 Louis IX dies at Tunis on crusade
- 1274 New crusading plans discussed at Second Council of Lyons
- 1289 Fall of Tripoli
- 1291 Fall of Acre, last Frankish town on mainland
- 1300 Mongols occupy Jerusalem briefly
- 1314 Council of Vienne suppresses Order of Templars
- 1333 Franciscan Custody of the Holy Land
- 1336 Philip VI's crusade fails to depart



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1 Problems in crusading historiography

Crusading is a perennially attractive subject for students of History. The difficulty posed by understanding the mindset of medieval popes, bishops and knights is tempered by the vivid colour of many of the surviving sources, and the illusion of closeness in time lent by the relevance of much of the subject matter to the contemporary world. It is also a subject of vital importance for a modern audience, arguably even more now than when the first edition of this book was published in 2004.

Since a large number of general studies of the Crusades already exist, it may be worth laying before the reader what this book sets out to do, and what it does not propose to attempt. First, this is a book designed with undergraduate historians in mind. I have therefore tried to approach the subject from the point of view of the student by posing – and trying as far as possible to answer – the kinds of questions that my own students over about twenty-five years of teaching the subject at university have themselves asked and debated in seminars. This means that I have given priority to analysis and interpretation over the narrative of events. Some degree of narrative is of course inevitable, if only to provide a context for analysis, but the story has been told so many times and in so many books that it has not seemed worthwhile to tell it again. There are, therefore, no set-piece descriptions of individual Crusades, let alone battles. The best scholarly surveys of the Crusades are still invaluable for the detail that they provide to superimpose on the sketch in the following pages. Despite this set of priorities, however, I hope that this book will also appeal to the general reader, who perhaps comes to the Crusades already knowing something of the story and its chief personalities, but would like an accessible yet sharply focused discussion of how the Crusades came about, what they attempted to achieve, and how they shaped the history of the East Mediterranean in the Middle Ages.

The study of the Crusades has expanded so rapidly in recent years that the parameters of the subject are much wider than they were a generation ago. This has made for some difficult choices in judging the scope of this book. One consequence of the growth of interest in the Crusades among historians has been that they are now almost open-ended. A convenient, if in some respects misleading, starting date is provided by the appeal that

2 *Problems in crusading historiography*

launched the First Crusade in 1095. Few historians believe that the Crusades began with a ‘big bang’ moment, at which Urban II presented a revolutionary idea for holy war fully fledged to an astonished Christendom. All historians more or less acknowledge that holy war as an idea embedded within Christian society had been current for many generations, even centuries; moreover, that the concept of spiritual merits or privileges for conducting such war was also well understood. These were not simply abstract ideas. Wars undertaken by Christian rulers against pagans, for example by the Franks against the Saxons in the late eighth and early ninth centuries, or by Wessex against the Danes in the late ninth century, had been articulated as the defence of Christendom against its enemies, and as such spiritually meritorious activities, even in some cases constituting a moral obligation. Nor was war against Muslims a new idea at the end of the eleventh century. The Arab conquest of Sicily in the ninth century, and subsequent raiding on the south coast of France, in Calabria and even as far north in Italy as Rome itself, had produced a body of literary responses to Muslim aggression. Both those who suffered from such raids, and those who resisted the raiders, were celebrated in hagiographical literature. These themes can be found in saints’ lives in Greek – deriving from the Greek-speaking communities in Sicily and southern Italy – and Latin, from Italy, France and Spain. Furthermore, they continue to be deployed in hagiography and other genres long after the Arab threat had ended, because by the mid-eleventh century it was Christians who had become the aggressors in the western Mediterranean, in the Norman conquest of Sicily from the 1060s to the 1090s, and in the campaigns of reconquest of Arab-held territory in the Iberian peninsula at the same time.

There was thus both a stock of literary models and a palpable memory on which promoters of holy war against the Muslim world could draw in the 1090s. This does not mean, however, that nothing Urban II advocated in 1095 was new. It is not the case that any and all anti-Muslim sentiments or military action against Islamic powers qualify as the same thing as ‘crusading’, and thus that there was no essential distinction between what took place between 1095 and 1099 and previous instances of Christian–Muslim warfare.

Nor does it mean, as one historian has recently suggested, that the First Crusade was simply an episode in a long-running war between ‘the Christian world’ and ‘the Islamic world’ (Chevedden 2015). The problem with such an approach is twofold. First, the implication it gives is that Islam and Christianity comprised two mutually exclusive worlds with a propensity to conflict, and this simply does not accord with historical facts. Very large Christian populations lived, usually in peace, under the rule of Muslim regimes in much of the Near East, North Africa and the western Mediterranean for centuries – in some cases, until within living memory. To be sure, dominant regimes sometimes subjected their minorities to harassment or even persecution, but there was no structural or systematic attempt to create

‘an Islamic world’ in which Christians, or for that matter Jews, had no place. Likewise, there is little evidence for any corresponding attack on Muslim powers by ‘Christian Europe’ by virtue of the fact that they were Muslim. As we shall see, the holy war launched by Urban II was specifically aimed at a racial group – the Turks – because of their occupation of the holy places in Jerusalem. A second, and related point concerns the notion of a wider geopolitical framework in which Urban was operating in 1095. Urban was certainly aware of the implications of other wars against Muslim powers that had already begun before 1095: specifically the Norman conquest of Sicily and the ongoing territorial wars against Arab states in Spain. These, however, were wars prosecuted by secular rulers for territorial gains, and while they were certainly supported and encouraged by a succession of popes who saw them as meritorious, they neither provided a template for future Christian–Muslim warfare nor initiated a wider conflict that spilled over into the Near East. In other words, the expedition launched in 1095 was not a direct consequence of earlier conflicts between Christian and Muslim powers. It had its own causes, the participants had quite a different motivation, and it had its own theological underpinning.

Despite changing political and economic situations both in the Near East and in the West, both the causes and the ideological underpinning remained remarkably constant for hundreds of years. In looking for the end of crusading, historians tend to follow their own preferences. Although the fall of the last western possession on the mainland of the Crusader States in 1291 is still accepted by many as a sensible end-point (e.g. Richard 1999), this is in many ways an artifice. Crusades continued to be launched along exactly the same lines of organisation and with the same aspirations for another fifty years or so after 1291, and even after the emphasis shifted from the recovery of the Holy Land to the more generalised struggle against the Ottomans who by the end of the fourteenth century were threatening Constantinople itself, crusading ideals as promoted and expressed by the European nobility continued to be recognisable as part of the same tradition that had inspired the generation of 1095. The last of the Crusader States, the kingdom of Cyprus, did not fall until the second half of the sixteenth century, but one can go further still. Even the seventeenth-century defence of Christendom against the Turks might easily be included in crusading history, even though the underlying theological principles behind crusading no longer applied in the same way. Recently, historians have emphasised how much the alliances created among European powers to wage war against the Turks in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries owed to the holy war tradition of earlier centuries, and how even Protestant powers such as England, in whose Church the theological assumptions about spiritual benefits no longer applied, supported such wars as both necessary and virtuous (Tyerman 2011).

My ending point in this book is the fifteenth century: not because crusading as a practice or a concept ended then, but because after the fifteenth

4 *Problems in crusading historiography*

century western society developed in ways that mean that the premises and assumptions one can make about infrastructures and institutions, let alone mentalities, were so changed as to mean that one is talking about very different starting-points. I recognise, however, that there is much to be said about crusading in the later Middle Ages that for reasons of length can find no place in this book.

Geographical parameters are also more problematic than they might at first appear. Everyone knows that the Crusades were wars of the Cross against the Crescent, but only comparatively recently have historians from outside Spain included the Iberian peninsula in their horizons when considering crusading. Equally, the Crusades against pagans in the Baltic region have largely been understood within the context of the western colonisation of north-eastern Europe rather than of crusading. There are good reasons for emphasising the particularities of the northern Crusades and the Spanish *Reconquista*, for in both cases these were wars whose inception cannot be explained solely by the development of crusading ideals. Some historians are still reluctant to see these wars as occupying the same place in the mind-set of participants or contemporary commentators. Nevertheless, I have included discussion of both in this book because the course of warfare and Christian settlement in Iberia and the Baltic was shaped by largely the same aspirations and ideologies as in the East Mediterranean. For similar reasons I have also found space for brief accounts of Crusades against heretics within western Europe and against Christian enemies of the papacy. Beyond the discussion in the Introduction, however, I have not attempted to broach the question of what constituted a crusade.

The selection of what to include and what to omit largely represents trends in crusading historiography. One benefit of this book will, I hope, be to guide readers to the most recent treatments of different aspects of the subject. For this reason the references in the text are mostly to secondary literature that provides systematic discussion of topics in greater depth than this book can allow. Because I have in mind a readership whose proficiency is largely limited to English, I have restricted myself as far as possible to references to works in English. This may perhaps be the moment to stress that many substantial and important contributions to crusading scholarship have also been made by scholars writing in French, German, Italian, Spanish and other languages.

What does it mean to study the Crusades?

There is scarcely any need in the present day to justify writing a book about the Crusades. A subject that a generation ago was seen by many professional historians as peripheral to their concerns with the political and social development of Europe has in the past generation seen an explosion of interest and new research. In part, this is because the subject itself has changed; even more, perhaps, because the world has changed. The durability

of conflicts inspired by religious ideology and fuelled by a growing sense of religious and racial hatred can no longer appear foreign to present-day concerns or political discourse. In an age of increasing extremism in political and religious values – both in the western world and in the regions traditionally associated with crusading, but expressed with increasing violence in the latter – the actions of crusaders and their opponents can appear not as the exotic expressions of a more violent world in the distant past, but as a phase in a cycle of conflict. It would be understandable to see the Crusades of the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries as echoes of present-day conflicts. As the fourteenth-century Arab historian Ibn Khaldun put it, ‘the past resembles the present more than one drop of water resembles another’. Such a view, however, would also be misleading. The Crusades came about for specific reasons and in a specific set of circumstances. Although it may be true that the East Mediterranean still suffers from the legacy of the wars initiated by the western Church and knighthood in 1095, the circumstances in which those conflicts began reflect developments in European and West Asian societies during the eleventh century. To repeat what has already been said above, there is no historical inevitability about war between Cross and Crescent, or between the values of Christian and Islamic cultures.

This may be one good reason for studying the Crusades today. Another is that crusading historiography has become increasingly sophisticated and wide-ranging. This means that the student who wants to know how medieval society worked on a number of different levels can do so through a study of crusading. Learning about the Crusades entails the study of the structures of western society as it developed from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries. Crusading naturally evolved over this period. The expeditions of a thirteenth-century prince such as Louis IX of France or Edward I of England differed markedly from the First Crusade of 1096–9 in organisation, method, and to some extent even in aspiration. It could scarcely be otherwise, for every facet of crusade planning and execution was affected by advances in governmental procedure, in the increasingly complex organisation of the Church, in military technology and in changing ideologies that governed Christian conceptions of Islam. But this was not one-way traffic. The continuing aspiration in the West to recover Jerusalem itself brought about many of the changes in medieval society that constitutional historians have hailed as advances. An example is the introduction of the first income tax in Europe in 1183 to finance crusading. In ecclesiastical structures too, aspirations concerned with the Holy Land were pervasive. The wide-ranging reform of the Church envisaged by the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 was articulated by the papacy by the need to make crusading more efficient; thus, fundamental changes to the ways in which bishops ran their dioceses all over Christendom were brought about in order to provide more systematic preaching of the Cross.

Crusading, then, teaches us about how and why medieval society evolved in the ways that it did. But crusading was above all a religious activity,

governed by the expectation of a spiritual reward. This expectation, loosely articulated by Pope Urban II in 1095, was by *c.*1200 to be defined as a legalistic exchange between the participant and the Church, as the mediator of God's will, and articulated in a legally binding vow. The circumstances and experiences of crusading itself brought about this change. Crusaders, their dependants and those to whom they owed services, wanted to know what they could expect in the event of death, injury or the loss of property as a result of crusading. This is not to say that the Crusades by themselves brought about the growth of a more systematic theology of penance or a more complex canon law, but rather that crusading was one of the experiences that made possible such evolutions in the workings of the Church. Changes in the way the Church celebrated its liturgy also came about as a result of crusading. New feasts, such as that to celebrate the capture of Jerusalem on 15 July 1099, entered the Church's liturgical calendar, and new prayers and chants were composed for them. Besides these, existing feasts such as the Exaltation of the Holy Cross (14 September) took on new significance after 1099, once the chapel of Helena, where the True Cross had been found, came into the hands of the Latin Church. After the loss of Jerusalem in 1187, such feasts took on an added poignancy as their celebration came to be linked to new crusade appeals.

Historians of the Crusades have always been concerned with the apparent paradox of holy war. To understand what Urban II meant in 1095 when he preached an armed pilgrimage for the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, we must approach the Crusade from long range, by tracing the evolution of a theory of penitential violence through the social and political turbulence accompanying the papal reform movement of the eleventh century. Urban II's message would have been impossible without the development of a papal office with a clearly defined ideology. This is an eleventh-century story. Equally, however, Urban II's preaching only took on significance in the ears of his listeners, and in the ways in which they retold what they had heard. This means that we must understand what it was about Urban's appeal that was so resonant to late eleventh-century society. Crusading, therefore, takes us backwards into the workings of knightly families: how they learned and expressed their piety, how ideals of devotion and social responsibility became fused with the habits of warfare.

The western settlement in the Levant came about because of a particular combination of circumstances in the East as well as in the West. One of the most significant developments in crusading historiography in recent years has been the progress made in understanding the physical and human environment created by the settlement. This has also extended conceptual boundaries. Our knowledge of how western settlers lived in their new lands is expanding all the time, and this knowledge has helped both to complement and to challenge older assumptions about the mentalité of the western knighthood. Disciplinary boundaries have also been crossed, bringing into

the study of crusading new genres and sources. One field in which this has been most notable is art history. Study of the visual culture of the Crusader States has posed old questions in new ways, by examining the cross-fertilisation of ideas and taste among artists and patrons in the East Mediterranean. This in turn has reinvigorated an old debate about the 'colonialism' of the western settlement. As yet, crusade historians have been wary of exploring the possibilities of postcolonial theory in order to reshape the debate, but recent studies of interaction of settlers with indigenous peoples have suggested new approaches.

Crusading studies today are genuinely interdisciplinary. The contributions of literary scholars, art historians, archaeologists, canon lawyers, liturgists, theologians and codicologists have all helped to sharpen awareness of the central role that crusading played in the lives of Europeans from the end of the eleventh century to the middle of the fourteenth. This book cannot include more than a selection of this new work, but I hope that it will at least convey how important crusading as an ideal and a set of practices was to the development of Europe. In so doing, I trust it will also demonstrate how complex Crusades were for contemporaries, and why answers to even the most apparently simple of questions – what *were* the Crusades? – are so difficult to reach today.

Three historiographical themes

The following brief discussions are designed to raise a few of the conceptual questions that have dominated crusading studies. I make no attempt to provide systematic answers, but simply to make readers aware of the distinct lines of argument, the related questions raised by each and the overall significance of each theme to the broader subject of crusading.

What was a crusade?

The first difficulty in determining what medieval people – whether literate or illiterate – meant by 'the Crusades' is that there was no single word or phrase to describe either the ideal or the practice. For one historian, 'crusading' is in itself a misleading term before the reign of Innocent III (1198–1216): 'There was holy war in the twelfth century which attracted spiritual benefits of various sorts. For some of these wars, randomly except in the case of those to the Holy Land, warriors adopted the cross' (Tyerman 1998: 19). Two premises underlie this view: first, that there was no systematic process according to which the Church or the knighthood classified holy wars or the spiritual rewards accruing from them; and second, that in the absence of any such system, the expeditions to the Holy Land still occupied a different place from any others. Few could argue with this as an account of the situation in 1095–9, but it becomes a controversial argument when pushed as far as the end of the twelfth century.

This view, if pushed to its logical conclusion, ends by resisting all definition, at least up to a point when it can be established that medieval society had, through canon law, constructed such a definition for itself. There is much to commend such an approach, at least in so far as it forces us to confront the fact that the word 'crusade' is not known in any source until almost a hundred years after 1095. The danger, however, is that it can lead to a kind of relativism that either includes any and all holy wars as Crusades on the grounds that there was no litmus test by which contemporaries could distinguish one from another, or that resists the use of the word altogether. The argument over how to define Crusades is in fact analogous to the controversy over universals in the twelfth-century cathedral schools. The nominalist approach resists defining the crusade closely because the word did not exist: if people had agreed on what constituted a crusade, they would have invented a word for it. In contrast, the realist position insists that the idea must have existed independent of language, and that despite the apparently random use of words such as 'journey' or 'pilgrimage' in the sources, it is possible to determine what for contemporaries was or was not a crusade. Between these two poles – which I have deliberately caricatured – are many different shades of opinion. My aim in this section is to explore some of the implications of different approaches.

The First Crusade has usually been seen as the blueprint for a successive series of wars following more or less the same pattern: the preaching of a holy war authorised by the pope and accompanied by the offer of spiritual rewards, followed by a military expedition undertaken by the nobility, sometimes including royal princes, against territory held by the Turks or any other enemy considered equally threatening to the stability of Christendom. But although the First Crusade was certainly the first such war, it has been argued that it does not necessarily follow that it was designed to inaugurate a movement, or that in fact it even established a pattern for future holy wars (Tyerman 1998: 8–29). The events of 1095–9 – or, as some historians prefer, 1095–1101 – can be seen as simply a peculiar combination of circumstance and opportunity that was not intended to be repeated. Moreover, far from initiating new ideas about holy war, the First Crusade simply reflected ideas that had been around since Pope Gregory VII (1073–85), if not before. In so far as the exercise was repeated in 1146–9, it was because no new or original thinking had been done about what a crusade was; indeed, Eugenius III self-consciously modelled his bull of 1145/6 on Urban II's preaching in 1095–6. Many historians would probably agree with the broad outlines of this argument, though there is a case for seeing actions such as Bohemond's assault on the Byzantine Empire in 1107, the siege of Zaragoza in 1119 and the attack on Damascus in 1129 as partaking of at least some of the elements mentioned above. In any case, it is one thing to argue that the First Crusade was essentially a 'traditional' exercise that did not provide a launching pad for new ideas about holy war, and quite another to conclude that it can have had no profound impact on

knightly sensibilities. The First Crusade may have been a 'traditional' war in so far as the terms on which warriors participated were already recognisable to them, but it created new political conditions in the East Mediterranean that in turn offered new opportunities and expectations for the knighthood.

Some historians anxious to find some necessary condition by which a holy war can be recognised as a crusade have fixed on the assumption of the cross by warriors as the defining feature of a crusade (Richard 1999: 260). In fact, the idea of following the cross into battle as a feature of holy war was far from new in 1095; what seems to have been original was the practice of individual warriors adopting the cross in the form of pieces of cloth on their clothing. By the end of the twelfth century the rite of taking the cross was accompanied by a vow binding in ecclesiastical law. This would appear to widen the definition so as to allow expeditions that owe nothing to papal preaching to count as Crusades, because sometimes kings – Henry VI and Frederick II of Germany and St Louis of France are examples – took the cross on their own authority, and had their actions retrospectively confirmed by the pope. Moreover, a bewildering array of personal expeditions and armed pilgrimages by members of the nobility followed the first crusaders throughout the twelfth century, among them the king of Norway in 1111/12 and the count of Flanders in 1177. They were not preached as holy wars by the papacy, though sometimes – as for example with the Anglo-Norman knights who went to the defence of Outremer in 1186 – such expeditions were responses to appeals from the Church of Jerusalem. We know very little about the state of mind of these knights, or whether they thought that what they were doing was the equivalent of crusading. They may have taken vows, but in few cases before the 1180s do we know anything about them.

Even this wider definition, however, still requires crusaders to have responded to an initiative offered by the Church, because the crusading vow was made to a cleric and formed a contract with God. Even if crusaders could take the cross at any time, without having to wait for a specific preaching campaign, the terms of crusading were still set by the Church. Two problems arise from such a definition. First, definitions of what constituted 'taking the cross' remained fluid even after Innocent III's pontificate. Second, can we be confident that it was the Church's model of crusading that informed lay mentalities? Did a knight – Conrad of Montferrat, for example, who arrived in Outremer in 1187 just in time to undertake the defence of Tyre – consider that he had earned spiritual privileges even if he had not been granted an indulgence as part of the contract represented by taking the cross? (And, we might ask, if he did not, why would he have bothered?) Fundamentally, how one answers the question 'what was a crusade?' will depend on the kind of weight one gives to the different forces shaping medieval society. Of course Crusades were regarded by contemporaries as religious acts, but does this mean that any war that could be rationalised as contributing to the defence of Christendom was likely to be

regarded as a crusade, regardless of whether it was subject to the same spiritual rewards as the expeditions to the East? In other words, did the consensus about what was meant by crusading come from the participants themselves, or from those who articulated, refined and shaped the developing ideal that lay behind the practice?

The most recent authoritative survey of the historiography divides crusader historians into four categories: 'generalists', 'traditionalists', 'pluralists' and 'popularists' (Constable 2001). Of these, the last category largely represents historians of an earlier generation, notably Alphandéry and Dupront (1954–9), but a few current historians (Flori 1999; Rubenstein 2011) have followed the same premises in their work, arguing that the First Crusade was an outpouring of the kind of lay piety shaped by reform tendencies in the eleventh century. This approach, which has been marginalised in recent years, may yet enjoy a revival as new understanding of the lay impulses behind the reform movement (Moore 2000; Cushing 2005) is absorbed by crusader historians.

The three other categories are more prominent in current historiography. The 'generalist' approach was pioneered by Carl Erdmann, whose work *The Origin of the Idea of the Crusade* (1977 [1935]) sought to place the First Crusade within a long-standing tradition of holy war and ecclesiastical politics, and thus to argue against its particular distinctiveness. Among current theorists of crusading, some, though not all, of Tyerman's arguments fall into this 'generalist' tradition. Another category, the 'traditionalists', best exemplified by Mayer and Richard, sees crusading to the Holy Land as having been higher in status than in any other theatre, or even – in Mayer's case – discounts most other forms of crusading altogether. Despite his generalist credentials, Tyerman has also subscribed to the view that the expeditions to the east were the benchmark of crusading. For 'traditionalists', what was really important about crusading was the objective.

In direct contrast to the 'traditionalist' position is the 'pluralist' view, which sees all forms of crusading as having been equal in the eyes of contemporaries, and the defining characteristic of the crusade as being not the direction or target but the papal offer of a spiritual reward. A manifesto for the 'pluralist' position has argued vigorously against the idea of a 'league table' of Crusades (Housley 1992: 3–4) in which Jerusalem occupied the top place. The implications of 'pluralism' can be seen in a variety of works (e.g. Riley-Smith 1977/2002a, 1987, 1995; Siberry 1985; Housley 1986, 1992; Maier 1996; Phillips 1996, 2009); indeed, one consequence of the hold that the 'pluralist' approach has enjoyed on crusading studies can be seen in the widening of crusading historiography to include regions other than the East Mediterranean and enemies of Christendom other than the Turks.

Such categorisation of the historiography doubtless has its uses, but it can also be misleading. Very few crusade historians (with the possible exception of Hans Mayer) are comfortably one thing or another; there are elements of 'pluralism' in Tyerman's arguments, just as there are 'traditionalist' concerns

in Housley's. Although I have tried in this book to follow no particular agenda, the result will probably seem moderately 'traditionalist'. Most of my discussion concerns crusading to the East and the Crusader States established there. Partly this reflects my own interests as an historian, and partly the constraints on space. Although other theatres of holy war find a place here, I have, with the exception of a few mentions, omitted Cyprus after the thirteenth century.

Undergraduate students whom I have taught sometimes argue in seminars and essays that the *Reconquista* in Spain, the Albigensian Crusade, the Baltic Crusades, and the wars against 'heretics' and political opponents of the papacy in Italy were 'diversions' from the 'original' ideal of the crusade, and even that they devalued that ideal. They are right to argue that the occurrence of such wars was not caused simply by what happened at Clermont in November 1095: the *Reconquista* was already under way, and the later wars against the Baltic pagans would have happened anyway, while the idea of penitential war against 'heretical' enemies of the papacy was formulated twenty years before Clermont. But one can turn the question on its head to argue that the Crusades for the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre were a diversion in a tradition of penitential violence that was already in place in the 1070s and that continued alongside the Crusades to the East throughout the Middle Ages. As the Crusades to the East engendered a distinctive vocabulary, so that vocabulary came to be applied to other holy wars; but the use of the vocabulary did not create them. Holy wars were normative to medieval society; it was the consistent application of the idea to the Holy Land that was anomalous.

A further consideration is that what contemporaries thought the function of crusading was changed over time. There is little attempt to theorise in the contemporary writing about the First Crusade, although certain ideas of about what constitutes a just war are present in the chronicle accounts of Pope Urban II's preaching. By the mid-thirteenth century, however, sophisticated views about the nature and rights of Christian society had emerged. The decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) provide a blueprint, but the canon law commentaries of Innocent IV (1243–54) and his contemporaries, notably Hostiensis, articulated a more analytical approach to the crusade. Innocent III, Gregory IX (1227–41) and Innocent IV, the lawyer-popes who dominated the office in the first half of the thirteenth century, all shared the fundamental view that the pope, as the head of Christian society, should rightfully enjoy sovereignty not only over that society, but over non-Christian societies too. This theory of sovereignty could be applied to the language of holy war, with the result that the implications of holy war could be defined in sharper, but also in broader ways. If one uses the terminology of the indulgence as a guide, one can argue that Innocent III still appeared to uphold a legal distinction between holy war for the recovery of Jerusalem and for other just wars. It is more difficult to see such a distinction in the crusading bulls of Innocent IV. One reason for

this is that the defence of the Holy Land had become a separate issue from the wider problem of relations between Christian and Islamic societies. The deeply reflective thinking about the nature of crusading that is evident in the memoranda produced for the Second Council of Lyons (1274) shows how far the problem has shifted, from the recovery of territory that ought by rights to belong to Christendom to the more general threat posed by the existence of Islam, a religion that denied what seemed to Christians to be self-evidently true. This is not to say that the recovery of what had been lost in the Holy Land did not still preoccupy popes and crusade planners, nor that such an objective still had spiritual dimensions. But the greater complexity in which the question of Islam was framed demanded a wider set of responses, of which holy war was only one. Once the fundamental question was understood in terms of sovereignty, the defence of the Holy Land could not be so easily distinguished from – for example – the defence of Sicily from the Hohenstaufen, or the Latin Empire of Constantinople from the Byzantines.

The motivation of crusaders

A related question to what constituted a crusade is why people took the cross, and what they expected to result from this action. For the most part, the question has been framed in reference to the First Crusade, and in these terms has provided enduring controversy among historians. The view that has prevailed in recent years is that the crusade was so popular because it met the spiritual aspirations of the landed classes who provided military leadership and whose lives were often shaped by military experience. Proponents of this view, for example Riley-Smith (1986, 1997) and Bull (1993), have rejected an older thesis advanced by Georges Duby, and to some extent still followed by medieval historians who consider the Crusades in the broader context of European expansion (Bartlett 1993). Duby's (1971) study of landed families in the Maconnais region of Burgundy led him to the conclusion that the crusade functioned as a solution to a sociological problem, namely the preponderance of younger sons of noble families who were effectively dispossessed by the feudal custom of passing on lands to the eldest son. The landless sons could either enter the religious life or attach themselves as household knights to a great lord and hope eventually to win patronage from him. The crusade offered economic advancement and the opportunity for increased social and political status for younger sons of landed families, in the form of new lands and wealth to be won in the East (Duby 1977: 120). This model, however, has not stood up to the rigorous examination to which it has been subjected in the last generation of crusading studies. One problem is that it is based on a regional study with little application to the situation in the West as a whole. The disinheriting of younger sons may have been a problem in regions where feudal custom prevailed, but in most of Germany and in France south of the Loire, division

of territories among a wider kinship group was still customary on the eve of the First Crusade, and such areas recruited well for the crusade (Bull 1993).

The assumption that the knighthood was attracted by the prospect of wealth and lands is resilient, perhaps in part because human nature suggests that it is so plausible. It is certainly difficult absolutely to disprove, because although there is evidence of families or individuals whose positions were advanced as a direct consequence of the crusade, it is hard to see what evidence could have survived that this was their motivation in taking the cross. Knights who went on the crusade and survived found their feats celebrated in verse and chronicle, and family myths grew up around crusading ancestors. Whatever a knight's motivation might have been, once it became clear that the crusade was being articulated in terms of self-sacrifice, courage and piety, he was unlikely to protest that he had in fact only taken the cross for material gain. This is not to say that profit, where it could be gained in the form of loot, for example, was not welcomed. In a much-quoted passage from the anonymous *Gesta Francorum*, the crusaders before the battle of Dorylaeum (1097) are urged to 'Stand fast together, trusting in Christ and in the victory of the holy cross; for today, if God is willing, you will all gain great booty' (Hill 1962: 19–20). In a similar vein, Martin, Cistercian abbot of Pairis, told prospective crusaders in 1200 that:

the land for which you are headed is by far richer and more fertile than this land, and it is easily possible that likewise many from your ranks will acquire a greater prosperity even in material goods than they will have remembered enjoying back here.

(Andrea 1997: 71)

Knights probably saw little contradiction between spiritual and material motivations; why should they not be rewarded in this life for the service of Christ?

Some of the contemporary chroniclers of the crusade, such as Robert of Rheims and Ekkehard of Aura, attempted to rationalise Urban's message by making him explain the endemic violence in the West in terms of land hunger, and appeal to knights to seek new lands outside Europe. This explanation is attractive if we see crusading as part of a broader colonisation movement of which the Spanish *Reconquista*, the Norman settlement in south Italy and Sicily, and German expansion east of the Elbe also form part. Crusading to the East may, from our perspective, seem to fit into this pattern. But quite apart from the reductionism implicit in such a model, it is difficult to see how the western knighthood, which maintained its livelihood from agricultural surpluses for which arable land was needed, could have been seduced by the prospect of settling a land with much poorer agricultural resources. Easier lands could be had, without fighting for them,

through the internal colonisation of marginal lands in the West, which was a feature of eleventh- and twelfth-century Europe. The most recent research indicates, moreover, that very few surviving crusaders did in fact settle in the newly conquered territories (Riley-Smith 1997: 19). An assumption that securing new lands was a strong motivating force is perhaps suggested by the disproportionate evidence provided by the careers of some of the crusaders who became prominent in the East, such as Tancred and Baldwin of Edessa. But unless we argue that large numbers of crusaders had intended to settle but were so disillusioned by what they found in the East that they turned back for home to try their lot as landless knights again, it looks as though the inducement of new lands in the East was not a powerful motivation. It could be argued, of course, that crusaders were easily seduced by the prospect of settlement because they knew nothing of the reality of conditions in the East – an argument bolstered by the contention of some historians, such as Alphan  ry, that genuine confusion existed in the minds of ill-educated crusaders between the heavenly and the earthly Jerusalem. But it is dangerous to assume widespread ignorance or lack of mental grasp where it cannot be proven, and accurate knowledge about conditions in the East was available at least among the top echelons of eleventh-century society, from pilgrimage accounts, monasteries, such as Monte Cassino, that had connections with the Holy Land, and papal envoys to Constantinople.

Plenty of crusaders, in any case, were already landowners in the West. The most celebrated example of a lord disposing of his property to be able to fulfil his crusading vow is Robert of Normandy's vifgage of his duchy to his brother, William II. It is clear from the terms of the contract, however, that Robert intended to return; the difficulties he encountered in regaining his inheritance from Henry I after his return (he was defeated in 1106 and spent the rest of his life in prison) are testament to the strong desire to participate in the crusade. Robert's spectacular attempts to raise money, and the collapse of his ambitions in the West as a result of taking the cross, only form on a larger scale an example of what must have been the experience of many knights. Other great lords who may seem in hindsight to have been motivated by the desire to establish new lordships for themselves are more difficult to assess. Raymond of Toulouse was giving up a wealthy county to settle in the East, but Godfrey of Bouillon's position was less secure. Both may have been genuinely inspired by a religious conviction that their lives would be spiritually enriched by permanent service to God in the Holy Land. The desire to settle new lands in the East can be interpreted in more than one way, and need not imply that a crusader's motivation was materialistic rather than spiritual. The archetypal 'empire-builder', Bohemond, probably did not intend to claim Antioch for himself until after it had become clear to him that the Byzantines were not prepared to take sufficient risks for its return. Opportunist he may have been, but this does not make him oblivious to pious conviction.

It is easier to be sceptical about 'new settlement' arguments than to prove that crusaders' motivations were entirely spiritual. One problem is that such

evidence as has been uncovered about individual motivation accounts for only about 10 per cent of participants on the First Crusade. Another is the nature of the evidence itself. One recent development in the study of early crusading has been the use of charters to shed light on what departing crusaders thought about their actions. Although this method had already been suggested by Constable (1982), it has gained special prominence in the works of Riley-Smith (1986, 1997) and Bull (1993), which base their arguments for the spirituality of crusaders on the language of charters drawn up usually between crusaders and religious houses. The functions of such documents are varied: sometimes they are simple financial agreements reflecting the crusader's need to liquidate assets in order to fund his expedition; others reflect wider-ranging negotiations between the crusader and the religious house as rival landowners, and seek to bring about peace and security in the locality for the duration of the crusade. Although the financial details evidenced by such documents confirm the crushing expenses incurred by crusaders – and thereby provide ammunition against the argument that crusaders took the cross for economic enrichment – it is the language of the charters that has been most productively exploited by historians in search of spiritual motivation. The preambles to these charters often use phrases or formulae that seem to indicate a particular kind of devotion to Jerusalem or the Holy Sepulchre. Moreover, the recognition by knights that making peace with neighbouring landowners with whom they had been at war was a religious obligation suggests that the crusade was undertaken by many as a penance for sins confessed.

As even those who have made most use of such evidence are aware, however, charters cannot be taken at face value (Riley-Smith 1986: 38–9). Charters of all kinds were emblematic documents in medieval society. In an age of mass illiteracy, they had a kind of mystique as objects that went far beyond the information they contained. But the information was also vital, both as a legal guarantee of the transaction being described, and as confirmation that whatever was being granted was in the first place within the grantor's power. This explains why the language of the preambles was so formulaic and high-flown. But it was the language not of the crusaders themselves but of the monks who wrote them; often it employed references to the Bible or the Church Fathers that would have been unfamiliar to laypeople, or expressed sentiments in a highly formulaic and rhetorical manner. Even the form in which most charters survive emphasises the clerical origin of the documents – the surviving charters used by crusade historians usually come from the cartularies, or charter collections, of religious houses, and are thus copies retained or made by those institutions rather than being the originals in the possession of the crusader's family. This is not to say that charters have nothing to tell us about the motivation of crusaders, but simply that they should be understood as a normative form of the expression of power, in which conventional formulae had an important function. This is true of all charters, not simply those of crusaders.

The whole question of whether crusaders' motivation reflected spiritual or 'material' concerns is premised in the first place on an assumption that the crusader exercised a free choice of whether or not to take the cross. This certainly seems to have been Urban II's intention in 1095–6, but in practice it is unlikely that most crusaders made such a choice entirely free of other considerations. Urban's recruitment method was to approach the heads of noble houses who, if they took the cross, recruited from among the warriors who were dependent on them. As one crusade historian has recently expressed it, all members of the knightly class were part of a *mouvance*, which might best be translated as 'patronage network' (France 1996: 8). Decisions about whether or not to take the cross, in common with most other choices, were made with reference to the *mouvance*. In theory, taking the cross remained voluntary, but it was natural for large numbers of feudal dependents to accompany their lords on crusade. Peer or kinship pressure was also a factor. Joinville, by his own account, took the cross with other lords, among them his cousin, the count of Saarbruck (Smith 2008: 173–4). Joinville's memoir suggests that taking the cross was perceived as voluntary but at the same time worked through existing relationships, and similar conclusions have been drawn from the data assessed for the Fifth Crusade (Powell 1986: 67–89). Political imperatives might also play a role, as they apparently did in recruiting by the Lord Edward in 1270.

Why most individual crusaders took the cross will never be known. The best that the sources can do is to suggest what the prevailing impulses in society were; but the historian's interpretation of a given source will always depend on understanding the purpose for which it was written and its intended audience. Of course it is always possible to say that because charters, chronicles and even crusaders' letters were written by clerics, they will reflect the pietistic and spiritualised language of the profession, rather than the aspirations of lay participants. As I hope will become clearer, however, a clear separation between the two did not exist at the time of the First Crusade. If we reject these sources altogether, we are left either with unsustainable sociological models or with assumptions about knightly behaviour based on the thirst for adventure or a general liking for warfare. Many knights doubtless did enjoy war, but this can scarcely be an adequate explanation for the sacrifices they made and the hardships they endured in order to practise it in such uncongenial conditions.

Colonialism vs integration

One early strand of crusading studies arose from an interest in the physical presence of the western settlement in the Levant. This approach was dominated by French or Francophone historians of the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, in particular Rey (1866), Madelin (1916, 1918) and Grousset (1934–6). The tone of these works – though not completely their content – is characterised by the title of Madelin's essay of

1916 'Frankish Syria', expanded into his book *French Expansion from Syria to the Rhine* of 1918, and echoed in Grousset's formulation of 'a Franco-Syrian nation' (1934: 287). Another historian in this tradition, Dodu, argued that Frankish settlement in the Crusader States was benevolent to the indigenous peoples and that the Franks assimilated culturally with them (1914: 52–3, 75). The thrust of such writing was certainly, as critics were to point out, polemical. Madelin, R.C. Smail argued, wrote from a conviction of 'the ability of Frenchmen to rule other peoples for their own good', and his work was designed to celebrate the French colonial achievement (1956: 41; for recent discussion of the question, Murray 2013: 291–309). It is no coincidence, of course, that much of this writing coincided with a period of intensified nationalism during and following the First World War. These historians' analysis of the Frankish – for which read French – 'genius for colonisation' identified as particular benefits the capacity to absorb cultural models, to blend racial and religious elements without causing rancour, and to impose just rule on colonists and colonised alike (Smail 1956: 42–3). Comparisons of Frankish settlement in the Levant with the French colonisation of Algeria – though not necessarily, as might have been the case a hundred years ago, as a defence of such colonialism – are still made by French historians (Le Goff 2009: 119).

These assumptions were severely criticised in the 1950s by Smail, Joshua Prawer and to some extent by Claude Cahen. The model these historians suggested in place of the 'assimilated society' of the earlier French school has largely prevailed until very recently. This model, scorning the Frankish taste for the luxuries of the Arabic-speaking world as inadequate basis for a genuinely assimilated society, gives priority instead to social and legal institutions. It is less significant, according to this argument, that the Franks ate sugar, employed Arabic-speaking doctors and wore eastern clothing, than that they erected a legal system in which the basic distinction was between Franks and non-Franks, or that they found no role for indigenous peoples in government. As Prawer observed, the only official function of the indigenous Muslims was to mourn at the funerals of Frankish kings. In fact, so far from being assimilationist, Frankish rule in the Crusader States showed the worst traits of colonialism: it was economically exploitative, segregationist, and designed to protect the interests of a small ruling group.

The context in which the 'segregation' model was initially promoted was a study of military institutions in the Crusader States. As Cahen observed, the small number of the conquerors made their dispersal throughout the Levant too dangerous, and they thus grouped themselves in the fortified towns of the coastline, leaving the interior to the indigenous peasantry (1940: 327). This deduction also informed the study of crusader castle-building (Smail 1956: 204–5), which was thought to have been primarily an attempt to dominate a dangerous hinterland from fixed defensive points. The general picture was one of a small but militarily powerful aristocracy with a defensive mindset, which banded together within a narrow area for collective

security. Smail characterised the Crusader States as government by force; that force being necessitated by the justifiable fear of revolt on the part of the indigenous people, and represented by the field army and the castles.

Another approach was signalled by Prawer's study of legal and social institutions. Analysis of the complex legal tradition of the kingdom of Jerusalem – so far as it can be reconstructed for the twelfth century – indicates that the crusaders imported largely existing laws from the West for their own self-government. However, the indigenous peoples were largely excluded from Frankish justice, except when Frankish and indigenous claims clashed in the courts, when the rulers' laws prevailed. Similarly, the social structure of the kingdom reflected the separation of Frank and non-Frank. The few names of Arab origin in governmental records and charters are exceptions to the rule that the landowners were exclusively Frankish. The religious settlement showed the same tendency towards segregation. Although there was no attempt to extirpate Islam, its growth was discouraged through a policy of prohibiting the building of mosques. Muslims and Jews were forbidden from living in the towns, which were Frankish preserves. The indigenous Christians, mostly Greek Orthodox, were disadvantaged by the policy of replacing their hierarchy with Latin bishops (Prawer 1985: 59–116).

Some important assumptions underlay these conclusions. One is that because the Franks had for their own safety to settle in restricted areas, and chose the fortified towns, the nature of the Frankish settlement was chiefly urban. From this assumption follow further deductions about the nature of feudalism and feudal services in the Crusader States. Another is that the indigenous population invariably opposed the western settlement. Challenges to both these assumptions have recently been made by Ellenblum (1998: 3–37), in a study of Frankish rural settlement in the kingdom of Jerusalem. These challenges, even if accepted, do not necessarily undermine scepticism of 'the benevolent colonialism' model, but taken alongside recent research in the fields of religious and cultural history, they cause the 'segregationalist' picture to become fragmented. Further damage has been done to the model by the only – to date – full-length general study of the relationship between the western settlers and the indigenous Christian people of the Near East. Christopher MacEvitt's *The Crusades and the Christian World of the East: Rough Tolerance* (2008) argues that the crusaders' approach was largely pragmatic; that although they were prepared to ride rough-shod over the sensibilities and the rights of indigenous Christians among the people they ruled, there was no ideological underpinning to this approach. More often than not, indeed, Franks looked for ways to work with indigenous Christian communities.

Our understanding of colonialism and the ways in which colonial regimes behaved is more complex than was the case when Smail and Prawer were writing. If, as Smail argued, the Francophone 'assimilationist' school represented by Madelin, Dodu and Grousset was writing to reinforce a positive

vision of French colonialism, he himself was writing in a period of disillusionment accompanying British colonial withdrawal. It must have been tempting to conclude that the Crusader States, characterised by 'the imposition of a numerically small military aristocracy over the mass of the native population', in which '[T]his ruling class exploited the subject peoples economically by means of social arrangements which they found in existence, and which were akin to those they had known in Europe' (Smail 1956: 62–3) had shared the fate of all colonial powers in the modern age.

Similarly, Ellenblum suggests, Prawer's approach to the segregation observed in crusader laws and social structures was 'influenced . . . by the manner in which Zionism interpreted the relation between the European immigrants and the local Muslim population' (1998: 10). The reference to Zionism encapsulates the political complexities inherent in approaching the subject of European settlement imposed by force on an inhabited landscape, even at a distance of several centuries. It should be noted, however, that early medieval governments imposed over different peoples had traditionally allowed each ethnic group to use its own laws in governing themselves. As long as they rendered the services due to the government, they were left a degree of autonomy. This was the principle adopted by the Frankish rulers in the Crusader States.

Any formulation of the problem, however, that uses the vocabulary of colonialism, or that refers generally to a European ruling class, is itself guilty of implicit assumptions. The Frankish ruling class did not consist of a single racially and culturally distinct body that imported customs from a colonial motherland of 'Europe'. Unlike in most nineteenth–twentieth-century colonial situations, the crusade settlers did not come from what they recognised as a single motherland. Although we tend to follow some of the contemporary sources in speaking of 'Franks', we should be aware that this designation represents a process in which a 'Frankish' identity came into being (Murray 1995: 59–73). The settlers comprised northern French, Flemings, Lotharingians, Burgundians, Normans, Provençals, Italians and Germans, speaking a number of different vernaculars, and following different social and legal customs. Although it is certainly true that this disparate ruling class exploited the indigenous people economically, it did not do so – in contrast to most modern colonial powers – for the benefit of, or at the initiative of, a mother-country, but rather for themselves. Nor was this settlement intended (with the exception of the mercantile quarters in the ports) to channel the resources of the colonised state back 'home' for the enrichment of the colonists' countries of origin.

The assumption that the Franks settled almost exclusively in the towns of the conquered territories because of the need for collective security is, Ellenblum claims, erroneous. In a study of crusader castle-building, he argues that for most of the twelfth century, fortified places were designed and functioned as administrative units as part of a pattern of rural settlement, rather than as a means to oppress a recalcitrant peasantry (1996: 517–52).

Moreover, his research into rural settlement – using methodologies borrowed from archaeology and historical geography – demonstrates a strong Frankish presence in the interior of the kingdom, in manor houses and villages as well as castles (1998, *passim*). The evidence for an overwhelmingly urban Frankish presence was stressed in previous accounts because of the assumption of the need for collective security; but this was itself predicated on an assumption that the indigenous people were hostile to the new settlers. This assumption, Ellenblum argues, blurs distinctions between the indigenous communities, particularly among the Muslims. It is easy to forget that the territories conquered by the crusaders in 1098–9 had only a couple of generations earlier been conquered by a Turkish military aristocracy from central Asia that ruled over the indigenous Arabic-speaking population in exactly the manner attributed by Smail to the Franks. If collective security were needed by the Franks, should it not also have been by the Turks? It is natural to suppose that the Turkish ruling class might have attracted the loyalty of at least the Muslim indigenous population. Some current opinions, however, suggest that the indigenous population was evenly divided between Muslims and Christians, while even the Muslims may not have been Islamicised until the beginning of the eleventh century (Morony 1990: 135–50; Gil 1992: 170–2).

A further assumption is that the indigenous Christians were just as likely to have identified with the Turks as with the Franks (Smail 1956: 63). This is certainly the impression given by some episodes in the source material; equally, others suggest the contrary. We must be careful to distinguish between different periods in the Frankish settlement. There were certainly complaints about the collaboration of indigenous Christians with the Turks after 1187, when most of them had come under Turkish rule again, but if we take the period 1099–1291 as a whole, there are remarkably few examples of collaboration or resistance on the part of any indigenous peoples to Frankish rule. It may be argued that this was because they were in no position to resist militarily; but then why was the collective security described by Smail and Cahen necessary? A further argument has been that the Frankish treatment of the Orthodox Church – to which most of the indigenous Christians belonged – drove them into passive opposition to the régime. Recent research, however, suggests that the Orthodox Church was more vibrant than has been thought: monasticism, for example, staged a revival under crusader rule (Jotischky 1995: 65–100; Pahlitzsch 2001; MacEvitt 2008: 132–5).

In arguing against the ‘assimilationist’ model, Smail pointed out that he was using largely the same sources of evidence as the proponents of that model, but attaching different weight to them. He accepted that the Franks adopted local crafts, diet, clothing and building techniques, but did not think this as significant as did Rey, Grousset and Munro, for example. It would be surprising if the Franks had not made use of local resources, but the fact that they did does not amount to the creation of a ‘Franco-Syrian nation’

(Smail 1956: 43–4). The sticking-point here may be the word ‘nation’, rather than ‘Franco-Syrian’. By the time of the Third Crusade, western Franks no longer thought of the aristocracy of the Crusader States as *culturally* similar, even though they might have been *racially* identical. The question of ‘assimilation’ or ‘segregation’ rather depends on what one chooses to privilege: cultural, political, legal or any other considerations. For although a Frankish taste for sugar, or silks, may only be evidence of pragmatism rather than assimilation, can one say the same of – for example – the Frankish aristocratic use of icons in private devotion? Art historians have convincingly demonstrated that a ‘hybrid’ style emerged in the visual culture of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in the Crusader States; a style that catered directly to aristocratic tastes. Artistic patronage, however, has never been simply a matter of aesthetic taste: it is loaded with political and cultural signification. In employing artists trained in Byzantine styles and working in Byzantine iconographic traditions, in adapting Orthodox forms such as the icon to western religious devotions, royal and noble patrons were contributing towards the creation of a new aristocracy. This was noted by westerners as much in Joinville’s admiration for the ostentatious splendour of John of Ibelin’s household as in Jacques de Vitry’s scorn for the ‘orientalised’ Franks of Acre (Stewart 1895: 67–8; Smith 2008: 182–3). The epitome of this culture can be found in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Cyprus, but the process of evolution had begun in twelfth-century Palestine. As one art historian has recently observed, what characterised the cultural taste of the Cypriot crusader aristocracy was a conscious eclecticism designed to display wealth and authority (Weyl Carr 1995: 239–74). Taking a lead from the princely houses of Jerusalem and Antioch, the Frankish aristocracy in the East Mediterranean married among the Armenian and Greek nobility, producing a genuinely indigenous aristocratic class whose tastes and choices in self-projection were determined by more than simply pragmatism (Hodgson 2011: 83–106).

The Frankish aristocracy of the East did not behave markedly differently from that of the West: both spent rather than saved, but those in the East could afford more glittering treasures, and married from the eastern nobility rather than, as the French or English nobility did, Castilians, Savoyards, Provençals or Scandinavians. The point is that the aristocracy throughout Christendom was evolving in this period into an international caste distinct from the people they ruled. At the highest level of society, therefore, from which most of our evidence comes, discussion of whether the Frankish settlers assimilated with or segregated themselves from the indigenous people, though productive in stimulating new research, may in the end be an attempt to answer the wrong question. For the middling and lower ranks among the Frankish settlers, such evidence as can be reconstructed from the archaeological and documentary record suggests that, whatever attitudes to the indigenous peoples may have been, westerners had little choice but to live in close proximity with them.



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2 The papacy, the knighthood and the eastern Mediterranean

Key Dates

- 1042 Neuvy Saint-Sépulcre (Berry) founded in imitation of Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem
- 1053 Normans in Italy defeat papal army of Leo IX
- 1054 mutual excommunication of patriarch of Constantinople and papal legate
- 1057 Bishop Lietbert of Cambrai's pilgrimage to Jerusalem cut short by Seljuq threat
- 1064 siege of Barbastro (Catalonia)
- 1066 Norman conquest of England
- 1073 Gregory VII becomes pope
- 1076 Seljuq victory over Byzantines at Manzikert
- 1080 Emperor-elect Henry IV invades Italy
- 1081 Alexios Komnenos becomes emperor in Constantinople
- 1080s emergence of Fideles Sancti Petri
- 1084 Gregory VII calls on faithful to defend Church with arms
- 1089 Urban II becomes pope
- 1092 death of Seljuq sultan Malikshah and Fatimid khalif Al-Mustansir

The origins of Urban's call to arms in 1095, and of what was to become in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries part of political and religious life throughout Europe, can be found in the previous half-century in a series of events and developments in both the West and the East. This chapter will examine the impact of reforming ideals in the papacy in the eleventh century; the religious convictions of the western knighthood; and the political fragmentation of the Islamic and Byzantine worlds before the First Crusade.

The papacy on the eve of the First Crusade

Modern historians have tended to follow most of their medieval predecessors in seeing the Council of Clermont, in November 1095, as the starting point of the Crusades. If we are looking for a single moment at which crusading can be said to have started, then the final day of the council, on which Urban II publicly proclaimed the expedition to the east to an audience comprised of senior clerics and some of the nobility of the Auvergne, certainly has more claim than any other. But we cannot hope to understand Urban's dramatic words at Clermont, still less the events of the First Crusade, without first considering the context in which the pope delivered his rousing message of holy war. If we are to trace his own thinking on the subject of sacralised violence, we need first to examine how the nature of the papal office that he held and its ideological direction had changed during the eleventh century. We must also consider the nature of the audience, and ask why his preaching struck such a responsive note in western European society. Finally, we need to look beyond Clermont, indeed beyond Rome and the West, to explore the geographical context of the First Crusade. The crusade was conceived and born in the West, but it was only successful because of a coincidence of political factors in the Islamic and Byzantine worlds, and its impact was felt throughout the eastern Mediterranean.

Urban II was far from being the first pope to proclaim a holy war. The idea of warfare sanctioned by God may not have been part of the mindset of the early Church, but it formed part of both the historic Jewish and adopted Hellenistic heritage of Christianity. Constantine, the first Christian emperor of the Roman world, attributed victory over his pagan enemies to God's intervention, and because the empire was itself understood to be divinely ordained, its defence against enemies who sought its destruction, or who refused to convert to Christianity, could be seen as wars fought on behalf of God's kingdom on earth. This way of thinking was taken up by the rulers of kingdoms that succeeded the Roman Empire in the West, and of course continued to govern the mindset of the emperors in Constantinople. Throughout the early Middle Ages, lay rulers and popes alike took up arms in defence of Christian civilisation against non-Christian enemies who were thought to threaten an order that God had imposed on the world. Contemporaries regarded the wars of Christian kings against Muslims in the Iberian peninsula, against the pagan Vikings in Britain and Ireland, and against the Saxons in northern Germany, as necessary blood-letting in defence of Christianity. Sometimes, as in ninth- and tenth-century Italy, when Arab raids devastated Christian communities in southern Italy – in 846 attacking Rome itself – popes issued bulls in which attempts were made to articulate the notion and circumstances of holy war (Gieysztor 1948: 3–23; Erdmann 1977: 113–16; Bull 1993: 64–6; Bachrach 2003). It was in the eleventh century, however, that a rational theory of holy war came to fruition in a circle of reforming clergy in the papal curia. In order to understand what prompted

such thinking, and how Urban II could make use of it in the 1090s, we must first chart the changing nature of the papal office itself in this period.

A revolution occurred in the highest echelons of the Church in the mid-eleventh century. The papal office had become, by the 1040s, scarcely more than a localised bishopric with little influence outside the city of Rome itself. The honour in which the successors of St Peter were in theory still held had been dissipated by a succession of unsuitable and incompetent popes, and by political circumstances in Italy. The problem lay only partly in the men who occupied the papal throne; far more in the methods by which popes were chosen. The office had come to be dominated by rival Roman noble families, who filled it with relatives and protégés as a means of manipulating political power. In 1046, however, Emperor Henry III marched an army to Rome, deposed two rival candidates for the throne and installed his own nominee. It was the beginning of a reform movement that was to have the most profound effect imaginable on the whole of western political society as well as on the internal organisation and pastoral mission of the Church itself. The reformers, who coalesced around the figure of Leo IX (1049–54), developed a programme based on three main issues: the abolition of simony and of clerical marriage, and what they termed the liberty of the Church. Although all three had a largely moral basis, they came to have a political effect. The ‘liberty of the church’, for example, meant in practical terms the freedom of the papacy to perpetuate its own reform programme through a new procedure for election to the throne of St Peter by the college of cardinals. This reform measure, implemented by Nicholas II in 1059, was essential for the momentum of reform. It meant that a pope could ensure the continuity of his ideals by appointing to the college of cardinals like-minded clergy, by whom – and usually from among whom – his successor would be chosen. Thus we see from the middle of the eleventh century a group characterised both by an international flavour (Leo IX was from Alsace, Victor II a Swabian, Stephen IX from Lorraine, Nicholas II from Alsace or Burgundy, Urban II a Frenchman) and also by monastic experience and ideals.

The intended political effect of this system was to deny influence to the Roman noble families who had for so long dominated the office. (This proved in fact largely illusory: the Roman aristocrats were still deeply involved in the papacy throughout the Middle Ages and beyond.) But it also led, in the long run, to the marginalising of the emperor who had begun the reform process. Eventually, during the pontificate of Gregory VII (1073–85), the reform programme led to outright war between the papacy and the German imperial claimant, Henry IV. Although the immediate cause of the conflict known (somewhat misleadingly) as the Investiture Contest was the issue of appointment to bishoprics, the course of the war itself shaped and refined the reform agenda. When Henry IV invaded Italy with the intention of deposing Gregory in favour of his own candidate, the pope needed to find an effective military response.

In his recourse to war, Gregory VII was following in the footsteps of Leo IX, who had raised and led an army – to defeat, as it happened – against Normans who had settled in and were in the process of taking over southern Italy in 1053. Another reforming predecessor, Alexander II (1061–73), sent the papal banner to accompany William of Normandy's invasion of England in 1066, and may have offered a form of indulgence to Spanish and French knights fighting the Muslims; he was certainly interested in the progress of the *Reconquista* (Bull 1993: 72–6). Some popes were more warlike than others, but few people questioned the right or need for the papacy to defend its interests; nor that those interests were necessarily grounded in political as well as spiritual authority, in land and possessions.

The language of righteous violence pervades Gregory's correspondence with secular lords. He warned a rebellious vassal of the king of Dalmatia, for example, that he would 'unsheath the sword of St Peter against [your] presumption', and a German critic speaks of Gregory as inciting men to violence. In fact, violence at a localised level had accompanied the reform movement throughout Italy. Historians now accept that the reformers were not simply intellectuals imposing high-minded ideals on the Church, but that much of the impetus for reform came from the 'grass roots' in urban communities, and that it was often enforced by crowd violence (Cushing 2005: 100–5). Gregory himself had supported the Patarini, a radical group of agitators in Milan who demanded the reform of their clergy (Cowdrey 1968: 25–48). More nebulously, 'reform' was hard to pin down, since being against reform was a label that could be used rhetorically to characterise a rival. Senior clergy – bishops, cathedral canons, abbots – were often the leaders of local society, and as such they were involved in struggles for power. A religious dimension thus coloured what might be understood in our own day as part of the ebb and flow of political life.

The defence of the papacy and its reform programme against Henry IV, however, demanded a more sophisticated set of alliances than could be found on the streets of Italian cities. Alexander II, anticipating the need for military resources, had developed a system of recruitment to the papal cause by means of oaths taken by members of the nobility to defend the papacy. This was extended by Gregory VII, with the result that by his death in 1085 a network of the *fideles Sancti Petri* had been created throughout Italy, northern Spain and the French and imperial lands. The term itself does not translate easily, but Gregory seems to have understood by it a form of vassalage owed by such oath-takers to the pope (Erdmann 1977: 206–8; Robinson 1990: 307–9). Among the most prominent in the 1080s were William Tête-Hardi, count of Burgundy, Matilda, countess of Tuscany, Robert, count of Flanders, Welf IV, duke of Bavaria, Hugh of Lusignan, a Poitevin baron, and probably Raymond of Saint-Gilles, count of Toulouse. All of these had shown themselves supporters of 'reform' through political patronage, symbolic public action or the sponsorship of religious communities dedicated to these ideals.

Some of these, notably Hugh and Raymond, were later to be crusaders, while the families of others preserved the tradition of support for the papacy (Riley-Smith 1997: 44–6). Being a *fidelis sancti Petri* did not obviate one's secular ties of patronage and vassalage; the count of Burgundy, for example, was an imperial vassal, and the count of Flanders the vassal of the king of France. But Gregory clearly expected that lay supporters of reform would privilege their vassalage to St Peter above any earthly ties.

Matilda, perhaps the most important lay supporter of Gregory VII, not only raised an army for the pope, but also recruited scholars to the cause. Three of these, Anselm of Lucca, Bonizo of Sutri and John of Mantua, became particularly interested in developing a theology of holy war to support the activity in which their patron was engaging. Their ideas derived ultimately from St Augustine of Hippo (354–430), whose own thoughts on justifiable violence had arisen in the context of the treatment of heresy (Robinson 1973: 169–92; Riley-Smith 1980: 177–92). Bonizo and John of Mantua may have been cautious of going farther than the notion that death in a just war merited the status of martyrdom (Riley-Smith 1997: 47–9), but Anselm of Lucca, more radically, took up Gregory VII's own idea that warfare could itself be a penitential activity. Here again, Gregory was not an innovator; he simply took to its logical conclusions a premise that had been part of the reform programme for a generation. Leo IX had promised absolution of sins to the army he led in 1053, but this seems to have been interpreted by contemporaries either as a general absolution given by a priest acting as confessor, or as a dispensation of penances that might remain uncompleted in the event that a soldier died in battle. Gregory VII, however, was criticised by one of his clerical opponents, Sigebert of Gembloux, for ordering Matilda to fight against Henry IV for the remission of her sins; the distinction here being that a particular case of warfare was singled out by the pope as so meritorious that it could absolve her of sins (Cowdrey 1998: 657). In this, Gregory seems to have been putting into practice a theory that had previously remained latent.

It is important to understand how revolutionary this distinction was. It is true that the Church had as yet no firm penitential system; indeed, such a system evolved partly through the experience of the First Crusade and its antecedents. Contemporaries did, however, see that something quite novel was being thought through by the papacy, and not all of them approved of it (Gilchrist 1985: 37–45). The traditional position had always been that sins of violence were punishable by the Church through penances assigned by the sinner's confessor in relation to the gravity of the sin committed. H.E.J. Cowdrey, examining the shift in Gregory VII's thinking on the subject, contrasts the traditional penance assigned in 1073 to Peter Raymundi, son of the count of Barcelona, for the murder of his stepmother, with later penances (1997: 78–80). Peter faced 24 years of penance, which included a prohibition on bearing arms, save in a case of self-defence, or – because of the geographical context – in order to engage in war against Muslim powers

who might threaten his territories. The problem was that a great lord such as Peter could hardly engage in political life, or even hope to maintain his family and property, without engaging in warfare. If those who confessed to acts of violence, and performed penances designed to satisfy those sins, were removed from the arena of conflict, the result would be anarchy, rather than peace. The solution to which Gregory VII seemed to turn was to distinguish between licit and illicit acts of violence. In 1075 he urged the laity of Chiusi to use force if necessary to expel a provost guilty of sexual sins, assuring them that they could thereby gain remission of their sins (Cowdrey 1993: 51–64). In his final encyclical, in 1084, Gregory called on the faithful laity to help defend the Roman Church by armed service as well as by spiritual support, as a way of gaining absolution of all their sins:

[He] divided those who bore arms into opposing camps – those who bore them from base motives in the corrupt service of this world, and those who bore them in the service of God and for the purposes of the Christian religion. Such service ennobled, and it raised their bearing of arms above the reproach of sinfulness.

(Cowdrey 1998: 33)

Where once all acts of violence had been judged inherently sinful and thus required penance, now certain prescribed acts of violence were not only permissible, but could actually form penances in themselves. The path to Clermont lay open.

The papal reform programme presumed the unassailable position of the pope as head of the Church. This was less obvious to contemporaries than it might seem, for until the mid-eleventh century few popes had even attempted to impose ecclesiastical policy or doctrinal interpretation on bishops outside Italy, and few bishops would in any case have listened had they done so. Gregory VII met resistance from many German bishops who found his interference in the affairs of their sees intolerable, and even a reform-minded bishop such as Lanfranc of Canterbury could not stomach papal intervention in England (Cowdrey 1998: 463). Gregory VII used the image of the Church as a body; a body has only a single head, and that head was logically the successor of St Peter, whom Jesus had entrusted with responsibility for his disciples. The Petrine commission became the basis for a theory of papal primacy not only over the Church in the sense of its ‘professional members’ – clergy, monks, nuns and so on – but in the sense of the whole of Christian society. All who were baptised were members of the Church, and thus subject to papal authority.

The doctrine of papal primacy was clearly central to Gregory’s relations with secular powers; but it had an effect far wider than the Investiture Contest. For in claiming headship over all Christians, the popes undermined the traditional view of the Church’s hierarchy held by eastern Christians. Greek Orthodox tradition maintained that the pope was merely one of the five

patriarchs of the Church. The bishop of Rome was held in particular honour by virtue of occupying the see of St Peter, but Christian doctrine could only be determined or altered in an ecumenical council at which all five patriarchates – Rome, Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem – were represented. Of these, Rome, Constantinople and, to a lesser degree, Antioch were considered senior, if only because the patriarchs of Jerusalem and Alexandria lived under the sufferance of Muslim governments. Relations between Rome and Constantinople fluctuated during the era of papal reform. Leo IX's attempt to heal a breach that had been opened as much by neglect as by design failed when, in 1054, his envoy to Constantinople, Cardinal Humbert, caused offence to the patriarch by excommunicating him publicly. Mutual recriminations followed, but although there were important theological issues over which the Roman and Greek Orthodox traditions differed, these were not so insurmountable as to entail separation of the Churches. Indeed, even while Orthodox patriarchs declined to restore the names of popes to the diptychs (the formal gesture of friendship through prayer), the two Churches remained in communion with each other. In one part of western Christendom – the Greek-speaking areas of southern Italy – there were even Orthodox bishops. Technically, the events of 1054 therefore did not constitute a schism between the Churches.

Theological differences between the Churches arose through the separate and organic development of different customs in East and West in the early Middle Ages – quite naturally, in an era when contact between them was limited. One of the main points at issue concerned the Roman Church's addition to the Creed, in the ninth century, of the phrase *filioque* ('and from the Son'), to show that the holy spirit proceeded from both Father and Son, rather than, as in the earliest formulation of the Creed upheld by the Orthodox, from God the Father alone. Another point of contention was the use of unleavened bread (*azymes*) in the Eucharist in the Roman Church. Both of these positions could be, and were, attacked and defended in theological terms during the course of the Middle Ages, but they were essentially differences of custom or usage rather than fundamental differences of dogma. The problem was that debates between Roman and Orthodox representatives rarely took place in a context that was free of political overtones, and all such debates seemed to founder on the much more fundamental question of authority in the Church. The question of the *filioque*, it is true, was a theological issue, but when Orthodox theologians attacked it they did so only partly in theological terms; equally important to them was the fact that it had been introduced unilaterally in the West and without reference to the accepted mechanism for discussion of doctrine.

At the beginning of his pontificate, Gregory VII conceived the idea of mounting an armed expedition to the East, in order to provide aid for the Byzantine Empire in its struggle against the Seljuq Turks who were over-running Asia Minor. Although the plan never materialised into action, it provides an indication of the effect that the ideology of the papal reform

had on papal policy with regard to the Byzantines (Cowdrey 1982: 27–40). Gregory, however, became embroiled in Byzantine politics to the extent of supporting the Norman attack on Byzantium in 1081, and excommunicated Emperor Alexios I Komnenos (1081–1118) for overthrowing his predecessors. Urban II (1088–99) chose rapprochement rather than confrontation with the Orthodox world, and was invited to submit a confession of faith to a local synod in Constantinople, which could then decide whether his name should be restored to the diptychs. Urban was adept enough to maintain good diplomatic relations with the Orthodox Church, while at the same time declining to submit Roman traditions to the scrutiny of the Orthodox senior clergy. The attempt, at the Council of Bari (1089), to accommodate the Orthodox rite of the Greek-speaking population of southern Italy while insisting that the Greek clergy recognise the papal primacy, demonstrates both his political skill and his view of the universal Church.

Urban had more room for manoeuvre than the Byzantines. Alexios Komnenos, the Byzantine emperor, realised that he needed to maintain good relations with the papacy in order to prevent a further attack from the Adriatic by the Normans of Italy. It is a measure of how far the papacy had progressed from the time of Leo IX that the popes were now not only the guarantors of political stability in the Mediterranean, but also a conduit by which the whole of the western military class might be reached. In March 1095 Alexios sent envoys to the pope at the council of Piacenza to ask him to recruit western knights to serve in his armies against the Seljuqs. It was this appeal that Urban relayed to his audience at Clermont eight months later. On one level, we need look no further in order to understand why Urban called for an armed expedition to the East at Clermont. Had Urban done no more than pass on the Byzantine appeal, however, it is unlikely that the expedition he launched would have accomplished the recapture of Jerusalem. Instead he transformed the emperor's message into something more complex and far-reaching; something designed to appeal to the piety of the knighthood. It is not enough, therefore, to approach Clermont only from Urban's point of view; we must also chart the patterns of religious belief and practice among his audience.

The western knighthood on the eve of the First Crusade

One of the chroniclers of the First Crusade, Guibert of Nogent, famously recorded Urban II's words at Clermont as offering 'a new way of attaining salvation'. To Guibert, the attraction of crusading to the secular warrior was the fluidity it established between two ways of life that had previously been regarded as incompatible – the knighthood and the religious life.

God has established holy wars in our day, so that the order of knights and their followers . . . can find a new way of attaining salvation. Now they need not abandon secular affairs completely by choosing the monastic

life, or any other religious profession, as was once customary. Now they can to some degree win God's grace while pursuing their own way of life, with the freedoms and in the dress to which they are accustomed.

(Levine 1997: 28)

Guibert was neither present at Clermont nor an eye-witness to the crusade, and his narrative relies heavily on other chroniclers. From his monastery in northern France, however, Guibert had the necessary distance to think about what the crusade meant to contemporaries. He had no doubt about the novelty of the enterprise. Guibert's perception that the crusade offered an alternative to the religious life was shared by other contemporaries. Ralph of Caen, analysing the motives of the crusader Tancred, the future ruler of Antioch, portrayed a man aware of the spiritual dangers of leading a violent life. Tancred was apparently considering giving up knighthood to follow a religious life, when he heard reports of Urban's preaching and took the cross (Bachrach and Bachrach 2005: 22). The language that Urban used – of 'taking one's cross and following [Jesus]' – resonated in lay society. Members of knightly society could apply the mandate of the Gospel to themselves, and thus, perhaps for the first time, have the sense that they, too, were participating individually in their own salvation (Purkis 2008: 30–58).

The analysis of charters drawn up on behalf of departing crusaders has yielded anecdotal evidence of individuals such as the Limousin knight Brunet of Treuil, who changed his mind about entering the cloister at the last minute, persuaded someone else to take his place, and the abbey he was about to join to use the proceeds of the gift he had made them to buy equipment for his expedition (Riley-Smith 1997: 70). Why did such men see a war preached by the pope as an alternative to the religious life? And why in the first place should they have been attracted to a form of warfare that was articulated in terms of an act of piety?

Warfare was endemic in western Europe in the eleventh century. Wars consisted, however, mostly of small-scale localised conflicts, rather than larger affairs between sovereign powers (France 1999: 1–15). Even when a great lord such as the duke of Normandy or the count of Anjou went to war, the numbers involved on each side usually consisted of no more than a few thousand, and the strategies employed were simply those of petty disputes between neighbours, albeit on a larger scale. Warfare was an inescapable part of being a property owner, because ownership had to be constantly maintained and defended. Moreover, in an age when the public authority mediated through courts of law lay in the hands of the greatest landowners, recourse to law was not always a viable alternative to taking up arms. At all levels of society, armed conflict was simply one aspect of the political process. This did not necessarily mean that eleventh-century Europe was a period of anarchy. Disputes over ownership of land, and the economic and jurisdictional rights that accompanied such ownership, could be solved by a process of negotiation and consensus between various parties,

sometimes but not invariably involving a court of law presided over by a greater landowner who claimed to embody public authority; often arranged and mediated by a local monastery and thus given spiritual accents. But such solutions were often arrived at only after one side or other had used military violence. Violence was not a last resort, but an opening gambit in the political discourse.

The moral problems raised by these forms of social organisation were grave, and recognised as such by contemporaries. During the eleventh century, recognition of the moral dangers inherent in engaging in warfare probably became more widespread. We have already seen how the reform papacy tried to deal with the problem by permitting, even encouraging, certain acts of warfare. But how did the ideas in Gregory VII's circle filter through to the average knight in, say, Burgundy, Anjou or Swabia? Some of the great lords of the West were in direct contact with popes; thus, for example, Urban II was able to appeal personally to Raymond of Saint-Gilles and Fulk IV, count of Anjou. An examination of Gregory VII's register reveals numerous letters to named individuals. Beyond this circle of the highest aristocracy, however, any presumed link between Gregorian reform ideals and knightly piety hinges on an actual link between senior ecclesiastics close to Gregory and the local communities of monks and canons throughout Europe. It is worth remembering that among the papal reformers themselves, monks were a strong presence. Stephen IX and Victor III were both former abbots of Monte Cassino, while Gregory VII and Urban II had been Cluniac monks. Others in the reforming circle, such as Peter Damiani, were monastic founders. Reforming ideals derived at least in part from monastic ideals, and, through the monasteries, could therefore reach the landowning laity. As suggested above, the papal reform movement was a manifestation of the desire for a more effective Church, which at the popular level in Italy might take the form of riots and public protests against immoral or incompetent clergy. In France, England and Germany, lay piety tended to take the form of family investment in monasteries, or of practices of devotion such as pilgrimages. New monasteries and other religious communities were founded, and older ones endowed, at an increasing rate from about the middle of the eleventh century onward. Guibert of Nogent, himself a Benedictine monk, described how:

[I]n manors and towns, cities and castles, even in the woods and fields, there suddenly emerged swarms of monks who spread out busily in all directions; those places where wild animals had made their homes and the caves where robbers had lurked were suddenly devoted to the name of God and to the veneration of the saints.

(Benton 1984: 11)

Moreover, monasteries were not as isolated from the secular world as one might expect. Guibert of Nogent, for example, was aware that although the

profession of arms was diametrically opposite to that of prayer, the people who chose the latter were usually drawn from the same families as the former. Monasticism in particular, and the religious life more generally (meaning the clergy attached to a cathedral, a collegiate foundation or community of canons, rather than the parish clergy), was an aristocratic profession in this period. Knights had brothers, sisters, cousins, uncles, nephews, nieces in monasteries and convents. Guibert himself came from a landed knightly family in northern France, and had entered the cloister as a child. He understood knights and knightly aspirations, and as an abbot with a responsibility for maintaining and maximising the landed endowment of his community, appreciated the close ties between landed families and their local religious communities. As Marcus Bull has observed: 'The important contacts were everywhere, played out thousands of times every year in chapterhouses, abbey churches, and cathedrals . . . as laymen . . . interacted with religious bodies' (Bull 1993: 115).

Families' investment in monasteries took different forms. Children might be placed in monasteries as oblates, with the expectation that they would grow up in and come to serve the cloister, while preserving an important biological and emotional bond between the family and the monastery. Adult entry to monasteries might occur at any time in an individual's life; Guibert's mother, for example, became a nun after her husband's death. Previous experience, even of warfare, was not unwelcome; thus, for example, Hildebert Grioard, abbot of Uzèrche, in the Limousin, in the early twelfth century, had been a household knight at Ségur (Bull 1993: 126–7). Becoming a monk or nun was the surest way of ensuring one's salvation; having a relative in a monastery guaranteed that the family would be remembered in the monastery's liturgical devotion, through prayers and masses offered by the community.

Gifts to religious houses, in the form of objects, land, property or the profits from it, were a normative part of the relationship between the land-owning classes and the monasteries (Bouchard 1987: 171–246; Rosenwein 1989: 109–43; Bull 1993: 157–66). It is easy to think of this relationship as a form of spiritual bribery: in return for material prosperity, the monks prayed for the souls of the donors. But the theology and the sociological reality underlying such practices are more complex. Historians of the early Middle Ages have become accustomed to thinking of their period in terms borrowed from anthropological discourse, for example, as a 'gift-giving culture' (White 1988). Gifts should be thought of not as bribes, but as assurances of friendship, alliance and mutual cooperation. The monasteries performed a social function for lay society. It was generally accepted that only a life devoted to God in the cloister was an assurance of salvation, but clearly not everyone could be a monk, nun or canon regular. Those who took on such a life assumed a responsibility for the rest of society, for the work they did in the cloister – the maintenance of a constant round of liturgical devotions – was a surrogate penance for those outside (Southern

1970: 224–8). This theory was articulated by Peter the Venerable, abbot of Cluny, in the 1120s. According to Peter, the donors could, by virtue of their gifts, share in the spiritual reward earned by the monks through their daily lives of prayer and fasting (Constable 1967: I, 84).

These normative practices were reinforced by penances imposed for sins. Laypeople could choose their confessors; for most, the parish priest probably had to suffice, but aristocratic penitents might use their own chaplains, or go to the abbot of a monastery with which they had a particular relationship. Friendships between monks and prominent landowners, some of which we know about from surviving pastoral letters of advice and injunction, were one way of directing the penances of the influential among the laity. Among the most common of penances was pilgrimage to the shrine of a saint, and in the eleventh century the most arduous, and thus the most meritorious pilgrimage, was that to the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem.

Pilgrimage to the Holy Land began in the fourth century with the construction of shrine churches in places considered holy because of the presence of Jesus and the Apostles. The most important of these from the start were the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem (which by 1095 comprised Calvary, the site of the crucifixion, as well as Christ's tomb) and the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. Pilgrimages in the later Roman Empire seem to have been largely devotional exercises, but in the early Middle Ages a penitential element becomes discernible both in the surviving accounts of pilgrims and in the references to pilgrims in other kinds of sources. The apparent increase in pilgrimage to the Holy Land in the eleventh century has been explained partly by the opening of a safe route by land for pilgrims after the conversion of the Magyars in c.1000, and partly by a few contemporary reports of apocalyptic expectations in c.1033. The most often quoted comes from Ralph Glaber, a Burgundian monk writing in the 1040s, who wrote that 'an innumerable multitude of people from the whole world, greater than anyone could have hoped to see, began to travel to the Sepulchre of the Saviour at Jerusalem' (France 1989: 198–9). Rhetorical exaggeration apart, it does seem clear that pilgrimage to Jerusalem became more extensive not only in terms of numbers but also of the social spread of pilgrims. Glaber's pilgrims included townspeople, and the massed pilgrimage organised and financed by Richard, duke of Normandy, in 1026/7 attracted people from across the social scale. For the most part, however, it was the landowning classes who had the leisure and resources to initiate pilgrimages. Clergy as well as laypeople undertook pilgrimages as penances: Fulk III of Anjou, who went to the Holy Sepulchre three times in expiation of his sins, is perhaps the most famous secular pilgrim of the eleventh century (France 1989: 60–1, 212–15), but the lay lords of whom we know are outnumbered by senior clergy such as Richard, abbot of Saint-Vannes, Aldouin, bishop of Limoges, Hugh, bishop of Chalons, Liebert of Cambrai, Poppo of Stavelot, Odilo of Cluny and Thierry of Saint Evroul. Pilgrimage was one devotional activity common to both the lay and the spiritual



Figure 2.1 The edicule of the Holy Sepulchre, built over the rock-cut tomb of Christ. The edicule, which was rebuilt after its destruction by Al-Hakim in 1009, is at the heart of all Christian pilgrimages to Jerusalem.

Source: © Omer Messinger/REX/Shutterstock.

nobility, and some historians have argued that the knighthood was taught to make penitential pilgrimages by the monks (Cowdrey 1973: 285–311).

Benedictine monks were in the vanguard of the new popularity of pilgrimage to the Holy Land in the eleventh century. The trend can in fact be seen from the middle of the tenth century onward, for example in Catalonia: in 955 Laufred, abbot of Besalú, embarked on a pilgrimage for Jerusalem, while Guarin de Lézat, abbot of St Michael Cuxa, made two pilgrimages to Jerusalem, in 978 and again in 990, on the latter of which he stayed in the Holy Land for three years. He may possibly have encountered while there the future abbot John III of Monte Cassino, the most influential monastery in Italy south of Rome. John and two other monks left the monastery in the 990s to make a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, but also went to the famous Greek monastery that had stood on Mt Sinai since the sixth century, and then travelled to Mt Athos, in north-eastern Greece, where a new ascetic movement had begun under the guidance of an Orthodox monk called Athanasius. A list of bishops and abbots who made pilgrimages to the Holy Land during the eleventh century would be too long to reproduce here, but among them were representatives of almost all French-speaking regions, and many from western Germany as well. Notable names whose pilgrimages were celebrated by contemporaries include Richard of Saint-Vannes (1020s), Bishop Lietbert of Cambrai (in

the 1050s; an ultimately unsuccessful pilgrimage), Vitalis of Marseilles, Berenger, bishop of Elne in the Pyrenees, Gerard, abbot of St Saviour in the Gironde, Audoi, bishop of Limoges, Azenarius, abbot of Saint-Martin, Massay, Isembert, bishop of Poitiers. Norman abbots were notable pilgrims: for example, Nicholas, abbot of Saint-Ouen at Rouen, Raoul, abbot of Saint-Michel, and Thierry, abbot of Saint-Evroul. Jerusalem was at the heart of monastic spirituality in the eleventh century (Callahan 1995: 119–27). Monasteries even made architectural copies or models of the Holy Sepulchre for use during the celebration of the Easter liturgy, and some monasteries reconfigured or rebuilt crypts or other chapels to resemble the Holy Sepulchre (Morris 2005, 153–65). The church of Neuvy Saint-Sépulcre, in Berry, was founded in 1042 as an architectural copy of the rotunda of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem by the knightly pilgrim Odo le Roux. By the 1070s Pope Gregory VII was referring to this church as being the possession of the Church in Jerusalem, and it may be no coincidence that it was here, according to the chronicler Albert of Aachen, that Peter the Hermit began his preaching of the crusade in 1095.



Figure 2.2 Pilgrims to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre have over many centuries carved these crosses in the stone on the stairs leading down to the Chapel of St Helen, supposedly the site of the discovery of the True Cross.

Source: © Andrew Jotischky.

The conceptual link between the crusade and the practice of pilgrimage lies not only in the obvious fact that both focused on the Holy Sepulchre, but also in the use made by contemporary chroniclers of the crusade of the imagery of pilgrimage. Scholars tracing the origins of the idea of the crusade have traditionally used pilgrimage as part of the framework on which crusading was built (Delaruelle 1944: 37–42; Alphan  ry and Dupront 1954; Blake 1970: 11–31; Cowdrey 1973: 285–311). The other main planks in this framework have included the *Reconquista* in Spain and the Peace of God movement of the first half of the eleventh century. Both, however, have recently suffered serious blows. The historical orthodoxy in Spanish scholarship, in which the *Reconquista* was seen as a ‘protocrusade’ (Men  ndez Pidal 1956) that attracted and taught French knights who thereby became conditioned to the idea of holy war against the Muslims, has been rejected by Fletcher (1987: 31–47), who argued that religious ideology is only discernible in the *Reconquista* after the First Crusade, and by Bull (1993: 70–114), who demonstrated that the French military contribution to the *Reconquista* was in any case negligible. The Peace of God movement, which began in Aquitaine around the end of the tenth century, was thought by an earlier generation of historians (Erdmann 1977: 57–94) to have contributed to a general mindset among the knighthood, in which knights had become used to the idea that warfare was morally wrong and that it ought to be restricted to certain categories of people and to certain times. Secular lords were encouraged to take oaths and join ‘peace leagues’ to maintain these restrictions, and to help punish those who contravened their oaths by engaging in violent acts outside the set terms. A connection with the First Crusade is apparent in Urban II’s recourse to a ‘general peace’ as part of his organisation of the expedition in 1095 (Cowdrey 1970b: 42–6). More recent scholarship has been less sure of the value of the Peace movement to understanding the reception of the crusade message in 1095. Bull (1993: 21–69) argues that even in the areas where it was most noticeable, its effectiveness was limited, and that by the middle of the eleventh century it had in any case fizzled out. It is, he says, ‘very difficult to imagine circumstances in which any coherent knightly ethos could have been central to the ideology and administration of the Peace programme’ (1993: 57). In regions where power was more centralised, such as Normandy and Flanders, there was no real tradition of peace leagues, but the practical advantages of the idea were seized upon by the central authority (the duke or count) as a means of controlling his baronage.

It may be unarguable that the peace leagues were ineffective in the long run; indeed, as the bishop of Bourges discovered in 1038, enforcing and maintaining the peace oaths tended only to contribute to the cycle of violence (Head 1987: 513–29). But this need not mean that they had no effect on the changing character of the secular knighthood. Peace leagues in Aquitaine, like riots against corrupt bishops in Italy, were attempts by local communities of laity and clergy to redress what they considered to be

injustices in the face of the impotence of public authority. Of course, not all knights in areas where peace leagues had been tried were convinced of their value; just as not all knights founded or endowed religious houses, and relatively few made the pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Some landowning families, however, can be identified as having participated in all these activities from one generation to another, just as crusading itself was to become in part a family tradition (Riley-Smith 1992: 101–8; 1997: 93–105). The veneration of particular saints or cults in certain families has been cited as evidence of a ‘predisposition to crusading’ (Riley-Smith 1997: 94). But it is in any case a mistake to assume that we can separate the landowning classes into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ knights; into one group that supported papal reform ideals, performed sincere penances for their sins, gave generously to local monasteries, made pilgrimages, upheld the peace and refrained from attacking their neighbours’ property – and thus answered Urban’s appeal to go on crusade – and another that rejected such idealism. Most probably fell into both categories.

Preparations for the crusade can be extraordinarily revealing of the remorse felt by knights for their sins of violence. The owners of the castle of Mezenc in Burgundy had robbed the peasants in villages belonging to the nearby abbey of St Chaffre du Monastier, but in a charter drawn up before their departure for Jerusalem, they promised to abandon their practices of extorting food and animals from the villages. The bishop of Le Puy absolved them on the strength of their commitment to the crusade (Riley-Smith 1997: 113–14). But, as has recently been pointed out, crusaders who returned home in 1099 did not behave markedly differently from before they had set out; whatever their state of idealism when they took the cross, it appears to have been transitory (Tyerman 1998: 11–12).

The case of Thomas of Marle is instructive. A landowner in the Île de France, Thomas is best known to posterity from the pages of the biography of King Louis VI of France, where he appears as the worst kind of feudal villain, an exploiter of his own peasantry and a menace to civil society (Cusimano and Moorhead 1992: 106–9). Guibert of Nogent was more explicit in his description:

His thirst for blood was so unprecedented in recent times that people who are considered cruel in fact appear less so when they are butchering animals than Thomas did when killing humans . . . When he compelled his prisoners . . . to pay ransoms, he had them hung up by their testicles (sometimes doing this with his own hands), and when, as often happened, the weight was too great, their bodies ruptured and their entrails spilled out.

(Benton 1984: 184–5)

Yet Thomas was also a crusader, whose prowess at the battle of Dorylaeum earned him an epithet in the contemporary *Chanson d’Antioche* as ‘valiant

... with a loyal heart'. Riley-Smith has suggested that Thomas' proclivity to violence came from a disturbed personality as a result of his upbringing; he certainly made the most of opportunities provided by the crusade to shed blood, taking part in the massacre of Jews in the Rhineland (Riley-Smith 1997: 156–7). Does this mean that he took the cross cynically because it offered such unparalleled opportunities for indulging in violence without the dangers of divine judgement? Or that he, presumably in common with many other crusaders, took the cross precisely because he knew that he had committed heinous sins? On the other hand, not all those whom Urban might have expected to take the cross on the strength of a 'predisposition for crusading', did so. Fulk IV of Anjou resisted an appeal made by Urban in person, despite the fact that he had already made the pilgrimage to Jerusalem.

The question of the motivation for taking the cross has been rephrased by some historians. The model once proposed, according to which the primary motivation must be understood in sociological and economic rather than spiritual terms, is now accepted by few. This model, based on the study of knightly families in the Maconnais region of Burgundy, suggested that the practice of inheritance of family land by the oldest son led to the disenfranchisement of younger sons by denying them a landed base, and thus made the prospect of military adventure in the East more appealing (Duby 1971: 283; 1977: 120). Some support for this model appears to be advanced by one version of Urban II's preaching at Clermont, in which the pope suggests that one reason for violence among knightly families is that the land to be shared out among them is insufficient. The problems with applying this model have been pointed out forcefully (Riley-Smith 1986: 44–7): it cannot be proved that younger sons were in fact predominant among crusaders; the response to the crusade was just as strong in regions where partible inheritance rather than primogeniture was still customary; it is inconceivable that landless younger sons would have been capable of raising the necessary money to embark on the expedition; the landless had plenty of safer opportunities to colonise new lands in the West. Such arguments, on both sides, presuppose that knights were in a position to exercise individual choices about whether to take the cross. In theory, the crusade vow was voluntary. But many knights – especially but not exclusively the landless – relied for their livelihoods on decisions made about war and peace by lords to whose patronage they were tied. Great lords, such as the crusade leaders themselves, had to raise armies, and the only means at their disposal was from among the traditional 'feudal' constituency of knights to whom they were bound in relationships based on marriage, conditions of land tenure, neighbourliness, or simple friendship.

Ultimately, an individual's motivation for taking the cross is unknowable. The whole question, indeed, can sometimes appear to be subject to a circular logic. Because we know that at Clermont Urban II appealed to an increasingly articulate piety among the knighthood, the normative devotional and penitential practices of eleventh-century aristocratic society can appear to

us as so many stages on the road to Clermont. Pilgrimage and endowment of monasteries, however, were staple features of aristocratic life, and would have continued to be so even had the crusade never been preached. It is worth remembering that although the First Crusade was an event of great magnitude, only a fraction of the nobility chose to participate. Moreover, the First Crusade cannot be interpreted as the logical outcome of such devotional practices. Although much recent crusading historiography has focused on the social and spiritual conditions in which the crusade was launched, we must also consider the political context in the theatre of the war itself – the eastern Mediterranean.

The eastern Mediterranean on the eve of the crusade

According to a tradition recounted by Albert of Aachen and repeated by William of Tyre, which was to have a powerful hold on the later European imagination, the impetus for the First Crusade came from a wandering monk, Peter the Hermit. Peter had apparently suffered persecution at the hands of the Muslims while on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and had been entrusted with an appeal from the patriarch of the city to the pope to launch a military campaign so that pilgrims could travel safely (Blake and Morris 1985: 79–109; Morris 1996: 21–34). There is indeed some evidence of Christian pilgrims being maltreated by Muslims while on pilgrimage. The Norman pilgrims of 1027 were pelted with stones, as was Ulrich of Briesgau in c.1040, and the German pilgrims of 1064, though a group of several hundred, were attacked near Ramla by brigands (Favreau-Lilie 1995: 321–41). Pilgrimage was never completely safe: even in the relatively stable conditions imposed by the Mamluk sultanate in the fourteenth century, pilgrims were sometimes attacked by hostile locals (Jotischky 2004: 92), and in the early years after the crusader conquest, armed escorts were necessary for the journey to the Jordan. In most such cases, violence seems to have been spontaneous, and committed by local groups over whom the political authorities had little control, rather than being part of an anti-Christian policy. Nevertheless, attacks on pilgrims must have been a factor in the perception that Christians, and Christian institutions, were under threat from the Seljuqs. Such a perception is confirmed to a degree by the experiences of eastern Christians in Syria and the Holy Land. In the middle of the eleventh century, when the Seljuqs first arrived in the region, and again in the 1080s when they conquered Antioch, monasteries were forced to close and their communities dispersed for fear of attack (Jotischky 2008: 46–8).

Such dangers were more prevalent, naturally, at a time when centralised political authority was weak. It would not be surprising, therefore, to find some germ of truth behind the story of Peter the Hermit. For the Islamic Near East experienced profound political change in the eleventh century, as a result of which existing ethnic and religious tensions had become severely exacerbated by the time of the First Crusade. Although it may be true that

the crusade could only have been as attractive as it proved to the western knighthood because of developments in the West, the conditions that made it feasible from a practical standpoint were the fragmentation suffered by the Seljuq Empire in the 1090s.

The Seljuqs, a tribe of Ghuzz Turks from central Asia, conquered Iran, Iraq and the Near East between the 1040s and 1060s. Recent converts to Islam, they adopted Sunni traditions and ideology. For much of the second half of the eleventh century, Syria and Palestine were battlegrounds between the Seljuqs and the Fatimid rulers of Egypt, who were Shi'ite Muslims. In theory, the Islamic world was divided in allegiance to two khalifates: the Abbasid dynasty in Baghdad, recognised by Sunnis, and the Fatimid dynasty in Cairo, recognised by Shi'ites. In fact both khalifates were largely honorific offices by this period: the Abbasid khalifate had ceased to exercise any real political influence over affairs in the Islamic world in the tenth century, and the power behind the Fatimid khalif was effectively the vizier. Abbasid public authority had progressively weakened in the tenth century partly because of the collapse of an effective fiscal system, and thus the inability of the regime to collect enough in taxes to fund the government.

Although the majority of Muslims in Syria and Palestine were Sunnis, there were significant pockets of Shi'ite adherence, particularly in Damascus and Aleppo. The separation within the Dar al-Islam had originally been a political matter, concerning the dynastic succession after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, but by the eleventh century each tradition considered the other as heretical, and suppression of Shi'ism was regarded by the Seljuqs as a religious duty. This focus on the internal homogeneity of the Islamic lands resulted in neglect of the world beyond Islam, which was to prove devastating in the 1090s.

The Seljuqs had assimilated quickly into Muslim society. The original Turkish tribes that had formed the basis of Seljuq military power in the mid-eleventh century were supplemented by regular armies recruited from enslaved peoples (*mamluks*). The sultans realised that military power by itself was not enough: the prosperity of the Islamic Near East rested on agriculture and urban commerce. The cities, in which the majority of the population was Arab, continued to provide the intellectual, economic and cultural leadership of the Seljuq Empire. The term 'empire' is in any case misleading, for the Seljuqs never ruled their territories as a single centralised state, but rather as a collection of provinces, no two of which shared the same ethnic patterns. Moreover, Seljuqs tended to fragment authority across ruling families, with the consequence that provinces or cities did not always act in concert with each other. It was largely the personality of Sultan Malikshah (1055–92), rather than any structural unity, that gave the impression of centralised rule over the Near East in the generation before the First Crusade.

In truth, there was little reason for Muslims in the Near East to pay much attention to events outside the Dar al-Islam. The age of Islamic territorial expansion was long past, and save for in the Iberian peninsula, contact with

Europeans was minimal. Apart from trade, Europe had little to offer an Islamic world that had for centuries enjoyed a higher level of technological and intellectual development. Muslims, like the Byzantines, tended to regard western Europeans as culturally backward and interested chiefly in warfare. Despite political uncertainties, moreover, late eleventh-century Syria and Palestine were economically prosperous. Although the economy of the Near East was based to a greater degree on urban commerce than was the case in much of the West, agricultural production was more important than has sometimes been appreciated. The Holy Land may not have been flowing with milk and honey, but it provided substantial crops of sugar cane, figs, olives and grapes. Moreover, being far from the centres of power in the Islamic world, it remained relatively peaceful until the advent of the crusaders. Within the Islamic world, it enjoyed a certain cultural eclecticism conferred by its geographical location as a crossroads between East and West. A pilgrim from al-Andalus, Ibn al-'Arabi, found scholars from Iran and Baghdad as well as from his own native Spain studying at the al-Aqsa mosque, and remarked on the *madrasas* (religious schools) of both Hanafite and Shafi'ite traditions (Hillenbrand 1999: 49).

As we have seen, the immediate event that precipitated Urban II's appeal in November 1095 was an embassy sent by the Byzantine emperor requesting military aid for the recovery of Asia Minor. How did this situation arise in the first place? Sporadic raiding during the 1060s prompted Romanus IV Diogenes to lead an army to confront the Seljuqs, but he was routed by Alp Arslan at Manzikert, in eastern Anatolia, in 1071, and subsequently the whole of Asia Minor was lost. For the first time since the eighth century, Muslim armies had reached the Bosphorus. Yet from a position of apparent strength, the disintegration of the Seljuq protectorate began quite suddenly in 1092, with the death of the vizier Nizam al-Mulk, who had in practice been the real ruler of the empire, followed closely by that of the sultan Malikshah. By coincidence, in the same year the Fatimid khalif al-Mustansir also died. One historian has recently compared the year 1092 in its effect on Islam to the fall of the Iron Curtain in Europe in 1989: 'familiar political entities gave way to disorientation and disunity' (Hillenbrand 1999: 33).

The resulting civil war between Malikshah's sons, Barkaru and Muhammad, which depleted the dynasty's resources, demonstrated that the real centre of gravity in the Dar al-Islam lay in Iran and Iraq (Holt 1986: 10–15). Consequently Syria and Palestine presented opportunities for ambitious and decisive leaders to construct new political entities. The crusaders were to find that many of the towns on the littoral were virtually independent of higher authority; governors and emirs were free to negotiate such terms as seemed most advantageous to them. The collapse of the Seljuq Empire empowered autonomous Arab emirs, such as the rulers of Shaizar, in western Syria, to follow their own policies. To such local Arab dynasties, the crusaders were scarcely more alien than the central Asian Seljuqs. Moreover,

all the lands under Seljuq and Fatimid control contained large populations of Christians, mostly Greek Orthodox in Syria and Palestine and Copts in Egypt. Although there is little indication that these indigenous Christians identified with the western co-religionists in the 1090s, the Armenians of Cilicia, who occupied a political penumbra in the Seljuq territories, were prepared to ally with the crusaders.

The Fatimid khalifate in Egypt had also been weakened by revolts from its armed forces – the consequence of a long-established Egyptian policy of using Turkish Mamluks, Sudanese and Berbers to serve the khalifate's military needs. From 1074 to 1094 Egypt was effectively ruled on behalf of the khalif by an Armenian mamluk, Badr al-Jamali, and his Armenian army. After his death, the legitimate heir to the khalifate, Nizar, was passed over by the new vizier al-Afdal in favour of a younger brother. Nizar's rebellion, coupled with outbreaks of plague from 1097 to 1100, fragmented Fatimid authority further. However, the enmity between Fatimids and Seljuqs enabled al-Afdal to capture Jerusalem itself in 1098, while the crusaders were besieging Antioch. It is an irony that the crusaders called to free the Holy Sepulchre from the Turks found that they were fighting an Egyptian, not a Seljuq, army in 1099.

There are indications in the Arabic sources that a sense of foreboding hung over the Islamic world during the 1090s. The political crisis appeared to confirm the story told by the stars – as the chronicler al-Azimi observed, when the Franks appeared, Saturn was in Virgo, a sure sign in the Arabic astrological tradition of misfortune and devastation (Hillenbrand 1999: 37). It is perhaps in this context that we should read the anecdote told in *Gesta Francorum* of the astrological prediction that the Christians would prevail over Kerboga at Antioch (Hill 1962: 53–5) – a story obviously told from a crusader perspective, but perhaps in knowledge gained at Antioch of low morale in the Near East. However far the western knighthood may have been conditioned to holy war against enemies of the Church in the late eleventh century, there could have been no better time to strike against the Islamic world than the 1090s. The question that immediately suggests itself is whether the Byzantine emperor Alexios Komnenos, from whom the original appeal for a military expedition originated, knew this.

If the Islamic world was experiencing fragmentation on the eve of the First Crusade, the Byzantine Empire had suffered prolonged crisis throughout the eleventh century (Ostrogorsky 1969: 316–50; Treadgold 1997: 583–611). The scale of the difficulties faced by Alexios Komnenos can only be appreciated if we compare the state of the empire in 1095 with its situation seventy years earlier. When Basil II, known as 'Bulgar-slayer', died in 1025, the imperial frontiers stretched as far to the east as the mountains that separate Iran from Turkey. The Bulgarian kingdom had been annexed, the Byzantine hold on southern Italy appeared secure, and the Mediterranean had been cleared of pirates by a dominant Byzantine fleet. For 150 years, from the last quarter of the ninth century onward, Byzantine armies were virtually unchallenged.

The arrival of new forces on all frontiers during the mid-eleventh century, however, placed intolerable strains on the resources of the state. In the West, the Norman adventurers who began to serve as mercenaries in southern Italy in the 1030s – fighting sometimes for the Byzantine governor, sometimes for the Lombard dynasts – gradually became the dominant power. The remarkable Hauteville family, originally from Normandy, established itself in the Greek-speaking provinces of Apulia and Calabria in the mid-eleventh century. Led by the head of the family in Italy, Robert Guiscard, in 1071 the Hautevilles demonstrated their mastery of the region by their capture of Bari from the Byzantine governor, and thus assured Norman mastery over Apulia (Loud 2000: 133–7). In the north, the Pechenegs raided unchecked across the Danube frontier, despoiling the resources of Thrace. The diversion of Byzantine forces to meet these threats stripped the eastern frontier, encouraging the Seljuqs to raid at will. It was Emperor Romanos IV's attempt to settle the eastern frontier in 1071 that led to the disaster of Manzikert, in which an ethnically mixed Byzantine army was smashed by Alp Arslan. Asia Minor itself was lost as a consequence – not as the immediate result of the defeat, but in a way that reveals how internal political instability in the empire exacerbated the military failings. Romanos was deposed while in captivity in favour of Michael VII Dukas, and in the resulting civil war, he approached the Seljuqs as allies to restore him to his throne. When Romanos was captured by Dukas and blinded, Alp Arslan had an excuse to invade and annex Asia Minor. At the same time, Michael Dukas courted Guiscard in Italy as a potential ally against the Seljuqs, offering him titles, salaries and a marriage alliance between his son and the Norman's daughter in return.

The Byzantine policy of attempting to balance hostile neighbours through alliances that played one off against another had often worked in the past, but it was inherently dangerous (Harris 2003: 35–51). When Michael VII was himself overthrown by a rival faction in 1078, Guiscard played the same card as Alp Arslan had done seven years earlier, justifying his invasion of the empire from the West in the 1080s as the fulfilment of his alliance with Michael. But instability in the imperial hierarchy was probably a symptom rather than a cause of the decline of Byzantine authority in the Mediterranean world. Of the thirteen emperors ruling between 1025 and 1081, eight were in power for less than three years; only one lasted more than ten years. Five were deposed, one more was probably murdered, and another forced to abdicate. It is easy to dismiss the imperial candidates as incompetent – Constantine VIII was addicted to pleasure, Michael IV an epileptic, Michael V unbalanced, Michael VI too old to be effective (Charanis 1958: 193–4) – but this does not explain the malaise that allowed such figures to rise to the top. The imperial office was not invariably hereditary; in the Byzantine conception of power, it was the office itself, rather than one's family, that conferred authority. Perhaps surprisingly, however, Byzantines had little compunction in ridding themselves of emperors, with the result that palace coups generated from within the civil administration were frequent.

The fundamental dynamic of power in eleventh-century Byzantium was the tension between the interests of the civil service and the landed aristocracy. Michael Psellos, the philosopher who served many of the eleventh-century emperors, thought that those emperors who had come to power through palace service tended to neglect the army, in the hope of curbing the power of landed magnates who might otherwise threaten their own positions. The result was that the military resources that were needed to meet predators on all fronts was simply inadequate. The emperors themselves, however, were victims of social and economic developments in the provinces that they seemed unable to control. At the height of Byzantine military strength, the backbone of the army was the free peasantry of Thrace, Greece and especially Asia Minor. By the mid-eleventh century, however, the system of 'pronoia', according to which landholders rendered military service, had ceased to function to the benefit of the imperial throne – partly because so many estates, both secular and ecclesiastical, had secured exemption from taxation and jurisdiction (Treadgold 1997: 680–3). Moreover, the tendency for great landowners to accumulate large estates at the expense of the smallholders meant that military resources coalesced into the hands of a few, who could then form sufficiently powerful cliques to challenge the emperor.

After 1071, the situation deteriorated markedly, as the emperors lost the ability to recruit from Asia Minor altogether. Byzantine armies had always included large numbers of foreign troops, but by the late eleventh century emperors had little choice but to rely on mercenaries. These troops, moreover, came from the very peoples who under different circumstances might be enemies of the empire; thus, for example, a chrysobull of 1088 mentions Pechenegs and Normans, as well as Norsemen, English, Rus and Germans under imperial command. In the twelfth century the English – 'the barbarians who bear the two-edged sword on their shoulders', as they are described in one contemporary document – were particularly prominent (Vasiliev 1937: 39–40). In the late eleventh century the Normans were the preferred mercenaries, though they had a tendency to be disloyal: three Norman captains, Hervé, Robert Crispin and Roussel of Bailleul, at different times rebelled against the emperor. In 1090, Alexios recruited 500 Flemish knights when the count of Flanders passed through Constantinople on his return from a pilgrimage to the Holy Land. Troops were recruited by direct contact with military leaders. Robert Guiscard, for example, was offered a Byzantine military title, and salaries for his men. The norm was for mercenaries to be associated with success in war in the form of conquered land, which would then be held through the arrangements customary under 'pronoia'.

Some scholars have found more encouraging signs in the underlying condition of the empire. It is certainly an exaggeration to portray the Byzantine military capacity as moribund; after all, a Byzantine army accompanied the First Crusade as far as Antioch (France 1994: 168–9), and in the wake of the crusade, the Komnenoi were able to reconquer much of their territory

in western Asia Minor. The economic decline, too, has been reassessed. One traditional indication of decline, debasement of the coinage, may in fact have been a deliberate policy in response to greater demand for coin (Hendy 1970: 47–8). Byzantine markets were able to provide the crusader armies with supplies, and foreign visitors admired the fertility and climate that allowed for two annual harvests in some regions. The Italian merchants who settled in Constantinople, numbering several thousand, were engaged not simply in long-distance luxury trade, but also in the export of grain, wine and meat from Byzantine farms.

Yet the political situation that Alexios Komnenos faced in the 1090s was complex. He doubtless knew of the collapse of the Seljuq Empire far to the east, but even before the death of Malikshah, Asia Minor had been a battleground between Kilij Arslan, heir of the victor of Manzikert, and the rival Danishmend emirate. His scope for interference in Asia Minor, however, was constrained by a threat from Serbia in 1094 and from a Cuman invasion of Thrace in 1095. Alexios had already ruled for fourteen years, but the Cuman threat was probably part of a rebellion by Nikephoros Diogenes, son of the Romanos IV who had been deposed after 1071. Employing western knights to strike against the Seljuqs in 1095 was simply a continuation of the policy adopted in 1090, when the Flemish recruits had defended Adrianople. Alexios' appeal in 1095 was probably part of a well-established pattern of diplomacy on Alexios' part. Since 1089 he had been working towards rapprochement with Urban II, and an ecumenical council had been mooted at which fundamental differences could be ironed out. An account of the acquisition of important relics from the Holy Land by the monastery of Cormery, near Tours, in 1103, reveals how Alexios had been acting even before 1095 as an intermediary and broker in enabling prominent westerners to become acquainted with the situation in the East. Alexios seems to have placed himself at the centre of a network of dealings with the West, of which the relics from Jerusalem that found their way to Cormery, and a western force that secured the defences of Nicomedia, were just two visible results (Shepard 1996: 117–18). It might even be argued that Alexios initiated the crusade with his appeal to Urban at the Council of Piacenza in order to extricate himself from the tangled affairs he saw wherever he looked. The extent to which Alexios was the true initiator of the crusade is disputed by Byzantinists (Frankopan 2012; Harris 2014: 125–41), but he had certainly played a role in reminding the West both of the significance of the empire as the gatekeeper of Christendom and of the need for support to maintain control over the gate. Moreover, as has recently been shown, there was a strong tradition in Byzantine writing in the eleventh century of defining and articulating religious orthodoxy through anti-Turkish polemical writing (Beihammer 2011: 15–36).

There are also signs of growing antagonism towards Muslims in some monastic sources dating from the second half of the eleventh century. There was a new interest in hagiographical cults in which resistance to Muslim

raiding in the western Mediterranean and Italy in earlier periods played a decisive role, such as the cult of St Bovo, which developed at Voghera in northern Italy toward the end of the century. A number of tenth-century Greek saints' lives from Sicily or Calabria drew on the experience of flight or persecution of Christians at the hands of Arab raiders from North Africa, and some of these undoubtedly became known in the eleventh century in Latin monastic circles. An example is the *Life of Elias the Cave-Dweller*, the Greek original of which no longer survives, but that was translated into Latin at the Latin monastery of Sant' Eufemia in Calabria in the 1080s, which had been founded by a Norman family. Arab raids in Calabria form part of the backdrop of the *Life*, and some episodes, such as an incident in which the tomb of Elias' mentor is desecrated by Muslims, could only have served to heighten western emotions against Muslims (Oldfield 2014: 41–9). Notable Greek monastic foundations in Calabria, such as St Elias and St Anastasius at Carbone, which attracted Norman patronage in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, had been founded in circumstances of Greek communities fleeing from Arab raids. In the *Dialogues* written in the late 1070s by Desiderius, abbot of Monte Cassino (1058–87), one of the miracles records the appearance of St Benedict and St Peter to defend Monte Cassino during the Arab raids of 864. Such evocations of the past 200 years on, at a time when the Arab threat to Italy was long gone, indicates a new concern for resistance to Muslim aggression in the generation before the Crusade was launched. It is particularly striking when we recall the close connections between Monte Cassino and the Byzantine Empire in the eleventh century (Bloch 1986). In southern France, likewise, the hagiographical collection assembled at the monastery of St Faith at Conques bears witness to a growing interest in miracle stories associated with the conversion of Muslims.

The western chronicles of the First Crusade are apt to present the expedition as a bolt from the blue. But wherever we look, we see signs to suggest that nobody need have been taken by surprise. Jerusalem had become increasingly familiar to laity and clerics alike as a symbol of penitential devotion. The Seljuq hold on the holy city was weaker than ever before. A display of military might in the eastern Mediterranean, such as had been proposed by Gregory VII as early as 1074, would also bring the opportunity to reinforce the principle of papal sovereignty. The Byzantines welcomed western military aid for specific campaigns against the Seljuqs. Elements of the western knighthood had already demonstrated a willingness to be directed by papal ideals in bearing arms. But these factors cannot explain in isolation what happened between 1095 and 1099. In order to understand how the crusade was put in motion, we need to examine in some detail the Council of Clermont and the impact of Urban II's preaching on western society.



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3 Crusade and settlement, 1095–c.1118

Key Dates

1095 (November)	Urban II's 'crusading homily' at council of Clermont
1096	attacks on Jews in Rhineland towns and Normandy
1097	crusaders capture Nicaea; victory over Kilij Arslan at Dorylaeum; Baldwin secures Edessa
1098	crusaders capture Antioch; founding of Cîteaux
1099 (July)	crusaders capture Jerusalem; Godfrey elected <i>Advocatus sancti sepulchri</i>
1100	Baldwin crowned king of Jerusalem
1101	defeat of crusader reinforcements in Asia Minor
1104	capture of Acre; Franks of Antioch and Edessa defeated at Harran
1107	Bohemond's invasion of Byzantine Empire defeated
1110	capture of Sidon
1113	Hospital of St John in Jerusalem recognised as Order by pope

Pope Urban II launched the crusade in 1095. This chapter examines how he presented his message, how it was understood by the European knight-hood, and how the course of the crusade was affected by these ideas. The establishment of the Crusader States is then examined in turn, with a focus on political and constitutional developments.

Preaching the crusade

On 27 November 1095, Urban II brought the proceedings at the Council of Clermont to a close with a dramatic public oration. Invited archbishops,

bishops and abbots had attended the previous sessions of the council, but on the final day crowds of lesser clergy, and probably laypeople as well, gathered in a field outside the town to hear the pope. We do not know exactly what he said, but from the four surviving accounts of his preaching, as well as from incidental observations in other sources, there can be no doubt that this was the occasion chosen for the public launch of the expedition we know as the First Crusade. The content of Urban's preaching, while it can never be known in full, can be reconstructed sufficiently to provide us with the main themes of his vision of the crusade. The implications of what he said, however, are still a matter for debate.

It can even be argued that for many crusaders, Clermont itself was an event of only minor significance. The narrative account of the crusade closest to the events that later transpired, the *Gesta Francorum*, does not even mention Clermont, saying only 'When that time had already come, of which the lord Jesus warns his faithful people every day . . . there was a great stirring of heart throughout the Frankish lands' (Hill 1962: 1). The *Gesta Francorum* was the work of a follower of Bohemond, the son of Robert Guiscard. Bohemond had not been approached by Urban in person as a potential recruit and had apparently not even heard of the expedition until word reached him of the passage of an army through southern Italy, as he was besieging Amalfi (Hill 1962: 7). But when he came to revise the narrative of the *Gesta Francorum* for his own account, Robert of Rheims, who had been present at Clermont, left his readers in no doubt that the council marked the formal beginning of the expedition. Three other chroniclers of the crusade, Fulcher of Chartres, Baldric of Bourgeuil and Guibert of Nogent, also used the same strategy, and in their hands the occasion of Urban's preaching became an opportunity to flaunt their own rhetorical training. But neither Raymond of Aguilers, who like the author of the *Gesta Francorum* was a participant on the crusade, nor the German monk Albert of Aachen, saw Clermont as the natural starting-point for their accounts. The central figure of Raymond's account, Raymond of Saint-Gilles, count of Toulouse, had already been sounded out by Urban and decided to take the cross before Clermont, though he waited before making a public announcement until after the council. In Albert's chronicle, however, the omission of Clermont serves the broader narrative, in which the crusade was initiated not by Urban II but by Peter the Hermit and the Christians of Jerusalem. Albert was a subject of the German emperor, and the main protagonist of his chronicle, Godfrey of Bouillon, had fought against the pope for Henry IV. He was reluctant, therefore, to credit Urban with initiating the expedition, preferring to see it as a broad-based alliance of Christians against the Muslim threat to the eastern Church. (It is significant that Albert was also the chronicler who was least partisan in his writing about the Byzantine role.) It is worth noting, in contrast, that those chroniclers who did see Clermont as the event that initiated the crusade were those representing northern French interests.

For those chroniclers who wished to emphasise the papal role in the expedition of 1096–9, however, the Council of Clermont was an event of overriding importance. The explanation for this lies partly in the theatrical nature of such councils, and partly in the immediate context of Clermont itself. When he became pope in 1088, Urban II cut a rather unimpressive figure. Like his predecessor Victor III, his sphere of action was limited to southern Italy, where he could rely on Norman protection. The early years of his pontificate were characterised by efforts to restore the papal position in Italy. To this end he resumed diplomatic contact with Alexios Komnenos, and succeeded in securing both Byzantine recognition of his own status and assurances that Alexios would not weaken this, or the position of the papal allies, the Normans, in Italy by supporting Henry IV. Although he seemed more amenable than Gregory VII in his dealings with the Orthodox, it is worth noting that he took care not to be drawn into theological debate, declining for example to send the required statement of faith to Constantinople, which the patriarch had stipulated as the necessary requirement before an ecumenical council could be held. At a council held in Melfi in 1089, Urban reaffirmed papal support for the Norman domination of southern Italy, which included the obligation on Greek Orthodox bishops in Calabria and Apulia – where there were very substantial Greek-speaking populations – to recognise papal authority. Urban also managed to build up sufficient political weight through a network of alliances to return to Rome in 1094. Once installed in the Lateran, he immediately called a council for spring 1095 at Piacenza.

The Council of Piacenza can sometimes appear like the ‘poor relation’ of Clermont, but its significance in its own right should not be overlooked. Most of the business at the council related to securing the momentum of the reform programme in Italy, now that imperial forces were in retreat. The restored prestige of the papacy was evidenced by the presence of representatives from Peter, king of Aragon, who became a papal vassal, and from Alexios Komnenos, who appealed to the pope to recruit a western army to fight for the emperor in Asia Minor. Our source for Piacenza, the often-overlooked chronicle of Bernold, says that the pope urged knights to take an oath to confirm their willingness to do so. This is surely an early indication of the strategy he would employ to recruit crusaders. Piacenza may have suggested to Urban the possibility and desirability of a military expedition to the East, but it was in the months between May and November 1095 that his thinking clarified, and even after Clermont he appears to have refined his vision still further (Cowdrey 1970: 177–88; Riley-Smith 1997: 53–80; Somerville 2011: 371–85).

From Piacenza onward, the planning for the crusade went hand in hand with the reaffirmation of papal supremacy. At Piacenza Henry IV’s estranged wife had testified against him; afterwards his heir Conrad became a papal vassal (Robinson 1999: 290–1). Accompanied by a sizeable household that included two cardinals and an archbishop, Urban crossed

the Alps into France. He progressed up the Rhone valley into Burgundy, visited Cluny, where he dedicated the altar in the abbey church, then turned southwest into the Auvergne, reaching Clermont by the middle of November. The visit to Cluny was a powerful symbolic act: Urban himself was a Cluniac monk, and the dedication of the altar doubtless reminded observers of Cluny's direct dependence on the papal see, created at its foundation almost two centuries earlier. Urban's tour through France in 1095–6 was self-advertisement on a grand scale. After Clermont he continued west into the Limousin, then in the New Year north to Anjou and south again to Bordeaux and Montpellier before returning by way of Provence to Italy (Becker 1997: 127–40). No pope in living memory had made himself so visible; and wherever he stopped, Urban dedicated churches and altars. Besides Clermont, he held councils at Tours and Nîmes. He disciplined and corrected where necessary, visited secular lords sympathetic to reform, and collected in his train yet more bishops. At the great feasts of the Assumption and Christmas he wore his tiara and processed publicly. The regal theatricality of his progress and behaviour was surely part of the message he intended to convey (Becker 1988: 436–46).

Three main themes emerge from the different accounts of Urban's preaching at Clermont: the danger that the eastern Church faced at the hands of the barbaric Turks; the sacred quality of Jerusalem for Christians; and the rewards to be gained by those who took the cross. The first two of these are treated with obvious rhetorical licence by the chroniclers who paraphrased his words, but we can surmise the effect of heightened emotion that the pope intended to produce in his audience. Although at least two of the chroniclers, Fulcher of Chartres and Robert of Rheims, were probably present, no two reports lay exactly the same emphasis on these themes, and some do not report all three: Fulcher, for example, makes no mention of Jerusalem, referring only to the eastern Christians and to the Seljuq conquest of Asia Minor (Fink and Ryan 1969: 65–8). The most intractable problem for historians, therefore, has been to decide how important Jerusalem itself was to Urban. Following Erdmann, Mayer argued that Urban did not speak of Jerusalem at all at Clermont, on the grounds that so potent a symbol would distract the audience from the real message, which was the aid to be rendered to the Byzantine Empire, as Alexios' envoys had requested at Piacenza. Yet it is clear from other evidence that Urban did mention Jerusalem at later stages of his recruitment in 1096 – for example, in letters to Bologna and Vallombrosa (Riley-Smith and Riley-Smith 1981: 38). Mayer concludes that Urban gradually altered his vision in 1096 as control of the expedition slipped out of his hands and as events came to be shaped instead by those who responded to his appeal (1988: 35–6). The impassioned speech about the sanctity of Jerusalem in Baldric of Bourgueil's account can thus be explained by hindsight, for by the time the chronicle was written, the crusade was long over and its extraordinary military success must have made it appear as though Jerusalem had always been the original target.

Most historians, however, follow the more orthodox line that Urban all along intended Jerusalem to be the aim of the crusade (Flori 1997: 267–85; Riley-Smith 1997: 59–62; Richard 1999: 22–3; Tyerman 2006, 73–5). For one thing, it would have been difficult to interest western knights in such numbers in a war against the Turks on behalf of the eastern Christians of Asia Minor. Previous western recruits had been offered financial inducements to fight for the emperor, but at Clermont Urban spoke only of the responsibility to aid co-religionists, with vague references to profits that might be made. The examination of charters drawn up between departing crusaders and monastic houses with which they came to financial arrangements has revealed an emphasis not only on Jerusalem, but on the Holy Sepulchre itself as the specific goal of the crusade (Riley-Smith 1997: 62–6). Although one needs to exercise some caution when it comes to use of charters as historical documents – for the knights making such charters were not the authors of the documents themselves – it is unlikely that in all such cases the language of the Holy Sepulchre reflected clerical rather than knightly understanding. The charters appear to confirm the impression conveyed by the language of the chronicles, namely that crusaders thought of the expedition in the same terms as they would a pilgrimage to Jerusalem (e.g. Fink and Ryan 1969: 76). Mayer has remarked that none of the accounts of Clermont make much use of the pilgrimage tradition in reporting Urban's appeal (1988: 32) but in fact the language with which Guibert of Nogent describes Jerusalem is very close to that found in contemporary pilgrimage accounts (Levine 1997: 42–4). Moreover, the only surviving decree from Clermont that has a bearing on the crusade seems to make a specific connection between the two in proclaiming that 'for anyone who, out of devotion alone, and not for the sake of honour or wealth sets out to free the church of God in Jerusalem, that journey shall be considered as equal to all penance' (Somerville 1972: 74). The expedition was to be a penitential pilgrimage of the kind to which the western aristocracy had become accustomed; the difference was that in this case pilgrims were allowed to bear arms. But westerners did not make pilgrimages to Constantinople, or to Asia Minor; the association of the indulgence must have recalled Jerusalem in people's minds.

A further point is the supposition, made initially by Erdmann, that Urban was primarily interested in answering Alexios' appeal because it provided an opportunity to reinforce the issue of papal primacy with the backing of military might in the region. Eastern Christians 'liberated' by western arms would have been more likely to subject themselves to papal authority. This argument presumes that Urban had little interest in Jerusalem for its own sake. Yet, as Cowdrey has recently shown (1997: 65–83), Urban brought with him into France, to use in the altars he dedicated, relics from the Lateran collection. Many of these relics were of Christ himself (for example, his foreskin and his sandals), or of his Passion (beans from the Last Supper; the reed and sponge). 'No one who trod the Lateran palace', argues Cowdrey,

‘could well fail to be mindful of the Holy Land and of Jerusalem’ (1997: 70). Urban’s predecessor as pope, Victor III, had been abbot of Monte Cassino at a time when there was considerable contact between the abbey and the Orthodox patriarchate of Jerusalem. Urban himself corresponded with Symeon II, the Orthodox patriarch, during the course of the crusade. Such contact, indeed, was a natural application of the theory of papal primacy over the whole Church. If Urban wished to extend recognition of papal authority to the patriarchates of Constantinople and Antioch, why not also over Jerusalem?

The fundamental distinction between the two arguments lies in whether we credit Urban with altering the terms of Alexios’ appeal, and transforming the appeal for aid for the Byzantines in reconquering Asia Minor into the broader aim of liberating Jerusalem, or whether we regard this change in focus as the result either of Urban’s own evolving ideas or of pressure from the recipients of Urban’s message. The distinction might be regarded as academic, for after all, whatever Urban’s intentions might have been, the route to Jerusalem led through Asia Minor, and the defeat of Kilij Arslan by the crusaders in 1097 made Byzantine recovery of much of their former territory possible. In one sense, then, the two aims were entirely compatible with each other. But it is in fact a critical point, not only for understanding how the crusade worked in practice, but for determining the nature and extent of the influence that the papacy had on the lay nobility, and how far such influence could be applied in terms of practical organisation.

A crucial element in the puzzle is the nature and meaning of the indulgence itself. No papal bull exists to confirm the decree of the council, although Eugenius III was to specify in his bull for the Second Crusade that he was repeating what Urban had enacted for the First. Moreover, the language of the decree, and of Urban’s own letter to the Bolognese of 1096, differs slightly from that in his letter to the Flemish (Riley-Smith and Riley-Smith 1981: 38), in which he refers not to lifting penances imposed for sins but to remission of sins altogether. Mayer has argued that even the ‘remission of sins’ meant, in Urban’s mind, simply an absolution from necessary penances that might have been imposed by a confessor; in other words, that the Clermont indulgence had an earthly but not a heavenly effect (1978a: 32–3). The problem with making such distinctions is that it is far from clear that anyone in the 1090s thought in such precise terms. It was not until the systematic definitions of twelfth-century theologians such as Hugh of St Victor and canonists such as Huguccio that the distinctions between the authority of the Church to dispense equivalent penance accrued as a consequence of sin, and the authority to remit sin altogether, were articulated. If we assume that such a distinction was meaningful to Urban, then we are led back to the notion that what he himself preached at Clermont was taken out of his hands by those who responded to the appeal and interpreted according to what they wished to hear. Whether Urban intended to make such theological distinctions about the punitive consequences of sin in this

world and the next, it must have been clear to his audiences that the war he was proposing fell into the same category as the penitential violence encouraged by Gregory VII. The main difference was the target – no longer the enemies of church reform, but of ‘the Church of God’ itself.

The means by which Urban’s message was disseminated can be reconstructed only to a degree. He recruited the count of Toulouse and Adhemar, bishop of Le Puy directly, and tried the same with Fulk IV of Anjou. Fulcher and Baldric both say that bishops were encouraged to preach the crusade, and we know that in the archdioceses of Lyons, Milan and Venice this was done (Riley-Smith 1997: 75). Presumably the many bishops who accompanied him throughout France had ample opportunity to learn his intentions, although it may also be the case that his original ideas were refined in such discussions with prelates. Most of those who took the cross, however, must have learned about the crusade – as Bohemond did – from hearsay and rumour, and it would not be surprising if the message had become distorted according to the political, theological and geographical grasp of the audiences. However they understood the precise nature of the expedition, there can have been little doubt about the general impression made by the pope. The most obvious point about Clermont and Urban’s subsequent preaching is also the most fundamental. The pope was urging the knighthood of Europe to take up arms. Gregory VII had presumed that the loyalty owed by the German nobility to the Holy See counted above that owed to their king; Urban II took this still further at Clermont by assuming that all fighting men were subject to the authority of the pope in their use of arms. Whatever else it may have initiated, Clermont was the highest expression of papal reform ideals.

The First Crusade, 1096–1102

Although Urban devoted considerable efforts to publicising the crusade, he set limits on recruitment. He does not seem to have envisaged participation by the Normans of southern Italy or by German knights – though the recruitment of Godfrey of Bouillon, duke of Lorraine, an imperial vassal, must have been particularly pleasing. He wrote to the counts of Roussillon, Besalu, Cerdagne and Ampurias, whose lands lay close to Muslim territory in Spain, assuring them that their armed struggle against the Almoravids was the equivalent of the expedition to the East and discouraging them from setting out (Riley-Smith and Riley-Smith 1981: 40). In 1099, when new armies were recruited in the West to reinforce the first contingents, Paschal II renewed this prohibition. Although the sources can give the impression that representatives from all regions in the West set out in 1096, recruitment followed a regional pattern. Following the example of their great magnates, large numbers from Provence, Flanders, Normandy, the Île de France, Lorraine, Swabia and the Rhineland set out for the East, but not until 1099, when the dukes of Aquitaine, Burgundy and Bavaria, the archbishop of

Lyons and the count of Nevers took the cross, did equivalent recruitment from those regions, along with northern Italy, take an effect.

Urban also tried to limit participation to those who would be militarily useful. Women and non-combatants were dissuaded, and although several bishops and clergy took the cross, monks were prohibited from going. These prohibitions did not all have the desired effect, for many crusaders took their families with them, despite Urban's assurance of protection for those left behind. The abbot of Corfe tried to equip a boatload of his monks to join the expedition, but had to abandon the plan when the archbishop of Canterbury found out. The total number of crusaders will never be known, but the best recent estimates suggest that at the siege of Nicaea in 1097 there were 70,000 men and women, of whom perhaps a tenth were knights. By the time they reached Jerusalem in June 1099, the army had dwindled to about 12,000, with only 1,200–1,300 knights (France 1994: 122–42). The rate of human wastage due to death in battle, disease or starvation, and to desertion, was appalling, but the army that conquered Jerusalem was still, by the standards of the day, a sizeable one.

The great magnates each led their own contingents, and the extent of communication between them before they reached Constantinople seems to have been minimal. Each army chose a different route, though all went overland as far as possible. Much has been made in some histories of the crusade about the so-called 'People's Crusade', the contingents led by Peter the Hermit and Walter Sans-Avoir, and supposedly made up of the urban poor and peasants with no experience of fighting, many of whom did not even reach Asia Minor (e.g. Runciman 1954: 121–33; Payne 1984: 38–46). In fact several of these were noblemen, such as William 'the Carpenter', viscount of Melun, Emich, count of Leiningen and Hugh, count palatine of Tübingen (Riley-Smith 1986: 51). Walter himself was not as poor as his name suggests – he was in fact lord of Boissy-sans-Avoir (Riley-Smith 1997: 224). A recent analysis of the structure of the crusade armies on class lines has concluded that the poor and non-combatants were far more numerous, and as a result far more significant, than previous historians have acknowledged (Kostick 2008: 288–90).

One reason why these crusaders have attracted negative attention is that in May 1096, Emich's contingent attacked the Jews of Speyer, Worms and Mainz; some crusaders then seem to have broken off from the march to attack Jews in the lower Rhine valley. It is difficult to explain how the anti-Turkish rhetoric of Urban's preaching came to be applied against the Jews, but it may have arisen from financial demands made of Jewish communities by crusaders, which then tragically exploded into violence, in which the local populations of the towns in question then joined (Chazan 1996: 3–106). The Church did not encourage violence against the Jews – in fact the bishop of Speyer protected those in his town – though neither did its general attitude towards them do much to prevent it. Envy of Jewish wealth has been suggested as a plausible reason for the attacks, but most crusaders had

probably borrowed from or mortgaged to monastic houses rather than Jews, and in any case the extent of Jewish money lending in the 1090s can be exaggerated. It is worth noting that Emich of Leiningen's anti-Jewish activities seem to have been concerned with conversion rather than massacre, though deaths certainly resulted. A recent study has argued that the Jewish sources themselves exaggerated the extent of the attacks (Chazan 1996: 107–26), but in any case this was a sombre episode that indicates how little control there was over individual components of the crusading armies. It also shows how attitudes among some Europeans towards those who did not 'belong' in Christian society were hardening, and how easily xenophobia could erupt into acts of violence.

The armies arrived at Constantinople at different times between winter 1096 and spring 1097. The role of the Byzantines on the crusade was to become one of the major grievances of contemporary chroniclers, particularly those, such as the anonymous *Gesta Francorum* and Raymond d'Aguilers, who reflected the attitudes of their leaders. The Greek source most often used to represent the Byzantine viewpoint of the First Crusade, Anna Komnena's *Alexiad*, pictures an emperor both overwhelmed by the unexpected scale of the western enterprise and unable to comprehend the mindset of the barbaric Franks (Sewter 1969: 308–9). There are good reasons, however, to disregard the tone, if not the content, of the *Alexiad*, which was written in the 1140s by a woman who was only a child at the time of the events being described, and who moreover was trying to eulogise her father, the emperor, in pursuit of a domestic political agenda (Shepard 1996: 108–9). Alexios had asked for western aid, and although he may have been surprised at the numbers who responded, the markets in and around Constantinople proved adequate to feed them. But the impression of an invading force conveyed to Anna Komnena is understandable given the appearance of different armies each with a distinct regional character and commanded by the leading magnate of that region. Moreover, if one of the leaders, Robert of Flanders, was the son of an old friend of Byzantium, another, Bohemond, had tried to conquer the Adriatic provinces of the empire with his father in the 1080s.

A hostile atmosphere had been created by skirmishes with imperial troops in the Balkans, mainly Pechenegs and Cumans, even before all the armies had reached Constantinople. The main problem, however, was to clarify the relationship between the crusaders whom Alexios thought he was taking under his banners, and the imperial throne. The oath of vassalage that he imposed on the leaders probably represented his own understanding of the kind of relations that existed among the western nobility. In eleventh-century France, for example, such oaths might be taken to cover specific situations or military enterprises. But the diversity of practice regarding concepts of vassalage is reflected in the refusal by some leaders, notably Raymond of Saint-Gilles and – initially, at least – Godfrey of Bouillon, to take the oath, while most of the northern barons – the counts of Blois, Vermandois and

Flanders and the duke of Normandy – made no such difficulties. Bohemond, whom one might have expected to cause trouble, may even have asked to be taken directly into imperial service as *domestikos* of the East. Raymond's refusal was explained on religious grounds – in taking the cross he had taken service with God, and could not therefore swear allegiance for the same enterprise to any man. But he, or the northern leaders, could equally well have baulked on the grounds that they already held lordships from a king in the West, and could not owe vassalage to more than one lord. Such considerations had already, earlier in the decade, troubled some of Robert of Normandy's barons who owed allegiance to Robert for lands in Normandy and to William II for lands in England, and it is curious that they do not seem to have worried Robert at Constantinople. The difference may be that in 1096 the crusaders were taking a personal oath that had no application to territory; they swore, indeed, to restore territory conquered from the Turks to Alexios. One further question is raised by the oath: what lands did Alexios expect to have restored to him? Asia Minor and Antioch certainly; but beyond that, Syria and Palestine had once formed part of the Roman Empire, and the same logic could be applied to them as to the lands lost more recently to the Seljuqs. The Byzantines had reconquered much of northern Syria in the 960s, and there were signs that imperial control might as a consequence be extended southwards. Alexios' grandson, later in the twelfth century, seems to have pursued such an argument.

The western chronicles, with the notable exception of Albert of Aachen, give the impression that the Byzantines themselves played little role in the military enterprise once the crusaders had crossed to Asia Minor. One chronicle, indeed, claims that Alexios cheated the crusaders out of their rightful spoils by accepting the surrender of Nicaea in June 1097, when all the hard work had been done by the westerners. In fact, Nicaea only fell because of Byzantine naval capacity, which enabled the crusaders to invest the city by land and water, but many of the crusaders did not seem to appreciate this reality. The sense of common purpose with which they became imbued once the fighting had begun, and particularly after the hard-won battle of Dorylaeum (1 July 1097), in which Kilij Arslan was decisively beaten, must have helped to bond the crusaders together, but also to make them more suspicious of outsiders. Fulcher of Chartres found this cooperation among different peoples remarkable (Fink and Ryan 1969: 88). The fact that a Byzantine contingent under Tatikios accompanied the crusaders as far as Antioch, and took part in the first phase of the siege, is unappreciated by most chroniclers (France 1971: 137–47; 1994: 243).

There is no doubt that the nine-month siege of Antioch (October 1097–June 1098) marked the critical phase of the expedition, and helped to shape its subsequent character. After the relatively easy passage through Asia Minor, in which the towns of Cilicia were taken, this was the first serious threat to the crusade. The privations of the siege were terrible. Northern



Figure 3.1 The decisive battle for Antioch at which the besieged crusaders defeated Kerbogha's army, as depicted in a thirteenth-century northern French manuscript of William of Tyre's *Chronicle*.

Source: © The British Library Board (BL Yates Thompson MS 12 f.29).

Syria has cold winters, and even the capture of the port of St Symeon, and Byzantine naval convoys supplying aid, could not assure an adequate food supply. Fighting men and horses were lost to starvation and the inevitable disease caused by poor hygiene. Anna Komnena's reflection on Bohemond, though in a different context, is apt here:

[This] has taught me how hard it is to check all barbarians once they have set their hearts on something: there is nothing, however objectionable, which they will not bear when they have made up their minds once and for all to undergo self-inflicted suffering.

(Sewter 1969: 367)

Rivalry among the leaders threatened the enterprise. Two of the younger commanders, Baldwin, younger brother of Godfrey of Bouillon, and Tancred, a relative of Bohemond, clashed over possession of Cilician towns (Asbridge 2000: 16–24), and Baldwin went off in 1097 to the north Syrian city of Edessa at the invitation of its Armenian governor, and took no part in the siege of Antioch. The degree to which this was a helpful strategic flanking movement that secured allies to the north-east, rather than an adventure undertaken for personal advancement, is debateable. Bohemond and Raymond of Toulouse seem to have distrusted each other's motives. It is not clear at what point it became obvious that Bohemond had no intention of honouring the oath to return Antioch to Alexios, but it was probably even before the city fell. Bohemond was in a strong position, for he had been elected overall commander to coordinate resistance to Ridwan, the emir of Aleppo who belatedly sent an army to raise the siege, and his military skill secured a victory at the Lake Battle outside Antioch in February 1098 (France 1994: 245–51). This victory was a considerable personal achievement. The chroniclers portray the crusaders as desperate and at the end of their tether. They had succeeded, thanks to Bohemond's initiative in suborning an Armenian captain commanding a tower in the garrison of Antioch, in entering the city and surprising the defenders. The citadel, however, remained under the control of the garrison, and the besiegers found themselves no better off than before: the relieving army sent by Kerboga from Mosul surrounded them and prevented further supplies from reaching them, and they were subject to attack from the citadel as well as siege from outside. By this time, Tatikios had left the siege, so there was no longer any line of communication between them and the Byzantines. Matters were so desperate that Stephen of Blois, the army's quartermaster, who had withdrawn before the entry into the city to the port of St Simeon, gave the expedition up as lost and retreated towards Constantinople (Brundage 1960: 380–95). He met Alexios at Philomelium on his way to join the crusade, but his news dissuaded the emperor from going any further. In Antioch, Bohemond persuaded the crusaders to decline the terms Kerboga offered for their surrender, but to put their trust in the relic of the holy lance that had pierced Christ's side at the crucifixion, that had been discovered after a vision buried under the church of St Andrew in the city. The crusaders mounted as many knights as they could and burst out of the city in a surprise attack on Kerboga's vastly superior forces. The Turks, taken by surprise, were scattered in confusion, and driven away by the crusaders in June 1098. Not surprisingly, after this they considered that Alexios had broken faith with them. By abandoning them to their fate, Alexios had lost Antioch to the crusaders.

It was not until six months after securing Antioch that the crusade continued. The reason for the delay was largely that nobody knew quite what to do next. Adhemar of Le Puy, whose authority alone of all the leaders was unquestioned, died of typhoid in the summer. The emperor had not

shown up to claim his prize; so the crusaders wrote to Urban II, inviting him to take possession of the city. Bohemond alone seems to have had a solution to the dilemma – he would keep Antioch as a personal fief. It is remarkable that during the months of delay, the armies did not disperse; their leaders occupied them instead with securing the region that was to become the principality of Antioch (Asbridge 2000: 42–6). In fact, the insistence of the rank and file on marching south, and their willingness to accept Raymond's sole command in January 1099, is the strongest indication that for most crusaders, Jerusalem was the natural destination of the expedition.

Some of the towns along the route south, such as Tripoli, were glad to submit to the crusaders; others, such as 'Arqah, had to be stormed. But on the whole resistance was light, for the defeat of Kerboga in the north and the Fatimid capture of Jerusalem while the crusaders were at Antioch had left Palestine under no single authority. The crusaders reached the holy city on 7 June, and took it on 15 July. The relatively short siege may appear something of an anticlimax after the travails at Antioch, but success was far from certain. Besides the casualties lost in the two years since crossing to Asia, the army had lost Bohemond, who had stayed behind in Antioch, and Baldwin, who had insinuated himself into mastery of Edessa, and their forces; probably very small in the case of Baldwin, but the survivors of the expedition thus far could ill afford to divide their forces further. The remaining leaders had divided more or less into two factions, with Raymond and his Provençals on one side opposed by the northern French, Normans and Flemish. Jealous rivalry between the leaders increased as the crusade proceeded, but how much this owed to mutual antipathy between different cultures is unclear. Ralph of Caen, Tancred's biographer, declared that Normans and Provençals were as different from each other as ducks and chickens (Bachrach and Bachrach 2005: 86), and the incident in which the Provençal priest who had discovered the holy lance died after being compelled to undergo an ordeal by fire at the behest of the French clergy probably underlined this. Recent writing, however, has suggested that the chroniclers came to see the crusade as an enterprise that bonded participants together, with the result that a new concept of a 'Frankish people' evolved as a consequence of the expedition itself (Murray 1995: 59–73; Bull 1997: 195–211). The siege of Jerusalem, partly because of mutual distrust among the leaders, went badly until two Genoese galleys arrived at Jaffa to supply the necessary wood for building siege engines (France 1994: 334–7). When the crusaders were finally ready to assault the walls, it was Godfrey of Bouillon, encamped on the north side of the city, who made the first breakthrough. He found the defenders were better equipped than the crusaders, and the fighting for control of the walls was desperate.

The ferocity of the battle on 15 July may explain in part the bloodletting that accompanied victory. No two accounts of the massacre are identical, but it seems that a large number of Muslims who had taken refuge in the

al-Aqsa mosque were killed. Modern historians cannot agree on the scale of the massacre, but understandably, those writing from the perspective of the eastern sources have stressed the shock the event caused throughout the Islamic world (Hillenbrand 1999: 63–6; Kedar 2004: 15–75). On the other hand, western historians have argued that the contemporary descriptions are inconsistent and misleading, and that the treatment of the inhabitants, though brutal, fell within the norms observed in western warfare (France 1994: 355–6). At any rate, Raymond d'Aguilers' notorious description of blood rising to the height of the horses' bridles is an image taken from the biblical Book of the Apocalypse rather than a narrative description. There is independent evidence from a Jewish source that many of the Jews of the city were taken to Ascalon to be ransomed, while some Muslims seem to have been enslaved and deported to the countryside, and others may have escaped to Damascus (Prawer 1988: 23–30).

The respite for the victorious crusaders was brief, for in August a large Fatimid army had to be repulsed near Ascalon. As at the Lake Battle and Kerboga's siege of Antioch, this engagement alone could have ended the enterprise, for in each of these cases the Muslims greatly outnumbered the crusaders. One reason for the success of the crusade in attaining its target was superior military skill. The crusaders, having been surprised by Kilij Arslan at Dorylaeum, showed themselves to be adaptable in counteracting the eastern tactics that relied on drawing the charge of the heavily armed westerners until the knights' momentum was spent and they became separated from each other or could be surrounded. At close quarters, the superior weight of western horses and armour would invariably prevail. At Ascalon they benefited from surprise; in both battles at Antioch, Bohemond's resourcefulness in drawing up the army's dispositions was critical.

A further, less tangible element in the crusade's success was the confidence imbued by piety. Unless we are to discredit all the evidence provided by the chronicles, it seems clear that the expedition had a peculiarly religious character. Of course, armies had since the early Middle Ages regularly travelled and fought with clergy who blessed weapons, said Mass and heard confessions before battle (Bachrach 2003: 78–94), but on the First Crusade, the large number of bishops and other clergy, and the probable presence of unarmed pilgrims travelling with the armies for safety, ensured a constant provision of services and prayers. These may have increased in intensity as the expedition progressed, and – at least if the chroniclers are to be believed – their character took on an increasingly apocalyptic aspect. Many of the participants may have seen the expedition in the first place as a harbinger of the last age (McGinn 1978: 33–72; Rubenstein 2011: 45–8). The circumstances of the crusade certainly gave rise to unique religious experiences, the most celebrated – or notorious – being the 'holy lance'. Many crusaders, Adhemar among them, doubted the veracity of the relic, considering it part of a Provençal strategy to wrest the leadership away from Bohemond, but its usefulness as a sign of God's continuing support for the expedition

was incontestable (Morris 1984: 33–45). The lance may not have won the battle against Kerboga, but if some crusaders fought more purposefully because they thought that it would, the strategy was, from their point of view, worthwhile.

A vision related by another priest, Peter Desiderius, persuaded the crusade leaders to hold a penitential procession around the walls of Jerusalem in June 1099. This was of course a highly symbolic act, consciously recalling the Israelites' procession around the walls of Jericho. This was one indication that the crusaders saw themselves as the 'new Israelites' replaying the events of the Old Testament; certainly the chroniclers, such as Raymond d'Aguilers, who called the Muslim enemy 'Amalekites', 'Canaanites', and so on, seem to have thought along these lines. By this stage of the expedition – three years after having left home, having suffered disease, hunger, extremes of temperature, and the loss of horses, friends and family – it must have been a suggestion hard for most crusaders to resist. It is all the more striking in that by this time, the clerical leadership of the crusade had declined through the deaths of Adhemar and many of the senior clergy and the appointment of others as bishops in newly conquered territories. Nevertheless, the penitential character of the expedition had already been stressed during the siege of Antioch, when harsh penalties were meted out to a couple caught in adultery, and prostitutes were expelled from the camp.

The disunity of the Islamic Near East has often been cited as a reason for the crusade's success. It is true that the crusaders profited from divisions between Kilij Arslan and Danishmend in Asia Minor, though in Syria they faced an army made up of forces from the supposedly rival Muslim leaders of Mosul, Homs and Damascus. To some extent this is in any case a red herring, for either Ridwan or the Fatimid army at Ascalon in August 1099 could by themselves have defeated the crusaders. The lack of coordinated resistance between June 1098 and June 1099 was the crusaders' reward for the defeat of Kerboga.

Political settlement in Jerusalem, 1099–c.1118

The intention of the crusade had been to recover territory, but no provision had been made for retaining, much less governing it. Even before the capture of Jerusalem, the crusaders had clearly begun to think in terms of some kind of ecclesiastical supervision, as appointments to bishoprics that were probably vacant, such as Albara in north Syria, and Lydda in Palestine, demonstrate (Hamilton 1980: 10, 11). A body of opinion in the army in July 1099 considered that Jerusalem itself should form an ecclesiastical lordship, as was common in many western cities, but in the event the claims of the secular leaders prevailed. There were few senior clerics left alive by this stage, and none with the authority or prestige to take control of Jerusalem. The choice fell between the only two leaders who had declared



Map 3.1 The Crusader States, 1144–1187.



Figure 3.2 After the capture of Jerusalem in July 1099, Godfrey of Bouillon was elected as ruler of the city, taking the title 'Defender of the Holy Sepulchre'. From a thirteenth-century northern French manuscript of William of Tyre's *Chronicle*.

Source: © The British Library Board (BL Yates Thompson MS 12 f. 46).

an intention to remain in Jerusalem, Godfrey and Raymond. The circumstances of Godfrey's election in July 1099 and the meaning of the title have been minutely studied (Riley-Smith 1979: 83–6; Murray 1990: 163–78). Although Raymond of Saint-Gilles justifiably regarded himself as the leader of the crusade from autumn 1098 onward, he was isolated among the leaders. The realisation that he commanded insufficient support to defend Jerusalem alone probably lay behind his pious refusal of a crown on the grounds that only Christ could wear a crown in Jerusalem. The title taken by Godfrey may have been a clever response to a stratagem on Raymond's part to dissuade others from assuming rulership, but, as Murray has shown, it was an office already familiar to the duke of Lorraine (2000: 74–7).

The crucial factor underwriting Godfrey's authority, in any case, was the contingent of troops from Lorraine who remained with him in Jerusalem. The army of Godfrey and his brothers Eustace and Baldwin was composed overwhelmingly of vassals of the Ardennes–Bouillon dynasty (Murray 1992: 301–29). The willingness of sufficient numbers to remain behind in Godfrey's service assured the continuation of the dynasty after Godfrey's death in August 1100. By holding the Tower of David in the name of Baldwin until he could arrive in Jerusalem in November 1100, the Lorrainers foiled an attempt by Daimbert, the patriarch of Jerusalem, to seize power for himself. Daimbert, who had been associated with the crusade since its inception (he was among the bishops who accompanied Urban II in France in 1095–6), was sent to the East by Urban with a Pisan fleet, but by the time he arrived in December 1099 the issue of rulership had been settled, and he had to content himself with what looks like a compromise – the complicity of Godfrey in deposing Arnulf of Choques from the patriarchate in his favour (Hamilton 1980: 16). Even before Godfrey's death, however, Daimbert had succeeded in extracting temporal concessions from him on behalf of the patriarchate, presumably in return for the use of his fleet. As in July 1099, however, Daimbert was away from Jerusalem at the critical moment – on this occasion besieging Haifa – and the opportunity to secure mastery of the city was lost.

Baldwin I could not afford to share his brother's scruples about accepting a crown. The royal title and, more important, the rite of anointing that accompanied coronation, were necessary to confirm Baldwin's position as a ruler chosen by God rather than by his vassals. Besides Daimbert, Baldwin also faced the recalcitrance of Tancred, who had attempted to seize Haifa in order to form an autonomous lordship based in the Galilee but with access to the sea. There was little reason for Tancred, who was not a Lotharingian and owed nothing to the dynasty, to have committed himself to supporting Godfrey in 1099, nor to have sworn loyalty to his younger brother a year later. The adoption of the crown by Baldwin, however, raised the stakes for those who might have thought they could carve out autonomous lordships from their newly conquered territories. Which way a struggle between Tancred and Baldwin might have been decided was never put to the test,

however, since Tancred was summoned to the north to take over the regency of Antioch when Bohemond was captured by the Danishmends in 1100.

Once the initial succession problem had been resolved, most of Baldwin's reign was devoted to the extension of the new kingdom. At the time of his coronation, the kingdom consisted only of the city and its immediate environment, including Bethlehem, and a corridor leading to Jaffa and including Ramla. Baldwin's apparent dependence on the Pisans, Genoese and Venetians – and the consequent commercial privileges he assigned to them – is explained by the need to capture the ports. Caesarea fell in 1101, Acre in 1104 and Sidon (thanks to a Norwegian fleet this time) in 1110, but not until the capture of Tyre in 1124 was the coastline secure, and Ascalon remained in Egyptian hands until 1153. The acquisition of new lands and properties was crucial to the state's survival, because in order to be able to defend it against external attack, the king needed a body of knights under arms; such a body, however, could only be maintained if he had the means to reward them with land, property or money. Defence, moreover, was a constant priority: although Baldwin defeated an Egyptian army in 1101, he was in turn badly beaten a year later, and further Egyptian attacks had to be sustained in 1105–6, 1107 and 1111–12, while in 1113 the dangerous Mawdud of Mosul invaded the kingdom with Damascene support. The interior of the kingdom remained insecure: in 1106–7, the visiting Russian abbot Daniel required a military escort to travel north from Jerusalem to the Galilee through Samaria.

All this had to be accomplished from a very small base of manpower. Proportions are easier to calculate than exact figures. Out of the 659 definite or probable first crusaders identified by Riley-Smith (1997: 19), only 104 are known to have stayed in the East. Not all of these settled in Jerusalem, and some were clerics. Murray (2000: 98–9) reports figures of 250–300 knights at the first battle of Ramla (September 1101), but a year later only 200 fought, many of whom had recently arrived from the West. By 1105 Baldwin was able to put 500 knights into the field, and in 1110, 600. The increase in the numbers of knights as the reign progressed was partly due to new settle-ment. One of the biggest gaps in our knowledge of the early kingdom is the nature and extent of settlement in the East outside the major expeditions of 1096–1101, but one indication is Riley-Smith's calculation that of the 697 settlers from before 1131 whose circumstances are known, only 122 had taken the cross in 1096–1101. Some of Baldwin's manpower came from temporary help offered by knightly pilgrims, such as a group of English knights in 1106, or King Sigurd of Norway and his followers in 1110, but there must also have been a steady stream of new settlers from the West. Systematic research is needed to track the nature and extent of knightly immigration to the newly conquered territories, and to determine whether any regions of the West in particular were targeted for recruitment or responded to the need for new knights. Norman Italy and Sicily, especially Apulia and Campania, may have been one such region (Murray 2009: 61–85).

The influx of knights to the East is one explanation for the continued survival of the vulnerable new states founded in the wake of the crusade. Another is their political cogency.

One characteristic of the new kingdom was the regional composition of its baronage. Besides the Lorrainer vassals of Godfrey and his brothers, many of whom seem to have died before 1100, a significant number of knights from Flanders, Picardy and the Île de France formed part of the baronage of the new kingdom. The prominence of certain extended families is also noteworthy. The Montlhéry family, related by marriage to the Ardennes–Bouillon ruling dynasty, established an influential network thanks to the participation of fourteen members of the clan in the First Crusade (Riley-Smith 1997: 171). By c.1115 Montlhérys held fiefs from the Euphrates to the Jordan, and they also numbered among them senior clerics such as Gilduin, abbot of Notre-Dame de Josaphat. The Courtenay dynasty that was to rule Edessa until the mid-twelfth century and subsequently to become one of the major baronial families of the kingdom of Jerusalem was descended from a Montlhéry daughter. William of Tyre, indeed, was later to remark on the extraordinary progenitive powers of the four daughters of Guy I and Hodierna of Montlhéry. Although well connected, the Montlhérys were not in origin a family of great importance outside a small area in the Île de France. The first generation of settlement in the East provided them with opportunities to acquire power on a new scale.

That such families were so characteristic a feature of the new settlement also reveals in part why the crown was able, despite a shortage of manpower and vulnerability to Egyptian attack, to build up its authority in the new kingdom with comparative ease. The only great magnates to remain behind in the East were those who established themselves at the head of new political entities – Godfrey and his brother Baldwin, Bohemond in Antioch and Raymond of Saint-Gilles, after 1101, in Tripoli. With the exception of Tancred, who in any case soon removed himself from the scene, most of the fief-holders in the new kingdom had been directly dependent on or related to the ruling dynasty before 1099. Moreover, most can be classed as belonging to the lower ranks of the landowning classes – if we take the Montlhérys as an example, families whose influence had been limited to defined regions where they might have been castellans or hereditary lords of a castle. The kingdom of Jerusalem thus had, in its first generation at least, no ‘higher baronage’ corresponding to that in the West.

The process by which new land was distributed also contributed to this situation. Godfrey and Baldwin created few lordships beyond Haifa and Hebron, though after 1101 Baldwin was able to take Tiberias into his gift. In part this reflects the slow pace of expansion, but even new conquests, such as Arsuf (1101) and Acre became part of the royal domain. Baldwin seems to have been anxious to create a strong landed basis for royal power. Nevertheless, he had to provide for his knights the resources that would enable them to remain in the kingdom. One way in which the kingdom of

Jerusalem is usually thought by historians to have differed from western feudal states in its potential for allotting pecuniary as well as landed resources. Baldwin made use of revenues from various royal properties to establish 'money fiefs' (fiefs *en bezant*); for example, in 1107 Gerard the Chamberlain was given income from the revenues of Jaffa, a royal property, while Robert of Apulia was given the farm of tribute from the local Muslim population in Arsuf (Murray 2000: 113). Such tributes were a valuable source of cash – in 1106 and 1107 Baldwin accepted payments from the still unconquered cities of Sidon and Tyre in return for breaking off his sieges – that could be used in lieu of landed property to create nominal fiefs. Plunder from battle against the Egyptians or from raiding beyond the kingdom's borders was also a means of supplementing resources – according to Albert of Aachen, Baldwin's campaign south-east of the Jordan into the Wadi Musa in 1112 was undertaken to gather booty from caravans. Because the kingdom was a more urban society than that in the West, greater potential existed for granting out as fiefs property in towns that could be let or sold, or from which commercial profits could be realised (Prawer 1980: 154). The royal demesne also included villages, with their agricultural resources, fortresses and fiscal rights such as the collection of the head-tax imposed on non-Franks.

The circumstances of the young kingdom's survival also contributed to the growing authority of the crown *vis-à-vis* the barons. The king was almost constantly at war, either for defence or to extend territory, and this naturally resulted in a high turnover of fief holders from death in battle or imprisonment. The lack of continuity among baronial families in the first generation after settlement has been extensively analysed (Tibbles 1989: 5–65). For example, five unrelated knights held the lordship of Hebron between 1100 and 1135, while Galilee was held successively by four unrelated lords before 1120. Not all of these changes in tenure are known for certain to have been caused by the death of the fief holder, but it is striking that in none of these instances did an heir succeed to the lordship. This may have been because the fief holder had not yet produced an heir – particularly in the early years after 1099, the number of eligible Frankish women for marriage must have been rather small. The rapid turnover of lords in two of the major fiefs in the kingdom is particularly remarkable when we consider that during this general period the baronial classes in the West were striving to make hereditary succession to lands and offices an accepted principle. To compare the situation in the kingdom of Jerusalem with the intricate manoeuvres by barons and rulers in France or England at the same time is to appreciate the relative simplicity of the political map in the East, at least as far as the crown was concerned. The vested interests of landed families, and the webs of rights and jurisdictions that went to make up lordship had been spun over many generations of intermarriage, acquisition and conflict. None of this existed in the new states in the East – not, at least, among western settlers. Whether by design or force of circumstance, Baldwin I was able

to achieve the reversion of fiefs to the crown, and thus to reserve the right of patronage to new lords.

The general picture of emerging feudal relations in the kingdom of Jerusalem thus suggests domination of the baronage by the crown. However, political events do not invariably complement this picture. In particular, the question of succession to the throne provided opportunities for the barons to determine policy. Thus, in 1116–17, pressure from the secular barons and the patriarch forced Baldwin I to repudiate his wife, Adelaide of Sicily. The marriage to Adelaide, contracted in 1112–13, had never been popular, because it guaranteed the succession to Adelaide's son from her first marriage, Roger II of Sicily, in the event that it produced no heirs. Such an arrangement ignored the claims of Baldwin's surviving brother, Eustace, count of Boulogne, who as a crusader in 1096–9 was better known, and probably more popular, than Roger (Murray 2000: 15–16). When Baldwin fell ill in 1116, the barons were able to act through the instrument of a council presided over by the patriarch.

In 1118, when Baldwin died on campaign, the barons once again acted decisively to determine the succession. According to Albert of Aachen, Baldwin had designated Eustace as his heir, with his more distant relative, Baldwin of Le Bourcq, who had succeeded him as count of Edessa in 1100, as reserve choice in the event that Eustace declined the offer. William of Tyre, describing the events sixty years later, invoked the idea of a strict hereditary principle according to which Eustace should have succeeded. But a group of nobles, led by the former patriarch Arnulf of Choques and Joscelin of Courtenay – who doubtless hoped to take over in Edessa – argued Baldwin's case on the grounds of pragmatism. Eustace, who had been count of Boulogne since 1088, was almost past campaigning age and the kingdom would be leaderless until he could come out to the East. Baldwin I died on 2 April, and Baldwin of Le Bourcq was crowned only days later. The speed of events makes this look very like a *coup d'état* on behalf of Baldwin – who by coincidence happened to be in Jerusalem at the time of Baldwin I's death. A war of succession might have ensued, because Eustace did in fact set out to claim his crown, but turned back when he heard of Baldwin II's coronation. If this was a *coup* engineered by Baldwin and a section of the baronage, who formed the rival factions? Murray (1994: 60–85; 2000: 120–3) surmises the existence of a 'legitimist party' who supported Eustace's claim. On the other side, Baldwin II, son of the count of Rethel, was related to the Montlhéry family, and it is certainly suggestive that the new king granted the important fief of Tiberias to William of Bures, a knightly vassal of the Montlhérys back in the West, and created a new fief, Jaffa, out of the royal demesne, for Hugh II of Le Puiset, another Montlhéry descendant. It certainly looks as though a closely related group of barons advanced each other's interests in order to gain influence in the new kingdom. In the process, they signalled the beginning of a more powerful baronial class.

At Baldwin I's death in 1118 the kingdom of Jerusalem, though still vulnerable, was a viable political territory. All but two of the ports as far north as Beirut were in royal hands. Capable use of small numbers of knights had secured the Egyptian frontier and extended Frankish influence east of the Jordan. A document of 1104 reveals that Baldwin even seems to have entertained the idea of conquering Egypt. Fiefs had been established through a resourceful combination of grants, while at the same time a royal demesne had been built up. Baldwin had encouraged settlement from the West and brought Christians from across the Jordan to settle in the kingdom. Much of this had been accomplished through the continued support of western arms, and without such aid it is difficult to imagine that Baldwin II would have had a kingdom to inherit. The extent to which western support could be channelled to constructive uses by the kings of Jerusalem would be crucial in the coming years.

Settlement in the north, 1098–1119

Occupation of towns in Cilicia and northern Syria probably began as a strategy to secure the First Crusade's passage into the vicinity of Antioch and to defend the army's flanks during the siege of the city. After the capture of Antioch, the leaders grabbed what they could in rather piecemeal fashion during the long delay before marching south to Jerusalem. The formation of the principality of Antioch was therefore the work of the First Crusade itself, rather than of Bohemond. Antioch's geographical situation, close to regional centres of Muslim population such as Aleppo, Homs and Shaizar, and between equally warlike rivals for power – the Danishmendids, the Seljuqs of Rum, the atabegs of north Syria and the Armenians of Cilicia – made it more vulnerable than Jerusalem. In addition to this, the Byzantine emperors never renounced their claim to a city they had controlled until 1085.

Bohemond himself had little impact on the state he founded. Captured by the Danishmend emir in 1100, he was only released (in an episode that became the subject of a romantic interlude in Orderic Vitalis' chronicle) in 1103, and returned to the West to raise an army for a new crusade in 1105. His invasion of the Byzantine Empire in fulfilment of this resulted in defeat in 1108, and he died in Apulia in 1111. His magnificent tomb in Canosa, Apulia, bears witness to the eclectic cultural ambience in which his life was played out. Huddled in the lee of the cathedral, it is easy to overlook, but its distinctive dome echoes the architecture of the holy city, and the inscriptions on the bronze doors – a Byzantinising touch – proclaimed him as a defender of Christendom against the pagans. Tancred, who acted as regent for Bohemond and his son from 1100–3 and 1105–12, was responsible for the real work of construction and consolidation in Antioch. It was he who recovered the Cilician towns of Tarsus, Mamistra and Adana from the Byzantines and captured Latakia. The Franks of north Syria, however, were

undone by their own ambition, for the joint attempt to take Harran by forces under the leadership of Tancred, Bohemond, Baldwin of le Bourcq and Joscelin of Courtenay, led to a crushing defeat in 1104. As a result of this the Cilician towns shrugged off Antiochene rulership in favour of Byzantine; but more seriously, Tancred's control of the Jebel as-Summaq and Ruj valley, which acted as a natural defence against Aleppo, was ended. At least seven strongholds were lost to Ridwan.

It was the defeat at Harran that prompted Bohemond to return to the West to launch the crusade of 1107. In some ways this expedition was a precursor of the more notorious crusade of 1202–4 that also ended with an attack against the Byzantines rather than the Turks. What eventually transpired should not obscure the fact that the crusade was preached by papal commission throughout the West, and that contemporaries regarded it as an expedition to reinforce the conquests of 1097–9. Bohemond's insistence on besieging Durazzo seems to have been articulated as an act of vengeance against an ally who had proved to be faithless (Richard 1999: 129), but there was probably a conscious policy behind it. Bohemond reasoned that in order to secure his north Syrian possessions, he would have to defeat the Byzantines as well as Ridwan, and the blow may as well be struck in one Byzantine territory as in another. We should also note that while Bohemond was tying down imperial forces in the West, Tancred was able to retake Cilicia and Latakia.

The terms of the treaty of Devol (1108) have been interpreted in different ways. Ralph-Johannes Lilie argued that the treaty, as recorded by Anna Komnena (Sewter 1969: 424–34) represented a complex network of clauses designed to restrict Bohemond's effectiveness in Syria, and, moreover, that it demonstrated Alexios' understanding of western feudal law (Lilie 1993: 77–8). In contrast, Asbridge has countered that the treaty derived from Greek as well as western precedents, and that Alexios wished to regard Antioch as falling under the umbrella of *pronoia* arrangements (Asbridge 2000: 95–8). The fundamental point is that Alexios, recognising the impossibility of driving Bohemond out of Antioch, tried to absorb him into the structure of Byzantine rule. Bohemond was to retain Antioch until his death, with the title of *dux*; his lands were to include St Simeon and the coast, the towns of Baghras and Artah and the Latin possessions in the Jebel as-Summaq. Latakia and Cilicia, however, were to revert to direct Byzantine rule. Lilie's conclusion that Bohemond did well out of the treaty (1993: 79) is hardly borne out by this attempt to restrict Antioch to its borders after Harran, for much of what the emperor granted to Bohemond (including Aleppo itself) was still in Muslim hands (Asbridge 2000: 98). The terms of the treaty may look lenient, but their intention was to ensure recognition by Bohemond and the Antiochenes of Alexios' position as emperor and, as such, Bohemond's overlord (Harris 2003: 79–80).

The treaty in any case remained academic, for Tancred, who continued to exercise the regency until his death in 1112, did not consider himself to

be bound by it. By the time that Roger of Salerno succeeded him, the principality had been extended in all directions to encompass Cilicia to the north-west, Latakia, Jabala and Apamea to the south, the Jebel as-Summaq and, to the north-east, the strategically important town of Marash. Short of conquering the Muslim states of Shaizar or Aleppo, there was little room for further expansion. Consolidation, however, came to an abrupt end with the disastrous defeat known as the Field of Blood (1119). The defeat was all the more crushing for having followed a period after Ridwan's death (1114) in which Aleppo had more or less become an Antiochene tributary. Surrounded by Latin fortresses, the Aleppans abandoned a policy of appeasement and alliance, and appealed to Il-Ghazi, ruler of Mardin. Il-Ghazi probably had no thought of destroying Antiochene power, but intended only to restore to Aleppo strongholds that lay between the two cities (Asbridge 2000: 75). In the event, however, Roger allowed his army to be trapped near al-Atharib; on the Field of Blood, he himself was killed in a massacre from which only 150 Frankish knights escaped. Antioch was saved by the intervention of Baldwin II of Jerusalem, who between 1119 and 1123 restored the strongholds beyond the Orontes. Although its territorial integrity was secured, the principality would for much of the rest of the twelfth century rely periodically on aid from Jerusalem in order to retain its frontiers from Muslim threat and its independence from Byzantine claims to suzerainty.

In military and demographic terms, Antioch was the most important of the Frankish states in the north. The first to be established, however, was Edessa. Baldwin I, having been invited by the Armenian population to drive the Turks from the area between the Taurus mountains and the Euphrates, managed to profit from quarrels among the Armenians to seize control of Edessa early in 1098. Enough crusaders remained with him to establish a county, but the westerners were always a small minority in a population of Armenians, Syrian Orthodox Christians and Turks. Despite the departure of Baldwin I for Jerusalem in 1100, and the capture of the second count, Baldwin of Le Bourcq, and Joscelin of Courtenay in the attempt to capture the nearby city of Harran in 1104, Edessa survived the first generation of crusader settlement in vigorous health. Alexios Komnenos regarded it as part of Byzantine territory – in 1097 it was ruled by a Greek-appointed Armenian, Thoros – and may have granted it as a dukedom to Bohemond at Devol (Asbridge 2000: 98), but Antioch and Edessa practised mutual cooperation in military affairs. Bohemond's capture in 1100 came about as he was answering an appeal from Baldwin, and Franks from Antioch and Edessa fought in alliance at Harran. Close relations developed while Tancred acted as regent for Edessa during Baldwin's captivity. Antioch was prepared to stretch its own resources in order to protect Latin rule in Edessa, but whether this was out of a sense of confraternity between frontier states, or because Bohemond and Tancred cast envious eyes on the rich natural resources of its northern neighbour (WT 1986: 504–6) must remain

conjectural. In fact, Baldwin of Le Bourcq had already done homage to Baldwin I in 1100, and although Tancred seems to have wanted Edessa to acknowledge Antiochene suzerainty, this was never enforced. In 1109–10 Tancred's attempt to claim Antiochene suzerainty over Edessa was rebuked by Baldwin. In 1108, on Baldwin's release from captivity, Tancred allied with Ridwan in order to lock the count out, but after a battle near Tell Bashir between Tancred and his Muslim ally, and Baldwin and the atabeg of Mosul on the other, order was restored. The most significant aspect of this unedifying scrap was the willingness of Latin and Turkish rulers to cooperate. After the 'righteous violence' against the Muslims on the crusade, the Franks were becoming sucked into the political complexities of the Near East. Edessa's vulnerability to Turkish attack was graphically demonstrated in 1110–11 when Mawdud, atabeg of Mosul, joined with Tughtegin of Damascus to ravage the county. The lands to the east of the Euphrates, which were hardest hit, never really recovered.

The last of the Latin states to be established as a result of the crusade was Tripoli. This was something of a consolation prize for Raymond of Saint-Gilles, who had been disappointed at Jerusalem. His leadership of the crusaders of 1101 doubtless owed a good deal to the expectation that he could still re-establish himself in the East. In the event, however, his humiliation was completed by being forced to give an undertaking to Tancred, then regent of Antioch, not to make any conquests on the coast south of Antioch. On Tancred's part, this was probably not so much dislike of Raymond as the fear that the count would insist on returning any conquests to the Byzantines. In the event, however, Raymond forswore his oath and by 1105, when he died, he had taken Tortosa and Gibelet and begun the siege of Tripoli. This was not completed until 1109, when his son, Bertrand, arrived. Bertrand's arrival enabled the kingdom of Jerusalem to act, for the first but not the last time, as arbiter between the competing claims of the Latin rulers. For Bertrand was opposed by William Jordan, Raymond's cousin, who had maintained the siege of Tripoli since 1105, and who had called upon Tancred for help. Baldwin I took the opportunity to settle the grievances of Baldwin of Le Bourcq against Tancred regarding Edessa at the same time; outflanked, Tancred and William Jordan had to give way. Tancred gained something from the settlement on behalf of Antioch, however, for William Jordan was allowed to hold 'Arqah as a vassal of Antioch. Baldwin I gained far more for Jerusalem, however. Bertrand was given Tripoli and its environs, as a vassal of Jerusalem. In the event, even Antioch's suzerain status over the northern part of the embryonic state was curtailed by the sudden death of William Jordan and the reversion of 'Arqah to Bertrand. The deaths of Tancred and Bertrand in 1112 engendered closer relations between Tripoli and Antioch. Pons, Bertrand's son, married Tancred's widow Cecilia, and the county of Tripoli achieved a quiet stability.

It has been argued that the council of Tripoli in 1109–10 demonstrates the existence of a kind of confraternity among the Latin rulers in the East

(Asbridge 2000: 117). It is difficult to know what the terms of such a confraternity might have been, beyond the recognition of the king of Jerusalem as the senior member. Tancred was forced to accept terms in a council because he realised that he could not stand against the combined forces of Jerusalem and Edessa, together with Bertrand's Provençals. But Baldwin had no authority in feudal custom to summon Tancred, and according to Albert of Aachen, he resorted to a formula on behalf of the 'universal church of Jerusalem' in order to do so. The council demonstrated that, ten years after the crusade, the Latin rulers were using any method available to them to maintain and expand conquered territory, much as they and their ancestors had done in the West. They regarded conquests as heritable land to be ruled according to feudal custom as far as possible and passed on to heirs. Mutual protection was important because the loss of any of the lands to the Turks – or the Byzantines – would threaten all; but where given, it did not necessarily imply dependence. When the agreement was put to the test by Mawdud's invasion of Edessa in 1110, the Armenian chronicler Matthew of Edessa and the Arab historian Ibn al-Qalanisi believed that Tancred had to be begged to join Baldwin I and the other Latin rulers (Asbridge 2000: 119–20); and in the event, Tancred took little part in the campaign to fortify Edessa. There was little evidence, in truth, of the spirit of Frankish unity that had so impressed Fulcher of Chartres during the crusade.



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4 Politics and war in the Crusader States, 1118–87

Key Dates

1118	Baldwin II succeeds his cousin Baldwin I as king of Jerusalem
1119	Il-Ghazi defeats Antioch at Battle of the Field of Blood
1123	capture of Tyre with Venetian naval help
1129	Melisende marries Count Fulk V of Anjou; Council of Troyes approves Templar Order; kingdom of Jerusalem attacks Damascus
1131	Melisende and Fulk crowned
1137	Emperor John Komnenos invades Cilicia
1144 (Christmas)	Zengi captures Edessa; Krak des Chevaliers ceded by count of Tripoli to Hospitallers
1145	Pope Eugenius' bull <i>Quantum praedecessores</i> launches Second Crusade
1148	Second Crusade fails to capture Damascus
1149	Raymond of Poitiers killed; Antiochenes defeated at Inab
1150–2	war between Baldwin III and Melisende
1158–9	Emperor Manuel Komnenos enforces suzerainty over Antioch
1167–9	Amalric I's attempted invasions of Egypt in alliance with Byzantines
1174	Baldwin IV, suffering from leprosy, succeeds to throne of Jerusalem
1177	Baldwin IV defeats Saladin at Montgisard
1178	Saladin captures Templar castle at Jacob's Ford
1180	Baldwin IV's sister Sybil marries Guy de Lusignan
1182	Reynald of Châtillon raids Red Sea coast of Arabia
1183	Saladin invades kingdom of Jerusalem but is repulsed
1186	Sybil and Guy crowned king and queen of Jerusalem
1187	Saladin defeats kingdom of Jerusalem at Hattin

The political development of the Crusader States in the twelfth century was marked by internal structural factors, such as succession to the throne of Jerusalem and the relationships between rulers and the developing settler aristocracy. War against the neighbouring Muslim states was endemic, but the lack of political unity in Islam in the first half of the twelfth century allowed the Franks to establish strong kingship in Jerusalem. The main themes of this chapter are:

- how the Franks dealt with problems of dynastic succession;
- how extra military resources were found through the establishment of the Military Orders;
- how relations between the Franks in the East and in the West affected the security of the Crusader States.

Political developments in Outremer, 1118–44

The death of a king without a clearly recognised heir in the Middle Ages could not fail to threaten the stability of his kingdom. The succession of Baldwin II was effectively a *coup d'état* that polarised baronial opinion in the kingdom into a 'legitimist' faction that supported the Bouillon dynastic claim and a 'pragmatic' group that preferred to elect the closest relative already in the East (Murray 1994: 60–85; Riley-Smith 1997: 173–4). This dynamic was to repeat itself several times during the twelfth century; indeed, the relationship between the settler nobility, the ruling dynasty and their kin in the West is one of the most enduring ways of understanding the problems experienced by the kingdom of Jerusalem in this period (Smail 1969: 1–20; Phillips 1996: *passim*).

The succession of Baldwin II brought to the ascendancy a new kinship group, that of the Rethel–Courtenay–Montlhéry. Baldwin's patronage of those who had brought him to power – Joscelin of Tiberias, for example, who was a Courtenay, became count of Edessa, while Hugh of Le Puiset, a Montlhéry, was made count of Jaffa – effectively replaced a Lotharingian élite with a northern French one. These changes can be seen not only in the transfer of fiefs to a new aristocracy, but in the personnel involved in day-to-day governance. Hans Mayer's exhaustive study of the chancellery of the kingdom of Jerusalem shows how the heart of royal administration – those who drafted the letters, deeds and memoranda that recorded grants made by the crown – reflected changes at the top, as the Normans and northern French who had appeared with Baldwin II were themselves marginalised with the arrival on the throne of the Angevin Fulk in 1131 (Mayer 2010: I, 59–78). Murray has suggested plausibly that members of this kin grouping in the West, whose semi-independence from the throne in the Capetian royal demesne had been circumscribed by the vigorous policies of Louis VI (1107–37), naturally gravitated to Outremer, where they might receive large rewards in a new frontier territory. The underlying tensions

that this caused within the baronial class were revealed when Baldwin II was captured in north Syria in 1123. During the sixteen months of his captivity, an approach was made, presumably by the 'legitimist' barons in Jerusalem, to Charles, count of Flanders, to depose Baldwin in his absence and rule in his stead (Murray 1994: 69–75; 2000, 124–46). Eustace of Boulogne was probably considered too old (and he may in any case already have become a monk by 1123), which left Charles as the active head of the Ardennes–Bouillon dynasty. In the event Charles' refusal of the offer and Baldwin II's return to the kingdom in 1125 led to further royal patronage of 'new men', such as the Brisebarres, doubtless in an attempt to surround the throne with trusted supporters to counteract the influence of the 'legitimists'.

The insecurity of the new dynasty was underlined by the continuing problem of succession. Baldwin's four children were all daughters, which meant that a husband had to be sought for the eldest, Melisende. The decision to find a husband in the West to rule as Melisende's consort was natural. Whoever was chosen would be responsible for the military leadership of the kingdom; in the 1120s the Armenians of Cilicia were militarily not powerful enough, and the Byzantines too much of a threat in the North, to be considered – even if such a choice had been acceptable to the Latin settlers. But because he had married an Armenian princess while count of Edessa, Baldwin had no western in-laws who might supply an eligible bachelor; moreover, the danger from the dispossessed Boulogne dynasty had not vanished, for Eustace's daughter Matilda had married Stephen, count of Blois, who was himself a descendant of William the Conqueror, and who might relish the opportunity to press a claim to a throne. Baldwin's policies after his release centred on aggression, and Damascus had been identified from 1125 onward as a target. The search for a husband in 1127 can be linked to the attempt to recruit western knights for an assault on Damascus, which some historians identify as a 'crusade' (Phillips 1996: 19–43). This explains in large measure the choice of Fulk V, count of Anjou, as Melisende's consort. Already in middle age, Fulk had valuable military resources and, as ruler of a powerful territory in north-western France that had proved able to defy both Normandy and the Capetians, considerable experience of warfare. Moreover, from his first marriage Fulk had already secured the succession for Anjou in his son Geoffrey, and was thus free to take up new responsibilities in the East. Above all, perhaps, Fulk was familiar to the barons of Outremer from the armed pilgrimage he had undertaken in 1120, and may already at that stage have been an active supporter of the Templars (Barber 1994a: 11; Phillips 1996: 30). Although that expedition may not have been a direct response to the disaster of the Field of Blood a year earlier, it was close enough to those events for it to look as though Fulk was a sympathetic and eager supporter of the new Frankish states in the East.

The import of a western consort was a measure to which the kingdom of Jerusalem would be driven again in the 1170s, 1180s–90s and 1210s.

In such cases, the military advantages of an alliance with a western dynasty were accompanied by an equivalent threat to the stability of royal/baronial relations posed by the arrival of the consort's entourage of household knights, for whom positions and offices had to be found to compensate those they had left behind in the West. The effect of Fulk's patronage after his succession with Melisende in 1131 has been studied in depth by Mayer, who concluded that although Fulk did surround himself with 'new men', these were not invariably Angevins, and indeed that he retained some of Baldwin II's favourites, such as Walter Brisebarre (1988: 1–25). The overall effect of Fulk's arrival, however, can be assessed in the revolt of Hugh II of Le Puiset, count of Jaffa, who was one of Baldwin II's protégés. William of Tyre represented the revolt of 1134 as the result of a love affair between the count and Melisende, but this looks like the deliberate romanticising of a political crisis. The fact that Hugh's revolt failed for lack of sufficient support among the barons should not disguise its significance. Hugh was acting on behalf of the interests of Melisende, whom Fulk had a tendency to sideline early in his reign, and of their heir, Baldwin, born in 1129. Indeed, it was to guard against such an eventuality that on his deathbed Baldwin II in 1131 named the two-year-old as joint heir with Melisende and Fulk. Another layer of interpretation is provided by Mayer's analysis of Hugh's background and adherents, for although Hugh's family came from the Île de France, he had grown up in Apulia and came to represent the Normans in the kingdom, many of whom were dispossessed by Fulk in favour of Angevins (Mayer 1990: 870–5). Hugh was thus identifying himself with the cause of nobles whose hold on crown offices and castles had been threatened by newcomers. Such an analysis makes perfect sense in the wider European context, where for example the last decades of Norman rule in England were characterised by struggles between rivals for crown patronage.

The reign of Baldwin II also highlighted growing differences between the interests of the barons of Jerusalem and those of the northern states. Whereas the threat from Egypt had receded in the first decade of crusader occupation, the Seljuq rulers of north Syria posed constant dangers to Antioch and Edessa. The defeat at the Field of Blood left Antioch vulnerable, and the death of Prince Roger in the battle made a regency necessary until the legitimate heir, Bohemond II, came of age. During the first half of his reign, therefore, Baldwin II acted as military protector of Antioch, much to the disgust of Jerusalem's barons who complained of his neglect of the kingdom. Indeed, Baldwin's (ultimately unsuccessful) strategy against Damascus, pursued from 1125–9, may have derived from his inclination to see Antioch's defence as integral to the security of Jerusalem. The marriage of his daughter Alice to Bohemond II cemented an apparently growing bond. All this changed abruptly, however, when Bohemond II was killed in 1130. The lengths to which Alice was prepared to go to retain sole authority – which included an appeal for assistance to Zengi, atabeg of Mosul – forced Baldwin to march north again to discipline his daughter. When Baldwin

himself died a year later, however, Alice was able to count on support from Pons, count of Tripoli and Joscelin, count of Edessa, and the new régime in Jerusalem appeared isolated.

Antioch now faced a similar dilemma to that faced by Jerusalem in the 1120s: the need to find a husband as consort for a female heir. In 1134, when Fulk intervened, Constance, the daughter of Alice and Bohemond II, was only six, and could not be married for another six years (Phillips 1996: 50). A betrothal could, however, be arranged once she was seven, and in the circumstances it made sense to initiate proceedings early. Alice favoured a Byzantine marriage, a proposal that might be politically difficult for the Antiochene nobility, most of whom were of Norman or northern French descent, but had strong connections with relatives in southern Italy, to accept, but that would ensure imperial protection for the principality. Some Antiochenes were pragmatic enough to support what would amount to an acknowledgement of Byzantine claims (Asbridge 2003: 29–47). But in the event, Fulk was asked to suggest a suitable husband, and chose Raymond of Poitiers, younger son of William IX of Aquitaine. So young was Constance, and so ambitious for power was Alice, that according to William of Tyre, Alice was duped into accepting Raymond for her daughter's hand by being led to assume that he was proposing to her (WT 1986: 658–9). In fact the machinations over the marriage were probably more prosaic and revolved around Alice's desire to retain control over her heiress (Phillips 1996: 60–1, 65–6). Raymond was a revealing choice for Fulk to have made, given that he had himself been approached only a few years earlier to fulfil the same role for Jerusalem for which he now proposed Raymond. It was also a risky one, for although Raymond's pedigree was impeccable, and although he had crusading connections through his father, he was young (probably in his mid twenties, though perhaps younger), and can hardly have had the same military or political experience as Fulk (Phillips 1996: 53–7). This deficiency might have been crucial at a time when Antioch was in considerable peril after Zengi's seizure of Aleppo in 1128. One might indeed suspect Fulk of selecting someone over whom he thought he could exercise sufficient influence to reimpose a protectorate over Antioch, but if this was ever his intention, he was too preoccupied with the revolt of Hugh of Jaffa and its aftermath to intervene in the north after 1134.

The decision to import a husband from the West was even more politically charged in Antioch than it had been in Jerusalem, for it amounted to a repudiation of the Byzantine suzerainty implied by the treaty of Devol. As a result, John Komnenos (1118–43) invaded Cilicia in 1137, replacing Latin bishops with Greek ones, and began to besiege Antioch, forcing Raymond to submit. The Byzantine threat prompted Pope Innocent II to ponder military sanctions against the emperor. Runciman, writing from a markedly pro-Byzantine stance, observed that John's invasion only proved Alice right (1952: 213). The terms to which Raymond was forced to agree went beyond Devol, for he was now recognised as an imperial vassal for

Antioch only until Aleppo and Shaizar were conquered, after which he would rule the new conquests and Antioch revert to direct imperial rule. Byzantine ambitions, however, outpaced their military capacities, and when John died in Syria in 1143, he was still trying to enforce his suzerainty over Antioch; the prospect of extending Frankish or Byzantine territory beyond the Amanus range looked remote.

The period between the two military disasters of the Field of Blood (1119) and the fall of Edessa (1144) saw the Latin states undergo different fortunes. Despite problems with succession, the kings of Jerusalem were able to benefit from quiescent frontiers to develop a solid fiscal and territorial basis for royal power. The striking feature of Hugh of Jaffa's revolt is that it failed to command support among a baronage that did not enjoy the territorial resources to resist the crown by military means. Meanwhile the boundaries of the kingdom were expanded by cumulative acts of expansion, such as the seizure of Banyas in 1140. Antioch, in contrast, had suffered from the revival of Byzantine power from one side and the threat posed by Zengi from the other, while enduring its own succession crisis. Like Jerusalem, however, Antioch was able to attract significant interest and support from the West.

The smaller states proved more vulnerable. Damascus, scared by Frankish aggression in 1129 and by Zengi's policies in the 1130s, saw an outlet for its own aggrandizement to the west, and in 1137 the county of Tripoli suffered a serious attack that deprived it of much of its eastern territory; in spring Count Pons was killed, and only a few months later his successor Raymond II was captured by Zengi. Tripoli's survival as an independent state was in jeopardy, and could only be assured through the protection of the Military Orders. To the north, Edessa, though territorially large and wealthy in natural resources, suffered from its exposed position. The city of Edessa itself was separated from the more protected fiefs in the county by the Euphrates, which meant that when the count was in his preferred stronghold of Turbessel (Tell Bashir), he could not easily respond to threats from the East. Ultimately, the counts simply had too few western forces at their disposal, and Edessa, primarily a mercantile centre, was defended largely by mercenaries or by Armenian allies of the counts. Joscelin II, who succeeded his crusading father, Joscelin of Tiberias, in 1131, has been blamed for succumbing too easily to Seljuq pressure (Nicholson 1958: 432, 446), but the real damage came from the weakening of Antioch and the inability of Joscelin II and Raymond of Poitiers to recreate the vigorous, if stormy, partnership between Count Baldwin and Tancred in the early period of Frankish settlement. In any case, the Frankish settler barons in Edessa were unable to supply sufficient military resources, and the relationship between the western settlers and the indigenous Christian population was uneasy, and at times hostile. This was hardly surprising given the tendency of the settlers to treat the Syrians as potential enemies, or collaborators with the Turks. In 1149, for example, Count Joscelin ransacked the great Syrian

Orthodox monastery of Bar Sauma of some of its treasures, temporarily expelled the monks and garrisoned Armenian soldiers there, and only permitted the monks to remain on payment of a tribute.

The fall of Edessa was almost accidental. Zengi's real ambition was the capture of Damascus, in order to secure total dominance in Syria, but from 1140 onward he had been preoccupied with enforcing his rule over the Artuqids to the north of his base at Mosul. When Joscelin, perhaps unwisely, involved himself in an alliance with the Artuqids, Zengi seized the opportunity, in December 1144, to encircle and capture Edessa. The aftermath emphasised the problems that the Franks of Edessa had always faced, for Zengi massacred the western defenders but spared the much larger indigenous Christian population, who in turn viewed Muslim rule with equanimity. The county was now cut into two, and when Joscelin's attempt to retake his capital in 1146 was repulsed with further serious losses, its continued existence as an independent territory was hopeless.

The loss of the first of the crusader states to have been established represented the most serious setback yet faced by the settlers. As well as being a blow to Frankish morale, it affirmed the danger of allowing the fragmented Seljuq lordships of north Syria to become concentrated in the hands of a single ambitious ruler. As we shall see, it also raised the question of how much the West was prepared to expend in the defence of the conquests of 1098–9.

The Military Orders

The most important institutional development in this period was the creation of the Military Orders. The most powerful of these, the Templars and the Hospitallers, were to amass such territorial and financial resources as to become virtually independent sovereign powers in the region. These resources, coupled with a spiritual role that was itself bolstered by wide-ranging privileges granted by the papacy, turned them into international conglomerations the like of which had never previously been known in Europe or the Near East.

The origins of the Military Orders did not presage such future greatness. The Hospital of St John, founded by merchants from Amalfi in the last quarter of the eleventh century, catered for pilgrims who needed accommodation or medical attention while in Jerusalem. The Hospital was originally part of the monastery near the Holy Sepulchre known as St Mary of the Latins, also an Amalfitan foundation, but by 1113 it had been recognised by the pope as a separate Order within the Church. The legend of the heroic suffering of the Latin administrator of the Hospital, Gerard, during the siege of 1099, at the hands of the Egyptians, made the institution popular with donors from the beginning of the Latin settlement. Royal patronage was noticeable as early as 1101, when Baldwin I gave the Hospital a tenth of the spoils of his victory at Ramla, and in 1112 the patriarch

gave it formal independence from St Mary of the Latins and exempted it from paying tithes within his jurisdiction (Riley-Smith 2012: 21). Thus, from the start, valuable ecclesiastical exemptions went hand-in-hand with aristocratic bequests.

The Templars were a recognisable institution from 1120 onward, but originated from an indeterminate group of crusaders who had remained in Jerusalem in 1099 under a personal vow to the patriarch of Jerusalem and who formed a kind of military household in the Holy Sepulchre (Luttrell 1996: 193–202). From 1120 their purpose became much more sharply defined by their leader, Hugh of Payen, who declared the intent to provide military defence for the roads to pilgrimage sites, such as the river Jordan, that lay in areas where banditry was still rife, and for pilgrims travelling on them (Barber 1994a: 9–10). After papal recognition of the Order at the Council of Troyes (1129), and particularly as a result of the articulation of their spiritual aims by St Bernard of Clairvaux, the Templars grew rapidly from the 1130s and attracted widespread recruitment and bequests. Like the Hospitallers, they benefited from generous papal privileges in the early stages of their development.

The status of the membership of both Orders in their early stages reflects broader spiritual currents in Europe. The particular attachment to



Figure 4.1 Aqua Bella, a few miles west of Jerusalem, is a fortified house with a chapel built around a courtyard. It probably dates from the 1130s and served as an infirmary for the Hospitaller Knights of St John.

Source: © Andrew Jotischky.

pilgrimage expressed in both Orders' constitutions placed them firmly within a spirituality centred on the experience of personal devotion to the Holy Land. But the popularity of the Hospital can also be seen in the context of the growth in foundations dedicated to practical piety, and associated in particular with the Augustinian rule, in the early twelfth century (Luttrell 1997: 40–7; Nicholson 2001: 1–3). The earliest Hospitallers were laymen – and women: the Amalfitans also founded a hospice for women pilgrims – who followed what was described in an Amalfitan chronicle as 'an almost religious way of life', which probably means that they had taken vows but were not fully religious. Such groups of men and women were, around 1100, an increasingly common part of the European landscape. When the canons of the Holy Sepulchre became Augustinian regulars in 1114, the Hospital moved in that direction, and the rule written by the Grand Master Raymond of Puy (1120–1158/60) shows a direct dependence on the Augustinian rule (Riley-Smith 2012: 24–6). The Hospitaller rule shows an interest in care for the poor as well as for the sick, which may be part of the legacy of the original dependence on the Benedictine monastery of St Mary of the Latins in Jerusalem.

The Templars, unlike the Hospitallers, were a direct product of the Crusades – not only because protection of the holy places was an avowed aim of the First Crusade, but also in as much as the notion of a knight dedicated to a religious purpose while remaining an active warrior was fully comprehensible after 1095. The Templar rule approved in 1129 required the brothers to take vows and to live in a community as monks, having first repudiated all ties of property and family. Although the European baronage seems to have taken up the Order enthusiastically, as testified by important bequests to Hugh in 1129–30, criticism of the ideal continued to be voiced throughout the twelfth century. John of Salisbury, for example, attacked the idea that the same body could spill blood and administer the sacraments (Riley-Smith 2012: 159–60; Barber 1994a: 41–2). The Gregorian reform movement of the eleventh century had sought to emphasise distinctions between the priestly and the secular, particularly in the lives of those entrusted with the sacraments, and Urban II had banned participation on the First Crusade by monks. It was the intervention of Bernard of Clairvaux, at the request of Hugh of Payen, and his coherent articulation of the Templar ideal in the 1130s, that ensured the Order's popularity. In deliberately encouraging a blurring of the distinction between knight and monk, Bernard was pursuing a strategy that he had already used to recruit knights to the Cistercians. The core of the Cistercian reform programme was the transformation of secular institutions and ways of living into spiritual ones. For Bernard, there was no anomaly, for in his eyes the *only* acceptable way to be a knight was to dedicate one's sword to the service of God. Thus the Templar was 'a man of peace, even when drawn up for battle' (Greenia 1977: 140). It is not surprising that this idea should have proved as popular with the knightly class as the indulgence offered to crusaders in 1095 had




Figure 4.2 The Templar castle of Safita, now near the Syrian border with Lebanon, was built in the mid-twelfth century. In good weather conditions the keep gave a view of the Mediterranean to the west and Krak des Chevaliers to the south-east.

Source: © Andrew Jotischky.

been, for not only was the reward for this service eternal life, but this was the only sure way in which salvation could be guaranteed to military men.

A few early high-profile recruitments to the Templars helped not only to spread the Order's popularity, but also to lay a basis for its wealth in landed property. Thierry I, count of Champagne, was an early donor to the Order, while in England King Stephen (1135–54) granted royal manors, such as Cowley in Oxfordshire, but the most spectacular example of royal patronage came from Alfonso I of Aragon (1104–34), who in 1131 willed his kingdom jointly to the Temple, the Hospital and the Holy Sepulchre (Barber 1994a: 24–7). Magnates who had to alienate property on becoming a Templar might will part of it to the Order; for others, bequests to the Order were seen in the same light as those to a monastery – and, in addition, as contributing in a practical way to the defence of the Holy Land. The astonishing rapidity with which the Templars accrued wealth is attested by Louis VII's admission in 1148 that only loans from the Order had enabled him to sustain his crusade. In fact, it was not only financial aid that enabled the crusade to take place, but the professionalism of the Templar contingent accompanying the royal army on its march through Asia Minor. The methods that delivered such success in recruiting men and in attracting wealth are now well known to us from regional studies of the composition of the Order and its networks of influence in the West. Recruitment among the nobility of Champagne and Burgundy was particularly intensive: Hugh I of Troyes was an early recruit, and Bernard of Clairvaux's uncle, Andrew of Montbéliard, became Grand Master. Landed wealth in the West enabled the Orders to channel resources in manpower to the East, but the Orders' ecclesiastical privileges rendered them virtually free of any local episcopal jurisdiction. By 1154, the Hospitallers and Templars had each been granted a series of papal bulls that, taken together, allowed them to possess tithes from their lands, to elect their own Master, to build churches in newly colonised regions and to remain exempt from episcopal excommunications or interdicts. If the Orders were popular with the lay knighthood, the clergy reacted strongly against such privileges. William of Tyre was scandalised by the behaviour of Hospitallers who, in the course of their dispute with the canons of the Holy Sepulchre in 1154, shot arrows into the canons' cloister, and in 1179 he was a member of the delegation of bishops from Outremer who brought complaints against the Orders to the Third Lateran Council. Disputes dragged on into the thirteenth century: in 1228 James of Vitry, bishop of Acre, complained that the Hospitallers were even carrying off corpses to bury them in their own cemeteries, the point being that they could thereby channel burial fees away from parish churches to their own.

Whereas the Templars played from the start an aggressively military role, for example taking part in the siege of Damascus in 1129, the Hospitallers came only gradually to the profession of arms. Until the Second Crusade, however, both Orders were primarily engaged in defence by garrisoning castles. The first indication of such a role by the Hospital was in 1136, when

King Fulk gave the Order the castle of Beth Gibelin, which lay roughly halfway between Bethlehem and Ascalon and which was thus a critical element in the defence of the southern frontier of the kingdom of Jerusalem. In 1144 Raymond II of Tripoli conceded much of his eastern frontier, including the great castle of Krak des Chevaliers, to the Hospital. Raymond, forced into this measure by his inability to defend his border, gave the land in freehold, which meant that the Hospitallers exercised rights as feudal lords in the region. Between 1160 and 1210 similar grants were made in parts of Antioch, Egypt and Armenia. In some of these cases, the Hospitallers were encouraged not only to garrison castles but also to establish colonists – hence the relevance of the papal privilege to build new churches. Lay pressure from outside the Order encouraged Raymond of Puy (1128–58/60) to develop a military role but until the middle of the century the Hospitallers may even have relied largely on mercenaries. The first mention of military duties occurs in the Constitutions of 1182, where fighting is conceived as an extension of alms-giving and care of the poor. Raymond of Puy made an explicit connection between entry into the Order and crusading: ‘Whoever enters our fraternity will thereby be secure in God’s mercy, just as if he himself had fought in Jerusalem’ (Riley-Smith 2012: 29). The adoption of an aggressive role was clearly a matter of wider debate, for in 1178/80 Pope Alexander III forbade the Hospitallers to bear arms except in the specific circumstances of defending the True Cross or in besieging Muslim cities. This may also have been a response to the policy of the Grand Master Gilbert d’Assailly (1163–70). A firm supporter of military action, Gilbert committed the Order to a policy of extensive building, such as the great castle of Belvoir in the Jordan valley (1168). At the same time he supported King Amalric I’s attempted invasions of Egypt in 1167 and 1169, committing large Hospitaller forces. The combination of expensive building and military activity proved ruinous for the Order’s finances, and Gilbert was forced to resign in 1170 (Riley-Smith 2012, 32–6). The tumultuous events of the 1180s, however, and the need of the kings of Jerusalem to put huge armies into the field against Saladin, confirmed the trend towards the creation of a Hospitaller field army. By 1187, the Order could contribute some 300 knights to the royal army, which more or less matched Templar military resources. When we consider that the total military strength of the kingdom from feudal sources amounted to about 670 knights (Edbury 1997: 124–6), the Military Orders’ 600 is not only impressive but highly significant for the direction of royal policy.

The Templars’ reputation as a military force was sealed by the Second Crusade. Everard des Barres, the Order’s Master in France, kept Louis VII not only afloat financially, but alive – when Louis’ army was being mauled by the Turks in Anatolia, it was Everard who organised a fighting retreat that ensured that the king could withdraw and the crusade continue (Berry 1948: 124–5). Although the Templars’ reputation suffered from their involvement in the failed siege of Damascus in 1148 and from some rather

ambivalent behaviour at the siege of Ascalon in 1153 (WT 1986: 797–9), the kings of Jerusalem appreciated their capacity to provide a standing army of mounted knights and foot soldiers. This was particularly important during the 1160s, when King Amalric I (1163–74) depended on the Hospitallers for his ambitious invasion of Egypt. (The Templars' refusal to participate is a reflection of divided contemporary views of the wisdom of his strategy.) Indeed, the reluctance of the Hospitallers to participate in the proposed campaign in 1177, after they had invested so disastrously in the failed expedition of 1169, demonstrated how crucial a part of the kingdom's military resources the Orders had become.

In addition to extra manpower, the Military Orders contributed an organisation and discipline born of dedication to the defence of the Holy Land. Bernard of Clairvaux's *In Praise of the New Knighthood* (c.1130) stresses the Templars' seriousness of purpose, in contrast to the dice-playing buffoonery of secular knights (Greenia 1977: 127–41). Steadfastness in battle was ensured with the rule that those who fled the enemy in the field were expelled from the house to which they belonged (Upton-Ward 1992: 148). Contemporaries regarded Templar fanaticism in battle as fearsome, and this seems to be borne out by the recklessness of their Master Gerard of Ridefort in May 1187 (Barber 1994a: 180–1). Whether his brave but disastrous charge against impossible odds at the battle of Cresson served the best interests of the kingdom is another matter. The Orders' value to the kingdom was appreciated by Saladin, who paid them the dubious honour of executing his Hospitaller and Templar prisoners at Hattin – even to the extent of first buying them back from their captors. According to 'Imad ad-Din, Saladin regarded the Military Orders as defilers of the holy places, which was, in a fashion, a backhanded compliment to Bernard's vision of the Templars as purifiers of the same sites (Gabrieli 1984: 138).

The success of the Hospitallers and Templars prompted imitation, but this was largely a matter of converting existing religious houses into military institutions (Forey 1995: 186). After the Third Crusade the German hospital at Acre, formed during the course of the siege of Acre, became the Teutonic Order of St Mary, which came to play a significant role in the defence and political development of the Crusader States in the thirteenth century, while the house of regular canons at Acre became the Order of St Thomas. Already by the 1140s there was a Military Order specifically for leper knights, the Order of St Lazarus (Barber 1994b: 439–56), while in Spain the Order of Calatrava was founded in the 1150s and the Order of Mountjoy in 1175 (Forey 1971: 250–66).

Although their accumulation of territorial wealth and ecclesiastical privileges provoked the jealousy of many, the Military Orders came to be seen as a solution to one of the gravest problems confronted by the Crusader States. As the grants of castles to the Orders demonstrated, the lay magnates were simply unable to afford the cost of defending the frontiers. The settlers needed constant financial and military support from the West, and the Orders

offered the most reliable and efficient means of channelling western pious sentiment for the holy places into coin, muscle and iron: the tools of war.

Crusading 1101–1145

Because we tend to think of Crusades as numerically distinguished expeditions, it is easy to assume that no activity that could be called ‘crusading’ took place between the failure of the relief expedition of 1101 and the launch of the Second Crusade fifty years after Urban II’s preaching at Clermont. Military expeditions to the East, however, were led by western nobles in the intervening years for the defence of the Crusader States and to extend their territories, and some of these had papal backing. Since ‘crusading’ as a term is largely an artifice of historians, however, it is difficult to be sure how contemporaries understood such expeditions in relation to Urban’s preaching or to subsequent papal initiatives. If we apply the term in the general sense of warfare against the Turks on grounds framed in terms of religious rhetoric and conceived as meritorious for participants, we would need to consider Sigurd of Norway’s expedition culminating in the capture of Sidon in 1110–11; the Venetian fleet that enabled the seizure of Tyre in 1124; and Fulk of Anjou’s armed pilgrimages of 1120 and 1127. These were not general appeals to the knighthood, and they were therefore not subject to the same formulations of spiritual reward as Urban had granted in 1095. But that formulation was of course subject to refinement and reshaping from the 1140s onward, partly in the context of new articulations of canon law and new theological developments.

These examples by themselves demonstrate that we cannot see crusading as an enterprise limited only to those who responded to the papal appeal. In all these cases, nobles or secular rulers were initiating holy war themselves. This suggests that Urban II’s ideas were more porous and more easily prone to reshaping and to different forms of representation than we might at first suppose. Moreover, there was a considerable hinterland of support for crusading among the nobility that only appears obliquely in the documentary record. Hugh I, count of Troyes, went to Rome in 1112 to secure a papal blessing for his intention to make an armed pilgrimage to the Holy Land; but it was his idea to go to the East in the first place, not the pope’s. Hugh later became one of the highest-profile recruits to the new order of Knights Templar.

Hugh of Troyes is not usually considered a crusader, for obvious reasons; yet a study of his career demonstrates his use of crusading as a political tool in his handling of political patronage. He supported vassals who wished to go on crusade, and associated himself with foundations that were directly or indirectly sponsors of crusaders. The success of the first crusaders in 1099 was so overwhelming – and so eloquently narrated by chroniclers – that they became celebrities in their own communities. Hugh was a victim of this celebrity status: in 1104, while recovering from an attempt to

assassinate him, he lost his wife to perhaps the most famous of the crusaders, Bohemond, who had returned to the West to recruit for a new expedition.

An illuminating recent study has shown how crusaders returning to their homes created memories by marking their return with gifts for local monasteries. Rotrou III of Perche placed a palm leaf, the symbol of pilgrimage, on the altar of the abbey church of Saint Denis, while at the same time confirming the gifts made to the monastery by his parents; Robert Curthose presented a battle-torn captured Turkish standard to his sister's convent of La Trinité in Caen; King Alexander I of Scotland gave Turkish arms probably won in battle by his daughter-in-law's first husband, the crusading hero Simon of Senlis – who incidentally died in 1111 while on an independent 'armed pilgrimage' (Paul 2013: 33–4, 104–6, 231). This kind of celebrity status, created by self-conscious acts of memorialisation by noble families, was to be evoked by Pope Eugenius III in the first surviving papal appeal for an expedition to the East, *Quantum praedecessores*, in 1145.

The Second Crusade, 1145–50

Edessa fell to Zengi on Christmas Eve 1144, but it was not until the spring of 1145 that this was widely known in the West, and not until the end of the year that Pope Eugenius issued his appeal in response to the event. The timing of Eugenius III's crusading bull *Quantum praedecessores* (1 December) and its relationship with Louis VII's announcement of his intention to make an armed pilgrimage at his Christmas court in 1145 has been much discussed (Grabois 1985: 94–104; Cole 1991: 40–52; Ferzoco 1992: 91–9; Rowe 1992: 79–89; Phillips 1996: 75–82; 2007: 61–3; Bull 1996: 25–45; Richard 1999: 155–7). The likeliest scenario is that Louis had quite independently made a pilgrimage vow, perhaps in fulfilment of one made by his brother before his death; certainly Eugenius' bull was aimed at Louis and the French knight-hood. For this reason it has even been suggested that the bull was a response to Louis' declared intent (Ferzoco 1992: 91–9). It seems clear, however, that the preaching of the crusade was a direct response to the crisis in the East, and that the initiative came initially from the East rather than from the papacy (Phillips 1996: 78–82). Indeed, Eugenius was aware of a wider context than simply the fall of Edessa, having hosted an Armenian legation to the papal curia in the autumn of 1145.

In hindsight it may appear curious that nothing ostensibly was done before the arrival in Italy of a legation led by Hugh, bishop of Jabala, in November 1145. An appeal for military aid might logically have been sent in the first instance to lay magnates, particularly noble dynasties, such as those of Aquitaine and Anjou, who were closely related to the ruling families in the East. But recent research has revealed increasingly close ties between the Latin ecclesiastical hierarchy in the East and the papacy from c.1137 onward (Hiestand 2001: 33–5), and it seems inconceivable that the violent death of the archbishop of Edessa and the destruction of Latin churches, both of

which are mentioned in *Quantum praedecessores*, would not have been known to the pope much sooner than the promulgation of the bull.

The reason for the long delay before the preaching of a crusade to recover Edessa may simply have been that such a course of action was not obvious to the pope. There is a tendency to regard the crusade of 1096–1101 as a kind of blueprint for what became a normative feature of papal policy. In 1145–6, however, Eugenius III seems to have been aware that he was doing something that no pope had done since 1095. His bull began with a reminder of Urban II's appeal and of the glorious response from the western knighthood. *Quantum praedecessores* marks the first attempt since 1099 to re-create the conditions of the First Crusade. This is highly significant, given that popes had licensed preachers to raise troops from the West since then – Pascal II in 1106 and Honorius II in 1127 being obvious examples. Moreover, crusading, as we have seen, had continued to take place between 1099 and 1145.

There are important differences, however, between 1095 and 1145. For a start, the response to Eugenius' appeal was so sluggish that the bull was reissued at Easter 1146. This may have been because, unlike Urban II, Eugenius made no attempt to preach the crusade in person, but delegated this task to others. The role of the most famous of these preachers has led one historian to characterise this as 'Bernard of Clairvaux's crusade' (Hiestand 2001: 37). The character of the crusade was shaped, therefore, more by Bernard's vision of what it ought to be than by papal policy framed solely in response to the fall of Edessa. Although *Quantum praedecessores* leaves no doubt that the recovery of Edessa (or Rohais, as it was known in Latin) was the priority, Bernard's preaching seems to have relegated this to a secondary place. He emphasised instead the sinfulness of Christians, which had permitted such a disaster to occur, and presented the crusade as an opportunity for the knighthood to demonstrate its love for God and thereby to redeem itself. This was not a completely new departure, of course, for the chroniclers' reports of Urban II's preaching make the same link between sinfulness, political events and salvation, and Bernard had said something similar in his manifesto for the Templars, a decade or so earlier: 'If God has allowed [Jerusalem] to be attacked so often, this has been in order to give brave men an opportunity to show courage and win immortality' (Greenia 1977: 144). The second version of *Quantum praedecessores*, moved by the same concern, attempted to regulate knightly behaviour and even clothing on the crusade in order to affirm the penitential quality of the enterprise. Consciously developing Urban's Clermont address, Eugenius offered a less ambiguous indulgence for the remission of sins for participants. The characteristic feature of Bernard's preaching in 1146 was its interior focus on the state of mind of the individual crusader. There is no doubt that it was successful; when he preached before the king and his court at Vézelay at Easter 1146, large numbers took the cross, whereas at Christmas the response to Louis VII's personal vow from among his barons had been

lukewarm. When he preached to Conrad III's court in Germany, Bernard met with a similarly enthusiastic response – so enthusiastic that the intention may already have been present before he preached (Phillips 2001: 27).

It would be a mistake, however, to see the Second Crusade entirely in terms of Bernard's 'interior focus', or to assume that it was purely as a result of his preaching that the aim of the crusade became diffused. For one thing, Bernard was not the only influential preacher of the crusade. A Cistercian monk, Rudolf – usually labelled as a 'renegade' – preached an anti-Semitic message in the Rhineland that had tragic consequences for some Jewish communities; although Bernard's own preaching activity in the Rhineland is usually seen as an attempt to counteract Rudolf's inflammatory work, the precise link between his preaching and collective murders is still unclear (Richard 1999: 157–8), and at least one contemporary source mentioned Rudolf as a perfectly respectable crusade preacher in connection with Bernard (Edgington 2001: 57–8).

Another consideration is that Bernard's public preaching to Louis and his barons at Easter and to the German king Conrad III and his barons at Christmas 1146 did not constitute the limit of his activity on behalf of the crusade. In March 1147, Bernard, presumably with papal consent, authorised barons from eastern Germany who wished to take the cross to transfer their vows to a campaign against the pagan Slavs who constituted their north-eastern frontier. This amounted to a recognition of the German territorial expansion east of the Elbe, which had been taking place since the beginning of the twelfth century, as a holy war for the purposes of conversion (Fonnesberg-Schmidt 2007: 23–43). Even the king of Denmark was encouraged to participate in this war (Jensen 2001: 164–79; Jensen 2015: 155–82). At the same time, and by the same logic, Bernard seems to have encouraged crusaders to assist campaigns in the Iberian peninsula, notably the conquest of Lisbon by Afonso Henriques, king of Portugal, in 1147, and of Tortosa, in Catalonia, in 1148. These campaigns, which for long were regarded as side-shows to the main action in the East, have recently been the subject of considerable discussion, and a convincing argument has been made for seeing them as part of an overall vision of the Second Crusade (Livermore 1990: 1–16; Phillips 2007: 136–67, 244–68, following Constable 1953: 213–79). Recruitment for the crusade in the Low Countries, England and the Rhineland focused on an assault on Lisbon en route to the East. The campaign for the recovery of Edessa, led by Louis VII and Conrad III, was thus only one thrust in a three-cornered assault on enemies of Christ on different frontiers of Christendom. Not all historians have been so persuaded by the Constable/Phillips thesis, however. Alan Forey and John France have, starting from different perspectives, highlighted problems in the notion of an overall papal strategy responding to regional impulses, not least in the area of logistics and the delivery of military strategy (Forey 1994: 165–75, France 2006: 77–93).

The conception of crusade strategy proposing a 'three-cornered assault' might suggest that a rather sophisticated theory of holy war was already in

place in the papal curia; alternatively, it might argue that the idea of holy war and the indulgence premised on it was so normative and so well understood in Christendom as a whole that lobbying by rulers on behalf of their own regional interests left the papacy no alternative but to extend the same privileges as had originally been considered appropriate for the East to other areas. One difficulty was that, serious though the loss of Edessa was, it did not even indirectly threaten the security of Jerusalem; in 1146, when Zengi was murdered, even Antioch seemed safe. If remission of sins could be granted for a campaign in northern Syria, why not for other frontier areas? As has been pointed out by historians who take a wide view of crusading in the twelfth century, indulgences had been offered for war in Spain in the 1120s and even in Italy in 1135 (Housley 1992: 36).

Discussion of the Second Crusade is inevitably dominated by knowledge that it failed in its full objective. One of the crucial questions raised by the failure is how clear those objectives were from the beginning. If Louis was indeed committed to a personal pilgrimage to Jerusalem even before *Quantum praedecessores* (Grabois 1985: 95–7, 98–9), is it surprising that he was deflected from the direction proposed by the papal bull? The contemporary evidence (including a letter from Conrad himself to Wibald, abbot of Stavelot) indicates that both Louis and Conrad thought they were going to campaign in north Syria (Phillips 1996: 84). Although traditionally Conrad has been seen as a reluctant participant, who was persuaded by Bernard's rhetoric against his own and the pope's better judgement, a convincing argument has recently been made that his participation was as integral as that of Louis VII, and consistent with prevailing views of the imperial role (Phillips 2001: 15–31; but Hiestand 2001: 32–53, for the opposing view). Whatever their original goal might have been, events in the East changed their minds, for in 1146 Joscelin II's attempt to recapture Edessa resulted in its complete destruction, and probably made any hope of retaining the rest of the county impossible.

Another factor in the change of strategy was the role of the Byzantine Empire. The French came to regard Manuel Komnenos as an enemy of the crusade, and blamed their mauling at the hands of the Seljuqs in Asia Minor on Manuel's refusal to supply them with reliable guides. Even before the French reached Asia Minor, a contingent in the army proposed that they attack Constantinople instead. Our main source for the French campaign, Odo of Deuil, was anti-Byzantine, but the German chronicler Otto of Freising (like Odo a participant) shows awareness of the wider political situation. Manuel was not only related to Conrad III by marriage, but sought an active role in Mediterranean politics in support of Byzantine opposition to the Norman kingdom of Sicily – an opposition shared, of course, by the Germans. However, the crusade could not fail to embarrass Manuel, partly because he had recently (1146) concluded a treaty with the sultan of Iconium, but, more important, because any crusading campaign in north Syria might jeopardise his own claims to suzerainty over Antioch and what

was left of Edessa. (It is worth recalling here the agreement made between Prince Raymond and John Komnenos in 1137 for the handover of Antioch in the event that Aleppo and Shaizar were conquered.) Conversely, this explains Louis' change of strategy in 1148. Louis may not have been fully aware of the eastern situation before he arrived in Antioch in 1148, but once there, his reluctance to campaign in the north, as Raymond urged, is understandable, for any conquests made would be subject to Byzantine claims, and the king of France could not appear to be acting as the vassal of the Byzantine emperor. This is a more plausible explanation than either the insistence that he had to fulfil his pilgrimage vow before engaging in battle, or the romantic view that he left Antioch hurriedly because his wife, Eleanor, was having an affair with Prince Raymond (Runciman 1952: 279). Conrad's opinion no longer counted: he had been forced by a crushing defeat in Asia Minor to retire to Constantinople and would only rejoin the crusade in April 1148, once Louis had moved south to Acre (Kostick 2010: 125–42).

At a grand council held near Acre in June 1148, Louis, Conrad and their magnates met the young king of Jerusalem, Baldwin III, and his mother Melisende, together with the prelates and barons of the kingdom, to decide how the crusading army would be deployed. This was a snub to Raymond, who wanted Louis to help him conquer Aleppo and Shaizar, so as to invalidate the 1137 Byzantine agreement. Although some barons advised an attack on Ascalon, the last Egyptian stronghold on the Mediterranean littoral, in the event the crusaders decided to besiege Damascus. Historians have usually been critical of this policy, for Damascus had traditionally been an ally of the kingdom of Jerusalem against Zengi, whose ambition the Damascenes feared (e.g. Mayer 1988: 106–7). With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to criticise the decision to turn a Muslim 'neutral zone' into an active enemy, particularly since by 1154 Zengi's son Nur ad-Din had in any case achieved what his father had failed to do. Yet at the time there was every chance of success, and Damascus was a rich prize that would have extended the kingdom's territory and resources immeasurably. Baldwin III, who was already engaged in a struggle to assert his authority and to end his mother's regency, had every reason to aim at such a conquest, not only for the prestige it would confer on him personally but also because it would add an appendage to the kingdom that Melisende could not easily claim (Mayer 1972: 115–27; Gerish 2012: 89–112). Moreover, although some of the barons, such as Welf VI of Bavaria, left the crusade, Louis' army was still large enough to expect success.

Damascus was surrounded by orchards, in which the crusader army camped towards the end of July 1148. Initial skirmishes, in which Conrad III distinguished himself, went well for the crusaders, but Unur had appealed to local provincial governors for reinforcements, and once these arrived they mounted a counter-attack that cleared the immediate danger to the city's walls. The orchards now proved excellent cover for lightly armed Muslim raiders who forced the crusaders to move their camp to open

ground. Unfortunately the new site, facing the city's eastern wall, gave little chance for an assault, and the counter-attacks from Damascus continued. After less than a week, during which arguments had already begun over the future of the city that was proving so difficult to besiege, the barons of the kingdom of Jerusalem withdrew their support and the crusaders, fearing that Nur ad-Din would arrive from Aleppo to throw his weight behind Damascus, were forced to withdraw. The feebleness of the siege (24–29 July) can be blamed on bad luck and poor tactics, but the strategy itself was not unreasonable. Damascus had been a target of crusader ambition since 1126, and its capture would have dented the Zengid dynastic expansion in southern Syria (Hoch 1992: 119–28; 1996: 359–69).

The consequences of the Second Crusade's failure to accomplish any territorial gain in the East now appear rather complex. William of Tyre, writing thirty or so years later, asserted that 'from that day onward the situation of the Latins in the East became worse' (WT 1986: 770–1). For William, the crusade was a huge blow to the morale of the kingdom, and the failure to agree on the conduct of the campaign led to distrust between the West and the settlers. Some western contemporaries, contrasting the fortunes of the 1147–9 expedition with that of 1096–9, concluded that the crusade was an ideal that could easily become tarnished (Constable 1953: 213–79). Modern historians have on the whole concurred with this gloomy view (Smail 1969: 1–20; Prawer 1972: 25; Mayer 1988: 103), though the reconsideration of the Spanish campaigns of 1147–8 has led to a more positive reassessment (Phillips 2007, xxvii–xxviii). Not only was Lisbon retaken from the Moors, but also Almeria and Tortosa (Jaspert 2001: 90–110; but *contra* see Garcia-Guijarro 2015: 219–55), and moreover the Iberian campaigns were undertaken by crusading forces from across the West, including England, Flanders, Frisia and Genoa. The most serious consequence of failure in the East was that the assault on Damascus threw Unur into the arms of Nur ad-Din, thus ending Damascene neutrality and hastening the process by which the Zengids were able to build up a unified power base in Syria. Such an analysis, however, is too simplistic. On the eve of the crusade, the Franks were already undermining Unur's authority by supporting a vassal who had rebelled against him (Richard 1999: 155). But Unur's goal was above all to maintain Damascene independence, and when Nur ad-Din marched on Damascus in 1150, the Damascenes once again turned to the Franks for support. The alliance of 1140–7 seemed still to be in place (Hoch 2001: 188–200). The cause of Nur ad-Din's eventual ascendancy over Damascus was more complex than the military balance of forces.

Bernard of Clairvaux felt the humiliation of failure deeply, but was soon attempting to redeem it with another crusade. In June 1149 Prince Raymond was killed in Nur ad-Din's crushing victory at Inab. Like Il-Ghazi thirty years earlier, Nur was unable to seize Antioch, but the principality was devastated. Plans for a recovery expedition from the West reached an advanced

stage of planning, to judge from the correspondence between Bernard, Abbot Suger of Saint-Denis, who knew the king's mind intimately, and Abbot Peter of Cluny. Eugenius III, however, was unnerved by previous failure, and the plans were never realised (Phillips 1996: 100–10). Louis VII also seems to have been unwilling to become involved – presumably his objections to campaigning in north Syria in 1148 had even more force now, and indeed he may have preferred the idea of joining Roger II of Sicily in an attack on Constantinople (Reuter 2001: 150–63).

What can explain the failure of the Second Crusade in the East? Blame for military failure was variously apportioned at the time by Conrad III to Baldwin III and the barons of the kingdom, for giving bad advice; to the Military Orders for accepting bribes from Damascus; and to Louis VII for alienating the settlers by promising Damascus to his own vassal, Thierry of Flanders. The decision to raise the siege after only a week because of the approach of Zengi's sons from Aleppo and Mosul was not supported by all the crusaders (Richard 1999: 166–7), and bad feeling prevailed among the Franks. The crusade had begun with clear objectives and high expectations, but bad luck, the lukewarm support of the Byzantines in Asia Minor and a series of poor military performances in 1147 and 1148 showed how much could go wrong on such a complex expedition – and, in retrospect, how remarkable the success of 1096–9 had been.

The zenith and nadir of the Latin East, 1153–87

The conquest of Ascalon in 1153 appeared to signal a new chapter of expansion in the Latin East, and helped to offset the disappointment of 1148. More immediately, it marked the end of a potentially damaging period for the kingdom of Jerusalem, during which Melisende's refusal to give up the regency – even after her son had come of age – erupted briefly into civil war (1150–2). It is striking in this regard to recall her younger sister Alice's similar stance after the death of Bohemond II – though Alice at least had the excuse that her heir was a six-year-old girl. Strife in Jerusalem was particularly dangerous to the Crusader States, because the situation in the north had again become critical. Baldwin III, like his father Fulk in 1131 and his grandfather Baldwin II in 1119, had to act as regent for Antioch following the disaster of Inab in 1149. As before, the priority was to find a new husband for Constance, for her four children were still minors. Although Nur ad-Din had symbolically bathed in the Mediterranean after his triumphant campaign in Antioch in 1149, he seems to have had no thought of annexing the principality, and subsequently concentrated his resources on Damascus instead. But a year after Inab, Joscelin II was captured, leaving both Edessa and Antioch effectively leaderless. In these circumstances Baldwin III advised Joscelin's widow to take the drastic step of voluntarily bringing to an end the existence of the county of Edessa by selling what remained of it to Manuel Komnenos.

As has been pointed out, it was ironic that the Byzantines, who were seen by many as the cause of the Second Crusade's failure, were now able to seize control of the same lands that the crusade had hoped to save (Phillips 1996: 123). Not only was this *realpolitik* on Baldwin's part – for he could not remain in the north indefinitely – it also recognised the contribution that a strong Byzantium might play in the political balance in north Syria. Constance might have accelerated this process, had she accepted the hand of the emperor's brother-in-law in 1152, but in the event she chose a western baron, Reynald of Châtillon. Reynald, whose reputation has been rescued in recent years (Richard 1989: 409–18), was not the penniless knight he was once thought to have been (Runciman 1952: 345), but the scion of an old aristocratic family from the Loire who had come to the East on an armed pilgrimage and served with Baldwin III at Ascalon. Given that Constance's choice was entirely personal, and the marriage secret, this was probably a genuine love match – but it also made good political sense for Antioch. A western lord of good pedigree and military experience, yet without a potentially destabilising entourage, enabled Antioch to pursue a policy of seeking western support in the face of Byzantine ambitions.



Figure 4.3 After a quarrel with Aimery, Reynald of Châtillon, prince of Antioch, had the patriarch tortured by being exposed on a tower and attacked by wasps. From a thirteenth-century northern French manuscript of William of Tyre's *Chronicle*.

Source: © The British Library Board (BL Yates Thompson MS 12 f. 120).

In 1157 cooperation between Baldwin III and Reynald resulted in the acquisition of Harim, a stronghold that had been lost to Antioch since 1119. However, in the following year Baldwin was required to play a critical diplomatic role that brought Byzantine influence fully into the picture. Reynald, who had been asked by Manuel to discipline the Armenian prince Thoros of Cilicia, a Byzantine vassal, ended up by joining with Thoros in an attack on the imperial island of Cyprus. This provided Manuel with the provocation he needed to accomplish what his father John had been on the point of doing when he died in 1143: the formal and final subjection of Antioch to Byzantine suzerainty. Faced by a Byzantine invasion, and in the knowledge of Nur ad-Din's growing strength to the east, Reynald appealed to Baldwin III for help. But Baldwin had in 1158 married Manuel's niece Theodora, and wanted to pursue a pro-Byzantine policy. He met Manuel in Cilicia in 1159, hunted with him and cemented a personal friendship. At Easter, he persuaded Reynald to submit to Manuel. It was a diplomatic triumph for Baldwin, who had assured a three-cornered defence of Christian north Syria against Nur ad-Din.

The Byzantine alliance with the kingdom of Jerusalem was to be a central feature of Near Eastern politics for the next twenty years. Although soon after his accession Amalric I raised suspicions of Byzantine intentions in petitioning letters to Louis VII, he, like his brother Baldwin, married a Byzantine princess, and it was in his reign (1163–74) that the closest links were forged through joint military activity, cultural interaction and formal diplomacy. Military imperatives demanded the continuation of the alliance, despite the misgivings of some of the settler barons. In 1154 Nur ad-Din had finally secured Damascus, and during the 1160s his authority throughout the Islamic Near East increased with his espousal of *jihad*. Although Reynald of Antioch was captured in 1161, and was to spend the next fifteen years imprisoned in Aleppo, Nur ad-Din was somehow kept at bay, even after the young Bohemond III, Constance's son by Raymond of Poitiers, was himself captured along with Raymond III of Tripoli and many other leading figures at the battle of 'Artah in 1164. Nur ad-Din is said to have declined to attack Antioch itself out of fear of Byzantine military strength (Richard 1999: 180).

Instead, military attention turned to the kingdom of Jerusalem itself, and to the attempt to curb Nur ad-Din's raiding across the Jordan from Damascene territory, and ultimately, from 1167 onward, to forestalling his ambitions in Egypt. Western military support, though occasionally decisive, as at Ascalon in 1153, or simply helpful, as in Thierry of Flanders' armed pilgrimage of 1157–8, was sporadic. There were also setbacks, notably the defeat at Jacob's Ford in 1157, when over 300 knights were killed and Baldwin III barely escaped with his life. The Byzantine Empire was better placed to provide consistent military support, and in Manuel Komnenos the Crusader States had a neighbour who was genuinely Francophile by inclination – to the extent of marrying Maria of Antioch, sister of the young ruler Bohemond III, after his first wife, the Austrian Irene of Salzburg, had died.

Amalric I first intervened in Egypt in 1163, but had to leave in a hurry when news arrived of the fall of Harin and Banyas. He explained to Louis VII that a Frankish attack was necessary if Egypt were not to fall to Nur ad-Din. Because this in effect did eventually happen, it is difficult to know whether Amalric was being prescient or merely trying to rationalise a military adventure that promised easy rewards. Egypt was certainly an attractive target. Its Fatimid rulers had, since the reign of Baldwin I, abandoned serious hopes of recovering the Palestinian territory they had once held; the government was weakened by internal rivalries and the army largely made up of slaves and mercenaries. But its wealth, assured by its role as intermediary in the trade between Italian towns and the Far East, had continued to grow. Amalric was to exploit this by demanding tribute. William of Tyre remarked on his cupidity but, as we have seen, the kings of Jerusalem had from the start relied on wealth in cash in order to maintain their position in the feudal hierarchy.

When Amalric invaded Egypt again in 1167, it was once again at the instigation of the vizier, Shawar. In the absence of strong government by the khalifs, the Fatimids' viziers exercised full authority, but Shawar had needed the support of one of Nur ad-Din's generals, Shirkuh, to wrest control from a rival, and when he found the price of Shirkuh's help too high, he turned to Amalric. When Shirkuh seemed to be on the point of establishing a territory of his own in Egypt, Amalric invaded and, after several months of campaigning, forced Shirkuh to withdraw and secured for himself an annual tribute from Shawar. The success of the campaign persuaded Amalric that a full-scale conquest was possible, especially if Manuel Komnenos could be persuaded to help. Charters drawn up in 1168 in favour of the Hospitallers, the Pisans and some secular barons for fiefs in Egypt demonstrate the seriousness of the project, though the role of the Byzantines as joint conquerors remains uncertain (Lilie 1993: 189–93).

The eventual failure of the expedition at the beginning of 1169 proved to be disastrous for the kingdom of Jerusalem. Shawar was murdered and his place as vizier taken by Shirkuh; the final death blow to Fatimid Egypt was dealt by Shirkuh's nephew Saladin, who massacred the caliph's personal guard of Sudanese and Armenians and, in 1171, suppressed the khalifate itself and declared himself sultan (Lyons and Jackson 1982: 47–57). Saladin had first emerged from obscurity as the defender of Alexandria in 1167, but it was only after Shirkuh's death that the ability and ambition that was to make him such a legendary figure became clear. Almost the only hope not shattered by this setback was the Byzantine alliance, which was formally ratified when Amalric paid a state visit to Constantinople in 1171. William of Tyre, who was part of the royal entourage, was impressed by everything he saw, but although he was pro-Byzantine in his sentiments, he stopped short of declaring that the king actually became Manuel Komnenos' vassal. The question of the relative status of king and emperor has divided historians, and some

modern commentators have chosen to support the Byzantine perception, reported by John Kinnamos, that Amalric recognised Manuel as his overlord (Lilie 1993: 206–9; Phillips 1996: 211–12; Hamilton 2000: 31), though a distinction should be made between protection and feudal suzerainty (La Monte 1932: 253–64). Amalric probably granted Manuel some recognition as protector of Greek Orthodoxy and of the Orthodox people in the kingdom of Jerusalem, but it seems unlikely that he went further.

When Amalric died in 1174, the danger facing the kingdom of Jerusalem had never been more acute. Amalric had foreseen, but been unable to prevent, the encirclement of the kingdom by Nur ad-Din and governments that he controlled. In 1171 Nur had finally added his father's base, Mosul, to his rule of Aleppo and Damascus, and when he died – coincidentally in the same year as Amalric – the Seljuq sultan's influence had been limited to Iran, and his own authority recognised in Syria and Egypt by the khalif in Baghdad. Despite plans and appeals for military expeditions from the West throughout Amalric's reign, nothing had materialised.

Most unfortunate of all, Amalric's heir, Baldwin IV, was not only a boy of thirteen, but also a boy already afflicted with a mysterious ailment that looked dangerously like leprosy. William of Tyre's fears were to be confirmed a few years into Baldwin's reign, which René Grousset eloquently called 'an agony on horseback' (Grousset 1935, vol. 2: 610). The years between Baldwin's accession and the fall of the kingdom to Saladin in 1187 are the most colourful, the most dramatic and the most often described in the historiography of the Crusader States. Baldwin himself displayed remarkable courage and forbearance in the face of his disease. William of Tyre, who was the boy's personal tutor, describes in a moving passage of his chronicle how he first became aware that the active and intelligent heir to the throne suffered, unsuspecting, from a condition that removed all sensation from his nerve endings (WT 1986: 961–2). At the time of his father's death, however, it was not certain that Baldwin's condition would develop into full lepomatous leprosy. Given that he would need a regent in any case until he attained his majority, the risk of crowning him was probably less than that of trying to find a better-qualified candidate (Hamilton 2000: 38–43). His sister, Sybil, who was two years his elder, had been brought up in a convent and had no experience of statecraft; in any case, the search for a suitable husband as consort would take time, and even if Baldwin should turn out to be unable to produce heirs, an undisputed succession would buy sufficient time for this to take place. On his accession Amalric I had been forced by baronial pressure to repudiate his wife, Agnes of Courtenay, who was the mother of Baldwin and Sybil, and his subsequent remarriage to Maria Komnena had produced another daughter, Isabel; but the girl was only two years old in 1174, and although the circumstances of the divorce from Agnes were murky, the pope had legitimised the children of this first marriage (Mayer 1992: 121–35, Hamilton 2000: 33–4).



Figure 4.4 William of Tyre, tutor to the young Baldwin, discovered that he was a leper when he felt no pain from injuries sustained while playing with friends. From a thirteenth-century northern French manuscript of William of Tyre's *Chronicle*.

Source: © The British Library Board (BL Yates Thompson MS 12 f. 152v).

The office of regent was at first filled by Miles of Plancy, Amalric's seneschal, perhaps unofficially. Either his unpopularity with the barons, or his failure to take advantage of Nur ad-Din's death by intervening in Egypt, led to his assassination in October 1174; but Miles' position had already been challenged by Raymond III of Tripoli. Raymond had only recently been released from captivity, and was comparatively unknown in the kingdom. His demand for the regency, based on his claim of being *plus dreit heir aparant* – the closest male heir to the king – was a constitutional novelty, but seems nevertheless to have been supported by the baronage as a whole (Riley-Smith 1973a: 101–4). Raymond's claim was based on the king's paternal side, for his mother, Hodierna, was a daughter of Baldwin II. It is striking, especially given what later transpired, that the claim was accepted

by the king's maternal relations, the Courtenays – even though Bohemond III of Antioch, who was descended from another of Baldwin II's daughters, Alice, could make the same claim (Hamilton 2000: 89–94).

The most pressing matter to be resolved during Raymond's regency was the marriage of Sibyl, for by 1176 Baldwin's condition had worsened and it must have been apparent that he would be unable to father children. Once Sibyl had married and borne children, those children could eventually be Baldwin's heirs, but because lepers had a much shorter lifespan than the average, it was also likely that the children's father would be required to act as regent and military leader of the kingdom until they reached their majority. The first husband chosen for Sybil by Raymond of Tripoli, acting as regent, was William, marquis of Montferrat. One interpretation of the choice of William as Sybil's husband is that this signalled a reversal of the pro-Byzantine policy of the previous two reigns. William was both a kinsman and a vassal of the western emperor Frederick Barbarossa, who moreover was at this period pursuing an anti-Byzantine policy of his own; Raymond of Tripoli, who was himself hostile to the Byzantines, may therefore have been trying to counterbalance a Byzantine 'protectorate' over the kingdom of Jerusalem with that of the western emperor (Hamilton 2000: 100–2). However, although both Baldwin III and Amalric had married Byzantine princesses, there was no precedent for a Byzantine male consort, whereas in seeking a husband from the West the barons were simply following the traditional policy of the Crusader States. By the time the marriage took place (November 1176), however, the situation had changed, and Raymond's political calculations looked less sure-footed. Barbarossa's defeat in Italy at the hands of a papal–Lombard force, to which Manuel Komnenos was allied, had lessened any influence he might have brought to bear, and an embassy to Constantinople led by Reynald of Châtillon that same winter renewed the alliance of 1171.

Baldwin IV's reign has in the past been understood by some historians in terms of factional rivalry between two 'parties' among the baronage: principally, in the modern era by Marshall Baldwin (1936: *passim* and 1958: 590–621), followed by Runciman (1952: 405). According to this view, which became the accepted orthodoxy, and which has continued to influence some non-academic writing on the subject, factionalism in the kingdom centred on rivalry between the 'court party' led by the Courtenay relatives of the king and their adherents, whose main characteristic was that they were recent arrivals in the East, and therefore less well prepared to understand the realities of political life with powerful Muslim neighbours, and an 'old guard' among the baronage, led by Raymond of Tripoli and the Ibelin family, who represented the original Frankish settler families. Although we cannot deny that feuding among the baronage became endemic in the reign of Baldwin, nor that some of it appears to have had a highly personal quality, more recent studies have demonstrated the flaws in such a view. For one thing, the Courtenays themselves had been in the East for as long as Raymond's family,

while in contrast the Ibelins had come to prominence only in the reign of Fulk. Besides, the policies to which apparent rivals adhered cut across such ‘factions’ (Edbury 1993: 173–89). As has recently been shown, events in Baldwin’s reign did eventually become a battleground between the king’s maternal and paternal relations (Hamilton 2000: 154), but there is little evidence for this before 1180. Indeed, up to that point, attention focused on the attempt to bring about a permanent western alliance, in the form first of William of Montferrat, then Philip, count of Flanders, who came to the East as an ‘armed pilgrim’ with a sizeable force in 1177–8. Both men found themselves faced with a renewal of the Byzantine alliance of the 1160s, with presumably the understanding that the allies would try once again to conquer Egypt. By 1176–7, the need was even more pressing than it had been ten years earlier, for Saladin had by now gained control of Damascus as well as Egypt, and threatened to be a more powerful enemy than Nur ad-Din.

Whatever William of Montferrat thought of the Byzantine alliance, his unexpected death after a short illness in the summer of 1177 left the kingdom highly vulnerable in the immediate term and the question of succession still unresolved. Thus, when Philip, count of Flanders, arrived only weeks later to fulfil an armed pilgrimage, he was offered not only command of the army of Jerusalem in the proposed invasion of Egypt, but also the regency. From the kingdom’s point of view, Philip was an ideal choice: he was wealthy and well regarded, he was related to the ruling house (his mother Sibyl had been the daughter of Fulk of Anjou by his first marriage) and his family had an impeccable crusading tradition – his father Thierry had been to the East four times, and his mother had retired to the convent at Bethany. But the offer left Philip in a quandary. As Hamilton has pointed out (2000: 123–4), the quarrels that marred his stay in the East arose over the status of Egypt. If it were to be treated as a new kingdom, then it might be worth Philip’s while to accept Baldwin IV’s offer. But the barons presumably saw Egypt, as they had done in the 1160s, as a new province of the kingdom of Jerusalem, and Philip was unwilling to risk his county of Flanders against an uncertain position as deputy to an ailing king – let alone to conquer territory that might be held under Byzantine suzerainty. When Philip, as a relative, demanded the right to advise on a new marriage for Sibyl, and suggested one of his own barons, Robert of Béthune, as a suitable husband, this was too much for some of the settler barons to stomach. In particular Baldwin of Ibelin hoped to marry Sibyl himself, and the chronicle of Ernoul, which represents the Ibelin family’s perspective, suggests that a group of barons in the kingdom began to emerge that wanted to see Sibyl’s hand – and with it the regency – pass to a native of the Crusader States. Eventually Baldwin was to emigrate from the kingdom in disappointment.

It is easy to see how resentments and difficulties arose over Philip’s role, but in retrospect the failure to coordinate the various forces – Flemish, Jerusalemite and Byzantine – in an assault on Egypt meant that a genuine

opportunity to break Saladin had been missed. William of Tyre, whose chronicle from this point assumes a partisan approach, blamed Philip, but the anti-Byzantine Raymond of Tripoli, Bohemond III of Antioch and the Templars were all equally reluctant to commit themselves to the campaign. In the event, the bulk of the kingdom's forces campaigned in the north in a fruitless attempt to recapture Harim, lost to Nur ad-Din in 1164. As has recently been remarked, this rather pointless expedition epitomised the dilemmas for western lords who came to the East, and often found themselves serving the ends of local political ambitions rather than furthering a cause fondly imagined back at home. Even a great lord such as the count of Flanders could not bring with him a force sufficient to alter the balance of power against Saladin decisively (Barber 2012: 267–8). The temporary departure of most of the kingdom's forces left Saladin free to invade from the South. Although the small army that met him was led by the young king, the mastermind behind the unexpected and complete victory won over Saladin at Mont Gisard, near Gaza, in November 1177 was Reynald of Châtillon. The army included the Ibelins and Joscelin III of Courtenay, the king's uncle, ensured an unexpected victory. When one considers that Baldwin, who had entirely lost the use of one arm, could ride a horse only by gripping with his knees, so as to leave his good arm free to hold a weapon, his personal courage is all the more remarkable. It is also worth noting how Reynald and the Ibelins, later to be on opposing sides in the political feuds of the 1180s, acted effectively together. Yet it proved impossible to follow up the victory, and in 1178 Saladin took the newly built castle of Le Chastelet, to the north of the Sea of Galilee at Jacob's Ford, with ominous ease.

The policy of seeking a husband for Sibyl from the West continued after William of Montferrat's death, and in 1179 it looked as though Hugh III, duke of Burgundy, was ready to accept the role. But 1180 was to prove a decisive year for two reasons: first, the death of Louis VII meant that Hugh changed his mind, fearing a succession crisis in France; and second, Sibyl chose as her own husband Guy of Lusignan. Guy's reputation has suffered from the fact that we rely so heavily for this period on William of Tyre and Ernoul, neither of whom had any time for him. He has been much pilloried by historians (e.g. Runciman 1952: 424) but as at least one has pointed out, he was in some measure the victim of circumstance (Smail 1982: 159–76). The choice of Guy may have been as romantic as Runciman thought, but it reveals the desperation – and canniness – of Baldwin IV as well. In 1180, the succession question was forced by the threat of a *coup d'état* by Raymond III and Bohemond III; whether or not such an event was likely, Baldwin clearly believed that it was. William of Tyre says that the intention was to put Sibyl, whose heir Baldwin V had been born in 1177, on the throne, where Raymond hoped to exercise power through her. By marrying her off, Baldwin could ensure that such a measure would become pointless, because it would promote her husband to the regency and deprive Raymond

of his opportunity to be the power behind the throne. Guy was an unknown quantity as a ruler, but his Lusignan descent meant that he was connected to the Angevin dynasty with its huge resources, and thus offered similar hopes as William of Montferrat had done in 1176 – the protective mantle of a powerful western ruling dynasty.

A third critical event in 1180 was the death of Manuel Komnenos. Although the anti-western reaction to his reign in Constantinople did not set in until 1182, it must have been clear that his heir, who was a minor, would be unable to maintain the same investment in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Indeed, by 1185 the Byzantines had swung towards an alliance with Saladin, and the kingdom had no option but to look again to the West for protection.

Despite victory over Saladin at Le Forbelet in 1182, and a demonstration of the range of the kingdom's attacking power in Reynald's Red Sea raid in the same year (Hamilton 1978: 102–3) – a demonstration that may in fact have backfired on the Franks – the situation remained critical. By 1183 the king's condition had become so bad that he could neither see nor use his limbs, and at the end of the year the young heir, Baldwin V, was crowned. The ceremony itself indicated that Baldwin IV now had misgivings about what Guy of Lusignan might do when he himself was dead – and in this sense recalls Baldwin II's naming of his two-year-old grandson as heir in 1131. Guy had incurred the king's displeasure by his conduct of the defensive campaign against Saladin's invasion of Galilee in summer 1183. It is apparent that Guy's marriage had polarised baronial opinion, and that Raymond of Tripoli's disappointment at being marginalised brought him sympathy from the Ibelins, Reynald of Sidon, William of Tyre and others who distrusted Baldwin IV's maternal relations. Some of the animosity on both sides seems to have been entirely personal – as, for example, the hatred of Raymond expressed by the new Master of the Templars, Gerard of Ridefort – and some the result of professional rivalry, for example William of Tyre's defamatory portrait of the patriarch of Jerusalem, Heraclius (Kedar 1982: 177–204). Resentments and distrust made it impossible for Guy to use the army with which he had been entrusted in the field, but although he had successfully outfaced Saladin, Baldwin IV nevertheless stripped him of the regency. It may be true that Guy had shown incompetence in his preparations (Hamilton 2000: 191), but the real problem lay in his inability to provide united leadership. Baldwin may even have tried to have Guy's marriage to Sibyl annulled, so serious were his misgivings; in response, Guy openly rebelled by refusing to attend a summons to the king's council, and in punishment was stripped of Jaffa, half of his fief.

Baldwin, in fear of civil war, was prepared to risk opening the succession question once again. Hamilton has pointed out that even if the marriage were annulled, any alternative candidate who agreed to marry Sibyl would do so in the knowledge that his regency would be a temporary affair, until Baldwin V came of age (2000: 196), though this argument may be weakened

if, as has been suggested, it was already widely known that the young heir was so sickly that he was unlikely to reach adulthood (Riley-Smith 1973a: 104). In any case, when Baldwin IV finally died in 1185, the succession was a mess. On his death bed he appointed Raymond regent for Baldwin V, but Joscelin III, his great-uncle, as his personal guardian – perhaps in the hope that this might curtail Raymond's ambition to make himself king. Baldwin IV by now seems to have trusted nobody, for control of the royal castles was given not to the regent but to the Military Orders. Should Baldwin V die before coming of age, the whole question was to be thrown open to the pope, the western emperor and the kings of France and England to decide between the claims of Sibyl and Isabel. In other words, deadlock had been reached in the negotiations.

The boy king survived only a year before dying at the age of nine – in his way, as tragic a figure as his uncle. The events of the summer months of 1186 are most closely described by Ernoul, but because he was so openly hostile to Guy and Sibyl, his interpretation must be tempered by the reports of chroniclers admittedly less close to events, who report that Raymond was plotting to make himself king. The drama in which he was outmanoeuvred by Sibyl at her own coronation, in which she cleverly allowed everyone to believe that she would put Guy aside, before crowning him herself, has been told fully elsewhere (Kedar 1982: 196–7; Hamilton 2000: 217–21; Barber 2012: 293–5). Most of those hostile to Guy accepted the *fait accompli*, though Baldwin of Ramla, the head of the Ibelin family, left the kingdom, and when Saladin invaded in the spring of 1187, Raymond had not yet been reconciled to Guy, and had in fact made his own truce with Saladin in his capacity as count of Tripoli.

The prolonged succession crisis had weakened baronial unity, but the kingdom had survived such threats before – in 1150–2, for example, in 1134 and in 1123. Why did the kingdom crumble at the single decisive battle of Hattin in July 1187? One argument is that the pressure of Saladin's slow build-up of strength, culminating in the largest army ever assembled against the Franks, led inevitably to the kingdom's defeat. But Guy's army in 1187, if outnumbered, was also the largest that the kingdom had ever put into the field, and victory had been won before over Saladin from a less promising position. Saladin's coalition of forces, moreover, proved to be brittle when put to the test in 1190–2. A more persuasive argument is that the removal of Constantinople from the balance of power in the Near East since 1180 left Saladin free to dominate his Muslim enemies in the north-east at his leisure. For, although the Byzantine alliance had never delivered in military terms what it promised, it had prevented both Nur ad-Din and Saladin from following up partial victories, for fear of reprisals. Yet another course is to blame the West for failure to respond to the urgent appeal made by Heraclius' embassy in 1184. But although it is true that no crusade was launched until after Jerusalem had fallen, the history of military intervention in support of the Crusader States before 1187 does not allow us to assume

that they guaranteed success in any case. The war between Angevins and Capetians did not help, but Henry II had sent large sums of money to the East, which was in fact used to pay for mercenaries in 1187. In fact, many crusaders did arrive in the Holy Land in 1186, but found that a four-year truce had been agreed with Saladin; one can understand the frustration of western knights who must have felt that they had been hoodwinked by appeals from the East (Phillips 1996: 263–4).

Structural weaknesses in the kingdom of Jerusalem must also be acknowledged. The resources of both the crown and the baronage were stretched by the 1180s by constant expensive military action, and although the crown could count on huge revenues from trade in the form of customs and tolls on goods leaving and entering the ports, this does not seem to have been sufficient to meet the necessary outgoings. In 1167, Amalric I had levied a tax of 10 per cent on barons who did not join his invasion of Egypt. Many of the barons were by this stage unable to maintain their own lands effectively, and resorted to selling castles and estates to the Military Orders who were better able to assure their defence (Tyerman 2006: 354–5). Indeed, new conquests were one way of increasing the capacity of the crown to grant out new lands to barons. By 1183, a new tax was levied in the kingdom, rated at 2 per cent on all income worth over 100 besants, and in addition 1 per cent on land worth the same amount. It was time for the kingdom to pool its resources for the common defence of the realm.

Amalric I had, in the 1160s, attempted to tie all fief-holders, and even freemen in towns, directly to the crown through a law known as the *Assise sur la ligece*. The purpose of this was to reduce the potential for rear-vassals (fief-holders who did not hold directly from the crown but from other lords) to disassociate themselves from their obligations to the crown. The effect, however, was to increase greatly the number of fief-holders who were members of the high court: effectively, of the active political class. This, in turn, had the effect of creating new hierarchies among the baronage. For the first time, the existence of what we might call a peerage – in the sense at least of ‘greater’ and lesser landowners – is noticeable in the kingdom. The creation of huge ‘super-fiefs’ such as Oultrejourdain, given in the late 1160s to Philip of Nablus and then in 1176 to Reynald of Châtillon, was a political necessity that reinforced such a development. The cumulative effects of such changes were that by the 1180s a class of ‘over-mighty’ barons had emerged in a way that had been inconceivable two generations earlier. It was this political landscape that made possible the feuding that bedevilled the 1180s.

The internecine quarrels engendered by Guy and Sibyl’s *coup* allowed Saladin time to complete his control of northern Syria by taking Mosul and Homs from the Zengids. The opportunity to attack him before he had cemented his hold on the Islamic Near East had passed. Nevertheless, the Franks do not appear to have been afraid of confrontation. Reynald of Châtillon’s attack on a Muslim caravan in March 1187 can be defended as

sound, if aggressive, policy (Hamilton 1978: 106–8), but it certainly gave Saladin the excuse to invade on the grounds that the truce had been broken. Early in May Gerard of Ridefort lost over a hundred Templar and Hospitaller knights at Cresson, in a foolhardy attack on a large Muslim raiding party that weakened the kingdom's military capacity. Saladin seems to have indicated to Raymond, who had made his own truce with him in his role as count of Tripoli, that he was bound by family honour to retaliate for Reynald's attack on the caravan, because his sister had been travelling in it. However, rather than simply allowing Saladin to be seen to have fulfilled his debt of honour, the Franks – or at least the Templars – had sought a confrontation with his raiding party in the spring of 1187. Now Saladin could quite legitimately regard the truce as having been broken, and even Raymond, who had advised conciliation, realised that war was inevitable.

When Saladin launched a full-scale invasion in June, the stage was set for a repeat of the 1183 campaign. On this occasion, however, Saladin exploited baronial divisions by assaulting Raymond's town of Tiberias, where his wife and two sons were housed. As in 1183, Guy summoned the army of the kingdom of Jerusalem to Sephoria. In the high court, Raymond advised the same policy that had produced a stalemate four years earlier – even at the expense of his own family. But this strategy, though sound from a military view, had in 1183 proved politically disastrous for Guy, who had been dismissed from the regency by Baldwin IV for failure to engage Saladin. This – rather than the indecisiveness of character of which he is accused by Ernoul – is probably why he chose to follow the advice of Reynald of Châtillon and Gerard of Ridefort rather than that of Raymond, and risked all on an encounter with Saladin. In order to meet Saladin, however, Guy had to lead the kingdom's army across the waterless Galilee plain towards Tiberias in the heat of mid summer. The success of such a strategy, in the heat of July, depended on a supply of water for horses and men, and in the end it was exhaustion, heat and thirst that defeated them. Saladin had split his forces, and throughout the march the Franks were harassed by Turkish raiders, until finally, desperate for water for men and horses, they were surrounded on the shallow hill of Hattin, only a few miles from Tiberias (Kedar 1992a: 190–207).

The details of the battle of Hattin are lost to us because there is no contemporary account, but we can piece together from Arabic and later western sources the outlines of the engagement (France 2015: 64–101). With the exception of a detachment of mounted knights led by Raymond that broke through the Muslim ranks, the army was gradually squeezed by Saladin's superior forces and surrounded. The numbers of knights killed in the battle may not have been very great – though the foot soldiers, as always, suffered more – but the army was almost totally lost. The king himself and hundreds of knights were captured, and the True Cross, the kingdom's totemic standard, was never afterwards carried into battle by the Franks. Despite the size of Saladin's army, there was nothing inevitable about a Muslim

victory in 1187. Poor judgement, perhaps brought on by tensions among the barons, decided the outcome of the campaign, and thus of the kingdom. Guy was released after a year, but Saladin executed Reynald of Châtillon and all the Templar and Hospitaller prisoners. The kingdom lay open, and Jerusalem fell after brief resistance in October 1187. Tyre alone escaped, and it was from there that, two years after Hattin, the slow recovery of the kingdom was to begin.

5 The Islamic reaction, 1097–1193

Key Dates

1104–5	Damascene/Fatimid alliance against kingdom of Jerusalem fails
1105	as-Sulami writes <i>Book of the Holy War</i> in response to crusade
1113	Mawdud, ruler of Mosul, murdered in Damascus
1119	Il-Ghazi defeats Antiochenes at the Field of Blood; Roger of Salerno killed
1123	Balaq captures King Baldwin II
1127	Zengi becomes <i>atabeg</i> of Mosul
1144 (Christmas)	Zengi captures Edessa
1146	murder of Zengi; succession of Nur ad-Din
1154	Nur ad-Din assumes rule in Damascus
1164	Nur ad-Din defeats Franks at 'Artah
1169	Shirkuh repels Amalric I's invasion of Egypt
1171	Saladin suppresses Fatimid khalifate in Cairo
1174	death of Nur ad-Din; Saladin assumes rule in Damascus
1183	Saladin captures Aleppo
1186	Saladin captures Mosul
1187	(July) Saladin defeats kingdom of Jerusalem at Hattin; (October) captures Jerusalem

The Islamic world was slow to acknowledge the peculiarly spiritual nature of crusading from a western perspective, and the first crusaders were regarded as just another invading force on an already fragmented map. Despite some military successes achieved against the northern Crusader States, the political disunity of Islamic Syria meant that there was no

concerted attempt to drive the Franks out; nor indeed any sign that such a policy was desirable. Under a succession of rulers from the 1130s–90s, however, there was a revival of the *jihad* ideal in Islam, which resulted in both political unification and a new religious spirit. This chapter examines the careers of Zengi, Nur ad-Din and Saladin as *jihad* leaders.

The first generation

It has become something of a commonplace among historians to explain the military success of the First Crusade partly by pointing to the lack of resistance from the Muslim world. Expressing the question in such terms, however, begs the question of why very different Islamic powers – the competing Seljuq emirs and the Fatimids of Egypt – should have thought in terms of resistance to a religiously defined enemy. Although the crusaders seem to have defined themselves in such a way, it does not follow that either the Turks or the Fatimids saw them as enemies because they were Christians; indeed, both Seljuqs and Fatimids were well used both to employing ethnic groups, such as Armenians, who happened to be Christian, and to ruling over loyal populations of Arabic-speaking Christians. As far as the Turks were concerned, the crusaders were simply an invading force, albeit one connected to the Byzantine Empire. But in fact the first crusaders did face stiff opposition: for example, from the Seljuqs in Asia Minor and north Syria in 1097–8 and 1101, and from the Egyptians in Jerusalem and at Ascalon and Ramla in 1099 and 1102. Any one of these encounters might by itself have ended the crusade. There is no doubt, however, that the Franks were an unexpected enemy in terms of the forces they brought to the East, and that the novelty of their invasion took Muslim rulers by surprise. Not unreasonably, given that the crusade was launched in response to a Byzantine appeal, some Arab sources confused the Franks with Byzantines. Most of the Arab historians who wrote about the First Crusade treated it as a territorial conquest – sometimes, as in the perceptive account of as-Sulami, followed later by Ibn al-Athir, with economic causation (Gabrieli 1984: 3–4).

Because few Muslim contemporaries appreciated the religious roots of the western invasion of Syria and Palestine, they were slow to form any concerted ideological response to the crusade. This does not mean, however, that the invasion did not inspire pious sentiments. Hillenbrand (1999: 69–71) has shown how the deep shock at the fall of Jerusalem was expressed in poetry, such as the lines by al-Abiwardi, a Baghdadi who learned about the disaster from Syrian refugees:

This is war, and the infidel's sword is naked in his hand, ready to be sheathed again in men's necks and skulls. This is war, and he who lies in the tomb at Medina seems to raise his voice and cry: 'O sons of Hashim!'

Laments such as this show a degree of religious sensibility, but it is directed inward, towards Islam, rather than outward, against the Franks as Christians. Thus an anonymous poet whose work has been preserved in a later history addresses his appeal to Muslims: 'Do you not owe an obligation to God and Islam, defending thereby young men and old? Respond to God! Woe to you! Respond!' Although the savage treatment of defenders of Muslim-held cities who held out against the crusaders was condemned, the First Crusade did not seem to give immediate rise to an anti-Christian response in the Dar al-Islam. Instead, Muslims were urged to examine their own commitment to Islam in order to protect fellow-religionists who had been attacked.

There is one exception to this general rule. Among the first generation of Muslim writers, the Damascene as-Sulami (1105) stands out for his broad understanding of the context of the crusade. He linked the invasion of the Near East to the Norman seizure of Sicily in the 1090s (as Ibn al-Athir, writing a century later, would also do), and argued that the crusade was a premeditated strike that revealed the extent of Frankish intelligence of the political disarray in the East since 1092. Moreover, as-Sulami realised that the goal of the crusade was symbolic as well as political, and that the conquest and tenure of Jerusalem was a religious imperative for the Franks (Cobb 2014: 38–40). This has led at least one modern historian to argue that the crusade should indeed be seen in geopolitical terms as part of a clash between 'East' and 'West' (Chevedden 2015: 7–53). But it has also been pointed out (Hillenbrand 1999: 73) that, at the time that as-Sulami was writing, most of the Levantine coast, including the important cities, was still held by Muslims, and his *Book of the Holy War* is thus as much an exhortation to resist an ongoing conquest as it is a lament for the fall of Jerusalem. As-Sulami knew that the Franks had persisted through luck as well as military prowess, and that they were far from invincible: their supplies were uncertain and the numbers of heavy cavalry limited.

The title of his work is revealing, for as-Sulami was perhaps the first Muslim writer of the Seljuq period to appeal to the *jihad*, an ideal that appeared to have lain dormant since the early expansion of Islam. The notion of war justified on religious grounds is sanctioned in the Qur'an, most notably in sura 9, in which those who pursue *jihad* will attain Paradise. The *jihad* ideal remained strong during the first two centuries of Islam, because it was necessary to rationalise the continued territorial expansion in pursuit of the aim demanded in the revelation to Muhammad: the submission of all people to the will of God. In its formulation by Islamic scholars and legists during this period, *jihad* seems to have been unique. Although in many respects Islam was open to outside influences, and although Christian ideas of holy war had already been formulated, there is no evidence that *jihad* owed anything to these ideas. Nevertheless, an important aspect of both Christian holy war and Islamic *jihad* was the theme of personal inner renewal. In the development of both religions, the relationship of the individual to society was critical; hence, although holy war and *jihad* were

considered as means by which Christian or Islamic society could attain an idealised state of perfection, they were also incumbent as duties to be fulfilled by their followers. This did not, of course, mean that each Muslim was expected to be in a perpetual state of warfare against unbelievers. To be engaged in *jihad* was to be constantly striving for the subjection of the self to God's will; in other words, to strive to be a good Muslim.

This more abstract and interior understanding of *jihad*, besides being regarded by the earliest thinkers as more fundamental than its outward manifestation through war against unbelievers, also became a more pragmatic way of defining the concept. From the end of the eighth century onward, the impetus for further expansion slowed, and boundaries between the Dar al-Islam and the lands beyond became more or less fixed. As different legal schools of interpreting Islam developed, so a variety of theories of the requirements of *jihad* on individuals, rulers and society also emerged. The Hanafite school, for example, traditionally took a conservative line according to which peace with non-Muslims was a theoretical impossibility. On the other hand, the Hanabalite school argued for accommodation with unbelievers when it was in the interests of the Dar al-Islam. *Jihad*, in consequence, declined as a significant military ideal between the end of the eighth century and the end of the eleventh.

The argument that the *jihad* was non-existent during the generation after the First Crusade, propounded most fully by Sivan (1968), has recently been criticised. Hillenbrand (1999: 104) argues instead that *jihad* ideals were always present among religious scholars, but that they had lacked military application for so long that it was difficult for the religious classes to infuse the ruling classes with enthusiasm for war waged for spiritual, rather than territorial or economic, ends. That a sense of the moral imperative of war against the Franks did exist among Muslims is clear from an episode in 1111, when the Aleppo *qadi* Ibn al-Khashshab burst into a mosque in Baghdad, accompanied by a number of *sufis*, and smashed the *minbar* (pulpit) in protest against the inactivity of the sultan. But a successful *jihad* required, above all, the sacrifice of individual political aspirations to the greater aim of the spread of orthodox piety throughout the Dar al-Islam. Moreover, according to religious orthodoxy, legitimacy to wage *jihad* rested solely with the khalif. The Abbasid khalifs had the spiritual authority, but lacked the political weight, to direct a *jihad*, and even if the sultan were responsive, he could do nothing without the cooperation of the various rulers of the mosaic of small territories that had emerged from the Seljuq Empire, who in their turn had no need of the *jihad* in order to satisfy their own political aspirations.

In fact, no single Muslim ruler in the Near East – not even the Seljuq sultan – enjoyed sufficient authority over his Muslim neighbours to make a unified stand against the Franks possible. The strongest power in the early twelfth century, Fatimid Egypt, formed an alliance with Damascus to annex the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1104–5, and tried to invade from Ascalon in 1105–6, 1111–12 and 1112–13, but after the fall of Sidon became increas-

ingly ineffective. By then, the Fatimids may have decided that the Franks, who had shown some inclination but little capacity for an invasion of Egypt, could form a useful buffer state between themselves and the Seljuqs. As Shi'ites, the Fatimids in any case did not recognise the spiritual authority of the Abbasid khalif. Having taken advantage of the collapse of Seljuq central authority to seize Palestine in 1098, the Fatimids were unlikely to do anything that might lead to the return of the Seljuqs to that region.

Although the Seljuq rulers of Syria and Asia Minor posed more of a threat to the Frankish settlers than the Fatimids, this threat was defused by their inability, for the most part, to operate together. The one individual who might have accomplished a show of unity, the sultan Barkyaruq, was unwilling to leave Baghdad to go to the aid of the Syrians at the time of the First Crusade because he was fighting a war of succession with his brother. Once his brother, Muhammad, succeeded to the sultanate, he did send armies to Syria under the command of Mawdud, governor of Mosul, in 1110 and 1111–12, but nothing was accomplished. On the second occasion the ruler of Aleppo, Ridwan, refused to allow Mawdud to enter his city.

One reason for the failure of Muhammad's expeditions seems to have been that the local Seljuq rulers were singularly unenthusiastic about direct influence from Baghdad. Indeed, rulers of small territories such as Ridwan, Kerboga, Tughtegin of Damascus, or the autonomous Arab lords of Shaizar, seem to have preferred to allow the Franks to become another player on the complex chessboard of Syria and Palestine. Aleppo, Antioch, Edessa and the Danishmend emirate of eastern Asia Minor were all, when it suited them, prepared to form alliances that cut across the religious divide, rather than submit to the suzerainty of a greater power. When Mawdud returned to western Syria in 1113, he was murdered in the streets of Damascus, probably on the orders of the governor, Tughtegin. Two years later, the sultan found himself opposed by a mixed army composed of Franks from Jerusalem and Antioch and Muslims from Damascus and Aleppo. The Frankish presence was not, so far as most Muslim rulers were concerned, a religious issue but a political one, and they saw the *jihad* as a means by which the sultan could re-establish his authority in Syria at their expense.

The first signs that an alliance between the religious and military classes was emerging to confront the Franks occurred in north Syria about twenty years after the seizure of Antioch. The *qadi* al-Khashshab of Aleppo seems to have influenced his own people with a degree of religious idealism in their struggle against Antioch, although the Aleppans' defender, Il-Ghazi, despite his military success at the Field of Blood (1119) proved to be an inadequate role model for *jihad*. In 1124, however, the tomb of Il-Ghazi's nephew Balaq was adorned with an inscription extolling his virtues in pursuing the *jihad* against the infidel. Balaq was described as the 'sword of those who fight the holy war, leader of the armies of the Muslims, vanquisher of the infidels and the polytheists' (the last being a standard insult against the Christians, for their belief in the Trinity) (Hillenbrand 1994: 60–9; 1999: 110–11).

Balaq's greatest triumph came in the autumn of 1122, when he captured Joscelin of Edessa. With Antioch still leaderless after Roger's death, Baldwin II had little choice but to march north to his old territory, but he too was surprised and captured by the Euphrates. Balaq secured control of Aleppo by marrying Ridwan's daughter, and proceeded to reduce the fortresses still in Frankish hands.

Yet despite his mastery of the region, Balaq's downfall is indicative of the obstacles in the way of the *jihad*, for he was killed while besieging the fortress of a rebel vassal. Only weeks later, Tyre, the penultimate coastal city left in Muslim hands, surrendered to a Frankish/Venetian alliance. Balaq had been on the point of marching to raise the siege when he died. His successor in Aleppo, his cousin Timurtash, was uninterested in war against the Franks, and withdrew to Mardin, showing open contempt for the problems of western Syria. When Baldwin II (now released) tried to press home the advantage by besieging Aleppo, the delivery of the city came from Mosul, whose governor al-Bursuqi forced Baldwin to retreat. And it was from Mosul, the chief city of Mesopotamia, that the first Muslim leader ruthless and able enough to combine the disparate forces of Syria was to emerge.

Zengi and Nur ad-Din: *jihad* revived

Although he was the first – and in some ways the most impressive – of the Muslim rulers who was to restore the *jihad* as a central feature of Near Eastern politics, Zengi remains a somewhat shadowy figure. His father, Aq Sunqur, was a close adviser to Sultan Malikshah, but in the succession crisis after 1092 his support for Barkyaruq cost him his life, and little is known of Zengi's formative years. By 1114–15, at the age of about thirty, he was in the employ of al-Bursuqi, the governor of Mosul. In 1122–3 he was entrusted with the governorship of Basra and Wasit, and in 1127 he returned to Mosul as governor. He is usually known, however, by the honorific title *atabeg* because, following Seljuq custom, the sultan appointed him as tutor to his sons. From Mosul, Zengi was well placed to extend his influence north, into Artqid territory, as well as west into Syria. His early campaigns against these Turcomans won him a reputation for ferocity, but also provided a ready supply of troops.

Zengi was fortunate in that his arrival in Mosul coincided with the death of Tughtegin of Damascus (1128), and followed close on that of Balaq (1124). His seizure of Aleppo in 1128 would scarcely have been so easy had they still been alive. But Zengi's aspiration was Damascus, the key to Syria. Tughtegin's death weakened a state that had for a generation resisted both Frankish expansion and attempts by the sultan to extend his authority into Syria. Zengi, like Baldwin II, who tried to annex Damascus in 1129, was following the policy of all Near Eastern rulers, whether Muslim or Christian, in seeking to profit from the misfortune of his neighbours. Although Zengi is best known in western historiography as the conqueror

of Edessa, and thus as the destroyer of the first of the Crusader States, that victory was almost incidental to his strategy, which was the creation of a new axis of power centred on Mosul, Aleppo and Damascus. Throughout the 1130s, he cast an inescapable shadow over Damascus, but was unable either to capture the city or to persuade its ruler, Jamal al-Din, and his successor, Unur, to hand it over. Damascus fluctuated between supporting Zengi's campaigns in the north – as in 1138 when it provided troops for his defeat of an Antiochene–Byzantine army – and resisting his influence through alliance with the kingdom of Jerusalem.

Zengi's union of Mosul with Aleppo had altered the balance of power in Syria by isolating Damascus. The policy of preserving Damascene independence was preserved, however, at the price of opening the door to the influence of the Ismaelite sect known as the Assassins. Tughtegin had been forced to give them Banyas as a reward for their support, and after his death they were able to continue what one historian has called their 'terrorist activities' under the shelter of Damascus (Gibb 1958a: 455). The Assassins, who were staunch Shi'ites, were to be a thorn in the sides of all empire-builders in the region throughout the twelfth century.

One reason why the domination of Syria proved so difficult for Zengi – as it was to prove later in the century for Saladin – is that his attentions were frequently called elsewhere. For the two periods 1131–7 and 1140–3 he was preoccupied with power struggles in Iraq and operations against the Artaqids and Kurds to the north of Mosul. Yet it was the latter distraction that was to provide Zengi with his greatest triumph. When the young Artqid prince Kara Arslan opened negotiations with Joscelin II of Edessa, Zengi threatened the county's eastern fortresses and, thanks to Joscelin's precipitate march east, found himself with an opportunity to attack and sack Edessa itself, in December 1144.

The conquest of Edessa sealed Zengi's reputation among both the Franks and Muslims. Because of the massacre of westerners, William of Tyre called him 'homicidal', transliterating his Turkish name into the Latin 'Sanguinus' ('bloody'). The inverse sentiment appears in the story told by Ibn al-Athir, in which Zengi, in Paradise, tells another dead man that he has been pardoned all his wrongs for the single virtuous act of ejecting the Franks from Edessa (Hillenbrand 2001: 119). Ibn al-Athir, himself a Mosuli, was the historian of the Zengid clan, and therefore predisposed to elevate Zengi's reputation. Arab chroniclers writing from other perspectives, such as Saladin's partisan, al-Isfahani, painted a portrait of a tyrannical and cruel man who ruled by fear:

He was like a leopard in character, like a lion in fury, not renouncing any severity, knowing no kindness . . . He was feared for his sudden assaults, shunned for his roughness, aggressive, insolent, [a bringer of] death to enemies and citizens.

(cited in Hillenbrand 2001: 122)

Hillenbrand has argued that ‘even in the context of medieval Arab writers discussing the Turks the blood-curdling qualities of Zengi stand out as exceptional’ (2001: 122; Cobb 2014: 131–6). There can be no doubting his personal courage, his skills of generalship or his political ambition. He can be distinguished from earlier Muslim leaders who confronted the Franks by his quality of ruthlessness. But to what extent was Zengi a *jihad* leader; and does his career mark the emergence of a new kind of resistance to the Franks, a resistance stiffened by the ideological coherence offered by the *jihad* ideal?

Although the capture of Edessa in 1144 may have been incidental to the strategy he was pursuing in Syria, there is no doubt that it was beneficial in persuading other Muslims both of his ability to defeat the Franks and of the service that he rendered Islam in so doing. Thus Ibn al-Athir, writing in the early thirteenth century, commented that if Zengi had not made himself master of Syria, the Franks would have overrun it. Another factor in assuring Zengi’s reputation was the situation in Damascus. For although Zengi can appear as an aggressor who tried to bully the Damascenes into handing him the city, he can also be seen as the protector of the Sunni majority against the double threat of the powerful Shi’ite Assassins within the city and the Franks who had already demonstrated their desire to conquer Damascus. It is also worth noting what else was happening in the wider Sunni Islamic world at the same time. By the 1140s *jihad* ideals were also being revived in the Far West, where the Moroccan Almohad dynasty’s invasion of the Iberian peninsula had caused the Christian advance to falter.

One respect in which Zengi differed from most of the warlords whom he succeeded was his use of eastern Seljuq institutions to bolster the infrastructure of his government. Thus Syria saw, under Zengi, the proliferation of the *madrasas* and *khanqas* that were already common in Iran. *Madrasas* were schools for the study of the Qur’an and Islamic law; *khanqas* were rather like the western monasteries, though with the important difference that the *sufis* for whom they were founded were not bound by vows of enclosure within the community. In sponsoring these institutions Zengi was cementing an alliance with the religious scholars. As one scholar has remarked (Irwin 1995: 229–30), Zengi’s aim was to institute a ‘moral rearmament’ to complement his military campaigns. Together, rulers and the religious scholars would rout out corruption and negligence in the Dar al-Islam. As early as 1130, Zengi was calling upon Damascenes to cooperate in a *jihad*, but it soon became clear that Damascus itself was to be an initial target of this campaign. For Zengi, the Franks were merely part of the infidel threat to the Muslim community; in many respects, a far more dangerous threat was posed by the presence of the Shi’ite Assassins in Damascus. Zengi’s *jihad* was targeted against moral and religious laxness within the Dar al-Islam, and against the heterodoxy promoted by the Shi’ites, as well as the infidel on its borders. Even al-Isfahani, no friend of the Zengids, called Zengi ‘a pillar of the *jihad*’, and this reputation seems

to have been enhanced, rather than created, by his conquest of Edessa (Hillenbrand 2001: 124).

The significance of the alliance between religious scholars and military leaders should not be overlooked. The scholars, *sufis* and *qadis* trained in the schools founded by Zengi, who reached maturity under Nur ad-Din and Saladin, were members of the largely Arab urban intelligentsia of Syria and Iraq. They were thus ethnically distinct from the Turkish (or, in the case of Saladin, Kurdish) Seljuqs who formed the military leadership of the Islamic Near East. Seljuq rule had been imposed on the Near East by conquest in the mid-eleventh century, and Seljuq rulers were still resented and distrusted by many noble Arab Syrian families, such as the Munqidh rulers of Shaizar, a town that lay within the spheres of influence of Aleppo and Antioch. The alliance cemented by Zengi laid the foundations for the kind of unity within the Islamic world that could eventually guarantee the revival of the *jihad* as a practical and realisable aim for the regeneration of Islam and for the restoration of its lost territories.

Zengi was assassinated by a slave in 1146, when he was at the height of his powers. It was left to his son, Nur ad-Din, to seize the prize for so long denied his father. Damascus, one of the most important centres of population and culture in Syria, had, after initial attempts to blunt the success of the first crusaders, been studiously neutral towards the kingdom of Jerusalem since c.1112. Its Seljuq rulers governed an uneasy population of Sunnis with a large Shi'ite minority, but after Tughtegin's death in 1128, his son Buri showed his strength by having his Shi'ite vizier murdered, and in the subsequent riots hundreds of Shi'ites were also killed. Buri was in turn the victim of assassination by the Shi'ites in 1132, and it was in the resulting civil strife that one of Tughtegin's emirs, Unur, seized power himself. Under Unur in the 1130s and early 1140s, Damascus became a buffer state between growing Zengid power and the kingdom of Jerusalem. If the fall of Edessa marked the beginning of a *jihad*-inspired resurgence, the failure of the Franks to take Damascus on the Second Crusade assured its momentum. The shock of the assault on them by a neighbour that had so recently been an ally, and the martyrdom in the siege of Muslim clerics, may have awakened a sense of *jihad* that had been absent among the pragmatic Damascenes up to that point. But perhaps just as decisive in promoting the *jihad* was Nur ad-Din's stunning victory at Inab in 1149, at which Raymond, prince of Antioch, was killed. The realisation that Nur was not only as formidable in the field as his father, but if anything more committed to an anti-Frankish *jihad*, coupled with the loss of the kingdom of Jerusalem as a viable ally against north Syrian expansion, decided Damascus' fate. In fact Nur ad-Din, having failed in 1149 to seize Mosul after the sudden death of his brother, had little choice but to concentrate his attentions on Syria. Unur, who had skilfully maintained Damascene independence, also died in 1149, and Nur ad-Din was able to demand troops from Damascus for a campaign to relieve Ascalon in 1150,



Figure 5.1 The citadel of Damascus was fortified by Nur ad-Din in the middle of the twelfth century after the unsuccessful siege of the city on the Second Crusade in 1148. Further defences were built by Baibars in the thirteenth century.

Source: © Andrew Jotischky.

pleading the cause of *jihad*. By this stage popular opinion in Damascus was with Nur ad-Din, no doubt in large part because he had brutally suppressed Assassin adherents in Aleppo and could be expected to show the same treatment to the sect that had become so feared in Damascus. In 1154, Nur ad-Din entered the city in triumph without having to shed blood, and Zengi's ambition of a Syria unified under a single rule had been accomplished.

The true significance of 1154 was revealed in Nur ad-Din's actions after taking control of Damascus. In addition to new *madrasas* and *khanqas*, he also established in 1163 a 'palace of justice' (*dar al-'adl*) where he himself sat as chief judge in cases brought by the citizenry. The seriousness with which Nur ad-Din took his judicial duties should be seen as part of the ideological facet of the *jihad* that was so characteristic a feature of his rule. In order to present himself as a fit leader of the Islamic community, Nur ad-Din realised that he had to fulfil the requirements of the just ruler (Rabbat 1995: 3–28). Religious foundations mushroomed in his reign; it has been estimated that of the forty-two *madrasas* built in Syria in this period, half were Nur ad-Din's own foundations (Hillenbrand 1999: 127). By building – literally – the facilities for Sunni Islamic education and training, he was creating a new generation of Sunni *qadis* and *imams*. Moreover, the religious classes had a direct role to play in his rulership. *Sufis* and legal scholars fought in his armies, while in Damascus public readings of religious tracts were held.

Although Arab chroniclers such as the Damascene Ibn al-Qalanisi present an image of the just ruler who from the start was inspired by zeal for the *jihad*, we should be wary of taking such assessments at face value. The Iranian Imad ad-Din al-Isfahani described him as 'the most chaste, pious, sagacious and virtuous of kings', and Ibn al-Athir saw in Nur ad-Din the restoration of the glorious age of the first khalifs. But Ibn al-Athir's history of Mosul is heavily biased towards the Zengid dynasty, while Imad ad-Din was in Nur ad-Din's service from 1166 onward. Following the chroniclers, Elisséeff, his modern biographer, has seen Nur ad-Din's career as guided by zeal for the *jihad*, in an apparently smooth progression from the imposition of internal justice, order and religious orthodoxy on Syria to the conquest of the infidel – internal *jihad*, in other words, followed by the outward extension of the ideal (Elisséeff 1967: II, 426). But, like Zengi, Nur ad-Din realised the practical value of the *jihad* ideal in building up his own territorial power. It is also possible to see the same pattern in quite a different light – as the exploitation of *jihad* ideals to accomplish mastery over the Islamic community, in order to provide him with the resources to extend his territorial ambitions to the West (Köhler 1991: 239, 277). It has been argued that Nur ad-Din experienced an inner conversion either as a result of illnesses in 1157 and 1159 (after which, in 1161, he undertook the pilgrimage to Mecca), or after his heavy defeat at the hands of the Franks in 1163. After this, according to Ibn al-'Adim, Nur self-consciously and publicly combined personal austerity with his prosecution of the *jihad* (Hillenbrand 1999: 134–5).

Nur ad-Din's most important innovation in the field of *jihad* was probably his adoption of Jerusalem as a central focus for the ideal. Although it had never been regarded as so important within Islam as Mecca and Medina, Jerusalem revived as a spiritual centre under Fatimid attentions in the eleventh century (Duri 1982: 355). It even became a substitute for pilgrims who could not reach Mecca. The spiritual significance of the city lay both in its role in the life of the Prophet, who had made his celebrated 'night journey' from Mecca to Jerusalem, and in the associations with the patriarchs of the Jewish Scriptures, who were also venerated in Islam. Religious poetry from the reign of Nur ad-Din complemented the increasing presence of Jerusalem in the works of religious scholars; for example, a poem by Ibn Munir spoke of fighting the crusaders 'until you see Jesus fleeing from Jerusalem' (Hillenbrand 1999: 150). A distinctive genre of poetry, the 'Merits of Jerusalem' flourished in Syria under Nur ad-Din, to be continued under his successor Saladin. This 'jihad of the tongue' was a critical element in aligning cultivated Arab opinion behind the military and political programme of expelling the Franks from the holy city (Latiff 2013: 135–52). Most famously, Nur ad-Din enshrined his aspiration for the conquest of Jerusalem in buildings, particularly in the *minbar* he commissioned to be installed in the al-Aqsa mosque once the crusaders had been evicted. Study of the *minbar* and its inscriptions has highlighted both how definitive a statement of intent it is and how unusually specific its message (Tabbaa 1986: 233–4). The *minbar* was constructed in 1168–9 and used in Aleppo until Saladin brought it to Jerusalem after the conquest in 1187.

The balance of power in north Syria established by Byzantine intervention in 1158–9, coupled with his failure to secure Mosul, and his defeat at Frankish hands in 1163, led Nur ad-Din to intervene in Egyptian affairs. It is difficult to know whether this was a response to King Amalric's own involvement from 1163 onward, or whether Amalric wanted to forestall Seljuq intervention after the death of the Fatimid vizier in 1161. At any rate, in 1164 the new vizier, Shawar, appealed to Nur ad-Din to return him to office after being overthrown by a rival, Dirgham. When Nur ad-Din sent his Kurdish commander Shirkuh to reinstate Shawar, he hoped to gain immediate financial advantage in the form of one-third of Egyptian revenues, as well as a measure of control over Egyptian policy. But after Dirgham had been killed, Shawar reneged on his promise to Nur ad-Din and appealed to Amalric for protection. It was a dangerous game, but one that seemed to have paid off when the Franks forced Shirkuh to retreat, then themselves withdrew. Meanwhile, Nur ad-Din's crushing victory over the northern Franks at 'Artah (1164), at which the rulers of Antioch and Tripoli were captured, raised his prestige – and capacity to hire Turcoman troops – to even higher levels. By mid-1168 he had achieved mastery over all of Syria between Antioch and Mosul, and when his brother Qutb ad-Din died in 1170, Nur ad-Din lost no time in intervening decisively in the resulting succession dispute to instate his nephew Saif ad-Din as his vassal. Shirkuh

led armies into Egypt in 1167 and early 1169, on the second occasion securing the defeat and death of Shawar and the final withdrawal of Amalric. This victory made Nur ad-Din the most powerful Muslim leader in the Near East, and indeed the most powerful since the death of Malikshah. Yet his final years were not to see the culmination of his aspiration to add Jerusalem to his conquests. Although he raided Tripoli and the Galilee and attacked Kerak, he stopped short of a full assault. When he died unexpectedly in 1174, little had been done to accomplish the *jihad* that poets, legists and religious scholars had supported in the public image that their work presented of Nur ad-Din. It was in many ways an unfinished career, yet one that has endured in the memory of Muslim communities who continue to regard Nur ad-Din with respect and admiration.

Saladin and the zenith of *jihad*

[H]e strengthened the cutting blades, gave drink to the terrible lances, and returned to his tents happy and content, received with welcome and gratitude, generous and appreciated . . . with glowing face, fragrant odour, radiant aspect, certain of victory and in firm possession of certainty . . . clearly drawing up his terms for recovering the debt owed to the Faith.

(Gabrieli 1984: 126–7)

The description of Saladin before the battle of Hattin by his secretary ‘Imad ad-Din conveys a sense of the manifest destiny he was about to seize. It was an image that Saladin himself was keen to present to fellow Muslims, particularly those who had reason to suspect his ambition. Yet, although Hattin can sometimes appear to us as the crash of a tidal wave of *jihad*-inspired resistance to the crusade that had been building up since the 1130s, there was nothing inevitable about Saladin’s rise to the top. Few, indeed, could have predicted, when Nur ad-Din was at the height of his powers, that he would be succeeded by this obscure Kurdish general. For Saladin conquered the kingdom of Jerusalem by first murdering, manoeuvring and bullying his way into Nur ad-Din’s inheritance.

When Shirkuh died only three months after defeating Shawar in 1169, Saladin took over leadership of his uncle’s mixed army of Turks and Kurds who constituted the occupying power in Egypt. Even after he had been appointed vizier, however, his authority was not unquestioned. As he explained to the khalif in Baghdad, his was not the only army in Egypt, for the Fatimid khalif, al-’Adid, had a large force of Armenians and Nubians loyal only to him (Lyons and Jackson 1982: 32). In order to impose Sunni authority over the Fatimid régime, Saladin first had to overcome the potential resistance offered by this force. He did so with a combination of economy and brutality that characterised his early career: having manufactured a plot

against him, he murdered one of the most powerful courtiers, the eunuch Mu'tamin, then bottled up in the streets and squares of Cairo the Nubian and Armenian forces who had taken up arms in protest against his action, and burned them out. He still had to face the joint assault launched on Egypt in 1169 by the Franks and Byzantines, but the scale of his triumph in Cairo was such that al-'Adid, in recognition of his vizier's newly won authority, sent sufficient troops to defend Damietta against them.

By the time that Saladin's growing power in Egypt had attracted the jealous attention of Nur ad-Din, on whose behalf he held the vizierate, he had already ensconced many of his relatives in positions of authority. His father Ayyub, his uncle and three brothers controlled the ports and were given *iqtas* (fiefs) from which troops could be raised. This delegation of authority among his immediate kinship was to be characteristic of Saladin's government as it expanded. It is tempting, indeed, to see the role that Saladin came to play in the Dar al-Islam as a means of creating sufficient resources to be able to reward the clan that kept him in power at the expense of his Muslim neighbours (Irwin 1995: 231–3). It is certainly significant that with Saladin the Islamic Near East saw the rise to power of a dynasty drawn from what had been an underclass, the Kurds. Much of the distrust Saladin was to face from Arab Syrians and Turks was based on racial hostility.

As an occupying Sunni ruler over a Fatimid state, Saladin had to tread carefully. Before the end of 1170 Nur ad-Din was urging him to replace Shi'ite worship with Sunni by establishing the Abbasid *khutba* in place of that pronounced for the Fatimid khalif, but Saladin was wary of the strong centre of Shi'ism focused on the person of the Fatimid khalif, al-'Adid. According to Ibn abi Tayy, a Syrian chronicler unsympathetic to Saladin, it was the vizier's reluctance to quash Shi'ism that led Nur ad-Din to suspect his loyalty (Lyons and Jackson 1982: 44). In any case, Saladin was fortuitously spared having to make a decision, for al-'Adid, though still only twenty years old, fell gravely ill, and when it was already clear that he was dying, Saladin had the Abbasid *khutba* pronounced while parading his troops through the streets of Cairo. Although Saladin seems to have treated the khalif's children well, there was no question of their succeeding, and in September 1171 the Fatimid khalifate was abolished.

The death of Nur ad-Din and King Amalric I of Jerusalem in the same year (1174) removed two distinct threats to his power in Egypt, for Amalric had not given up hope of conquest, while Nur ad-Din was on the point of curbing his lieutenant's authority by calling for a financial account of his government. By a stroke of fortune for Saladin, the succession to both was uncertain, for both heirs were minors, and Amalric's was already known to be sickly. In fact, the time of the death of Amalric, coming so soon after Nur ad-Din's, was less useful to Saladin than it appears now, for Baldwin IV's succession temporarily removed any danger to Syria from the Franks, and thus robbed Saladin of an excuse to take over the government of Damascus from Nur ad-Din's heir as-Salih on the grounds of protecting the

Muslim community. For although Saladin's base in Egypt made him more powerful than any Syrian leader, Syria remained a better base from which to launch a *jihad*, and Saladin realised that it was only by making use of the *jihad* ideal that he would be able to attain dominance over his Muslim rivals. In the event the leading Damascene families argued among themselves, while Saif ad-Din, Nur's nephew, was too concerned with events in Mosul to show an interest in Syria, and it was a simple matter for Saladin to have himself invited to Syria to act as as-Salih's guardian.

Control over Damascus did not deliver the whole of Syria, still less confer the legitimacy within the Dar al-Islam that Saladin needed. Most of Saladin's career, indeed, was occupied in first trying to dislodge as-Salih from Aleppo, then in conquering Mosul from the Zengids. Interspersed with these campaigns were military activities directed against the Franks; for example, his attempted invasions of the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1177 and 1183. After the glorious triumph of 1187, Saladin struggled to maintain his conquest against the fresh assault of the Third Crusade (1189–92), in the face of increasing reluctance by other Muslim leaders to recognise the authority he considered should have been guaranteed by his victories. Much the same question can be asked of Saladin as of Nur ad-Din: to what extent was the *jihad* an instrument of policy designed to confer legitimacy on his territorial ambitions?

In Saladin's case, such legitimacy was harder won, for Nur ad-Din was after all the son of Zengi, while Saladin had blatantly disinherited the heirs to Fatimid Egypt, Damascus and Aleppo. In the case of Egypt, it could at least be said that he was acting on Nur ad-Din's instructions, and ultimately in the interests of the Abbasid khalifate, in order to spread orthodox Sunni Islam. Syria was a different matter, and here actions such as Saladin's marriage to Nur ad-Din's widow (which, cynical though it may appear, was standard medieval practice) had to be balanced by a constant stream of letters to the khalif designed to establish his position. Such letters contained a curious mixture of begging (for troops and money), boasting of victories, and demanding that he be confirmed as the leader of the *jihad* against the Franks. Clearly, Saladin's chancery was a vital part of his government, and one historian has attributed the initiative in his *jihad* propaganda to the religious intellectuals, especially al-Fadil and 'Imad ad-Din, who staffed it (Irwin 1995: 232). According to this argument, it was the men produced by the policies of Zengi and Nur ad-Din who were pushing the *jihad* to the top of the agenda.

Besides official communications must be placed sources such as the biography by Baha ad-Din Ibn Shaddad, *qadi* to Saladin's army from 1188 to 1193 (Richards 2001), or the highly rhetorical *Eloquent Exposition of the Conquest of Jerusalem* by 'Imad ad-Din, which was apparently recited in front of Saladin in 1192 (Hillenbrand 1999: 182). Because he naturally devoted most of his work to the period in which he knew Saladin most intimately, in other words after the conquest of the Latin kingdom, it was

impossible for Baha ad-Din not to present him as the ideal *jihad* warrior. But he also wanted to portray him as an ideal Muslim ruler, and to explain his success in *jihad* – in unspoken contrast to earlier warriors, such as Il-Ghazi – as the natural consequence of his piety. Saladin embodied, for Baha ad-Din, the pillars of Islam; thus, in the biography, Saladin is made to renounce secular amusements and alcohol at the crucial moment of 1169. It is difficult to know how seriously such formulaic statements might be. One critic, al-Wahrani, painted a picture of licentiousness at Saladin's court in Egypt in 1177 that included homosexuality and drunkenness (Lyons and Jackson 1982: 118–19). Saladin's generosity – giving alms is one of the requirements of Islam – is a constant source of comment by Baha ad-Din. But the fact that when he died, Saladin had only 47 dirhems and a single gold piece in his treasury (Richards 2001: 19; for other examples of generosity, 25–6) can be interpreted as financial negligence as well as generosity: as al-Fadil remarked, Saladin spent the fortune of Egypt to gain Syria and that of Syria to gain Mesopotamia, and that of Mesopotamia to conquer Palestine. But Saladin understood the importance of generosity as a weapon of policy, a point recognised by the equally perceptive William of Tyre, who acknowledged that Saladin used liberality as a means to exact loyalty (WT 1986: 1012–13). Ibn al-Athir, likewise, attributed the victory at 'Amid, near Mosul, in 1183 to Saladin's generosity, which he contrasted with the meanness to his own men shown by 'Amid's defender, Ibn Nisan. In this context, al-Fadil quoted a dictum of Khalif Harun al-Rashid: 'no money is wasted that receives a legacy of praise' (cited in Lyons and Jackson 1982: 368). Saladin knew, moreover, how to make financial exactions appear in the best light: when he abolished the unpopular service taxes that had been imposed by the Fatimid régime in Egypt, he replaced it with a compulsory *zakat*, or alms tax, which was not only sanctioned in Islamic law but required by Qur'anic injunction. Saladin was in fact perpetually short of money, and although Egypt appeared wealthy, the ostentatious splendour of the Fatimids may have disguised economic decline; by the 1190s its gold coinage had run out (Lyons and Jackson 1982: 49, 318). When he was appealing to the khalif for money during the siege of Acre in 1191, he declared that his personal resources amounted to only three estates, one in Egypt and two in Syria (Lyons and Jackson 1982: 324).

Baha ad-Din's testimony about the role of piety in the army is harder to doubt. Parts of the *hadith* – the customs of the Prophet that formed part of Islamic law – were recited to the army before battle. Like Nur ad-Din, Saladin attached religious scholars to his army. According to Baha ad-Din, he preferred to give battle on Fridays, when he could benefit from the prayers said on the Islamic holy day (Richards 2001: 72). After Hattin, the captured Hospitallers and Templars were given to *sufis* to be executed, to emphasise the religious duty of even non-combatant Muslims to wage *jihad*. (That *sufis* were unaccustomed to such duties doubtless prolonged the captives' agony.) The appeal to *jihad*, which became much more

noticeable in Saladin's bureaucracy and in his policy after the submission of Aleppo in 1183, was necessary in order to amass an army of sufficient scale to conquer Jerusalem. The picture painted by the sources of a decisive religious awakening at the mid point of his career looks rather formulaic, especially given that we encounter the same in contemporary accounts of Nur ad-Din. It is true that in 1175–6 and 1185 attempts were made on his life by the Shi'ite Assassins, which may have resulted in his devoting himself to the cause of Sunni orthodoxy more strongly. Like the later crusader Louis IX of France, Saladin is said to have dedicated himself to the recovery of Jerusalem in gratitude to God for delivery from serious illness. During this illness, which occurred in 1182, al-Fadil apparently encouraged Saladin to vow that he would hereafter devote himself to *jihad*, and eschew warfare against Muslims. After gaining Aleppo in 1183, Saladin could afford to take such a vow – although if he took one, he did not keep to it – for he had no more need to fight Muslims for control of Syria.

Modern scholars have tended to be sceptical about Saladin's religious motives. Ehrenkreutz (1972: 237) and Lyons and Jackson (1982: 240) argue that if he had died in 1185, when he was seriously ill, he would be remembered as nothing more than a self-aggrandising dynast in common with many of his predecessors, and Köhler (1991: 316) points to the many treaties he made with the Franks, and indeed, from 1183 onward, with the Byzantines. This scepticism has been less readily accepted by Hillenbrand (1999: 185–6), who argues that the public image presented by the ruler was more important than his personal piety. Even if we regard much of the chroniclers' account as stylised, we need not be unduly sceptical about Saladin's religious motives. It is perhaps easier for today's reader to take seriously sincere declarations of *jihad* than it was even thirty years ago. Moreover, it is dangerous to dismiss as simply propaganda the personal piety of any medieval ruler: beliefs could be nonetheless sincere even if they were subject to exploitation for political gain. A recent history of the Crusades from an Islamic perspective introduces Saladin as a 'protean' figure who has, in the last century at least, become 'all things to all people' in both the western and Islamic worlds (Cobb 2014: 5–6). There is no doubt that Saladin as an historical figure is much more difficult to grasp because of the role he has come to embody in different phases of Arab and Islamic self-consciousness in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

The attempted invasion of Jerusalem in 1177 may have been a piece of opportunism on Saladin's part, taking advantage of the evacuation of much of the kingdom's armed strength to the northern campaign. At this stage, the problem posed by the Franks was still largely their willingness to give military aid to Aleppo (as they had done in 1175) and thus to forestall Saladin's Syrian ambitions. In any case, the defeat at the hands of Baldwin IV at Gaza, though humiliating, was only a temporary setback, partly reversed by a victory near Banyas and the destruction of the Templar castle on the Jordan at Jacob's Ford, north of the Sea of Galilee, in the

following year. Yet he could hardly claim to be the leader of the *jihad* on the basis of such sporadic affairs, especially while Kilij Arslan was winning a spectacular victory over the Byzantines in Anatolia (1178). In his letters to the khalif from this period ‘the holy war is the dominant concept, but how it is to be pursued is left blurred’ (Lyons and Jackson 1982: 156). In fact, he was in an impasse, for he could not pursue the *jihad* until he had the resources of Syria behind him, while on the other hand he had no claim to those resources without waging wars against Zengid Aleppo and Mosul that made his protestations of *jihad* sound hollow.

As in 1169 and 1174, it was the death of a rival – this time as-Salih – that gave Saladin his opportunity. His own claim to Aleppo was weak, but by 1183 he had been able to isolate it by gaining effective suzerainty over Mosul. It was as he returned to Syria that Saladin heard news of Reynald of Châtillon’s Red Sea raid, which had already been dealt with by his brother al-’Adil in Egypt. Scholarly opinion is divided as to the significance of Reynald’s campaign (Hamilton 1978: 106–8; Lyons and Jackson 1982: 185), but by exploiting rumours of the Frankish intent to raid Medina and steal the body of the Prophet, Saladin could at last convince the khalif that his leadership alone could protect the Dar al-Islam from the infidel. A letter to the khalif in which Saladin defends his resumption of war against the



Figure 5.2 The Qubbat as-Saqra, or Dome of the Rock, was built in 691 to celebrate the Muslim victory over the forces of Rome and its conquest of the Holy Land in the seventh century.

Source: © Globuss Images/Alamy.

Mosulis also lays out his own strategy for the future: he had first come to Syria, he says, to fight the unbelievers, including the Assassins, but had been prevented from doing this by Mosuli interference and by their seizure of Aleppo. If he were given Mosul, then Jerusalem, Constantinople, Georgia and even Spain would follow, ‘until the word of God is supreme and the Abbasid caliphate has wiped the world clean, turning the churches into mosques’ (cited in Lyons and Jackson 1982: 194).

Saladin finally began work on realising this dream with his invasion of the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1183, but Guy of Lusignan’s caution forestalled him. Four years later, he had not only the further justification that Reynald of Châtillon had broken the truce, but the extra resources from his subjugation of Mosul behind him. By 1187, his own credibility was at stake, for having for so long demanded to be taken seriously as a *mujahid*, he now had to deliver Jerusalem to Islam. His numerical advantage over the Franks had been attained largely through the promise to recover Jerusalem, so he could not afford another inconclusive campaign. This is why he was prepared to divide his forces at Tiberias, and why he was so fortunate that Guy, following bad advice, took the bait and marched across the Galilee to meet him. Saladin’s forces probably outnumbered Guy’s by three to two, without counting reservists. It was, however, a loosely structured army, its size based on his having convinced and bullied other emirs across Syria and Mesopotamia that he would be victorious. As has been argued, ‘profit and numbers were inextricably linked’: once he started to lose, his allies, who were under no compulsion from the khalif to fight for him, would desert him (Lyons and Jackson 1982: 252–3, 286). The battle of Hattin itself was won by using the traditional tactics of outflanking and surrounding the enemy, but it was the ability to use the extra numbers to hold the ridge so that the Frankish cavalry could not break through that proved decisive. Nevertheless, Saladin had been handed his opportunity by Guy’s determination to pursue him and to seek battle where there was, as yet, no need.

Saladin’s victory at Hattin, though complete, posed new dilemmas. The strategic imperative was to seal the victory by taking the coastal towns and the strongholds in the interior of the kingdom, but the momentum and logic of *jihad* demanded that Jerusalem itself be taken. In the event, a single miscalculation – the length of time that it would take to besiege Tyre – was to cost Saladin much of the advantage he had won. For although Acre, the chief city, Haifa, Arsuf and Caesarea fell quickly, the defence of Tyre was rallied by Conrad of Montferrat, who arrived at Acre by sea from the West without realising that it had fallen, and turned back in the harbour as he was about to go ashore. Meanwhile Saladin was preoccupied with the assault on Jerusalem in September–October 1187. After brief resistance, Balian of Ibelin was able to persuade Saladin to offer terms to the defenders by threatening to kill all his Muslim prisoners and to destroy the Islamic holy places. The capture of Jerusalem, which was celebrated in contemporary poetry and religious literature (Hillenbrand 1999: 188–92), brought Saladin

immense credit in the Dar al-Islam, but his failure to take Tyre in 1187 with the other Frankish towns gave the Franks a base from which to regroup. A further lapse, the release of Guy of Lusignan from captivity in 1188, also proved to be costly. Abjuring his oath not to take up arms against Saladin, Guy put together a tiny force from the rump of the barons who remained loyal to him. Denied entry to Tyre by Conrad, with nowhere to go, Guy encamped in front of Acre in 1189. Gradually his force attracted others, and provided a focus for the early recruits to the crusade launched by Gregory VIII, notably Henry of Champagne, until it grew into a full-scale blockade by land and sea.

Saladin's difficulties within the Dar al-Islam were far from ended by his successes. From the khalif's point of view, the continued existence of the kingdom of Jerusalem had provided a necessary distraction for Saladin. Indeed, according to 'Imad ad-Din, the khalif feared that quick victory over the Franks would free Saladin to realise his aspiration of an Islamic empire that would include Baghdad (Lyons and Jackson 1982: 280–1). The longer that Saladin struggled to relieve Acre, the harder it proved to keep his coalition together. Baha ad-Din reports the unravelling of the coalition through the desertion of some emirs, who clearly felt that they had won all they were likely to from Saladin (Richards 2001: 95–6, 133–5). Saladin's letters to the khalif had become increasingly desperate. 'Islam asks aid from you as a drowning man cries for help', he wrote, and it was with despair that he reported the dispersal of his army.

Moreover, although he could still expect reinforcements from al-'Adil in Egypt, Saladin knew that a crusade was on its way to Palestine. The unexpected death of Frederick Barbarossa in Anatolia provided some relief, but the arrival of the French and Angevin contingents under Philip Augustus and Richard I in summer 1191 proved decisive. The fall of Acre was Saladin's worst setback in the *jihad*. What was so damaging for Saladin was that, whereas he had lost battles against the Franks in the past, at Acre he had every advantage on his side and still failed. The fall of Acre was followed by the reverse at Arsuf in September, which, although it did not result in any territorial loss, assured Richard's reputation among the Franks while weakening Saladin's among the Muslims. During the next year, the two rulers fought themselves to a standstill: just as Richard did not have sufficient forces to take and keep Jerusalem, so Saladin was unable to retain intact his own conquests of 1187–9. Essentially Saladin fought a defensive campaign, spending six months inside Jerusalem and maintaining an armed front along the Jordan valley. During the protracted negotiations between the protagonists in 1192, Saladin's brother al-'Adil came to prominence, with the result that the treaty that both parties eventually accepted owed much to his view of how Muslim–Frankish relations might work along this frontier. Throughout the crusade, Saladin took advantage of the splits among the Franks so as to play Conrad of Montferrat and the native barons off against the Angevins. He also continued to receive Byzantine embassies,

though it must have been obvious to him after the German army had forced its way through Byzantine lands in 1189–90 that his alliance with Constantinople had little practical value. The key to the negotiations was Jerusalem, for although both Saladin and Richard realised that its strategic value was minimal, neither could afford to give it up: for both sides, the city's ideological significance provided the basis on which they had in the first place been able to recruit armies.

After Richard's departure in September 1192, Saladin made plans for the pilgrimage to Mecca, but never carried them through. He wintered in Damascus, and died there in March 1193, having contracted a fever. His reputation among Muslims was assured by the recovery of Jerusalem, which was to remain in Muslim hands, save for a brief hiatus, for over 700 years. At his death, Egypt, Syria, Mosul and its environs and most of Palestine were under his control. In the Holy Land Jerusalem had been taken and there was little prospect of its loss to the Franks, who were restricted to a tiny coastal strip between Jaffa and Tyre, though large parts of Tripoli and Antioch remained unconquered. The *jihad* ideal, propagated by religious scholars, provided a coherent ideology for the future defence of his conquests. The outlook for crusading looked bleak.



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6 Crusader society

Key Dates

1114	canons of Holy Sepulchre adopt Rule of Augustine
1120	Council of Nablus
1123	<i>Pactum Warmundi</i> establishes Venetian quarter in Acre
1149	consecration of rebuilt Church of the Holy Sepulchre
1160s	redcoration of Church of the Nativity in Byzantine style
1183	visit of Ibn Jubayr to kingdom of Jerusalem
1216	James of Vitry becomes bishop of Acre
1220s	Franciscans and Dominicans (1229) arrive in Holy Land

This chapter poses questions about the kind of society established by the Franks in the East. What were relations with the subject peoples – both Muslim and Christian – like? How did the indigenous peoples respond to conquest and settlement? What was their legal status, and how did the legal framework really work in practice? How did they maintain distinctive cultural identities while under western rulership? Recent archaeological evidence is used to assess settlement patterns in the Holy Land, and the importance of the visual culture of the Crusader States is stressed through an examination of art and architecture. Finally, there is a brief explanation of the nature of the economy of the Crusader States: how was crusader society fed, what were the main sources of income, and what did the crown do to stimulate trade?

Franks and natives: assimilation and marginalisation

The First Crusade was proclaimed by the papacy as a war to liberate the eastern Churches. Early encounters with the indigenous Christians of the East, however, were disillusioning for the Franks, and must have been frightening

for the 'liberated' peoples. The letter supposedly sent by the crusade leaders to Urban II announcing the conquest of Antioch made no distinction between Muslims and 'heretical' Christians (Fink and Ryan 1969: 111); indigenous Arabic-speaking Christians were probably among those slaughtered in Jerusalem in July 1099; and the Greek Orthodox monks who served the shrine of the Holy Sepulchre were expelled from the church along with the clergy of the separated eastern Churches. After the death of Adhemar of Le Puy, who had maintained contact with the Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem, Symeon II, there seems to have been nobody in the crusading army with sufficient knowledge to guide the conquerors in the new relationships into which they entered with their subject peoples. This is perhaps surprising, considering contacts that had been made between a number of leading western clergy and the Orthodox Church in the eleventh century. Some, such as Azenarius, the abbot of Saint-Martin, Massay, had even assisted at Orthodox liturgies while on pilgrimage. Nevertheless, the first generation of the new settlement looks rather like a period of 'trial and error', in which the settlers gradually learned how to deal with the Arabic-speaking peoples, both Christian and Muslim, who constituted the vast majority of the population.

In the 1120s, one of the settlers, Fulcher of Chartres, reflected that the capacity of the new state to assimilate peoples of different ethnic origins was in fact one of its virtues:

Consider and ponder how in our own days God has transformed the West into the East. We who were westerners have become easterners. Whoever was a Roman or a Frank has in this country become a Galilean or a Palestinian; people from Rheims or Chartres are now citizens of Tyre or Antioch. We have already forgotten our birth places, which are unknown to many of us, and no longer talked about. Some of us have already inherited property here. Some have married not only among their own people but Syrians, Armenians, or even converted Muslims . . . Words of different languages have become common to all nationalities, and a mutual faith unites people who know nothing of their ancestry.
(Fink and Ryan 1969: 271–2)

Because Fulcher's motive in writing was in part to attract new settlement from the West, we cannot take his words at face value; nevertheless, they provide a glimpse of Frankish self-perception by a thoughtful and well-informed contemporary. The question of ethnic identity and its relationship to the state was one that interested Fulcher. Describing the journey of the first crusaders through Asia Minor, he remarked on the unity of purpose among the crusaders despite the diversity of language and identity. Just as the experience of common action forged a single 'Frankish' people on the First Crusade, so the task of state-building created, in his eyes, a hybrid society of 'occidental-orientals' (Murray 1995: 59–73).

On one level, crusader society was no such thing. Even Fulcher was unable to envisage Muslims as forming part of the hybrid society so blessed by God; indeed, they were not permitted to enter the city of Jerusalem. Muslims were treated differently in civil and criminal law from Christians; however, non-Frankish Christians also suffered different treatment from Franks. Any society operates through the interplay of legal, social, political, cultural and religious forces, and in Outremer these forces were sometimes in a state of mutual tension. What the law said or implied about the place of one ethnic group or another was not invariably borne out by the evolving experience of state-building, or in the development of a visual culture. Most writing about crusader society has tended to coalesce on either side of a debate about colonialism, and to focus on the aptness of a colonial model for understanding the relations between Franks and natives (Prawer 1972; Kedar 1992b, 341–66). But we should also remember that Outremer was a frontier society, in which the subject people shared a common identity with populations on the other side of the political frontier. The conditions under which the subject peoples lived therefore reflected the latent threat that a Muslim conquest might be perceived by the native peoples as a war of liberation, in which they would themselves participate to overthrow Frankish rule.

These factors became particularly acute after 1187, when the contracting of Frankish territories had the effect of changing the demographic make-up both of cities and rural areas that were economically dependent on them. The city of Acre, for example, roughly doubled in size in the thirteenth century compared to its pre-1187 limits (Jacoby 1979). Much of this was due to the need to incorporate new populations of refugees from rural areas that had been lost to the Ayyubids, and these included both Franks and Arabic-speaking Christians who had not previously experienced coexistence at such close quarters. Moreover, the fact that some indigenous Christians undoubtedly had relatives and connections who were still living under Muslim rule must have added to the implicit dangers as far as Franks were concerned. This much was clearly stated by James of Vitry, bishop of Acre, when he accused the *Suriani* (by which he meant the indigenous Arabic-speaking Christians) of collusion with the Muslim enemy.

Religious worship

Written crusader sources identify Muslims, Greeks, Syrians, Armenians, Jacobites, Georgians, Nestorians, Copts, Ethiopians, Maronites, Samaritans and Jews as distinctive religious groupings. Sometimes these communities could be identified with territorial units such as villages: in practice, most local rural communities comprised a homogeneous group with the same religious affiliation. All the towns, however, had mixed populations in which many of the different groups were represented, and here the interaction of different traditions was most noticeable. Pilgrimage accounts from the twelfth century remark on the diversity of religious traditions at the shrine

churches, and attempts to categorise and understand these differences can be seen in treatises on the state of the Holy Land from the end of the twelfth century onward (Kedar 1998a: 111–33).

Religious identity became an index of ethnic behaviour and customs for western observers such as James of Vitry, bishop of Acre (1216–27). James overtly linked his critique of the religious customs and theology of Arabic-speaking Christians to negative racial observations: thus, for example, the ‘Syrians’ (Greek Orthodox), who were halfway between Greeks and Latins in religious customs, are described as ‘vacillating’ and ‘duplicitous’: ‘they say one thing but think another’. Because they spoke Arabic and were culturally closer to Islam than western Christendom, James was suspicious of their loyalty both to their secular rulers and to their ecclesiastical superiors. While the Armenians and Georgians were respected because they ruled over sovereign territories of their own, and could thus enter into political relations with the Crusader States, the indigenous Greek and Syrian Orthodox were despised for their pusillanimity: ‘everywhere they live, they pay tribute to someone . . . they are as useless as women in battle’ (Stewart 1895: 67). Much of the vocabulary and ideas expressed by James derive from classical and earlier medieval sources, but the important point is that he chose to give racial overtones to religious customs (Jotischky 2003: 1–20).

Many of the customs of indigenous peoples – even of Christians – were unfamiliar, and therefore regarded with suspicion by the Frankish authorities, and perhaps by ordinary Franks also. James remarks, for example, on the practice of circumcision among the Syrian Orthodox, which they borrowed from Jewish and Muslim custom; on the lack of auricular confession and clerical celibacy; and on the Syrian Orthodox custom of branding the foreheads of children with the sign of the cross. However, in the twelfth century at least, there was no attempt to impose conformity of religious practice on the subject peoples. Indigenous Christians, Muslims and Jews were by and large permitted to observe their own traditions unmolested. Greek and Syrian Orthodox, Armenian, Georgian, Coptic and Ethiopian monasteries all flourished under Frankish rule. By far the greatest number of these were Greek Orthodox: some in Jerusalem and other towns, but most in remote areas such as the Judaeian desert, the Jordan near Jericho, or associated with popular shrines. All Christian confessions were expected to continue their worship within their own churches, and to be guided by their own priests. In this respect, the situation in the Latin East corresponded with that in southern Italy and Sicily, where Orthodox communities in Greek-speaking areas retained their own parishes and even bishops. The arrangements formalised by Pope Urban II in 1098 for Greek-speaking regions under Norman control in Italy allowed for Orthodox bishops, clergy and monasteries within the overall hierarchy of the Roman Church; in other words, as long as clergy and bishops recognised papal authority. The same arrangements applied in the Crusader States. James of Vitry’s complaints about the continuation of Orthodox practices in his diocese indicate that the

eastern Christians were accustomed to being left alone by their Latin bishops. James' arrival in the East, however, marks a change in policy by the papacy. In contrast with the attitude of *laissez-faire* that had prevailed throughout the twelfth century, James went into the churches of his Greek Orthodox flock, and even those of the Syrian Orthodox, who were not his responsibility, and hectoring them about their errors in religious custom. Whether his preaching had any effect may be doubtful, but the fact that he tried to impose Roman conformity on them remains significant.

In respect of the religious hierarchy, however, the farther away in belief from Latin Christianity, the greater freedom of both ecclesiastical jurisdiction and religious custom applied in practice. Because the Greek Orthodox were technically members of the same Church as the Roman, they and their clergy were subject to the supervision of the same bishops as the Latins, and since no see could have two bishops, it was Latins who were appointed at the expense of Greek Orthodox. This was at least in part a pragmatic solution, since many dioceses probably did not have resident bishops in 1099. Indeed, the Orthodox Church was still using diocesan lists that dated from the period before the Arab conquests, that no longer reflected demographic realities. There were exceptional circumstances, determined by political events, when Greeks rather than Latins held episcopal office in a given diocese; for example between 1165 and 1170, and again in the early thirteenth century during the commune under Bohemond IV, when a Greek patriarch resided in Antioch, or, more obscurely, after 1159, when the Latin bishop of Laodicea, Gerard of Nazareth, was forced out of his see by a Greek (Jotischky 1997: 222–5; Hamilton 2001: 199–207). There were also occasions on which Greek Orthodox clergy were appointed as coadjutor bishops to assist Latins, presumably in sees where there were significant Orthodox populations (MacEvitt 2008: 110–15). In contrast, the Syrian Orthodox and Armenians, who were members of separate Churches, continued to elect their own religious hierarchy throughout the crusader period without interference, and their Church leaders even enjoyed the friendship of Latin senior clergy.

The First Crusade was a war of liberation and conquest; it was not a war for the extermination or conversion of Muslims. Thus, although the Franks in the first ten years of the settlement did sometimes massacre Muslim urban populations when they resisted conquest, there is little evidence of any policy of conversion. Some individual Muslims certainly did convert: just after the conquest of Jerusalem, for example, the ruler of Ramla was converted and fought with the crusaders against the Egyptians. A few, such as the lord of Galilee, Walter Mahomet, even managed to attain high status in Frankish baronial society (Mallett 2014: 105–20). On the whole, however, Frankish lords were reluctant to convert their Muslim peasantry, for conversion to Christianity would end their servile status. The thirteenth-century papacy, which took a more active interest in the ecclesiastical affairs of the crusader East than had been the case before 1187, found it impossible

to persuade landowners – even religious ones such as the Military Orders – to permit or undertake conversion on a large scale, although by this time there was greater urgency to do so because of the growing fear that the existence of Islam itself constituted a danger to Christendom (Kedar 1984: 145–9), and despite a changing spiritual climate in the West in which conversion and missionary activity played a prominent role.

Some mosques, particularly urban ones, were converted into churches – most famously, the Qubbat as-Saqra in Jerusalem, which was reconsecrated as the *Templum Domini*, and the mosque in Caesarea, which became the cathedral of St Peter. Sometimes, as in Ascalon after 1153, the reconsecration of a mosque as a church represented a return to the situation before the Islamic conquest. But the Muslim traveller Ibn Jubair of Granada, who visited the kingdom of Jerusalem for a few weeks in 1183, reported functioning mosques in Tyre and public prayers in Acre, and it is quite likely that had he visited other towns, he would have found a similar situation (Kedar 1990: 138–9). At some shrines the Latin authorities recognised Muslim veneration as well as Christian: for example at Bethlehem, at Sebastia, where John the Baptist was buried, and even at the Qubbat as-Saqra in Jerusalem (Jotischky 2013: 245–62). The most celebrated example of this occurred when the ruler of the autonomous little emirate of Shaizar, Usama ibn Munqidh, was allowed to pray in the Templar church inside what had once been the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.

In rural communities, there was probably little interruption in Islamic worship. An episode in 1156 in the region south-west of Nablus, when restrictions on Friday sermons were imposed by the Frankish lord on his Muslim subjects, with the result that large numbers of Muslim villagers fled to Damascus, can be read as revealing religious intolerance; however, as Kedar observes (1990: 151–2), it also suggests that long-standing practices such as pilgrimages to Mecca, and visits by local jurists to Damascus to consult Qur'anic scholars, continued unmolested until they were discovered. What the Frankish lord objected to was not so much the religious content of the sermons as the drain they imposed on his resources by taking peasants away from their work. In the end, Frankish lords regarded the economic value of a largely passive and contented villeinage as more important than whether they practised Christianity or Islam.

Legal and social status

In law, the Franks effectively made no distinction on religious grounds between their subject peoples. The basic division of society was between Franks and non-Franks, not between Christians and non-Christians. Broadly speaking, the poll tax on *dhimmis* (non-Muslims who lived under Islamic rule), which had applied to all native Christians and Jews, was reversed so that a similar tax was now paid by Muslims. Because a lord could raise the normal rate arbitrarily, the tax must potentially have been

punitive (Mayer 1978: 175–80), though we know very little in practice about how it was imposed, whether there were regional variations, and so on. The laws of the kingdom of Jerusalem, which survive only from the thirteenth century, but which can be taken as an indication of earlier practice as well, are interested in comparative legal status primarily in a financial context. The financial compensation for the crime of assault, for example, regarded ‘Syrians’ – which included Christian and Muslim Arabs, as well as Jews – as both paying and receiving only half what was due to Franks. But the Cour de la Fonde, the court that had jurisdiction over all non-Franks living in towns in cases other than assault, showed clear prejudice both in its composition and in some assizes against Muslims (Kedar 1990, 164–5).

Fulcher of Chartres’ enthusiastic encouragement of new settlers from the West also reveals something of the economic advantages of such divisions: ‘those who had only a little money have innumerable bezants here; those who had not even an estate, here, through God’s gift, already have a city’ (Fink and Ryan 1969: 272). In effect, there was no Frankish peasant class in Outremer; nor was there any need for one, because the native peoples fulfilled the role by working the land, and thus of producing the agricultural needs of the population in conditions of servitude or of villeinage analogous to the system of manorial economy in the West. The Franks appear to have imposed their own manorial culture onto the existing relations of social and economic dependence that existed in pre-crusade Palestine and Syria. Since an agricultural economy quite similar to that in the West was already developing in the Near East by 1100, this made little effective difference to the vast majority of the subject peoples. Ibn Jubair famously remarked that the Muslim villeins he saw in Galilee seemed more prosperous and content than those living under Islamic rule outside the kingdom of Jerusalem (Broadhurst 1952: 317). What did make a difference in status and economic position was whether one lived in a town or in the countryside, for servitude in the sense of being tied to a particular piece of land applied only to the rural economy. In practice, however, this important distinction must have been relevant mostly to the indigenous Christians, for relatively few Muslims, except those in servitude in urban industries, such as glass-making, lived in towns. But indigenous Christians who lived in towns enjoyed higher legal status than those in the countryside, and this in turn enabled them to acquire wealth through commerce or industry.

The subject peoples enjoyed autonomy of varying degrees in self-government. Looking back to the foundation of the kingdom of Jerusalem, the thirteenth-century legal scholar and landowner John of Ibelin thought that the ‘Syrians’ (meaning the indigenous Christians) had asked Godfrey of Bouillon for the privilege of self-government through their own courts and following their own laws. There was little reason why Godfrey should not have granted this, for it was convenient for the Franks to use religion as a determining feature in local jurisdiction, given the homogeneity of most units of settlement. Besides, early medieval practice had always allowed

different ethnic and indigenous groups to use their own laws, and the expansion of western settlement into Islamic territories in Sicily and Spain at the same time as the Near East saw comparable arrangements for internal self-government by religious minorities. Thus Muslim villages were allowed to appoint a headman (*ra'is*) to supervise the administration of Islamic law in the community, and to represent the village to its lord, and the same seems to have been true for indigenous Christian villages. Because rural communities tended to be homogeneous units, there can have been few occasions when cases arose that required judgement between Franks and non-Franks; in towns, however, where the populations were more mixed, such cases were heard in Frankish law.

Ecclesiastical law enforced the separation of Franks and Muslims. The decrees of the council of Nablus (1120), for example, enacted that sexual intercourse between Christians and Muslims was to be punished by castration for males; consenting women were to have their noses cut off. Muslims were prohibited from wearing 'Frankish' clothing, in a reversal of the sumptuary laws to which Christians living under Islamic rule were subjected (Mayer 1982: 531–43). But the Nablus legislation may have portrayed an ideal rather than reality, and Fulcher of Chartres' description of an assimilated society, written in the following decade, may be closer to the actuality. The career of Usama ibn Munqidh testifies to the close relations that could develop between individual Muslims and Franks (Cobb 2008), and if Usama was an exceptional case because of his political importance as an independent frontier lord, there are also examples of Muslim and Arabic-speaking Christian doctors who were valued by the Frankish aristocracy for their skills (Kedar and Kohlberg 1988: 113–26). If Usama's horrifying description of Frankish medicine is accurate, the preference for eastern practices is hardly surprising.

The subject peoples of the kingdom of Jerusalem, whether Christian or Muslim, played no role in the public life of the state: they had no official representation in government. They might, however, be employed in government posts where the use of Arabic was crucial, notably in the administration and daily operation of ports such as Acre. The situation seems to have been somewhat more favourable in Antioch where, as Usama indicates, Greeks could hold public office, and probably also in Edessa. In both Antioch and Edessa, eastern Christians – Greeks, Armenians and Syrians – constituted the majority of the population, and in Edessa the hold of the Frankish authorities was in any case much looser than in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Here the Franks, indeed, seem to have adopted a policy of favouring one subject people – the Armenians – over the much larger Syrian Christian population, and the Armenians played a significant role in the defence of the territory against the Turks (MacEvitt 2008: 96–7). But even where an eastern Christian community remained a powerless minority, it could not be entirely ignored, especially when it could find influential backing. Thus, for example, the Syrian Orthodox monastery of Mary Magdalene in

Jerusalem complained in the 1130s about the seizure of some villages in its possession to the south of Jerusalem. Godfrey of Bouillon had originally granted this property to a Frankish knight after the First Crusade, but when the knight was captured by the Egyptians and disappeared from sight, the monastery was able to petition for its return from Baldwin I. When, to everyone's surprise, the knight returned as a hero from captivity in the 1130s, Fulk reconfirmed Godfrey's grant of 1099. But the monks found an ally in Queen Melisende who, herself half-Armenian, championed the interests of the native Christians. Fulk found himself caught between Frankish public opinion and the need to placate his wife, in whose name he ruled (Palmer 1992: 74–94). It is significant that the case occurred soon after the revolt of Hugh, count of Jaffa, which can be seen as an attempt to prevent Fulk from marginalising Melisende from government. Although the revolt failed, it must have sounded a warning for Fulk. Despite the lack of military or political authority with which James of Vitry was to taunt them, eastern Christians could on occasion use their influence with the royal dynasty to protect their interests.

Settlement patterns

Of the religious and ethnic groupings under crusader rule, some minorities were largely limited to a particular region – for example, the Maronites in the county of Tripoli and the northernmost parts of the kingdom of Jerusalem. Others, such as the Georgians, Copts and Ethiopians, comprised religious communities in or near Jerusalem. Armenians, besides a significant community in Jerusalem itself, could be found in all the major towns of Outremer, but were particularly numerous in Antioch and Edessa, and in the latter also formed a sizeable element in the countryside. The Jacobites, the name given by the Franks to members of the Syrian Orthodox Church, were likewise concentrated in the north, but a rural population was resettled by Baldwin I from east of the Jordan to villages to the south of Jerusalem, and they had a presence in the main towns. Jewish communities could be found both in the coastal towns – especially in Haifa – and comprising some villages in Galilee. The largest groups of subject peoples, the Arabic-speaking Greek Orthodox – *Suriani* in most crusader sources – and the Muslims, were scattered throughout Outremer, with larger concentrations of Muslims in the kingdom of Jerusalem than in the northern states.

Recent research using methodologies borrowed from historical geography has suggested that the spatial distribution of Muslims and indigenous Christians in the kingdom of Jerusalem was more sharply delineated than has previously been supposed. The picture that emerges from place-name evidence, coupled with archaeological surveys of the distribution of churches, indicates that the Arabic-speaking Orthodox tended to live in villages located within defined areas of the kingdom (Ellenblum 1998: 213–76). From the archaeological records of surviving churches, it is possible to determine that

Palestinian Christians in the Byzantine period lived largely around Jerusalem itself, and within an area of an arc sweeping from Jericho and the Jordan south-west as far as Hebron to the south, and westward to the coast around Ascalon, and including the areas around Lydda and Ramla. There were also Christian communities all the way up the coast, and further concentrations in Galilee and the far north between Acre and Tyre. Although not all the identifiable Byzantine churches survived into the crusader period, Ottoman census records from the sixteenth century confirm that most of these parishes remained Christian throughout the Middle Ages. The central areas of the kingdom, however – roughly corresponding to biblical Samaria – seem never to have been areas of predominantly Christian settlement. It was here, Ellenblum argues, that the Arab conquest of the seventh century filled a vacuum, after the destruction of the Samaritan communities in the sixth century, and it was these regions that were therefore largely Muslim.

This model of spatial distribution argues for a much more even proportion of indigenous Christians to Muslims than most historians have previously allowed – perhaps even a 1:1 ratio. Contemporary observations, which are by their nature impressionistic, give conflicting views. According to the Frankish writer Ernoul, in the 1160s Muslims could be found in all the villages of the kingdom, and this seems to be confirmed by Ibn Jubair (Kedar 1990: 149). But Ernoul was reporting the words of the king of Armenia, a visitor to the kingdom, and Ibn Jubair only travelled in the Galilee and the environs of two northern towns. Moreover, another Spanish Muslim traveller, Ibn al-‘Arabi, wrote that in 1093–5 the indigenous Christians occupied the whole of Palestine (Kedar 1990: 149), but he may have been speaking of the region of Jerusalem, which he visited. If we add to the mix the remark of ‘Imad ad-Din that the villages around Nablus, Sidon and Beirut were largely Muslim, then the regional distribution model seems to be borne out. Muslims lived largely in the central regions and in the hinterland of the far northern towns; Christians largely in the South.

Archaeological research has also disproved the long-held view that the Frankish settlers lived exclusively in the towns of the coastal region. On the contrary, extensive farming and settlement of the interior of the kingdom has been established (Ellenblum 1996: 41–210; Boas 1999: 60–90). Here again, however, a model of spatial distribution can be applied. Frankish rural settlement seems mainly to have been within the bands of settlement of indigenous Christian villages; for example, ‘Abud, St George near Tiberias, and Darum (Ellenblum 1996: 119–44). Typically, as in the West, the Frankish landlords built manor houses on hilltops, which were sometimes fortified, and from which they could dominate the villages over which they exercised lordship. Although the Franks in the countryside did not usually live among the indigenous Christians, but maintained separation from them on the same ethnic basis as we find, for example, in the crusader laws, there is evidence of some pragmatic interaction between Franks and natives. Agricultural resources, such as water and irrigation, might be shared.

This made sense, because the Frankish rural settlers had no interest in denying the indigenous peasants the means by which they could provide the agricultural surpluses that formed the income from land.

Another kind of sharing was the double use of rural churches. Because the number of Franks in the countryside was relatively small, it made no sense to build new parish churches for them, when every Christian village had its own. The archaeological evidence from parishes such as 'Abud and St George indicates that the Orthodox churches built in the Byzantine period were enlarged or altered in the twelfth century, to provide for the observance of Roman as well as Orthodox liturgy. The literary record confirms this: for example, a letter from a Byzantine theologian, Theorianus, to the Orthodox priests of Beth Zechariah ('Ain Karim), a few miles west of Jerusalem, deals with the practical consequences of having to share the church with Latin clergy (Jotischky 1997: 218). The village, which as the birthplace of John the Baptist was the centre of a minor cult, was given to the Hospital of St John, but the Orthodox priests were evidently expected to continue using the church alongside the hospital's clergy.

The subject peoples: resistance or docility?

It is striking that the literary evidence for hostility in Frankish attitudes towards the eastern Christians begins to become more noticeable after the shrinking of the kingdom of Jerusalem as a result of the conquest of 1187–91. The population of Acre, for example, doubled from the influx of refugees from the countryside, many of whom were eastern Christians. At the same time, most of the hinterland was lost, which meant that indigenous communities were split between Frankish and Muslim rule. James of Vitry's suspicion of the Syrian Christians on the grounds that 'for a little money they sell the secrets of the Christians to the Saracens' makes sense in a context in which indigenous Christians were moving across political frontiers (Stewart 1895: 67). As James observed, the Syrian and Greek Orthodox Christians were Arabic speakers, and shared a common culture with the indigenous Muslims.

Indigenous Christian attitudes to the Franks are difficult to ascertain, partly because of the paucity of sources dealing with the question, and partly because, in the absence of any political or cultural leadership among the indigenous communities, such evidence as can be found shows no consistent pattern. Local Christians gave help and moral support to the crusaders in 1099, and the Armenian chronicle of Matthew of Edessa welcomes the crusade in terms of a liberation. In 1144, however, the Syrian indigenous population of Edessa (as opposed to the Armenian) saw no reason to support a Frankish régime that had been at best negligent of local interests, and at worst oppressive; a Syrian Christian chronicle of the period describes the joyful welcome given to Zengi when he entered the city in triumph. On the whole, however, the indigenous Christians of the kingdom of Jerusalem seem

to have felt more investment in a Frankish rather than a Muslim government. Saladin's conquest must have reinforced such calculations, for in 1183 his raid in the Galilee damaged the Orthodox monastery on Mt Tabor, and in 1187 monks of St Euthymius, in the Judaeian desert, were captured and enslaved by the Turks (Jotischky 2001: 85). Although one contemporary Arabic Christian source attributes Saladin's capture of Jerusalem in 1187 to the espionage of an Orthodox Christian merchant who had known the sultan in Egypt, western sources indicate that Orthodox senior clergy supported Richard I's crusade. The abbot of Mar Sabas, for example, showed Richard where a piece of the True Cross could be found (Jotischky 1999: 189–91).

The destruction, exile or forced resettlement in the countryside of a large section of the urban middle class between 1099 and 1110 when the Franks were engaged in capturing the coastal towns meant that those Muslims who survived lacked effective leadership. This doubtless explains their apparent docility throughout the crusader period. Although there were sporadic revolts against Frankish overlords, these occurred mainly when the army of a neighbouring Muslim power was in the region (Kedar 1990: 155). On the other hand, collaboration with the Franks was also rare. It is particularly striking that there was no attempt by the Frankish crown to establish a military levy from among their Muslim subjects, as the twelfth- and thirteenth-century kings of Sicily did, and as the Franks did from their indigenous Christian subjects. As Kedar has pointed out, the Muslims living under Frankish rule, like the indigenous Christians, were subject to both the Frankish authorities and to the neighbouring Muslim powers (1990: 158). When it came to war, they were simply ignored by both sides.

The Church in the Crusader States

The Latin Church

The first offices created by the crusaders in the East were ecclesiastical. Latin clergy filled empty sees as the army progressed from Antioch to Jerusalem. By the time Jerusalem itself was taken, the patriarchate of the city was itself vacant, but since Symeon II, the Orthodox patriarch who had been in correspondence with Adhemar of Le Puy, died at about the same time as the holy city was captured, the crusaders could not have known this. The only senior cleric left alive in the army, the bishop of Martorano, an obscure south Italian see, was considered thoroughly unsuitable, so the office was filled by Arnulf of Choques, a Norman canon who had deputised for Adhemar as papal legate. It is likely that Urban had intended to return Symeon, who had been exiled by the Fatimids, to his office, but in any case the pope himself died before the news of the seizure of Jerusalem reached Rome. The election of Arnulf represents the abandonment of Urban's policy regarding the eastern Churches by the crusaders (Hamilton 1980: 11–12).

The legate dispatched to the East to replace Adhemar, Daimbert, archbishop of Pisa, arrived in September 1099. Among his responsibilities was to assist the new settlers in establishing an ecclesiastical framework. A good deal of organisation was necessary, for the Orthodox episcopal and parochial framework, which had been set up in the sixth century, no longer applied in practice. Many of the sees in the old *Notitia* were no more than names, for the cities of the Roman provinces on which they were based had either vanished or lay geographically too far beyond the influence of the Orthodox world. Some sees did have resident bishops, who were either appointed direct from Constantinople or had their elections confirmed by the patriarch of that city. Although the evidence is patchy, most seem to have been replaced by Latins, sometimes in fractious circumstances, once their sees came under crusader control. Thus, a bishop was appointed to Lydda in June 1099, but Sidon had an Orthodox bishop as late as 1110, because it was still in Muslim hands. The supreme ecclesiastical authority in the kingdom of Jerusalem was the patriarch of Jerusalem. Under him were the four archbishops – of Caesarea, Tyre, Nazareth and Petra – and the ten bishops (Stewart 1895: 32–5). In the twelfth century the patriarch of Antioch fought to retain jurisdiction over the archbishopric of Tyre, which had in the Byzantine period been its suffragan. Jerusalem won, however, because it would have been inconvenient for ecclesiastical jurisdiction to cut across political frontiers (Edbury and Rowe 1988: 116–23). This kind of pragmatism was also evident in the exchange effected in the positions of Ascalon and Bethlehem. Presumably because it lay so close to Jerusalem itself, Bethlehem had never been a bishopric in the Orthodox system, whereas Ascalon had; but since Ascalon was in Fatimid hands until 1153, and because Bethlehem was so important a shrine, the Franks reversed their positions (Mayer 1977: 56).

Daimbert's first actions, however, were to overturn the crusaders' own religious policies, by refusing to recognise the election of Arnulf, and by making himself patriarch in his place. As patriarch, he then tried to wrest control of Jerusalem from the secular power. It may have been Urban's intent that Jerusalem should become an ecclesiastical lordship, but Paschal II evidently feared that Daimbert's political activities would destabilise the new state, and deposed him in 1101. Subsequent patriarchs tended to be pious servants of the crown, notable for conventional rather than spectacular piety and for competence in administration rather than theological learning. With the exception of Stephen of Chartres (1128–30), who was elected while on pilgrimage to Jerusalem, Fulcher (1145–57) and Aimery II (1197–1202), none of the patriarchs before 1220 were monks, and few of the bishops. None of them disgraced their office, and some were deeply pious, even to the point of naivety. There were of course exceptions, such as Baldwin, the first abbot of Notre-Dame de Josaphat, who apparently extorted money from the faithful by branding a cross on his forehead and claiming that the mark had been made by an angel (Riley-Smith 1986: 82). But the qualities

required of prelates in the Crusader States were those of the court rather than the cloister, and only a handful, such as Patriarch Heraclius, William, archbishop of Tyre and Gerard, bishop of Laodicea, were scholars. More typical of twelfth-century bishops was Ralph, bishop of Bethlehem (1155–74), an Anglo-Norman who served as chancellor of the kingdom and not only accompanied the kingdom's armies but was wounded while carrying the True Cross. Perhaps the outstanding prelate in the Crusader States in the twelfth century was Aimery of Limoges, patriarch of Antioch (1142–90), a skilled politician, diplomat and administrator who for long periods in his term of office effectively ruled the principality. Although he established a friendship with the Syrian Orthodox patriarch and brought the Maronites to obedience to Rome, his interest in the eastern Churches was pragmatic rather than theological (Hamilton 1999: 1–12).

During the period of reconstruction after the Third Crusade, the papacy's involvement in the affairs of the Church in the Crusader States became more intensive. Innocent III directly appointed bishops from his own circle, among them Albert of Vercelli to the patriarchate of Jerusalem in 1205, Peter of Ivrea, a Cistercian, to Antioch in 1209, and James of Vitry to Acre in 1216. These three alone stand out for their learning and for the vigour of their pastoral ministry. But what really distinguishes them, and other thirteenth-century prelates such as James Pantaleon and Thomas of Lentino, patriarchs of Jerusalem successively (1255–61 and 1272–7), or Albert of Rizzato, patriarch of Antioch (1227–46), from their predecessors, is the closeness of their programme to that of the papacy (Bolton 2000: 154–80). In the absence of a strong monarchy, or in a period in which secular authority was contested by the representatives of the Holy Roman Emperor and local barons, the patriarchs provided leadership and a means by which papal policy could be implemented. Thus, for example, during Frederick II's crusade in 1229, the patriarch of Jerusalem, Gerold of Lausanne, upheld papal instructions rather than the authority and prestige of his own church when he placed the holy city under an interdict.

One important element in the religious life of Outremer in the thirteenth century was the arrival of the friars. The Dominicans established their first house in the Holy Land in 1229, the Franciscans at some point in the 1220s. Although their mission was largely the same as in the West – supplementing the work of the parish clergy by preaching, hearing confessions and offering the sacraments – the East had the added frisson of the potential for new converts to Christianity. Over the course of the thirteenth century the friars attempted what the Latin Church had been reluctant to do before, namely to tackle the problem of the strength of Islam by conversion. William of Tripoli, the Dominican Master-General, was surely too optimistic when he declared in 1273 that almost all the Muslims were ready to convert to Christianity, but some headway was made and, given the much smaller numbers of Muslims under Latin rule in the thirteenth century, it was perhaps not so outlandish a notion (Kedar 1984: 180–2). But friars also continued

to support the Crusades by preaching the cross, and there is little trace of tolerance, let alone pacifism, in their approach to Islam (Maier 1996). The friars were particularly useful as agents of the papacy, and many of them were appointed legates to the East. Innocent IV, notably, used the Franciscan Lorenzo da Orte to try to bring about a closer relationship between the Latin and Orthodox Churches, based on the direct submission of Orthodox clergy to Rome, without the intermediary authority of the Latin hierarchy in Outremer (Hamilton 1980: 322–4). The friars were also instrumental in bringing about closer relations with the separated eastern Churches. In 1237, for example, the Dominican prior-general appeared to have secured the personal conversion to Rome of the Jacobite patriarch of Antioch.

It would be unfair to criticise the twelfth-century Latin Church in Outremer too heavily for its 'pre-Gregorian' character (Hamilton 1980: 134–5). Its most important task, as far as Christendom was concerned, was to safeguard and to service the shrines of the Holy Land. In the words of one chronicler describing the Council of Clermont, the Holy Land was itself a relic. Another chronicler described the crusade itself as a holy theft, in which the Holy Sepulchre had been snatched from the Muslims. The Latin clergy were the guardians of this relic. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre was substantially redeveloped by the Franks during the first half of the twelfth century. After the damage inflicted during the anti-Christian persecution of al-Hakim in 1009, the rebuilding, largely financed by the Byzantine emperor Constantine IX, resulted in a more compact church. This was enlarged by the Franks, with the addition of a cloister and conventual buildings for the canons. The choir of the church, which lay at the centre, was surrounded by a complex of cave-chapels, each associated with an episode in the story of the Passion, and each of which would have been by itself the centre of an important cult in any western church. These chapels created what has been called an 'enclosed stage set' for pilgrims, for whom the visit to the Holy Sepulchre marked the climax of an elaborately choreographed ritual. The uniqueness of each moment of the drama of the Passion was preserved by the architectural role of the different components of the whole complex. Although the tenor of the redecoration was to supplement rather than to replace what was already there, the costs must have been enormous. The chapel of Calvary was entirely redecorated with mosaic, the edicule of the Sepulchre itself was gilded, and the choir was substantially improved. Much of the energies of the chapter must have been consumed up to 1149, when the rebuilding was completed, by the business of soliciting and administering the grants of money necessary for such work (Hamilton 1977: 105–16; Folda 1995: 175–245). The architecture and decoration of this most important of shrine churches was not there simply to be admired by pilgrims or congregations: it was the setting for the living performance of the liturgy. One of the easily overlooked contributions of the Latin Church in the Crusader States is the development of new liturgical forms to reflect the fact of Christian possession of the holy places. Places

that had been celebrated liturgically – for example, in the daily recitation of the psalms in monastic churches throughout Christendom – were now a very real part of Christendom, and this added a new layer of understanding to the practice of the liturgy. One example of a new liturgical development that owed its emergence to location is the rite known as the *Visitatio sepulchri* in the Easter liturgy, which commemorates the visit of Jesus' female disciples to his tomb after the crucifixion – the moment at which the resurrection, the central message of Christian belief, is discovered. This liturgical drama was possible in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre because it housed not only the site of the crucifixion but, under the same roof in the rebuilt crusader church, the tomb itself. The processional liturgy that developed thus portrayed vividly the theology of the resurrection to the faithful, including pilgrims from all over the Christian world, in the place where it had taken place (Shagrir 2010: 57–77). But the Crusades also gave birth to new liturgical forms in the West. Every year on the anniversary of the capture of Jerusalem in 1099, churches in France celebrated the moment in a special liturgy that drew on the themes and language of Advent, and in so doing invited worshippers to make parallels between the triumphal entry of the crusaders into the holy city and the Incarnation (Gaposchkin 2014: 237–59).



Figure 6.1 The rebuilding and enlarging of the Anastasis Church (Church of the Holy Sepulchre) was the largest construction project undertaken in the kingdom of Jerusalem. The rebuilt church was consecrated in 1149.

Source: © David Sanger photography/Alamy



Figure 6.2 The Ethiopian monastic community on the rooftop of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre allows a view of the canons' cloister from the twelfth-century rebuilding.

Source: © Andrew Jotischky.

The Holy Land was studded with shrines commemorating the lives of Jesus, the Apostles and the prophets of the Old Testament. Moreover, the potential for identifying and exploiting new shrines, and thus of extending the pilgrim itinerary, was enormous. In 1114, for example, the canons of Hebron discovered a cave underneath their cathedral containing bones that were immediately identified as belonging to the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, who had long been associated with the site but whose tombs had never been located (Whalen 2001: 139–76). The clergy, monks and nuns of the Holy Land were, as Peter the Venerable reminded the Cluniacs of Mt Tabor, specially favoured by their guardianship of the holy sites on behalf of Christendom. Lay Christendom showed this favour in the traditional manner, through the bequests of land and other gifts. Because donors gave what was within their gift, the shrine churches, particularly the Holy Sepulchre, the Church of the Nativity and the abbey of Notre-Dame de Josaphat, became extensive landowners in the West. Such guardianships not only increased the potential for new income streams from pilgrimage, but might advance the political claims of the community, or bishop of the diocese.

James of Vitry, writing in the 1220s, describes the Holy Land as a 'garden of delights' that abounded in monasteries, churches and the dwellings of hermits:

From all parts of the world, all peoples and tongues, and from every nation under heaven, pilgrims devoted to God, and religious of all orders, drawn by the sweet scent of the holy places, rushed to the Holy Land. Ancient churches were repaired and new ones were built; monasteries were constructed in those places from the donations of great men and the alms of the faithful.

(Stewart 1895: 26–7)

The most significant of these foundations, mostly those at shrine churches, predated the First Crusade. Notre-Dame de Josaphat, in the valley of Jehosaphat outside the eastern wall of Jerusalem, was founded over the tomb of the Blessed Virgin, probably by western pilgrims in the last quarter of the eleventh century. Royal and noble patronage from early in the twelfth century assured its prosperity, as is attested by its cartulary. Like the other houses whose cartularies survive, the Holy Sepulchre and Mt Sion, Notre-Dame's properties, estates and villages enabled it to become one of the largest landowners not only in the kingdom of Jerusalem, but throughout the Mediterranean – with properties in Cyprus and Sicily – and even in the West (Mayer 1977: 258–372). Another foundation by western pilgrims, Saint Mary Latin, was as close to a conventual community at the Holy Sepulchre as the Roman Church could reach before the First Crusade. Although its monks, as far as we know, did not serve the shrine itself, it lay only a stone's throw from the Holy Sepulchre. Mt Sion was refounded by Godfrey de Bouillon as a house of regular canons, as also was the Church of the Ascension on the Mount of Olives. The Qubbat as-Saqra, or 'Dome of the Rock', built by the Muslims in 638, was reconsecrated as the 'Templum Domini', because it stood on the site of the Jewish Temple. It also became a house of regular canons. As was the practice in the West, all cathedral churches, whether at shrines or not, were served by regular canons, though in the case of the Holy Sepulchre itself, the canons beneficed after the First Crusade did not adopt the Augustinian rule until 1114.

Some Latin houses, as James of Vitry indicates, were re-foundations of disused churches. St Anne's, a Benedictine convent in Jerusalem, was built adjacent to the ruined Byzantine church that commemorated the house of the mother of the Blessed Virgin. In Sebastia, the burial place of John the Baptist, a Latin monastery replaced a disused Orthodox one. The number of completely new monastic foundations, however, was surprisingly small. Two houses of Premonstratensian canons, St Samuel and St Habbakuk, commemorated Old Testament sites, but the reluctance on the part of Frankish landowners to convert their subject peoples probably discouraged further such foundations.

The character of the Latin Church, centred as it was on the shrines and on pilgrim itineraries, ran contrary to the currents in contemporary monastic spirituality in the West. The most important new foundations in the twelfth-century West were marked by their eremitical character – not necessarily in the sense of promoting individual solitude, but rather of settlement detached from existing ties of landownership or of populated centres. There was plenty of wilderness available in Outremer, and ample opportunity for independence from feudal relationships, but such places presented security problems, and in any case the new Orders did not as a rule warm to the prospect of new foundations in a land so marked by fixed associations with biblical events.

The Cistercians are a case in point. It is no coincidence that the first Cistercian foundations in Outremer occurred only in 1157, after the death of Bernard of Clairvaux. Bernard's own lukewarm attitude to monastic settlement in the Holy Land is exemplified in the letters he wrote in 1124 concerning the proposed pilgrimage to Jerusalem of a fellow Cistercian abbot, Arnold of Morimond, and some of his monks. Bernard argued that cloistered monks who made a pilgrimage to the earthly Jerusalem were missing the whole point of being a monk, which was that the cloister was the earthly Paradise, the foretaste of heaven. The physical shrines of the Holy Land needed to be defended by righteous warriors, but they were an irrelevance for monks (Jotischky 1995: 2–4). Until the arrival of the Cistercian Peter of Ivrea as patriarch of Antioch in 1209, there were only two Cistercian monasteries in Outremer, and one of those, Salvatio, was probably lost in 1187 (Hamilton 1976: 406). Peter applied well-known Cistercian strategies in his new office, persuading unaffiliated reforming foundations in the Black Mountain near Antioch to become Cistercian houses. A similar thing happened elsewhere in the patriarchate of Antioch, when in 1231 Cistercians took over the abandoned Orthodox monastery of St Sergius at Gibelet.

One of Peter of Ivrea's 'new' Cistercian monasteries, St Mary Jubin, had a chequered past in the twelfth century that demonstrates some of the difficulties of monastic reformers in the Crusader States. Gerard of Nazareth, who before becoming bishop of Laodicea in c.1140 had himself been a hermit, describes the Black Mountain as a centre of eremitical monasticism of a type familiar from the same period in the West (Kedar 1983: 55–77; Jotischky 1995: 17–46). Some of the monks of Jubin, a monastery founded in the 1120s, tried to adhere to a strict interpretation of the Rule of St Benedict, including an abandonment of property. The monastery experienced a schism over the prior's refusal to countenance this, as a result of which one of the reformers, Bernard of Blois, 'stirred up like a gadfly, ran through the woods, prepared to die of hunger rather than to allow such an unspeakable thing' (Kedar 1983: 73, my translation). Bernard and many of the monks left for another house, Machanath, as a result of which Jubin fell on hard times. Another example of Gerard of Nazareth's reforming

monks, Elias of Narbonne, demonstrates the attraction that the Holy Land exercised for some westerners. Elias came to Jerusalem on pilgrimage, but remained behind to live as a monk, first in a reforming community and later in a cave. He eventually entered the cloister at Notre-Dame de Josaphat, but he later became abbot of another reforming community, Palmaria in Galilee. Here he angered the monks by trying to import Cistercian customs; he fled to Jerusalem, and Palmaria eventually became a Cluniac house (Kedar 1983: 55–77; Jotischky 1995: 29–35).

The Holy Land inevitably attracted extremes of ascetic behaviour from some individuals. We know of a hermit who preceded St Francis' more celebrated devotion to the nursing of lepers; of another who incarcerated himself in a cell in the city wall of Jerusalem; of another who was so detached from the world that he did not even know whether Antioch was still held by the Franks or Muslims (Kedar 1983: 55–77; Jotischky 1995: 25–29). One of the characteristics of Latin monasticism in Outremer was the apparent ease with which individuals moved from the cloister to the wilderness and vice versa. Although we know of no direct evidence that connects western monasticism in the East to Orthodox practices, it is probable that the presence and traditions of Orthodox monks and anchorites had an influence on the character of Latin monasticism.

The Orthodox and the eastern Christians

If the election of Arnulf of Chocques as patriarch in 1099 was the consequence of an anti-Orthodox policy stemming from the crusaders' disillusionment with the Byzantine role on the crusade, the arrival of Daimbert presaged a return to cooperation. One of Arnulf's first actions had been to expel the Greek Orthodox monks from the Church of the Holy Sepulchre; a year later, however, they returned when it became apparent that the Easter Fire miracle (at which fire descended spontaneously from heaven to light the lamps that had been hung around the Sepulchre) would not work without their expertise. The description of this ceremony at Easter 1107 by the Russian pilgrim Daniel – even allowing for the author's slant – leaves no doubt that the Orthodox monks were a vital component of the liturgy (Wilkinson 1988: 166–71; MacEvitt 2008: 115–22). The twelfth-century rebuilding of the church, moreover, left the Greek Orthodox and other eastern Christians in possession of altars and rights of worship.

The hierarchy of the Orthodox Church, however, did not fare so well. The patriarch, Symeon II, had been exiled by the Fatimids in 1098, and many of the sees seem to have been vacant in 1099 or long since to have fallen into disuse. But the coastal towns, with their communities of indigenous Christians, probably did have bishops, and these were replaced by Latins as their towns fell into the crusaders' hands in the early years of the twelfth century. This policy conformed to ecclesiological theory, as was later explained in a canon of the Fourth Lateran Council. The reasoning was that

the Orthodox were part of the same Catholic Church as the Latins, and the Church, which was a single body, could not have two heads. Consequently a diocese could only have a single bishop, and it was natural for the ruling group to appoint their own rather than a Greek. However, both in the mainland Crusader States and in Cyprus in the thirteenth century, the Latins found it necessary to use Greeks as suffragan or 'coadjutor' bishops, with particular responsibility for the Orthodox flock of a diocese. Orthodox bishops are known to have been appointed to Lydda, Gaza/Eleutheropolis and Sidon, and perhaps to other dioceses that had substantial populations of Orthodox laity (MacEvitt 2008: 110–15). In this respect, the separated eastern Churches fared better than the Orthodox. Because the Monophysite Syrian Orthodox (Jacobite), Armenian and Nestorian Churches were not in communion with Rome, the question of multiple bishops did not arise, and these Churches continued to appoint their own to sees under crusader rule in accordance with their own hierarchical arrangements; thus, there was a resident Jacobite patriarch of Antioch and bishop of Jerusalem, as well as Coptic and Nestorian bishops.

The Orthodox clergy was left to minister to their flocks as before the Latin conquest. Thus Orthodox liturgical life continued as before: priests said the liturgy using leavened bread rather than unleavened as was customary in the Roman liturgy; married; observed the fast on Saturday, and so on. In practice, the replacement of Greeks with Latins probably made little difference to many parochial clergy in the patriarchate of Jerusalem, because the Orthodox bishops had tended to be Greeks appointed from Constantinople, whereas the Orthodox clergy and laity were Arabic-speaking. The indignation of James of Vitry at the latitude given to Orthodox clergy in Acre in 1216 not only signals a change of direction under an increasingly interventionist papacy; it also reveals how tolerant the Latin authorities had been in the twelfth century of the continuation of Orthodox practices (MacEvitt 2008: 106–15). In theory, the submission to Latin bishops meant that the Orthodox clergy were recognising the authority of the papacy, but, as Oliver of Paderborn remarked in the 1220s, who could tell what they were really thinking, even if they did observe the correct forms when required by their bishops? Other evidence confirms James' impressions. Gerard of Nazareth complained that the Orthodox clergy of his diocese (Laodicea) were consecrating cemeteries and practising confirmations – ceremonies that in the Roman Church could only be carried out by a bishop (Jotischky 1997: 223–4). In Cyprus, there were complaints about Orthodox encroachments on Latin episcopal rights (Coureas 1997: 251–317). The Frankish laity in the East sometimes adopted the cults of eastern saints, such as the Syrian Bar Sauma. Such tendencies can only have been encouraged in the kingdom of Jerusalem by the practice of sharing churches, particularly in rural areas, between Orthodox and Latin communities. Nor were complaints all on the Latin side. A letter from the Orthodox clergy of 'Ain Karim, near Jerusalem, for example, raises the question of whether altars

that had been used for Mass in the Latin rite needed to be purified before they could be used again for Orthodox services (Jotischky 1997: 218). John Phokas recorded a story he heard at Lydda of how St George, whose burial place the church commemorated, protected 'his' (i.e. Orthodox) clergy from the presumption of the Latin bishop (MacEvitt 2008: 131).

Contact with the other eastern Christians seems to have been determined partly by political conditions. Thus, Aimery of Antioch's friendship with Michael, the Jacobite patriarch of Antioch, intensified as he found himself the victim of Byzantine pressure to replace him with the Orthodox patriarch Athanasius (1165–70). In 1237, the Jacobite patriarch Ignatius II submitted a statement of faith to the Dominicans in Jerusalem while on a pilgrimage to the holy city – an act of friendship that was hailed in the West as the patriarch's conversion to Rome (Hamilton 1980: 349–53). In the 1240s Innocent IV may even have tried to create a uniate Jacobite Church, in which the clergy and hierarchy could retain their own liturgical traditions and become dependent directly on Rome, rather than submitting to the local Latin Church. Some pilgrims to the Holy Land remarked on the diversity of religious traditions with tolerance or even approval. There is an implication, for example, in the account of Burchard of Mt Sion that such diversity of forms of worship from Christians whose origins are so widespread – not only Greeks, Armenians and Syrians but Egyptians, Ethiopians, Georgians and even Indians – is part of the special quality of the Holy Land itself (Stewart 1896: 102–11).

The monastic life of the Orthodox Church experienced a significant revival in the crusader period. This was not so much because of the policy of the Latin Church, but because political circumstances made it possible for patronage to be extended to the monasteries by the Byzantine emperor. No better account of this revival can be given than a comparison between the pilgrimage accounts of Daniel (1106–7) and John Phokas, a Cretan monk who visited the Holy Land in 1185 (Wilkinson 1988: 120–71, 315–36). Daniel visited St Sabas, in the Kidron valley south-east of Bethlehem, which was still functioning, but found many others, including St Theodosius, also near Bethlehem, St Euthymius, between Jerusalem and Jericho, and St Mary Kalamon, by the Jordan, in ruinous states. By 1185, these and others had been rebuilt and filled with monks again. Others, such as St Aaron, on Mt Horeb, and St John Prodromos, by the Jordan, were functioning soon after 1110. Phokas remarked on the prosperity of a group of Orthodox monasteries by the Jordan near Jericho: 'the land, divided and shared out among these holy monasteries, is full of woodland and vineyards, as the monks have planted trees in the fields and reap rich harvests from them' (Wilkinson 1988: 328). Some monasteries, among them St John Prodromos, by the Jordan and St Elijah, near Bethlehem, are known to have been restored as a result of gifts from Emperor Manuel Komnenos, which locates the physical revival of Orthodox monasticism between 1143 and 1180. There is no evidence for the patronage of Orthodox monasteries by the Latin

rulers, as was the case, for example, in Norman Sicily, or even for certain monasteries in Lusignan Cyprus. But that the rulers of the kingdom of Jerusalem were content for Manuel to exercise such patronage is even more remarkable, for it suggests that they were colluding in a Byzantine imperial policy to promote the image of the emperor as the guardian of Orthodoxy. Even when the ownership of a monastery lay in Latin hands – as for example was the case with St George's at Beth Gibelin, which was a Hospitaller property – prayers were said for the emperor (Jotischky 1995: 83–8).

St Sabas and St Catharine's on Mt Sinai are the only two Orthodox monasteries that enjoyed an uninterrupted history from their early Christian foundations. But equally as striking as the physical revival of ruined monasteries is the revival of traditions associated with them. For example, when Gabriel, a monk of St Sabas, had to be disciplined for his attempted murder of another monk while under demonic possession, he was sent to the monastery of St Euthymius to carry out a régime of manual labour. This not only parallels a case from the early eleventh century, but shows that the original relationship between the *laura* of St Sabas and the *cenobium* of St Euthymius in the sixth century had been re-instituted (Jotischky 2001: 89–90). Similarly, the Orthodox hermit whom Phokas met in the ruins of St Gerasimus, by the Jordan, in 1185 is described as consciously reproducing



Figure 6.3 The *laura* monastery founded by Sabas in the late fifth century in the Judean desert continued to be an important bulwark of Greek Orthodox monasticism in the kingdom of Jerusalem.

Source: © PhotoStock-Israel/Alamy.

the practices of the founder of the monastery in the sixth century (Jotischky 2000: 110–22). Such traditions must have been preserved in literary form, in the works of Cyril of Scythopolis, John Moschus and others. Among the functions of the Orthodox monasteries in the Holy Land was the preservation, by copying, of canonical, hagiographical and theological texts. The surviving manuscripts produced at the scriptoria of the Orthodox monasteries of the Holy Sepulchre, St Sabas, St George Choziba, St Euthymius and others demonstrate, through the range and extent of these works, the vitality of monastic life (Pahlitzsch 2001: 213–24). Besides the copying of the Greek Fathers and the liturgical works needed for services, there were original compositions, including theological treatises on the errors of the Latin Church. Most of the surviving manuscripts produced in Orthodox monasteries, however, were ‘paraliturgical’ books: psalters, calendars with collections of saints’ lives and gospel books. These were made for individual prayer and contemplation by monks, rather than for the celebration of communal liturgies. The quality of many of these manuscripts –



Figure 6.4 The Monastery of Temptation, located on a narrow ledge near the summit of Jebel Quruntul, near Jericho, was founded to commemorate the place of Jesus’ temptation. A sixth-century foundation, it was occupied in the 1130s by Latin hermits under the direction of the prior of the Holy Sepulchre.

Source: © Andrew Jotischky.

the fact that many were illuminated – indicates the strength and vigour of Orthodox monasticism under Latin rule in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Weyl Carr 1985).

This is not to say, however, that the monasteries were only detached centres of contemplation. In the absence of an Orthodox hierarchy, they provided a voice and a focus for the maintenance of Orthodox traditions. Far from being detached, they were at the centre of the life of the Orthodox community: when Emperor Manuel Komnenos provided money for the rebuilding of the monastery of St Elias, between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, it was at the request of the local Orthodox villagers. Moreover, they were also a focal point for the regeneration and revival of traditions of Orthodox spirituality beyond the Holy Land. St Sabas and other desert monasteries were at the centre of a spiritual network, attracting monks who went back to their own regions in Asia Minor and Cyprus to found monastic communities based on their liturgical practices, disciplinary customs and modes of veneration (Jotischky 2012: 9–19).

Art and architecture

Nowhere is Fulcher of Chartres' picture of an assimilated society more realistic than in the area of visual culture. In the religious architecture and the decoration of shrine churches, in painting and manuscript production, the influence of indigenous artists increased throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Not only were local artists employed in workshops and scriptoria, but western artists borrowed Byzantine and indigenous methods and iconographical programmes, with the result that a distinctively hybrid artistic culture evolved in the Crusader States.

In the early years of the Crusader States this was not yet apparent. The earliest extant crusader church, in Tarsus, and the new church of St Anne in Jerusalem, built before 1110, echo the architectural forms of southern French Romanesque (Boase 1977: 73–4), and surviving fragments and reconstructed ground plans suggest that this remained the standard model for crusader ecclesiastical architecture. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre was a more complex site, however. Constantine's churches of the Anastasis and Sepulchre, linked by a courtyard, were destroyed in 614 by the Persian invasion, and in 1009 al-Hakim, the Fatimid khalif, ordered the seventh-century rebuilding to be torn down. A Byzantine-sponsored rebuilding from 1048 onward produced a domed rotunda over the Sepulchre, with a polygonal apse extending to the east and housing the Anastasis church. The crusader rebuilding of the twelfth century was designed to house a greater complex of shrines in a single building. The site of the crucifixion occupied a chapel in the south transept, a new arch was cut from the rotunda to the Anastasis church, and chapels commemorating the events of the Passion radiated from the apse. Separate chapels commemorating Calvary and the Empress Helena's miraculous discovery of the whole site opened off an

ambulatory that encircled the apse. But the Franks also extended the conventual buildings, in order to house the Augustinian canons who served the church from 1114 onward. The style of this complicated church has been a matter of debate, but despite the retention of some elements of the eleventh-century Byzantine work, the basic models seem to have been northern French, Aquitainian or Provençal (Boase 1977: 78; Lyman 1992: 63–80), and the lay-out both of the architecture and the iconographic programmes corresponded to churches along the great pilgrimage routes of southern France and Spain (Folda 1995: 177–245).

The architectural sculpture, such as that in the column capitals of the south façade, bears comparison with classical Syrian models, though the surviving lintel relief, with its unique iconography of Passion Week, is purely western in influence – possibly Provençal, and in particular deriving from La Daurade in Toulouse (Barasch 1971: 107; but see Borg 1969: 25–40; Boase 1977: 82). Other sculpture from the Crusader States has similarly western origins. The extraordinary figural sculpture from the twelfth-century cathedral at Nazareth, for example, bears comparison with contemporary Burgundian work such as that at Vézelay, Autun and La Charité-sur-Loire, but there are also traces of southern influence (Barasch 1971: 109; Folda 1986: *passim*). Column capitals in the Temple Mound area and on the Church of the Ascension on the Mount of Olives similarly derive from French models (Kühnel 1977: 41–50; Folda 1995: 253–73). There is little trace in any surviving sculpture from Outremer of indigenous influence or workmanship.

In contrast to architecture and sculpture, the fields of monumental and panel painting, mosaic and manuscript illumination show the exceptionally strong influence of indigenous artistic production. The Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem is a good example of cultural synthesis. Unusually among shrine churches, the Constantinian church remained almost intact in 1099, and therefore retained its basilica shape. The nave columns were painted in the mid-twelfth century with a series of saints' portraits. The mixture of eastern and western styles and the eclectic choice of saints demonstrates the presence of artists of varying traditions, and may also signify a sophisticated iconographical programme. The paintings may, however, represent votive offerings from pilgrims, and therefore also reflect the diversity of religious traditions that gathered at this important shrine (Kühnel 1988: 83–8; Folda 1995: 364–71).

In the 1160s, moreover, a decorative programme sponsored by Emperor Manuel Komnenos, King Amalric I and Ralph, bishop of Bethlehem, added a series of mosaics to the walls of the nave arcade and the apse. Mosaic work is in itself an indication of local artistic production, since knowledge of the craft was relatively unknown in the West. The iconography and style of the mosaics is wholly Byzantine, and separate inscriptions record the names of two artists: the Orthodox monk Ephraim and Basil, who was probably also Orthodox (Hunt 1991: 69–85; Folda 1995: 347–64; but see Boase 1977: 119–21). The nave mosaics are of particular interest because

they also reveal a distinctly Orthodox theology. Although it was once thought that some of these mosaics dated from the eighth century (Stern 1936: 101–52, 1938: 415–59; Boase 1977: 121), it is now clear after recent restoration that the whole programme is twelfth century. The subject, the ecumenical and selected provincial councils of the early Church, is rendered largely through inscriptions, mostly in Greek, and deriving from Palestinian Orthodox written sources. The use of Latin and Syriac in occasional inscriptions in the scheme points to the involvement of indigenous and western artists, and to the use of the church by varied religious traditions. But the selection of texts, for example in the inscription recording the profession of faith of the Council of Constantinople (381), which omits the *filioque*, seems like a deliberate ploy to promote Orthodox theology at the expense of Latin, and in the context of a Latin cathedral and the co-sponsorship of the Latin bishop, is a remarkable statement not only of the role of local Orthodox monks as artists, but of the role of Orthodoxy itself in the religious culture of the crusader kingdom (Hunt 1991: 69–85; Jotischky 1994: 207–24).

The Church of the Nativity is only one example of such artistic cooperation. In the Church of the Holy Sepulchre itself, the mosaics and wall paintings – no longer extant – show a similar situation. Byzantine influence is also noticeable in the wall paintings at Abu Ghosh, a Hospitaller church to the west of Jerusalem (Weyl Carr 1982: 215–44). It is clear that not only did western artists learn new techniques from Byzantine or indigenous Orthodox artists, but that a distinctly new artistic style evolved in the Crusader States in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. How did this come about? Manuscript illumination from the mid-twelfth century already reveals the existence of workshops of Italian, French, English and local artists, and the cross-over of techniques and styles was a natural consequence. The ‘Melisende Psalter’, a manuscript made at the scriptorium of the Holy Sepulchre during the 1130s, has been identified as the work of several artists, among them the Byzantine-influenced Basil (who may even have been the same Basil who signed his name to the mosaic angels in the nave at Bethlehem), a south Italian and another western artist using an English liturgical calendar (Folda 1977: 252–3, 1995: 137–63).

Such a synthesis must also have reflected – or, in the first place, prompted – the tastes of patrons. It is not surprising to find a workshop with such accomplished artists as those of the Melisende Psalter attached to the Holy Sepulchre, the most prestigious of crusader churches. But the Byzantine influence – whether from Byzantines or indigenous Orthodox artists – also suggests that court patronage favoured such works as a matter of taste, or even in an attempt to rival aristocratic culture at Constantinople: as Folda remarked, ‘Byzantine’ was synonymous with ‘aristocratic’ (1995: 159). This should not be surprising at a court whose queen was herself half-Armenian, or in a royal house that consistently throughout the twelfth century favoured marriages with Armenian or Byzantine princesses. A political agenda may

also underlie the *Melisende Psalter*, if, as Folda (1995: 155) suggests, the manuscript was commissioned by Fulk as a reconciliation gift for his queen after the rebellion of 1134. In this case, the creation of a book so clearly indebted to eastern artistic inspiration says a good deal about the desire of the Franks to balance the diverse ethnic and religious components under their rule.

The Byzantine elements in crusader manuscript illumination intensified from the 1160s onward. Byzantine artists may have supervised the work of Latin illuminators in the scriptorium of the Holy Sepulchre (Buchthal 1957: 26–8), but there is also stylistic evidence that Armenian scribes were working there (Folda 1995: 341). The Abu Ghosh frescoes, which date from the 1170s, suggest Byzantine artists being employed by the Hospitaller patrons of the church (Folda 1995: 387–9). It is surely no coincidence that the period between c.1158 and 1180 was a period of political alliance between the kingdom of Jerusalem and the Byzantine Empire, and that both Baldwin III and Amalric I married Byzantine princesses. The establishment of queens' households may have provided opportunities to introduce artists directly from Constantinople (Weyl Carr 1982: 221–4), though the Bethlehem mosaics indicate that indigenous Orthodox workmanship of very high quality was available. With the passage of time, such relationships between Byzantine-trained and western artists became unnecessary. A 'crusader style' of painting developed in the thirteenth century that incorporated both eastern and western elements, exemplified in the remarkable group of manuscripts produced in the scriptorium of Acre from 1275 onward (Folda 1976).

Perhaps the most remarkable evidence for Byzantine tastes in crusader art is the production of a large number of icons for western patrons. The icon, a cult image integral to Orthodox worship, was more or less unknown in the West during the crusader period. Yet a genre of icons exhibiting signs of western artistic influence, and sometimes including western as well as Orthodox saints, survive from the monastery of St Catherine, on Mt Sinai, where there may even have been an atelier of western artists supervising their production (Weitzmann 1963: 179–203, 1966: 51–83), and from the thirteenth-century crusader kingdom of Cyprus (Mouriki 1985/6: 9–112). It is in Byzantine icon painting, mediated through the culturally diverse Crusader States, that Italian panel painting of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries has its origins.

The existence of a distinctive genre of such art raises questions – as yet unanswered – about the use of icons by western settlers in the Crusader States. Did the settlers merely admire them as portable works of art, or collect them as sophisticated pilgrim emblems associated particularly with St Catherine's? Or does the existence of these icons suggest that devotional practices as well as artistic tastes were borrowed from the indigenous Orthodox? These are questions that may be answered in the future, as the fruits of art historical research are more fully absorbed by religious historians of the Latin East. Yet the synthetic nature of the visual culture

of the Crusader States, even if reduced to a question of aristocratic taste, is sufficient by itself to make us sceptical of the idea that crusader society was entirely segregationist in its treatment of the native peoples (Folda 2005: 511–30).

Economy and society

Historians who regarded crusader society as essentially based on segregation between Franks and native peoples tended to do so partly because they also thought that the Franks were exclusively urban dwellers and the native peoples rural peasants. Patterns of settlement, according to this model, reinforced the tendency towards separation of peoples. Research over the past generation, however, has thrown considerable light on Frankish settlement in the interior of the Crusader States, particularly in rural areas of the kingdom of Jerusalem. It can no longer be doubted that conscious attempts were made in the twelfth century to create 'model settlements' for Franks in the countryside (Ellenblum 1998: *passim*; Boas 1999: 60–90).

A recent estimate numbers 235 Frankish settlements among the 1,200 or so villages in the kingdom of Jerusalem before 1187 (Boas 1999: 63–5). Taxes were levied on Frankish and native settlers alike by feudal overlords on land and livestock, but also on natural products such as olives and honey, and on rights to use mills and olive presses. This was in fact simply the extension of the western custom of monopolising control over the means of production of food by the landowners. The structure of rural life under crusader rule appears to have been little altered: such villages as have been excavated resemble those of pre- and post-crusader periods. But two types of Frankish village are discernible: those, such as at 'Abud, that indicate settlement alongside native Christian communities (Ellenblum 1998: 128–35), and planned villages such as al-Bira, north of Jerusalem. In one planned village, al-Kurum, peasant freehold seems to have been the norm, and many of the settlers were probably westerners who were deliberately encouraged to emigrate on the promise of favourable terms (Boas 1999: 63). At al-Bira we know of southern French, Italians and Spaniards, numbering 142 families in total by 1187 (Benvenisti 1970: 223–4). These were probably people of peasant origin who, as William of Tyre suggests, found urban life too expensive for their means (WT 1986: 937). Excavations at al-Qubaiba, like al-Bira a new village owned by the canons of the Holy Sepulchre, have yielded a bakery, olive-press and pressing-floors. Both villages lay within a radius of a dozen miles of Jerusalem, and were located on hilly land with soil conducive to olive cultivation and certain kinds of animal husbandry, but not for cereal agriculture.

Most of the evidence suggests that planned villages were largely established on lands belonging to the crown, the major religious institutions or the Military Orders. They demonstrate, therefore, serious attempts by the major landowners to exploit the natural resources of the region: wine, olives

and sugar cane, and livestock such as goats, sheep and pigs. In the case of viticulture and pig-farming (Prawer 1980: 133–4, 185–6), such activity was intended to supplement their diet, but sugar-cane production, which was revolutionised under the Franks – perhaps because it demanded a high degree of servile labour – became an important industry for export to the West (Prawer 1980: 196–7; Boas 1999: 74–87). Despite attempts to support rural agriculture, however, contemporary sources suggest that grain, poultry and wine were sometimes imported. This must have been especially so when a large crusading army from the West was present, and during the course of the thirteenth century, after the loss of much of the rural hinterland, increasing amounts of food were imported.

The countryside and town in Outremer did not represent completely different spheres of economic activity. The natural resources of the hinterland included sand for glassmaking and ashes for soap production – both of which were primarily urban industries – and sugar-cane production was moved from the Jordan valley to the coastal region near Acre in the thirteenth century (Prawer 1980: 160). There is also evidence of sophisticated craft-based industries in crusader towns, such as metalwork and pottery production (Boas 1999: 143–92). All towns also had their own markets for the sale of produce, as in the West. But what distinguished most crusader towns from those in the West – with the obvious exception of Jerusalem itself – was their location by the sea, and thus their place in an existing pattern of trade between East and West. Geography provided the Crusader States with the capacity to become the agents of exchange in the long-distance trade between East and West. From the West, timber, iron, copper, furs, amber and textiles were sold in exchange for gold, spices and silk. In this way, the crusader ports, though never as important as Egypt in the luxury trade, became a medium to serve the increased demand for luxury goods in the West. In this respect, the crusader occupation changed nothing of the pre-existing economic structures in Palestine, in which the coastal towns had, since classical antiquity, been the main centres of population and commerce. Some of the coastal towns – Tyre, Acre, Beirut, Tripoli, Antioch, perhaps Ascalon – had populations that far outnumbered most cities in the West before the mid-thirteenth century (Benvenisti 1970: 27; Prawer 1980: 181–2).

Under the Franks, however, two new elements greatly benefited from the economic potential of the coastal towns. One was the crown, as income from the passage of goods through Acre, Jaffa, Tyre, Sidon, Tripoli and Beirut, and the markets established in these towns, gave the kings a wider range of resources than those customarily available in the West. Another was the western mercantile community, primarily Italian and Provençal in the twelfth century, with the addition of Catalans in the thirteenth century, which established economic colonies in the ports. These were autonomous quarters, exempt from local laws and governed instead by the laws of their parent city. According to the agreement made between the Venetians and

the patriarch of Jerusalem – who was deputising for the king – in 1123, within the Venetian quarter of Tyre, not only the mercantile community itself, but anybody who lived within the defined quarter, was subject to Venetian jurisdiction (Prawer 1980: 221–5). Moreover, the Venetian quarter included some of the surrounding rural area, which included villages and their inhabitants. This land could also be used to enfeoff Venetian noble families who had initially been attracted to the Levant by trade. The grant of land as well as property and jurisdictional rights inside the town indicates a transition from a purely mercantile to a colonial community. Venice acquired more privileges than its commercial rivals Genoa and Pisa, despite a rather sporadic participation in crusading from 1095 to 1124. But cities such as Pisa, Amalfi, Genoa, Marseilles and Barcelona, which had bargained military assistance in conquering and defending the towns in the first place in return for favourable trading privileges, were also greatly enriched by assured access to eastern markets.

The extent of the early twelfth-century grants reflects the urgency of the crown in securing naval and military assistance. In the agreement made in 1110 at the siege of Sidon, Baldwin I gave Venice a street in Acre, known as the *vicus Venetorum*, but only in 1123, in the more comprehensive agreement known as the *Pactum Warmundi*, did the crown give up its seigneurial rights to the bakery, mill and control of weights and measures, even in this district. Initially, the Italian mercantile communities were interested primarily in commercial rights such as warehousing and market spaces, rather than jurisdiction, and the nature of their presence in the port towns was determined by the seasonal nature of long-distance trade. Not all ports were equally attractive: Tyre (from 1123), Acre, Sidon and Tripoli were preferred, probably because they already enjoyed dominance in pre-existing trading patterns. From about 1111 onward, coinciding with the capture of Sidon, the Italian presence took on a more permanent look, with fixed rather than seasonal markets, and eventually the emergence of permanent merchant communities in ports.

The *Pactum Warmundi* (1123) reflects the superior bargaining position of the Venetians over the crown at the time. Tyre had been invested but there was little prospect of capturing it without Venetian naval support, and that could be secured only at the price demanded in the *Pactum*. Moreover, Baldwin II was in Muslim captivity at the time, and negotiations were therefore conducted by Warmund, patriarch of Jerusalem. In order to safeguard the agreement, the Venetians even insisted that future kings of Jerusalem should be required to agree to uphold the *Pactum Warmundi* before their coronation (Prawer 1980: 224). The agreement gave for the first time genuine autonomy within the area defined as ‘Venetian’, as well as commercial privileges. In return for a rather negligible knight service owed to the crown, Venice secured sovereignty over not only her own nationals but over anyone living in the Venetian quarter in Tyre. This meant that Venice had the right to administer justice within its enclave, and to retain the financial benefits

of justice in the form of fines – another drain of income away from the crown. The range and type of seigniorial assets granted to the Venetians in the *Pactum Warmundi* indicate that a new phase of Italian colonisation had begun. Henceforth, the Italians became urban settlers in Outremer.

The ways in which Venice and Genoa exploited the financial potential of its quarters in Acre can be reconstructed from surviving thirteenth-century documentation (Jacoby 1979: 1–45, 2003: 240–56, 2005: 73–105). A Venetian inventory divided the quarter into four districts, at the centre of which lay the *fondaco*, a kind of warehouse and retail complex that also included lodgings. In addition to smaller houses, there was also a palace belonging to the *bailli*, another belonging to the *fondaco* and a fortified tower. The palace of the *bailli* was a two- or three-storey building with space for six shops on the ground floor, and apartments that could be rented out on the other floors. Next to the palace stood the quarter's parish church, dedicated to St Mark. Around the palace on ground level were pitches for stalls, which were also rented out by the commune. The great palace of the *fondaco* was the largest building owned by the Venetian commune. It comprised sixteen shops on the ground floor space, and apartments on its upper floors, some of which were set aside for commune officials such as the parish priest and the court clerk. We even know the level of customary rental prices for rooms in the palace, which ranged from two to fifteen besants per month depending on location and season (Prawer 1980: 233–4). A similar picture is painted by a Genoese inventory of 1249 for Acre: the Genoese maintained four houses and six palaces, which were divided into apartments to be rented out seasonally for short periods, and in addition six houses rented out for a year. Income came partly from rentals by the commune itself, but partly from other buildings in the quarter whose occupants paid a property tax to the commune for the land they occupied.

Even allowing for the fact that the crown had little bargaining leverage when it made the initial agreements with the Italians, it does seem as though a great deal was given away in the long term for short-term military gains. The full effect of the mercantile quarters was to stifle the development of a Frankish commercial class by allowing foreign merchants to monopolise retail as well as wholesale trade. Prawer has suggested that at the time when the agreements were made, neither side fully appreciated the implications of the concessions made by the crown (1980: 219). However, a more positive assessment of the agreements from the crown's perspective has been made by Riley-Smith, who argues that so much income flowed through the ports in the form of taxable goods and the taxes levied on ships that the losses to the Genoese, Venetians and other mercantile communities were minimal (Riley-Smith 1973b: 109–32). The mutually beneficial relationship between the crown and the western merchants was one of the defining characteristics of the kingdom of Jerusalem, as well as the main source of its economic stability in the twelfth century. In the thirteenth century, however, and particularly as the Hohenstaufen government ran into difficulties in the

1230s–40s, the economic strength of the mercantile colonies strained the kingdom's resources, while their autonomy only added to the process of political fragmentation. As early as the reign of Amalric I (1163–74) the crown attempted to claim back rights of jurisdiction over Italians who had settled permanently and owned property in the kingdom of Jerusalem, but although further attempts were made in the thirteenth century, the crown simply had insufficient authority to make headway. The War of St Sabas, so called because of the parish in Acre that formed the centre of a bitter quarrel over jurisdictional rights, polarised the Italians and the Military Orders in a civil war in the 1250s that severely damaged the kingdom's ability to function as a single unity. In the absence of central authority during a long interregnum, there was no balancing force to hold in check the political and economic ambitions of the Italian colonists and their home governments.



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7 Recovery in the East, new challenges in Europe: crusading, 1187–1216

Key Dates

1187 (October)	papal bull <i>Audita tremendi</i>
1189	siege of Acre begins
1190	Emperor Frederick Barbarossa dies in Asia Minor
1191	Richard I's capture of Cyprus; arrival of main French and Angevin armies in East and capture of Acre by crusaders (July)
1192 (October)	treaty with Saladin concludes Third Crusade
1194	Amalric II becomes king of Cyprus
1197	death of Emperor Henry VI while preparing new crusade
1198	Innocent III becomes pope
1202	Fourth Crusade captures Zara
1203	Fourth Crusade puts Alexios IV on imperial throne in Constantinople
1204	crusaders sack Constantinople and establish Latin Empire
1208	Innocent III preaches crusade against Raymond VI of Toulouse and Cathars
1212	Children's crusade
1215	Fourth Lateran Council

After the fall of the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187, immediate efforts were made in the West for its recovery. The years covered in this chapter saw the launch of new Crusades that achieved varying degrees of success. But at the same time, the papacy began to apply crusading concepts to problems nearer home such as the rise of heretical movements. This chapter examines the reasons for the limited success of the Third Crusade and the failure of the Fourth, then proceeds to focus on Pope Innocent III's development of crusading ideas and practice.

The Third Crusade

The Third Crusade ultimately failed in its objective, for Jerusalem remained as firmly in Muslim hands when Richard I and Saladin drew up the treaty to end hostilities in 1192 as it had been when the crusade was launched. A fuller assessment of its significance, however, may be reached by asking whether the recovery of Jerusalem was in fact necessary for the continued life of the Crusader States. When Gregory VIII issued his crusading bull *Audita tremendi* in October 1187, Tyre was the only one of the kingdom of Jerusalem's towns still in Frankish hands. Tripoli was unable to protect itself, and Antioch was threatened by Saladin in 1188. Yet only ten years after Hattin, the coastline had been reconquered almost in its entirety from Gaza to the Gulf of Attalia; Antioch, now faced with a powerful new neighbour in the Cilician kingdom of Armenia, was safe, and Tripoli's security had been assured by absorption into Antioch. Much of the work itself was to be completed after 1192, but the groundwork was laid by the Third Crusade, and in particular by the vigour and military skill of Richard I.

Audita tremendi was issued after Hattin but before news of the fall of Jerusalem had reached the West. Predictably, the response was immediate and massive. The themes of the papal appeal – the need for penitence and internal peace in Christendom – struck a chord that Eugenius III's bull in 1145 had been unable to reach. The effect of the loss of Jerusalem could be seen immediately in public worship in the Christian West. The English chronicler Roger of Howden wrote that only months after Jerusalem fell Pope Clement III ordered prayers to be said throughout Christendom for the liberation of the Holy Sepulchre and of the Christians taken prisoner by Saladin. This was not simply a vague encouragement to pray, but an instruction that a new collect (a fixed prayer in the canon of the Mass, the words of which varied daily) be said, along with Psalm 78, before the *Agnus Dei*, which is recited just before communion is taken. The pope was, therefore requiring that the ordering of the Mass itself be altered to reflect the political situation. The text of Psalm 78 was particularly poignant for the situation: beginning 'Lord, the heathen has come into thy inheritance', it comprises a lament by the people of Israel for the loss of Jerusalem and their own exile from the Promised Land. An appeal to God to intervene to save his people against violence is a long-attested liturgical practice, going back at least as far as the late tenth century and known as the *clamor*. After 1187, churches and religious communities began to shape new liturgical forms for the *clamor*. At the cathedral at Chartres, for example, a new programme of verses and prayers was developed, and the Cistercian Order officially adopted the *clamor* at its chapter-general in 1194 as an institutional means of praying for the return of the holy places.

Even without news of the capture of Jerusalem itself, the loss of the True Cross at Hattin provided symbolism sufficient to bring conflicts between kings to a hasty end so that resources could be deployed instead towards

the crusade. For moralists, the lesson was clear enough: the West's refusal to listen to repeated appeals for aid from Outremer had left no alternative but for God to allow Saladin victory but, as always, true penitence could bring about both the restitution of the Holy Sepulchre and forgiveness for individuals. In fact, the situation was more complex than this, for western dynasties had been intricately involved in the political life of Outremer since the Second Crusade (Phillips 1996: *passim*). Moreover, it could be argued that Hattin presented openings for western kings that were not unwelcome. Henry II of England and Philip II of France allowed Joscius, archbishop of Tyre, to negotiate a truce in a war that neither appeared to be capable of ending. Philip had little choice but to take the cross once Henry – and indeed his heir Richard – had publicly done so (Tyerman 1988: 59); but for the German emperor Frederick Barbarossa, who had crusaded with his uncle Conrad III in 1147–9, the expedition offered opportunities for military glory denied him since his defeat in Italy in 1176, for reconciliation with rebel barons, and for a demonstration of imperial prestige. The Second Crusade had set the precedent for royal participation, and Henry II had taken the cross as early as 1177 – as in 1188, as part of a settlement with the Capetians. Both he and Philip II had dynastic connections in Outremer – he was a cousin of Baldwin IV through their mutual descent from Fulk V of Anjou – and Baldwin IV's will in 1185 had appealed to the three principal rulers of the West to safeguard the kingdom in the event of his heir's death.

The Third Crusade, however, depended on others besides the main leaders. The first action in response to *Audita tremendi* was a decisive encounter in 1188 by William II of Sicily's fleet against Saladin's Egyptian navy, but William's death ended further Norman Sicilian involvement in the crusade. By the time Richard and Philip arrived in the Holy Land, however, an army of over 15,000 Frisians, Danes and Flemings, supported by some French contingents led by Henry, count of Champagne, had gone far towards the recapture of Acre. Genoese, Pisans, Venetians and Bretons had also joined what was indeed a truly international expedition.

The successes enjoyed by the crusade were partly due to extensive preparations. Henry II and Philip both levied the 'Saladin tithe', a tax of a tenth on all movables on laity and clergy alike, which assured that at least the Angevin contingent remained well resourced throughout the crusade. Philip II encountered such opposition from his barons that he had to abandon the tax, but the strength of the Angevin government lay in its ability to organise the efficient collection of money. The tax in England was levied parish by parish, by committees that included representatives of local landowners, the bishop, the crown and the Military Orders (Tyerman 1988: 75–85, 2006: 389–91). Moreover, the message of sinfulness and the need for penitential discipline was useful to secular government in organising the campaign. The Geddington ordinances promulgated by Henry II in February 1188 included restrictions on ostentatious clothing, swearing and gambling (Powicke and Cheney 1981: 1025–9). The moral discipline required of Christendom by

the papacy also served the needs of military strategy, and Henry's decrees indicate a close partnership between crown and Church in the Angevin realms.

The death of Henry II in 1189 left the Angevin crusade in the hands of his heir, Richard. Although Henry had initially considered travelling overland, Richard decided instead to go by sea. Moreover, unlike Philip II, he provided his own ships – some built specially, others chartered; a lesson that a decade later the Fourth Crusade failed to note. Naval mastery was to prove decisive in Richard's military strategy; not only did it enable him to ensure a supply line independent of the land campaign, but it also provided him with the conquest of Cyprus from Isaac Komnenos in May–June 1191. This entanglement meant a delay of about a month before his arrival at Acre, for which he was criticised by the French contingent. It was in fact his second delay, since he had also stopped in Sicily to enforce payment of compensation by the new ruler, Tancred of Lecce, for the dowry payable for his sister Joanna's marriage to William II. Taken together, these stoppages have led to suspicions that Richard was using the crusade as an opportunity to serve wider dynastic ambitions. In his defence, a stable succession in Sicily was crucial to the long-term defence of Outremer; and besides, the money he secured would prove essential in keeping an army in the East for eighteen months. The Cypriot adventure was probably the result of simple chance. The ships in which his fiancé Berengaria of Navarre and her household were sailing were blown off course in a storm and sought shelter at Limassol. The ruler of Cyprus, Isaac Komnenos, saw an opportunity to enrich himself by holding the princess captive for a ransom. Richard had little alternative but to demand her return, and when he saw at Limassol how easily Isaac, despite his claims, could be outwitted and scared, the conquest of the entire island proved too tempting a plum for him to refuse. His defeat of Isaac at Limassol and then St Hilarion was total, and achieved at very little cost. Strategically, moreover, the conquest of the island was extremely useful in the longer term, providing as it did the landed resources to enfeoff large numbers of knights who had lost their lands in 1187. Initially Richard sold the island to the Templars, but then in 1191 transferred it to Guy of Lusignan.

The recapture of Acre in July 1191, soon after Philip and Richard had arrived in the East, masked underlying problems in the Frankish army. In fact the Third Crusade suffered from the start from the continuing political divisions that had characterised the last years before Hattin. The siege of Acre had begun in 1189 because Guy of Lusignan, after abjuring his oath to Saladin not to take up arms against Islam again, had been refused entry to Tyre by Conrad of Montferrat and had nowhere else to go. Although the siege appeared militarily hopeless at first, with the help of the Pisans, who began a naval blockade, and steady reinforcements from the surviving barons in Tyre, it grew in significance until neither Conrad nor indeed Saladin could afford to ignore it. Politically, however, Guy's position was ruined by the

death of his queen Sybil and their daughters in autumn 1190, for he had no claim to the throne in his own right, and without heirs he had no card to play in the succession to the throne. Indeed, his right to wear the crown in 1186 had been suspect because he had not been crowned by the patriarch but by Sybil herself. The heir to the throne was now Isabel, Sybil's half-sister, the daughter of Amalric I and his second wife, the Byzantine princess Maria Komnena. By his conduct at the siege of Acre, Guy had done much to restore a reputation damaged by the events of 1186–7, but Conrad still had considerable support from the native barons, now led by Balian of Ibelin, who had married Maria Komnena after Amalric I's death. Maria's influence was critical, for in the autumn of 1190 she sanctioned the annulment of her daughter Isabel's marriage to Humphrey of Toron, so that Conrad could marry her and thus wear the crown himself on the same grounds that Guy had worn it in 1186. They probably thought that Humphrey, who had declined to allow himself and Isabel to become figureheads of a rival coronation to that of Guy and Sybil in 1186, would prove equally pliant on this occasion. Baldwin of Forde, archbishop of Canterbury, who had led an advance party of Richard's army to the East, and who was the senior cleric present at Acre, refused to marry them on the grounds that Isabel's half-sister Sibyl had previously been married to Conrad's brother William Longsword, and Isabel and Conrad were thus, in canon law, related within the prohibited degrees. Besides this, as Baldwin realised, the marriage infringed the interests of the Angevins, whose vassals the Lusignans were. The papal legate, however, seems to have had no such scruples, and after Baldwin died in November 1190 the marriage duly took place, apparently against the express wishes of Humphrey and Isabel themselves. This manoeuvre effectively disinherited Guy of whatever claim he might still have enjoyed to the crown; furthermore, it meant that when Richard and Philip arrived in 1191, they found themselves embroiled in a succession dispute.

The siege itself did not take long to conclude, because the arrival of the western fleets meant that not only were the land armies reinforced but also that the city could now effectively be blockaded from land and sea. The settlement of the succession dispute by Richard I and Philip II in July 1191, after the conclusion of the siege, allowed for Guy to be confirmed as king for his lifetime, but forced to recognise Conrad as his heir. This seems to have satisfied neither party. Richard's support for Guy, his Lusignan vassal, cost him the cooperation of Conrad, and most of the native Frankish barons, for the duration of the crusade. The Hospitallers supported Guy, the Templars – in a change of allegiance – Conrad. Gerard de Ridefort, the Templar Grand Master who had been such an important confederate of Guy in 1186–7, had died during the siege of Acre. Conrad was subsequently to open separate negotiations with Saladin in the hope that the Muslims might recognise his new lordship of Tyre, Sidon and Beirut.

Philip II's premature departure after the fall of Acre, to ensure that his interests in France were safeguarded after the death of the count of Flanders,

was probably less serious a matter, for he left 10,000 troops behind with the duke of Burgundy, and besides, his withdrawal left Richard a freer hand. But the internal divisions were not fully resolved by the agreement in July 1191, and in February 1192 Richard had to divert resources to defend Acre against an attempt by Conrad to seize it for himself. Moreover, he had alienated Leopold V of Austria, a survivor of Barbarossa's expedition, and an ally who might have appeared negligible to Richard at the time but who was to have a considerable influence on the subsequent trajectory of Richard's reign. Finally, in the spring of 1192, Richard was forced to abandon Guy and recognise Conrad as king. Then, suddenly, Conrad was murdered in the streets of Tyre, apparently by two assassins disguised as monks. Because it happened so soon after the succession had been settled in Conrad's favour, and under such mysterious circumstances, Richard has been suspected by some of engineering the murder. Fortuitous though it might have been for Richard, the murder was in fact the work of the Assassins, who had a grievance against Conrad because he had impounded a ship carrying goods belonging to them (Gillingham 1978: 206–7). But it left the succession question wide open again.

The reluctance of the barons of the rump of the kingdom to cooperate cannot wholly explain why the Third Crusade enjoyed only limited military success. Another reason was the disaster that befell Barbarossa and his German army. Although Leopold of Austria and some others took the sea route, the emperor himself, accompanied by his son, Frederick of Swabia, nine prelates and thirty-two great magnates, chose to march overland, following the traditional route taken by German crusaders. This was a provocative move. Since 1185 the Byzantine Empire had been in alliance with Saladin, and when he heard news of the German expedition Saladin demanded that the Byzantine emperor, Isaac Angelos II, deny access to Barbarossa's army. But the Byzantines were militarily too weak to keep their side of the treaty, and the Germans' threats were sufficient to secure access to Asia Minor in April 1190. Barbarossa expected an easier time in Asia Minor than the dreadful mauling he had experienced in 1147 when accompanying his uncle on the Second Crusade, for he had taken the precaution of making an alliance with Kilij Arslan III, who was for his part only too pleased to be able to undermine Saladin's power in Syria. But by 1190 real authority in Asia Minor had passed to Kilij's son Qutb ad-Din, who had married one of Saladin's daughters, and knew his obligations. In May 1190, therefore, Barbarossa had to face a hostile Seljuq army. This time, he was able to avenge the defeat of half a century earlier, and Qutb was brought to terms. An expedition that had promised so much was reduced to a shambles, however, by an unfortunate accident. Barbarossa, impatient to cross the river Saleph in Seleucia, drowned when he was dragged away by the strong current, possibly after suffering a heart attack. Frederick of Swabia was unable to keep the army together, and the contingent that eventually reached Acre in October 1190 was scarcely significant enough to make a difference to the crusade.

It may be, as has recently been suggested, that the collapse of the German army was in part attributable to the emperor's conservatism in trying to recruit and pay for the expedition through traditional means – expecting crusaders to pay their own way – rather than imposing a tax on his subjects, as had been done in England and France (Tyerman 2006: 389).

The siege of Acre was a triumph of persistence on the part of Guy and his followers and of the early arrivals, and a testament to the siegecraft of the Capetian and Angevin armies. Though not the last military success of the crusade, it was to prove the most significant. For although Richard showed, between summer 1191 and autumn 1192, that Saladin was far from invincible and that the apparent unity of the Islamic world for the purpose of the *jihad* was a façade, his campaign also exposed the limitations of traditional crusading.

If Richard inherited a winnable situation when he arrived at Acre at the beginning of June, his victory at Arsuf was of his own making. In late August he began the march south along the coast past Mt Carmel towards Jaffa, supplying the army from the accompanying fleet. As they reached Caesarea, Saladin began to harass the crusaders' rearguard, but he did not commit himself to battle until Richard reached Arsuf, a few miles north of Jaffa. Here Saladin hoped to use the forest as a screen for the advance of his main forces, and to squeeze the crusaders on the plain between forest and sea. The fighting march became a pitched battle on 7 September, after a cursory attempt to come to terms had failed. Richard's success at Arsuf was due to his ability to control the disparate army, made up of native barons of the kingdom, Flemish, French, Angevins, Poitevins and the Military Orders. The Hospitallers, bringing up the rear of the army on the march, had already been goaded almost beyond endurance by the harassment of the Turkish horse archers. Now they suffered the brunt of the initial Turkish attack as Saladin tried to separate them from the rest of the army. Richard refused to let them charge, for fear the whole battle order would be lost, but when at last the Hospitallers gave way to temptation and unleashed the heavy cavalry charge, he timed to perfection the moment to commit the rest of his forces to the charge, and the Turks were driven from the plain.

The victory at Arsuf (September 1191), although once again demonstrating the effectiveness of heavy cavalry against lightly armed Muslim forces on ground favourable to them and under skilled leadership, recovered no territory. It cleared the coastline, enabling Richard to secure the defences as far south as Darum, but also dissuaded Saladin from risking his army in the field against Richard. Yet only decisive victory in battle could bring the crusade to a successful conclusion. Richard's caution in securing and fortifying Jaffa as a base before marching on to Jerusalem meant that he was faced with the prospect of a winter siege that he was unwilling to risk. This was probably wise, for Jerusalem, located in hill country, was not easy to approach, let alone invest, in the rainy season. Some months later, in early June 1192, he was once again in a position to approach Jerusalem, but

again withdrew when only a few miles away. On this occasion he took an unpopular tactical decision in the face of French impatience, for Hugh of Burgundy was keen to begin. But Saladin had refortified the walls of Jerusalem, and Richard, an experienced general with many such actions behind him, could see little point in a long siege that might be unsuccessful. Moreover, he realised that even if he succeeded in recovering the city, there was little likelihood of defending it against an enemy that, even without the distant allies of 1187–91, could still call upon reinforcements from Syria and Egypt. He preferred to try for an aggressive operation against Egypt, but this, too, failed to materialise.

Instead, at the end of July 1192, Richard found himself having to recover Jaffa from a surprise attack by Saladin, in an episode that did much for his reputation for personal valour but little to take the crusade farther than it had advanced by the autumn of 1191. Ambroise, the Anglo-Norman chronicler who recorded the crusade in verse, described how Richard, who had sailed down the coast from Acre as soon as he heard of Saladin's advance, leapt from his ship and waded ashore just before the last remnants of the garrison surrendered. The Muslims, surprised by the ferocity of the king's charge from the beach, fled in confusion. Only days later, Richard's courage and example swung the tide again in an engagement at Ascalon: 'On that day his sword shone like lightning and many of the Turks felt its edge . . . He mowed down men as reapers mow down corn with their sickles . . . He was an Achilles, an Alexander, a Roland' (cited in Gillingham 1978: 215).

Had Saladin succeeded, as he nearly did, in recapturing Jaffa, the Frankish coastline recovered by the crusade would have been cut in half. It may have been this close shave, rather than the failure to recover Jerusalem, that persuaded Richard to abandon aggression in favour of consolidation. For it must have been clear to him that the objectives of the crusade as articulated in 1188 – namely, to recover the Holy Sepulchre and the True Cross – were at odds with the military imperatives. Christendom could expect little more than the defence of what had been won back since 1189. Richard himself could not stay in the East indefinitely, and by spring 1192 was already keen to turn his attention to the problems that had been developing in his western territories during his absence.

Moreover, the dynastic prospects for the kingdom of Jerusalem were looking more settled than at any time since 1174. Isabel had successfully prevented Hugh of Burgundy, who was sympathetic to Conrad, from taking over Tyre. Richard had already compensated Guy of Lusignan for the loss of his crown with the island of Cyprus, and wisely did not try to bring him back. Instead, overlooking the fact that in his eyes Isabel was still canonically married to Humphrey of Toron, Richard proposed that the uncrowned queen now marry Henry, count of Champagne, who had proved himself a valuable ally during the crusade. The wedding took place with the same haste as Isabel's enforced marriage to Conrad in November 1190.

Between 1192 and 1197, when he died, Henry showed himself a vigorous defender of his kingdom, though he never accepted the title of king.

What had the Third Crusade regained from the disaster of 1187? Richard's treaty with Saladin granted access to the Holy Sepulchre for Christian pilgrims, the right of clergy to officiate at the shrine, and a corridor of land from Jaffa to Jerusalem to maintain a pilgrim road; and in terms of territory, the rich coastal plains around Acre and Tyre, the two cities that formed the heart of the royal demesne. Much rural land had been lost, of course, but the crown in the thirteenth century was still able to grant fiefs *en bezant* from increased revenues in the towns. The towns themselves, particularly Acre, increased in size and population after 1187 as both Franks and Arabic-speaking Christians who had previously lived in the countryside withdrew into the new frontiers. The continued existence of the kingdom of Jerusalem would thus depend, in the thirteenth century even more than had been the case in the twelfth, on a successful urban economy. The loss of land in 1187, of course, meant the loss of many agricultural resources, but in fact the coastal plain retained by the Franks was highly conducive to the intensive farming of sugar cane and olives. The demographic balance in the 'new kingdom' was also different, for the large population of Muslims who lived in the rural areas were now once again under Turkish rule. For the Franks this represented a loss in forced manpower for building work, but also removed the danger – admittedly never a serious one in the twelfth century – of an uprising against their authority. Against this loss must be balanced the acquisition of Cyprus, to which Guy – and, after his death, his brother Aimery – attracted many of the Frankish nobility of the East to replace the Byzantine landowning class. Although Cyprus was from 1194 onward a separate kingdom from Jerusalem, its landowners were largely the same families as those on the mainland.

The treaty of 1192 was the result not only of fifteen months of warfare between Saladin and Richard, but also of sporadic negotiations since September 1191. At one point it looked as though Saladin might accept a deal to restore the former extent of the kingdom, which would then be ruled by his brother al-'Adil, who would in turn marry Richard's sister Joanna. Implausible though this might seem to us – and unacceptable as it proved to Joanna – this would in fact have represented simply the transfer of standard western techniques of conflict resolution to the East, and the fact that the plan was proposed demonstrates that both sides accepted the inevitability of a Frankish presence in the Near East. The fate of Jerusalem itself is also instructive. Saladin, understandably, was not prepared to abandon his greatest conquest. For their part the Franks realised that the kingdom could function without it, but that it made no sense to occupy the city itself unless Kerak, to the east, and Ascalon, on the Mediterranean coast, were also in Frankish hands to secure its flanks. This consideration, though not always appreciated in the West or by crusaders, was to make a Frankish military recovery of Jerusalem an impossibility throughout the medieval period.

Problems of leadership and logistics: the Fourth Crusade

The idea that Constantinople might have to be taken into Frankish hands as a preliminary to the successful defeat of the Turks in the East had been mooted by crusaders in 1096, 1147 and 1190, but on none of these occasions had it been seriously attempted. In 1204 it actually happened, but as the result of a chain of circumstances rather than as the original intent of a new crusade. Widespread western suspicion of Byzantine culture and society, the Byzantine alliance with Saladin, the role of Venice in eastern Mediterranean commerce, and the presence on the crusade of 1202–4 of individuals who had personal interests in Byzantium have led some historians to suppose that the Fourth Crusade was from an early stage disposed to seize Constantinople, whose wealth could then be deployed for the recovery of the Holy Land (Brand 1968: v; Nicol 1988: 126, 130; Harris 2003: 147). How far one gives credence to this probably depends in part on the extent to which one subscribes to a ‘conspiracy theory’ model of historical causation.

The chronicler Geoffrey de Villehardouin’s explanation for the fate of the crusade is one of logical cause and effect. The crusaders could not meet the terms of their treaty with the Venetians, so they were compelled to accept Venetian transport on revised terms that included the capture of the former Venetian possession of Zara, and the restoration of Alexios IV to the Byzantine throne (Smith 2008: 19–22). Once installed, Alexios would guarantee their further passage to the Holy Land or Egypt. When Alexios was unable to deliver, the crusaders had no alternative but to sack the city in order to secure sufficient resources to fulfil their vows; having conquered the city, however, they found that they were not strong enough both to hold their new territories and to mount an assault on the Holy Land, and so stayed put. However, Villehardouin’s attempt to justify the actions of the crusaders, of whom he was one, begs important questions both about the planning and organisation of the crusade before it ever left Italy, and about decisions made once it was under way.

The crusade announced by Innocent III on his election in 1198 was an attempt to continue the momentum built up by the abortive crusade of the emperor Henry VI in 1197. Henry died in Sicily in September, leaving the advance contingents of his army, together with the native Frankish barons of the East, to face an Egyptian army that had been summoned in anticipation by al-’Adil. Preachers were commissioned in 1198 and attempts were made to reconcile the warring Richard I and Philip II. The main impetus for recruitment, however, seems to have developed in north-eastern France, Flanders and Germany, perhaps after a group of knights meeting for a tournament in the Ardennes in late 1199 had been shamed by the papal legate Peter Capuano into taking the cross instead. The French barons formed a committee that, early in 1201, travelled to Venice to negotiate transport across the Mediterranean. In May 1201 Innocent III approved an agreement according to which the Venetians undertook to provide transport

for 4,500 knights and their horses, 9,000 squires and 20,000 foot soldiers, plus food for nine months, at a cost of 85,000 marks. The details of the agreement are recorded by Villehardouin, a member of the committee who later wrote one of the fullest and most vivid accounts of any crusade (Smith 2008: 9–10).

Problems developed even before the crusade had set out. The count of Champagne, the nominal leader, died in 1201, and after others had refused the leadership, Boniface, marquis of Montferrat, was chosen. This was a critical choice. The Montferrats were related both to the Hohenstaufen and the Capetians, and had been involved, since 1176, in the dynastic affairs of the kingdom of Jerusalem. The marquisate, an imperial fief situated in the wealthy Piedmont region of northern Italy, could provide large numbers of knights. But the family also had interests in Constantinople, for Boniface's younger brother, Renier, had married the daughter of Manuel Komnenos, before falling victim to the anti-western sentiment manipulated by Emperor Andronikos I (1182–5), while Conrad of Montferrat had followed Renier to Constantinople before sailing for Jerusalem in 1187. This Byzantine connection has been seized upon by historians who argue that the crusade fatefully changed course from the Levant to Constantinople even before leaving Venice, with the election of Boniface as leader (Nicol 1988: 129–30). In autumn 1201, Boniface met the pretender to the Byzantine throne, Alexios (IV), who had been exiled when his father Isaac II was deposed by his brother Alexios III in 1195. There was good reason for Alexios to seek help in the western empire, for his sister Irene was married to Philip of Swabia, Boniface's own suzerain. Queller and Madden suggested that the possibility of taking the crusade by the overland route via Constantinople, where Alexios could be installed as emperor in place of Alexios III, must have been considered, but warned against the danger of assuming that leadership of the army necessarily meant that Boniface could use the army as he pleased (1997: 37–9). For one thing, Boniface was not in a position to change the treaty drawn up with Venice in spring 1201, according to which the crusaders were bound to travel by sea; for another, he could scarcely impose the ambitions of his own dynasty on other magnates, such as the count of Flanders, who did not share them.

The Venetians have often, particularly by Byzantinists, been cast as the villains of the piece. Venice developed from a Byzantine protectorate in the early Middle Ages into an independent commercial power, but by the last quarter of the twelfth century the former colony enjoyed a dominant role in the eastern Mediterranean. The expulsion of Venetian merchants and their families from Constantinople in 1171 – according to one contemporary source, in retaliation for a practical joke in which Venetian sailors dressed up a monkey in imperial robes – was a serious blow in the commercial rivalry between Venice and Genoa for Black Sea and Aegean trade. While Genoa suffered the anti-western backlash of the 1180s in Constantinople, Venice profited from the dynastic instability in the Byzantine Empire, and after the

coup of 1185, Isaac II retained the throne with Venetian naval help, in return for the establishment, by 1198, of a virtual trading monopoly in the waters around Constantinople (Brand 1968: 195–206; Madden 2003: 85–9).

Some historians have portrayed Venice as a chronically exploitative state whose involvement in the crusade was necessarily a cynical piece of commercial enterprise: the crusade was ‘bad for business’ (Nicol 1988: 124). But this is unfair. Venetians, along with the other Italian maritime powers, had been enthusiastic crusaders from the early twelfth century, and their commercial prosperity enabled the crown in the crusader kingdom to build up a secure financial base. In 1202 Enrico Dandolo and many Venetians took the cross themselves (Madden 2003: 117–32). It is true that Alexios III’s *coup* of 1195 had threatened Venetian dominance in the Bosphorus once again, but this need not mean that the Venetians saw the crusade preached in 1198 as a means to deposing him. The treaty negotiated by the doge, Enrico Dandolo, and the baronial committee in spring 1201 specified Egypt as the target of the crusade. Until the emperor’s nephew Alexios IV arrived in the West, in September 1201, having escaped from his uncle’s custody, there was no pretext for deviating from this plan. Even after Alexios turned up to complicate matters, Venice stood to gain far more economically from the conquest of Egypt than from restoring the monopoly in the Bosphorus. Damietta, the principal Mediterranean port of Egypt, was a terminus of the trade route across the Red Sea to India, and the prospect of establishing a commercial quarter there was more enticing than anything in Byzantine waters. It was only from the mid-thirteenth century onward that the Black Sea could rival the Levant as an artery of trade. The rumour that Venice had been bribed by the sultan of Egypt to divert the crusade to Constantinople has no contemporary basis.

The crusade began to falter in summer 1202, when it became apparent that insufficient numbers were turning up to meet the terms of the Venetian treaty. Villehardouin, seeking to explain the direction taken by the crusade in 1202–3, blamed those who had taken the cross but either never set out from home or, like many of Baldwin of Flanders’ forces, chose alternative routes. These, he implies, betrayed the crusade; however, he offers no convincing explanation for why they should have done so (Smith 2008: 16–17). In fact, a significant number of knights sailing from different ports not only reached the kingdom of Jerusalem but took part in defensive fighting against al-’Adil while their fellow crusaders were otherwise engaged in Constantinople. More likely than betrayal is simple lack of communication and central organisation. Another eyewitness to events, Robert of Clari, whose account represents the point of view of the ‘average’ crusader rather more than does Villehardouin’s, leaves no room for the theory that knights made different arrangements because they already suspected that the crusade was to be diverted by Boniface of Montferrat and the Venetians to Constantinople. Even the original destination of Egypt was not revealed to Robert until he was already at sea. It seems, then, that the baronial leadership

was simply unable to impose the conditions to which they had agreed on disparate and inchoate groups of crusaders. The failure of the crusade was one of unclear leadership and poor organisation.

By late August 1202 only some 11,000–12,000 of the 33,500 crusaders estimated in the treaty had assembled in Venice, and it must have been apparent that they would be unable to meet the terms agreed in 1201. Despite Villehardouin's accusations, it is far from certain that, even if all those who did eventually set sail had turned up in Venice, the crusaders would have been able to raise the money required. The estimate of about 2,100 extra men who went directly to the Holy Land would only have raised the total number in Venice slightly (Queller and Madden 1997: 48). Even after Baldwin, count of Flanders, Boniface of Montferrat and other leaders had borrowed to their limits to make up the amount, they fell short by 34,000 marks. The implication must be that the baronial committee of 1201 was either gulled by the Venetians into agreeing exploitative terms, or that they gravely overestimated the numbers who would take the cross and fulfil their vows. The figure agreed in 1201 was 85,000 marks, or four marks for each mounted knight, and two for a squire or sergeant, but the sum was to include provisions for a year. Comparison with the contract made by Philip Augustus with Genoa for transport to Acre in 1190 demonstrates that the Venetians were asking hardly more than the going rate (Queller and Madden 1997: 11–12). The problem, therefore, must lie with the numbers estimated. No wonder, then, that Villehardouin did not lay blame on the treaty itself, 'for he himself stands out among those responsible for the ruinous blunder' (Queller and Madden 1997: 48).

Could the Venetians have done more to preserve the crusade at this stage? Time was running short, for if they were going anywhere the crusaders needed to set sail before the autumn set in. Meanwhile food was scarce, and neither the crusaders themselves nor the Venetians could feed the army indefinitely. The doge must have feared – as Byzantine emperors had found in 1096 and 1147 – that crusaders kept hungry and waiting would eventually turn against their hosts. However, he could not let them disperse and return home without writing off huge losses against the Republic. Robert of Clari reports that Venice had suspended commercial shipping for eighteen months prior to 1202 so as to be able to build and equip the fleet (McNeal 1996: 38). Ordinary commercial vessels could not be used to carry horses in the numbers required; specialised transport ships had to be built. The Venetians, whose existence depended on maritime trade, were taking a risk in agreeing the contract in the first place, and now had to find a way of covering that risk.

One of the most controversial aspects of the crusade, for contemporaries as well as for later historians, is the diversion to Zara. Villehardouin and Robert of Clari concur that most of the crusaders were ignorant of Dandolo's proposal to save the crusade, but Gunther of Pairis, whose account relies on the eyewitness report of his abbot Martin, hints that some knew and

made their displeasure known. Martin himself asked the papal legate to be released from his vow rather than attack a Christian city, but Peter Capuano refused him. The papal desire to salvage the crusade outweighed the moral consideration of shedding Christian blood. At this stage, there was no reason to suppose that the crusaders would not eventually have the opportunity to spill Muslim blood also, so the argument that evil must be accepted for good to prevail must have carried some weight. The problem was that although the same crusaders – even, in some cases, clerical ones – would under most circumstances have had little compunction about attacking a city held by a Christian enemy, especially when, as in the case of Zara, the claim to the city was disputed, knights did see a distinction between what one did when signed with the cross and what one might do when not under a crusading vow. Those who tried to prevent the attack, such as the Cistercian Abbot Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay, Enguerrand de Boves and Simon de Montfort, were very clear in their understanding of what crusading should and should not involve. Innocent III's role at this point is ambivalent. He certainly condemned the attack, but only when the army was already outside Zara's walls, and the presence of both Boniface and Peter Capuano in Rome during the attack itself suggests that he accepted the inevitability of a policy that he could not condone, and from which he sought to disassociate his legate and the official leader of the crusade (Andrea 2000: 41–5, 46–8, 55–7, 58–9, for Innocent III's letters to the crusaders and their replies).

The entanglement of the pope in Alexios IV's plans is also a murky issue. By the time the crusaders had left, Innocent had already received an embassy from Alexios III appealing to him not to allow the crusade to be diverted to Constantinople, to which he replied favourably (Andrea 2000: 35–9). But Innocent's failure to prevent the sack of Zara, even at the pain of excommunication, must cast doubt on his ability to influence the course of the crusade any further. The doge had persuaded the crusaders to attack a city in the possession of a king, Emeric of Hungary, who had himself taken the cross, and from whose walls crosses had been hung by the inhabitants. In these circumstances, what chance did the pope have of turning them away from Constantinople, a city that was widely regarded as the enemy of crusading? Moreover, the papacy had every reason to support the deposition of Alexios III in favour of his nephew. Although his father, Isaac II, had been an ally of Saladin, the young Alexios not only undertook to supply the crusaders with sufficient ships, provisions and troops to complete the crusade, in return for putting him on the throne, but further promised to ensure the submission of the Orthodox Church to Rome. Papal/imperial negotiations over the next century and a half were to show the futility of such a promise, but in 1202–3 it must have looked to Innocent like a short cut to the long-desired union of the Churches. A further factor was that Philip of Swabia, who was Innocent's preference for the western imperial throne, openly supported Alexios IV because he was married to his sister Irene, and when the plan was revealed to the army, the German crusaders

naturally argued in its favour. It was no easy task, however, to persuade the victorious crusaders at Zara to accept Alexios' proposal, Nor were the envoys sent by Philip and Alexios helped by having to do it piecemeal, since much of the army had already left Zara by the time they arrived, and it was thus only when all were assembled at Corfu for revictualling that the whole army was aware of the proposal. Furthermore Innocent, having confirmed the excommunication of the Venetians for the Zaran affair, could scarcely approve the crusade leaders' decision to accept Alexios IV's proposal. In fact, the crusaders had little choice but to go along with what Dandolo decided, for although some individuals, notably de Montfort and Guy of Vaux-de-Cernay, abandoned the main group in order to take their small contingents directly to the Holy Land, the transport of over 10,000 men and horses still depended on the Venetians. Villehardouin's justification of the course of the crusade is correct in so far as the crusaders as a body had, literally, no control over their own movements.

The crusaders made short work of restoring the blinded Isaac II to occupy the throne jointly with his son. After an initial show of resistance to the crusaders' assault by land on the Theodosian walls guarding the western flank of the city in July 1203, Alexios III abandoned the defence of the city



Figure 7.1 The Theodosian walls, built in the early fifth century, provided Constantinople's main defence from attacks by land, but by 1203, when they were stormed by the Fourth Crusade, they were in need of repair.

Source: © imageBROKER/Alamy.

and fled. This was probably more than the crusaders had dared hope, for although the city's defences were in a poor state of repair and the military resources available not as great as the citizenry might have expected, Constantinople still presented a formidable military obstacle. Had the Byzantine fleet been in a better state to repel the Venetians' operations across the Golden Horn, the result might have been very different. As it was, Venetian marines were able to assault the sea walls on the south side of the Golden Horn while the crusaders' land forces attacked the western walls. Even so, stiffer resistance from Alexios III at the Theodosian walls might have kept the result in the balance.

The military encounter turned out to be easier than the political one. Alexios IV, dazzled by the prospect of the throne, had promised far more than he could deliver. The crusaders had restored him to the city of Constantinople, but not to the whole empire. He had also reckoned without the hostility of his own people for an emperor – albeit a legitimate one – so clearly dependent on Latin arms. Caught between his allies and his subjects, Alexios wavered so much that historians have been unable to agree whether he persuaded the crusaders to stay beyond summer 1203 (Richard 1999: 249–50) or turned suddenly against them (Queller and Madden 1997: 149–50; Phillips 2004: 222–3). In any case, he and his father were murdered in January 1204 when the Byzantines, under the new leadership of the noble Alexios Ducas, known as 'Murtzuphlos', revolted. Villehardouin's account of being sent into the hostile city to confront Alexios with his faithlessness (Smith 2008: 52–61) suggests that the crusaders had already decided to attack the city if the new emperor did not fulfil his promises. Once Alexios Murtzuphlos had installed himself in his place on a tide of anti-Latin feeling, they had in any case to defend themselves against attempts to burn their fleet. A second assault on the city was inevitable, since it was the only way to extricate themselves from the situation. On 13 April the city fell to the crusaders, and for three days suffered a vicious and vindictive sack. One reason why Greeks still regard the Fourth Crusade with such horror is the very nature of the crusaders' victory. Gunther of Pairis' proud list of the relics stolen by his abbot Martin, which included 'a considerable part of St John, an arm of St James, a foot of St Cosmas, a tooth of St Lawrence' as well as a piece of the True Cross, could doubtless be amplified many times over by unrecorded acts of looting (Andrea 1997: 125–7).

The division of the empire between the crusade leaders and Venice had already been agreed in a concord drawn up in March. The loser turned out to be Boniface of Montferrat, whose stock had fallen since the death of his protégé Alexios IV. However, the new emperor, Baldwin of Flanders, soon found that he had exchanged a strongly centralised county in the West for a paper empire. Without the capacity to distribute fiefs – a privilege reserved for a joint Venetian/French committee – his authority was limited from the start, and by the 1220s the Latin Empire was already doomed as a political entity. Venice, on the other hand, held on to its new island possessions

in the Aegean and Ionian seas until the sixteenth century. As far as the crusade itself was concerned, there was now no possibility of reaching the Holy Land or Egypt, for even if the will had been there, the crusaders had relied since the beginning of 1203 on promises of Byzantine resources that they now found to be worthless. Such gains as they made by seizing the city could not easily be liquidated and turned into the machinery of war for export to the Holy Land.

The Fourth Crusade is often thought to have been a failure, but in military terms its achievement was almost as impressive as that of 1097–9. To assault and take control of a city the size of Constantinople – far greater in extent and defensive fortifications than any city to the west – was in itself a military accomplishment of considerable prowess. The success of the operations in 1203 and 1204, moreover, depended on innovative forms of naval warfare against a maritime city, and on the flexible coordination of land and sea forces. Moreover, although next to no impact had been made by the crusade on the Holy Land, the crusaders could, as Villehardouin attempted to do, rationalise their actions by arguing that they had furthered the cause of future expeditions. As it turned out, Constantinople was never again to be pivotal to a crusade for the recovery of the Holy Land but, with the exception of the period between 1158 and 1180, the Byzantines had always represented an obstruction to crusaders, so the argument was by no means frivolous. The manner of the victory, however, proved fatal to any attempt to treat the imposition of a Venetian patriarch and canons in Constantinople as the genuine union of the Churches so desired by the papacy. In the history of crusading as a phenomenon, the Fourth Crusade's chief significance is twofold: first, it demonstrated how poor organisation before departure could wreck an expedition; and second, it gave weight to the notion that Crusades could legitimately be launched against other enemies of Christendom than the Muslims.

Innocent III and the idea and practice of crusading

On his election as pope in 1198, Innocent III took as the text on which to base his first encyclical the verse 'O Jerusalem, if ever I forget you' (Psalm 137: 5). The preaching of a crusade to the East was undertaken immediately. The patriarch of Jerusalem, Aimery the Monk, was asked to submit a report to the curia describing the state of the Holy Land, as an *aide-mémoire* for planning a crusade. Innocent, moreover, involved himself in the affairs of the Latin Church in the East more than any previous pope. After the death of Aimery in 1202, the papal legate Soffredo, who had been sent to supervise a new election, was himself elected, and when he died after only a year in office, another Italian in Innocent's circle, Albert, bishop of Vercelli, was sent to the East. Innocent persuaded yet another of his associates, the Cistercian Peter of Ivrea, to take up the patriarchate of Antioch. The Holy Land was central to the piety and spirituality of the pope and his intimate circle at the beginning of the thirteenth century (Bolton 2000: 154–80).

It is ironic, given this interest in the Holy Land, that Innocent has the reputation of being the pope who, more than any other, widened the scope of crusading. Other regions than the eastern Mediterranean – the Iberian peninsula and the Baltic in particular – had long been targets of Crusades. But Innocent's pontificate saw a conceptual shift as well as a geographical one, with the extension of crusading privileges to those who took the cross against Christian enemies of the papacy in Sicily and against Cathar heretics in southern France. As is often the case in papal history, this was simply the logical extension into practice of ideas implicit in previous actions or statements. Gregory VII had encouraged the use of force to remove 'unreformed' clergy, and canny rulers, such as Henry II in his proposed invasion of Ireland in 1170, had seen how the idea of the crusade could be exploited to further his territorial aims. Whether Innocent intended, however, to place Crusades in other directions than the Holy Land and against enemies other than the Muslims in the same category, as some historians have argued or implied (Housley 1992: 2–6; Riley-Smith 2002a: *passim* – but *contra* see Tyerman 1998: 37) depends partly on one's interpretation of papal practice.

Because so much of lasting significance was articulated in Innocent's pontificate, it is easy to see him as an idealist who created new ways of formulating papal primacy. But Innocent's crusading policy can just as convincingly be interpreted as a series of pragmatic reactions to problems as they arose. Some of these problems were chronic, others the result of fortuitous circumstances; but all were inherited, rather than being of Innocent's own making.

Heresy and Christian unity

Perhaps the most problematic inheritance was the increasingly strong hold taken by heretical beliefs in Christendom. The regions particularly susceptible to the dissemination of heresy, urban northern Italy and south-western France, though vastly different in character, had one crucial feature in common: the lack of a powerful central government in whose interests it was to stamp out heresy as a potentially dangerous subversion of society. In southern France by c.1200, the parochial Church seems to have lost the loyalty of large sections of society. Lack of education among the clergy meant that parishioners were often vague about what constituted orthodox beliefs, and the provision of pastoral care depended largely on the competence of individual bishops. Catharism, a dualist religion that presupposed the existence of two equal powers, good and evil, and that in the extreme forms that had taken hold in southern France also denied the divinity of Christ and the validity of the sacraments, had by Innocent's pontificate become organised quite systematically, and appeared to offer a coherent set of alternative beliefs to orthodox Christianity (Lambert 1998: 61–81; Barber 2000: 68–106).

The organisation of the religion made it particularly difficult to detect, because with the exception of the Cathar priesthood (the 'perfect'), Cathar

believers were not required to observe ways of life that marked them out as observably different from their neighbours. Another of the difficulties in trying to understand Cathar beliefs and the operation of their networks of believers is that so much of what we think we know of them derives either from unfavourable reports and inferences about Catharism from clerical investigators, or from records of the Inquisition, which are tantamount to evidence obtained under threat of torture. This difficulty has led some historians to conclude that Cathar beliefs as they are reported in clerical sources are little more than a confection on the part of those looking for an enemy to demonise, and that heretics existed only in the eyes of their beholders (Pegg 2001, 2008; Moore 2012). According to this view, those persecuted should be seen either as anticlerical reformers whose opposition to the established wealth and power of the Church led them to be categorised as deviants from the Christian faith, or simply as uneducated innocents whose ignorance of Christian teaching convicted them in the eyes of inquisitors. If you were looking for heresy, it could easily be found among such people. There is much to commend such a view; we can easily agree that Catharism as presented to us in clerical sources was to some degree a construct of a powerful literate elite with the weapons of bureaucratic procedure and priestly language at their disposal. Nevertheless, the existence of alternative beliefs cannot be dismissed so easily, because some texts by Cathars have come down to us, and the proven existence of dualist heresy in the Byzantine world at the same time means that we cannot simply dismiss all those labelled as heretics in the West as simpletons or rebels (Hamilton and Hamilton 1998).

The application of the crusade to the Cathar problem was a last resort on Innocent's part. Repeated demands to the dominant magnate of the region, Raymond VI of Toulouse, to stamp out Catharism failed because they were impossible for him to meet. Raymond was the largest landowner, with rich and varied lordships in the Toulousain, Gascony and to the east of the Rhone, but he lacked the machinery of government available to northern magnates. He was suspected of Cathar sympathies himself, but whether or not this were true – and the charge rests largely on the indictment of the Cistercian Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay – he was simply in no position to drive the Cathars out of his territories, even if he had wished to do so. By the time he inherited the county in 1194, at the age of thirty-eight, Catharism was an accepted condition of life in the Languedoc (Sumption 1978: 64–5; Costen 1997: 25–51). What the count himself was unable to achieve, the lesser magnates could certainly do no better, and the promise of indulgences equal to those for the great pilgrimages was insufficient to induce them to rid their lands of heretics. Raymond already had a history of antagonism towards the clergy – he was excommunicated for the first time in 1196 – but Innocent's preferred method of resolving the problem of heresy, which was to send legates with absolute powers to enforce obedience to Rome, turned the local bishops against them too. The legates, the

Cistercians Peter of Castelnau and Arnald-Amaury of Cîteaux, although themselves southerners, were resented by the bishops whose authority they overrode. In consequence, the bishops of Béziers, Toulouse and Viviers were all replaced within months of the arrival of the legates. Arnald-Amaury, who was also to lead a crusading army in Spain, had a propensity for bloodshed: it was he who allegedly advised at the siege of Béziers: ‘Kill them all; God will know his own.’ The legates found – though perhaps never fully understood – that the presence of Catharism was a symptom, rather than the cause, of the disaffectedness of so many Christians in the Languedoc from the Church. Between 1203 and 1208 teams of Cistercians, supplemented by a Spanish bishop, Diego of Osma, toured the Languedoc preaching and disputing publicly against the Cathars and trying to reform the local clergy.

By 1207 Peter of Castelnau’s patience had been exhausted; having negotiated a truce among Raymond’s vassals without his knowledge, he excommunicated the count himself for failing to keep his promises. The problem with excommunication as a weapon, however, was that it relied on a local Church willing to respect it. Innocent thus tried to back it up by appealing to Philip II of France to enforce it. His appeal of November 1207 was in some ways a logical application of the joint encyclical of Pope Lucius III and Frederick Barbarossa of 1184, in which the principle of using the secular sword to enforce the submission of heretics was articulated. But Innocent went further by offering the same indulgence as for a crusade against the Muslims (Rist 2009: 65–8). Raymond was finally scared into negotiating, but in January 1208 Peter of Castelnau was murdered by one of Raymond’s officials, and the crusade was duly preached throughout France. Raymond’s attempt to save himself by taking the cross against the heretics may be seen as cynical opportunism, but in any case it did not work, and by the summer of 1209 he had been forced to hand over control of the administration of his lands to the papal legates. Although after initial losses in 1211–12 he successfully invaded the Languedoc and retook Toulouse, the crusade found new vigour in the leadership of Louis VIII of France in 1224, and by 1229 Raymond VI had been defeated and humiliated. The county of Toulouse, halved in extent during Raymond’s own lifetime, would effectively be annexed to the French crown.

The course of the crusade was largely that of a territorial war fought by northern French nobles, led initially by Simon de Montfort and subsequently by Louis VIII, against the families and properties of the southern nobility, whether or not they were themselves Cathars. The cruelty of the war as it unfolded makes it difficult for modern observers to react in any way other than with revulsion. The crusade was not simply an impetuous act of vengeance for the murder of the legate, for Innocent had already offered indulgences both to those who expelled heretics from their own lands and, in November 1207, to Philip Augustus and anyone who took the cross under him. Once the crusade had been preached and forces were committed,

shocking acts of brutality towards inhabitants of southern French towns were not only licit but, in the eyes of the crusaders and their supporters, meritorious.

Yet despite the novelty of such enduring acts of violence on such grounds within Christian Europe, Innocent, in using force against the Cathars, was following a traditional ideology. The theological justification for acts of violence in defence of the Church had been developed in the curia of Gregory VII for application against those who threatened the integrity of Christian society, and the Third Lateran Council in 1179 had approved the use of force to deal with heresy (Tanner 1990: 216). Heresy was regarded throughout the twelfth century as a social crime as well as a theological error, and lay rulers were quicker than the Church to punish heretics by force where necessary (Moore 1987: 8–9). It was not, therefore, the resort to war that troubled contemporary critics of the Albigensian Crusade, so much as the harnessing of crusading ideals to that war.

The problem, as critics saw it, lay not in Innocent's use of crusading language per se, but in the fact that by the early thirteenth century the language of crusading was beginning to have specific and practical implications. Since the Geddington Ordinances of 1188, a precedent had been set for the assumption of the cross as equivalent to a religious vow, which in turn enacted a change in status for the vow-taker and, in consequence, set in train practical measures by which he could raise money, defer repayment of loans, evade jurisdiction, and so on. Preaching any crusade, even one limited in its geographical application to one part of Europe, unlocked the machinery by which money could be collected from the faithful throughout Christendom. Although there was as yet no coherent canonical theory of crusading, the term 'crusade' had begun to appear after the Third Crusade, both in the Latin form 'crucesignatus' (lit.: someone signed with the cross, hence, a crusader) and, more telling in the context of the Albigensian Crusade, in the vernaculars of northern and southern France (*croisier*, *crozeia*) (Tyerman 1998: 49–50). This implies that perceptions were hardening about the meaning of an activity that had since 1095 had no specific terminology.

Most of the contemporary criticism of the Albigensian Crusade comes from the Languedoc itself; in other words, from the victims. The landowning classes of the Languedoc, whether they were sympathetic to the Cathars or not, could see that a crusade against heretics was in practical terms impossible to carry through. In current terminology, it was an 'asymmetric' war. War could be waged against individual lords and their property, or against towns, castles and armies put into the field to defend them, but less easily against religious beliefs or organisations. To Innocent and the crusaders, however, the property of Cathars, and places where Cathars lived or were sheltered, were no less legitimate targets than Aleppo or Damascus might be for crusaders to the East. Although it is counterintuitive for us to equate the Muslim threat in the East, which was largely territorial in nature, to that posed by heretical beliefs within Christendom, it was not so for most medieval

Christians. For one thing, Islam was itself largely thought of as a Christian heresy rather than as a separate systematic religious tradition. Then again, Cathars were not simply the disenfranchised urban poor or peasants; they could be found in all social classes, from Raymond VI's second wife downward, and in positions of authority in towns in both the Languedoc and northern Italy. Cathars in Orvieto even succeeded in expelling the bishop.

More profoundly, however, the existence of Catharism was understood by the Church as a threat to its own validity. In denying the efficacy of the sacraments, Catharism made the priesthood irrelevant, and in so doing, it cut through at a stroke the complex social and spiritual ties that held Christian society together. In an age in which religious choice has become axiomatic as an indicator of individual freedom, it is difficult for us to acknowledge how deeply this struck at the heart of the social order. The structuralist interpretation of the Church's defence of its authority, favoured by sociologists, is that the clergy needed to enforce orthodox Catholic beliefs and practices in order to preserve their mystical power as an élite over the illiterate masses (Kaelber 1998: 106–17). Innocent and his circle, however, did not think in these terms. They thought, simply, that maintaining universal Catholic practices was necessary for the salvation of society. 'The Church' was not a separate entity from 'society'; in all senses the Church *was* Christian society, meaning all people were baptised into the Church at birth. The Church, which had been instituted by Christ with St Peter at its head, was a single body, and as a single body must be kept safe and delivered up to Christ at the end of time. The pope, the successor of St Peter, was thus responsible for the salvation of society by preserving and maintaining the sacraments through which individuals could gain assurance of Paradise (Rist 2009: 54–61).

The key to Innocent's thinking is the idea of unity. Within the Church there would always be those who in their manner of life rejected salvation – as Augustine had envisioned it, the elect and the damned lived side by side. But to establish an alternative Church was to upset the unity implied by the single body created through the agency of the Holy Spirit at the first Pentecost. There could be only one Church; coexistence with another that offered different doctrines and sacraments was impossible because the presence of another invalidated the first.

The crusade was the logical weapon for Innocent to use in the defence of Christendom for practical reasons too. Since 1187, four Crusades had been preached; it had become a more normative and recognisable means of raising armies than ever before. Despite the appeal to Philip Augustus, Innocent was aware that he was hardly more likely in 1207 than he had been in 1199 to persuade him to act as the enforcer of papal policy. But by commissioning preachers to accept crusading vows from the knights of Christendom, Innocent was making a virtue out of necessity. The capacity to attract knights through the offer of a crusading indulgence was a visible demonstration of the pope's overriding authority as the leader of Christendom.

After the experience of the Fourth Crusade, in which papal authority over the crusaders had proved to be so hollow, it is hardly surprising that Innocent wished to play a more direct role in the crusade against the heretics. But he was to be equally frustrated here by the extremism of his legates, particularly Arnald-Amaury, and by the ambitions of Simon de Montfort. Innocent seems to have wanted Raymond VI to keep not only his title as count but most of his possessions in the Languedoc, but he had to give way in the council he himself summoned in 1214, and recognise instead the reality of the battlefield. After this, the second phase of war was both more bitter and more attritional, and the result was the dismemberment of the lands of the count of Toulouse and the leading families of the Languedoc.

The Albigensian Crusade, in the end, accomplished only the violent transfer of the lands of the southern nobility to northern French crusaders; the real work of combating heresy was achieved by a combination of the Inquisition and better preaching and more uplifting example on the part of a new generation of preachers (Lambert 1998: 215–29). Yet this brutal episode, like the Investiture Contest for Gregory VII and his successors, provided an arena of conflict in which new and more coherent ideas about crusading and its role in Christian society could be forged.

The Children's Crusade

Innocent III began planning new Crusades while the Albigensian Crusade was still undecided. Preaching for a crusade against the Muslims of the Iberian peninsula was widespread throughout western Europe in early 1212, and may – along with continued preaching for Simon de Montfort's army in 1211–12 – have been partly responsible for the phenomenon that has come to be known as the Children's Crusade. The hopeless journey of the children across the Alps to Italy and their expectation of somehow reaching the Holy Land and being granted a miraculous victory where professionals had failed provides one of the most iconic, if pathetic, images of the Middle Ages. Historians have differed in their understanding of these events. Should it be seen as an expression of the medieval cult of the child, connected perhaps with the growing cult of the Holy Innocents of Bethlehem (Alphandéry and Dupront 1954–9: II, 135–48)? Or as 'one of a series of social explosions through which medieval men, women and children found release' (Zacour 1969: 342)? Contemporary reports of the events that have come to be seen collectively as the Children's Crusade do not provide much help, since the more detailed accounts that provide the full measure of the tragedy were written much later – in some cases after 1250 – and reflect a romantic and far-fetched version of what happened. The fullest version of the story is contained in the chronicle of the German Cistercian monk Alberic of Trois Fontaines, according to whom several thousand children appeared at Marseilles with the intent of winning back the Holy Land. Two merchants offered them free passage to the Holy Land

but packed them into unseaworthy vessels, two of which sank, and sent them not to Acre but to North Africa, where they were sold into slavery (Dickson 2008: 143–6). The truth is probably more prosaic, though nonetheless important for what it can tell us about the reception of crusading ideas among the poor and the young. Between late March and mid-May 1212, groups of young agricultural labourers along the Rhine began leaving their herds and ploughs untended and gathering under the leadership of a charismatic young man called Nicholas. They moved south from Cologne along the Rhine, crossed the Alps and reached Piacenza, probably by late August. The contemporary reports suggest that about 7,000 appeared at Piacenza, carrying crosses, pilgrims' staffs and other symbols. They seem to have dispersed as suddenly as they had appeared, probably splitting up into smaller bands to try their luck at the main ports of embarkation for the Holy Land throughout Italy. Slightly later, a separate group of youths gathered in northern France under the leadership of a shepherd, Stephen of Cloyes. Stephen preached that Jesus had appeared to him as a pilgrim and told him to take letters to the French king. Stephen's band headed for the royal monastery of Saint-Denis, near Paris, but the movement dispersed when Philip II advised the youths to go back home. Although some of the contemporary accounts link the German and French movements, it is far from clear that there was any connection between the two separate phenomena. Doubt has even been cast on whether the 'children' were indeed as young as we might suppose, given that in medieval conceptions of age the state of 'youth' (following that of childhood) might stretch from the age of 14 into one's twenties (Dickson 2008: 33–5).

The Children's Crusade should be seen in the context of heightened awareness of crusading at all levels of society, partly as a result of liturgical innovations. Processions, open-air preaching rallies and the public performance of the *clamor* were all intended to serve the end of regenerating Christian society so that it was in a fit state to recover Jerusalem. Military action by itself would never deliver such a result, because – as had been amply demonstrated in the 1140s and in the events of and after 1187 – a successful crusade could originate only in a properly penitential environment. This, indeed, was the message of much of the crusade preaching of the time. From here it was a short step to the logic that spiritual regeneration, coupled with faith, would be sufficient to bring about God's miraculous provision of military capability. It is no coincidence that this was exactly the period at which Francis of Assisi's message of the apostolic life of poverty, penitence and simple faith was taking hold in Italy, soon to spread throughout western Christendom. Where kings and nobles, compromised by political aspirations, interests and greed, had signally failed, the young and the poor – God's innocents – might succeed. The meek, after all, had been promised that they would inherit the earth.

Towards a centralised crusade

It has been said that hierarchical ideas formed the basis of Innocent III's thinking about crusading (Sayers 1994: 166, differing in interpretation from Mayer 1988: 217). When we look at crusading activity in his pontificate, Innocent certainly appears as the organising principle. It is striking that none of his Crusades was led by, or even featured to any great extent, royal figures. Although individual nobles, such as Philip of Flanders in 1177, had mounted Crusades in the past, since 1145–6 the papacy had aimed bulls proclaiming Crusades at kings. The problem was that in the period 1198–1216 none of the dynasties on whom popes had previously relied was any longer in a position to answer an appeal. The death of Emperor Henry VI in 1197 was followed in 1199 by that of the Angevin Richard I, whom Innocent had in fact approached a year earlier; in both cases, the consequence was a succession dispute. The German throne was claimed by three candidates: Henry's infant son Frederick II, his uncle Philip of Swabia and Otto of Brunswick, neither of whom wished to jeopardise their candidature by leaving Germany. John, who succeeded Richard to the throne of England, had to fight off a claim from his nephew Arthur, who was supported by Philip II. Philip himself, who had not relished his crusade ten years earlier, would not take the cross until the Angevin succession had been resolved; he was even reluctant to lead a crusade into the Languedoc.

Circumstances may have suited Innocent's ideals well. Although in 1199 and in 1212 Innocent tried to reconcile Philip and John, the absence of royal figures also provided him with an opportunity to direct the crusade more personally than any pope since Urban II. For, as Richard has pointed out, a dangerous precedent had been set by Henry VI's crusade (1999: 236–7). Henry had taken the cross as a matter of personal conscience in 1195, rather than in response to a papal appeal. But by 1197 a fortuitous set of circumstances had altered his stature in the East. When Richard I fell into the hands of Duke Leopold V of Austria, Henry, as Leopold's overlord, took Richard into his custody and demanded as part of the exorbitant ransom suzerainty over Cyprus. As overlord, Henry then sent Amalric II a crown to wear; Cyprus thus became an imperial vassal. Moreover, when in September 1197 Henry of Champagne died when he fell from a window in Acre, Almeric was chosen to marry the thrice-widowed Isabel and thus become king of Jerusalem as well as Cyprus. Although the kingdoms were in no way constitutionally linked, it was obvious that Henry VI, as Almeric's suzerain in Cyprus, would have unparalleled influence for a western monarch in the Crusader States. Innocent III realised that any successful claimant to the imperial throne would enjoy the same influence.

Yet by 1212 it was apparent that committees of barons, as had operated in 1202–4, lacked sufficient direction, and that papal legates could dictate crusading policy on the ground more easily than the pope himself. Two decrees, *Novit ille* (1212) and *Quia maior* (1213), were instrumental in

formulating a papal theory of crusading, and in paving the way for the decree *Ad liberandam* of the Fourth Lateran Council, which was the most detailed statement of how crusading as an institution was to be managed. The first of these was only peripherally connected with crusading. *Novit ille* was a decretal letter sent to Philip Augustus in which the pope claimed the right of arbitration in the war between the Capetian and Angevin dynasties (Tierney 1964: 134–5). No pope, not even Gregory VII, had so explicitly articulated the rhetoric of papal primacy so as to claim to judge the actions of kings in the purely secular sphere. But Innocent did so not, he says, as a feudal judge, but rather as a judge over matters of sinfulness. In this he was simply following the Petrine commission. ‘No sane man could deny our right to judge and punish any Christian in matters of sin’, he argued, and he further claimed that the matters in dispute, concerning as they did breaches of oaths and of treaties, were spiritual, not secular, affairs. *Novit ille* is a far-reaching and high-minded ideology of papal authority. At the same time, it is a document born out of a pragmatic desire to end a war that jeopardised the possibility of launching another crusade. Its significance for crusading lies in the assumption that the crusade is the highest aspiration not only of papal policy but also of Christian kingship, and that kings’ secular policies ought thus to be subordinated to serving the needs of the crusade.

Quia maior, which outlined Innocent’s plans for a new crusade for the recovery of Jerusalem, contained little new; instead, it summarised and articulated more coherently than before a century of previous papal policy. In it, the performance of the liturgical *clamor*, with monthly processions, was enjoined on all dioceses. Most importantly, the plenary indulgence, never yet precisely defined, was now established as a fixed inducement to crusaders. All who took the cross, whether they actually fought or simply paid for others to take their place, were forgiven the sins they had confessed to a priest. One problem evident to contemporaries was that of equivalence: did the penalty meet the gravity of the sin? It was not until the 1230s that theologians devised a system, known as the ‘Treasury of Merits’, according to which the substitute for an earthly penance that might be deemed to have fallen short of the sin committed was notionally provided by the extra store of grace ‘in the bank’ from the inexhaustible goodness of Christ and the saints.

Furthermore, the grant of indulgences to those *crucesignati* who commuted their vows to money payments, and that could then be used to resource substitute crusaders, was controversial at the time (Throop 1940: 91). In fact, it was not Innocent’s invention; he was merely trying to make sense of a precedent implied in a practice that had developed during the preaching of the Third Crusade. Later critics of the abuse of indulgences, thinking of caricatures such as Chaucer’s pardoner, might see *Quia maior*’s policy of vow commutation as cynical. But, like so much of Innocent’s policy, it was pragmatic in origin. Crusading as an *effective* activity was largely limited to the social élite: those who could afford to equip themselves and who could contribute in a militarily useful way to campaigns. But crusade

preaching and recruitment were not limited to royal and noble households: especially from the early thirteenth century onward, preachers sought to recruit from among the growing urban populations. Research on crusade recruitment in England shows blacksmiths, tanners, cobblers and merchants taking the cross (Tyerman 1988: 168–75). In 1196 the pope instructed that *crucesignati* who had failed to fulfil their vow should be forced to do so. But Innocent III realised that it was impossible to force, for example, a poor blacksmith who had taken the cross as an emotional response to an eloquent crusade sermon to fulfil a vow that should not have been accepted in the first place. Some of the English *crucesignati* who turned up in the records of the archbishop of Canterbury's survey into vow-breakers had set out but turned back when they ran out of money; others had become invalid or had families to support. Besides, although urban crusaders proved invaluable in the sieges of Lisbon in 1147, Acre in 1189–91 and Damietta in 1217–19, on the whole such crusaders could be a liability. Thus in 1200/1 Innocent ordered that the *crucesignati* identified as vow-breakers should instead redeem their vows for cash. In *Quia maior* this measure becomes official policy, by providing a procedure for commuting a vow to a money payment that was to be collected in a crusade chest placed in the parish church. Although officially vow redemption was still distinct from commutation, in practice the two were probably often confused.

In hindsight it is easy to see how this policy can be interpreted as the manipulation of people's sensibilities to encourage them to take vows that they were not in a position to fulfil; or, more cynically still, as the indirect taxation of the laity to fund Crusades. But Innocent's policy was at the same time practical and profoundly idealistic. He was trying on the one hand to ensure that Crusades could be made more self-sufficient, so that they would never again be blown off course as had happened in 1202–4. On the other hand, he wanted to make the crusade an activity controlled by the head of Christian society but in which the whole of that society could participate. If the loss of Jerusalem was the consequence of human sinfulness, then all Christians should play a part in its recovery. By taking the crusade vow, even non-combatants could affirm public support for the ideal, and by commuting it, they could support a campaign financially. During the course of the thirteenth century, popes would follow this fundamental premise as regards recruitment, albeit with varying degrees of success (Lower 2005: 13–17). One feature of this inclusivity was the regular recruitment of women as crusaders. High-born women had been present on the first two Crusades; Eleanor of Aquitaine was the most prominent example, but Ida, widow of the margrave of Austria, had been a participant on the crusade of 1101. By the thirteenth century, it was not at all unusual for the wives of crusade leaders to take the cross, as Innocent III himself acknowledged (Tyerman 2015: 166).

Innocent III's legislation had the effect of linking the ideal of crusading to financial realities. The attempt to sort out anomalies in previous practice

gave crusading a book-keeping aspect; thus, for example, indulgences were graded in proportion to whether the vow was kept or commuted. The same attention to practical detail characterises *Ad liberandam*, the final – and lengthiest – decree of the Fourth Lateran Council (Tanner 1990: 267–71). In overall vision and grasp of detail, the conciliar decrees of Fourth Lateran were the most mature regulatory documents yet produced by the medieval Church. They provided a blueprint for how Christian society should function, from baptism to last unction, from parish to archdiocese. Yet by drawing to a conclusion with the specific arrangements for the new crusade first referred to in *Quia maior*, Fourth Lateran makes it appear as though the entire programme for the reform of society, from union with the Greek Church to the visitation of monasteries, was to serve the end of the crusade. The decree begins by asserting that the recovery of the Holy Land is the ‘ardent desire’ of the Church. Although another decree of the Council offered the same indulgence to those combating heresy as to those fighting the Muslims in the Holy Land, it is – as traditionalists among crusade historians have pointed out – by reference to the Holy Land crusade that the scale and nature of indulgences is conceived (Tyerman 1998: 37–8; cf. Mayer 1988: 312–13). *Quia maior*, indeed, offered the indulgence for the Spanish *Reconquista* only to Spaniards and Provençals. This suggests that Innocent wished to subordinate, at least for the duration of this expedition, all other military activity against the enemies of Christendom to the crusade for Jerusalem.

Although the measures in *Ad liberandam* were specific to the new crusade, they called on earlier precedents. A general peace was declared throughout Christendom for four years, and tournaments were banned for three; bishops were instructed to check that *crucesignati* left by the declared departure date of 1 June 1216; crusaders’ debts were to be deferred, and interest payments rescinded; materials of war such as timber and iron were prohibited from trade in Muslim-held ports, indeed all shipping to Muslim ports was to be suspended for four years. These measures were to be repeated in the crusade decrees of the First and Second Councils of Lyons in 1245 and 1274 (Tanner 1990: 297–301, 309–14), and featured in crusade planning well into the fourteenth century. More contentious in future crusade planning was to be the measure regarding taxation of the clergy. A rate of one-twentieth was levied for three years, in addition to which the papacy would itself contribute £30,000. The principle of clerical taxation having been thus enshrined in canon law, rulers planning Crusades came to expect to be granted the faculty by future popes. The rate varied: in 1225 a tenth was levied in France but a fifteenth in England; in 1245 the rate was again a twentieth but in 1274 a tenth. Once again, Innocent was merely codifying recent precedent: in 1199 his legate Peter Capuano had persuaded the French bishops to pay a thirtieth in lieu of sending knights on crusade. But secular rulers had always looked to the Church for financial help for Crusades, sometimes heavy-handedly. Taxation meant that systems had to be put in place to collect the money and gifts in kind. Innocent III envisaged this being

done by bishops, but it was not long before the task was allocated to papal legates. In England at least, this caused bitter resentment, as for example in 1236 when the legate was assaulted by students in Oxford (Luard vol. III 1876: 481–4).

Innocent III's Crusades were, on the face of it, a failure. This is not to say that they achieved little, but that their achievements were rather different from what he had expected. In both the eastern Mediterranean and the Languedoc, the principle of Christian unity was enforced at the point of the sword, rather than by voluntary submission to papal authority. He found few takers for the indulgence offered to resist the Hohenstaufen in Sicily (see Chapter 8, below). The crusade heralded by *Quia maior* and *Ad liberandam* – that he did not live to see – despite painstaking planning and initial success, in the end accomplished nothing. Yet Innocent's contribution to crusading is immense. In letters to bishops and friends he articulated a pastoral and devotional theology based on the Holy Land (Bolton 2000: 154–80). His appointments re-energised the Latin Church in the Crusader States. Above all, he clarified existing practices in preaching, recruitment and financing Crusades. Whether through idealism or in reaction to practical problems, Innocent succeeded in making the crusade a central feature of the daily life of ordinary Christians. He may be criticised for opening the way for abuses; nevertheless, in the century after his pontificate far more people took the cross and far more money was raised for crusading than in the previous hundred years.



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8 Varieties of crusading from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries

Key Dates

1031	collapse of khalifate of Cordoba
1063	Fernando I of Castile begins receiving <i>parias</i> from Seville and Badajoz
1085	Alfonso VI of Castile captures Toledo
1080s	arrival of Almoravids to Iberian peninsula
1118–19	Aragonese capture of Zaragoza
1146	papal bull <i>Divina dispensatione</i> legitimises crusade against Wends
1147	capture of Lisbon
1148	crusade against Wends
1191	founding of Teutonic Order at Acre
1199	invasion of Sicily by Markward von Anweiler
1206	Sword Brothers founded at Riga
1212	combined Christian victory at Las Navas de Tolosa
1225	Latin Empire of Constantinople driven out of Asia Minor
1245	Council of Lyons launches crusade against Emperor Frederick II
1261	Michael VIII restores Byzantine Empire in Constantinople
1266	Charles of Anjou conquers Sicily
1282	'Sicilian Vespers': revolt against Charles of Anjou in Sicily

Crusading took many forms in the Middle Ages. The success of the First Crusade had an important effect on the way in which Europeans perceived the campaigns of reconquest in Spain, which began to assume an overtly spiritual character. Similarly, territorial wars of expansion against pagan peoples in the Baltic and on the eastern borders of Christendom in central Europe came to be seen as Crusades and, in the thirteenth century, so did the wars of

attrition fought by the popes against political enemies in Italy. After the Fourth Crusade, the defence of the Latin Empire of Constantinople also attracted crusading privileges. This chapter examines each of these examples as a case study and offers interpretations of the similarities and differences between them.

Crusades and holy wars

Even while preaching the First Crusade in 1096, Urban II realised that his use of holy war against the Turks in the East could have similar application elsewhere. As we have seen, the late Roman idea of the just war was revived by the papacy in the later eleventh century in a political climate – conflict with the empire – that required the threat, if not the actual use, of force. Alexander II sanctioned the invasion of England in 1066 on such grounds; Gregory VII allowed that the bearing of arms could in certain circumstances act as a penance; and in 1089 Urban II offered the campaign against Muslim-held Tarragona, in Catalonia, as a substitute for penance (Mayer 1988: 29–32; Bull 1993: 97). In 1096, Urban discouraged Catalan counts from leaving their own territories to join the armed pilgrimage to Jerusalem: fighting the Muslims on their own doorstep was just as efficacious a means of doing penance (Riley-Smith and Riley-Smith 1981: 40).

The logic of the holy war implied a wide diffusion of actions against the enemies of Christ, wherever they might be found. Opposition in principle to such diffusion – for example, against heretics in Italy and southern France, or pagans in north-eastern Europe – was limited, perhaps because contemporary opinion had during the course of the eleventh century already become accustomed to the idea that a holy war, with some form of spiritual privilege, could reasonably be applied to a wide range of opponents. In the cases of the *Reconquista* in Spain and the Crusades against pagan Livs and Lithuanians in the Baltic, or the Cumans on the borders of Hungary (Berend 2001: 31), holy war served the needs of an existing drive to conquest and the colonisation or exploitation of lands occupied by non-Christians. In the case of the so-called ‘political’ Crusades of the thirteenth century, the theory of the crusade was put to the test in service of papal claims to political sovereignty in Christendom.

Were these campaigns ‘Crusades’ in the same sense as was understood of the expeditions to the East? Did those who undertook them assume that they were engaging in the same meritorious process, and did the leadership of the Church regard them as equal in merit? I leave questions of definition aside for two reasons: first, because contemporary attitudes to crusading were never frozen into a universally understood set of terms – the terminology of crusading was inexact and fluid, at least until the late thirteenth century – and second, because the arenas of conflict in which crusading terminology came to be applied were geographically and historically different. What marked out the Crusades discussed in this chapter from those

in the rest of the book was that they were either existing conflicts, or potential conflicts that would in all probability have continued, even if the events of 1095 had never taken place. The forms of such conflict, the rhetoric and expectations of participants may have differed, but they were all essentially territorial wars that came to be defined by the application of a theological rationale. In the case of the Baltic Crusades, a further element was introduced in the form of conversion, because the native peoples of these regions were, unlike the Muslims of Spain, pagans rather than adherents of a religion that was generally considered an aberrant form of Christianity. The purpose of this chapter is twofold: first, to demonstrate how the language and ideas of crusading could be manipulated both by the papacy and by those doing the fighting; and second, to compare the results of crusading with respect to settlement and institutions of government in different regions.

The *Reconquista* in Spain, c.1057–1212

Before the First Crusade, the Iberian peninsula was the only part of Latin Christendom to have endured lasting conquest by the Islamic world. But although towns as far north as Barcelona and Santiago were sacked at the end of the tenth century, the period of conquest was largely over, and the political map fixed, by c.900. The dominant power in Spain was the khalifate of Cordoba, whose influence stretched into the foothills of the Pyrenees. Most Christians in Spain lived under Islamic rule; only in the valleys of the Pyrenees and the Basque regions of north-western Spain and Galicia did Christians exercise authority. Although these tiny regions – and especially the kingdom based in Oviedo under Alfonso III in the 880s – began to engage in aggressive warfare against the khalifate, it was the internal collapse of the khalifate of Cordoba in 1031, and the subsequent political vacuum in Spain, that made the *Reconquista* possible.

In the wake of the khalifate, independent Muslim states, known as ‘taifas’, emerged based on the major cities, such as Zaragoza, Valencia, Seville, Toledo and Badajoz. Because they had no institutional legitimacy in Islamic law, but relied on the strength of dynastic rulers, they were vulnerable as much to internal discontent as to external threat. Thus a system developed in the eleventh century according to which taifa rulers paid subsidies, known as ‘parias’, to stronger or more aggressive neighbours for protection – both from the neighbour himself and from other rivals, whether Christian or Muslim.

The Christian powers of northern Spain in the mid-eleventh century – León, Navarre, Aragon and the counties of Catalonia – though tiny in size, had nevertheless developed a military aristocracy and a military technique that made them dangerous to their larger Muslim neighbours. They were essentially geopolitical structures, with no basis in tribal or ethnic distinctions between Christian peoples under their rule. They could be divided and


reunited, as happened to León–Castile in the 1060s, or partitioned, as happened to Navarre. As elsewhere in early medieval Europe, kingship in Spain was fixed on the personality and possessions of a ruling dynasty.

By 1054, the early hegemony among the Christians of Navarre under Sancho Garcia III (1000–35) had given way to that of the kingdom of León–Castile, united by his son Fernando I. This was the first Christian power with the military capacity to intervene in Islamic affairs. In 1063 his raid into al-Andalus induced the taifas of Seville and Badajoz to begin paying him parias; such payments, naturally, enhanced his own military capacity. Fernando's heir, Alfonso VI, continued to raid into Islamic territory in order to acquire the wealth that would enable him to dominate his Christian rivals. Thus, for example, Granada paid him an annual tribute of 10,000 dinars. As the taifa ruler of Granada, 'Abd Allah, observed: 'I knew that the payment . . . protected me from his misdeeds, and was preferable to incurring losses and the ravaging of my country' (cited in McKay 1977: 18). The paria system enabled a Christian hegemony to be paid for out of Muslim wealth. In 1074, Alfonso VI enjoyed an annual income of 74,000 dinars from parias – incomparably more than could have been acquired from taxation of his subjects or the income from crown estates.

In 1076, two events assured Alfonso VI's supremacy among the Christians: the murder of Sancho Garcia IV of Navarre, who was pushed off a cliff in a bid for the throne by his brother and sister; and the parias paid by Zaragoza in return for colluding with that taifa's conquest of Valencia. The resources in coin and land, including the fertile Rioja valley taken from Navarre, enabled Alfonso VI to campaign in the south again in 1079–80, and to extend a protectorate over the taifa of Toledo. In 1083 he raided Seville, symbolically riding his horse into the Mediterranean to demonstrate his intended mastery of the peninsula. The surrender of Toledo in 1085, by arrangement with its ruler, al-Qadir, demonstrated not only his military strength but also his ability to redraw the political map, for al-Qadir was imposed on Valencia as a compensation, thus interfering with Zaragoza's conquest.

The annexation of Toledo not only increased León–Castile's size, but also added the largest and most cultivated city in Spain. But it had the effect of frightening the other taifas into inviting the Almoravid leader Yusuf from North Africa for their protection. Yusuf, who enjoyed an unofficial authority as a spiritual as well as a political leader, and his Almoravid successors, came over the next half-century to regard Spain as a natural extension of their African territory. The introduction of the Almoravids instilled a sense of Islamic identity into the taifas' resistance to Christian expansion. In 1086 Yusuf defeated Alfonso, in 1093–4 his cousin conquered the taifa of Badajoz, and in 1102 the Almoravids repulsed the Catalans at Lérida and captured Valencia.

Alfonso VI's death without a male heir, and the civil war that erupted as a result of the marriage between his daughter Urraca and Alfonso I of



Map 8.1 Iberian peninsula during the Reconquista, c. 1109.

Aragon, meant that León–Castile was, for the first quarter of the twelfth century, eclipsed as an active proponent of *Reconquista*. The struggle for power demonstrates how far the Christian kingdoms were from any sense of a united front against Islam in Spain, even along purely territorial lines. But it also shows how resilient León–Castile had become by 1100 that it was able to withstand such internal pressure without succumbing.

Meanwhile the initiative passed to Aragon. From its origin as a tiny state based on the Pyrenean town of Jaca, Aragon inched south through the valleys. If the state's independent survival was assured by the acquisition of Pamplona as its share of the partition of Navarre in 1076, the conquest of Huesca by Peter II in 1096 sealed a generation of accumulation and consolidation. The conquest doubled Aragonese territory and provided it with a city of some 2,000–3,000 souls – about three times the population of Jaca, Pamplona, or for that matter León. Alfonso I, 'the Battler', assured Aragonese greatness with his conquest of Zaragoza in 1119. Huesca doubled Aragon's size, but Zaragoza, together with its satellite cities such as Tudela, engorged it. The resources of Zaragoza made possible an extended *razzia* (raid) deep into al-Andalus in 1125–6.

Alfonso's death in 1134 led to an implausible but ultimately successful merger with the county of Barcelona. Alfonso had been married briefly and disastrously to Urraca of León–Castile, but the marriage had no issue, and he neither remarried nor produced any illegitimate heirs. In an astonishing gesture, he left his kingdom jointly to the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, the Hospitallers and the Templars. This impossible will was never enforced; instead, Alfonso VII of León–Castile grabbed Zaragoza, while Garcia Ramirez, a descendant of Sancho I, revived a tiny kingdom of Navarre based in Pamplona. But the Battler's younger brother, Ramiro Sanchez, who had become a monk at Huesca, emerged from his monastery, contracted a marriage with a daughter of William IX of Aquitaine, begat an heiress, Petronilla, and betrothed her to the heir of Barcelona, Ramón Berenguer IV. The dynastic future of his kingdom assured, he retired once more to his monastery, and was heard of no more.

The union of Aragon and Barcelona meant that in 1137, for the first time, there was now a Christian kingdom able to compete on equal terms with León–Castile. The county of Catalonia itself was more or less the creation of Ramón Berenguer, who moulded together a number of old Carolingian counties through marriage, diplomacy and fortunate bequests. At times it looked as though Catalonia's orientation would lead north and east, to Toulouse and southern France, rather than south, but Alfonso I's conquest of Zaragoza freed the cities of the Ebro plain for conquest or the payment of parias to Barcelona. Meanwhile an independent kingdom emerged in the west. The county of Portugal, consisting of the southern part of Galicia and Oporto, and briefly of Lisbon, was detached from León–Castile by Alfonso VI and bestowed on his daughters, Urraca and Teresa, and their spouses, Raymond and Henry of Burgundy. After Urraca's disputed accession to the

throne of León–Castile, Teresa managed to cling to enough of Portugal to pass on to her son Afonso Henriquez, who eventually assumed a crown (Reilly 1992: 201–4).

On the eve of the Second Crusade, therefore, three kingdoms had become dominant enough to represent Christian expansion in Iberia. Up to this point, the war of conquest had only fleetingly been coloured by anti-Islamic ideals. This is not to say that the *Reconquista* was not justified to contemporaries by religious rhetoric. Alfonso III of León had in the ninth century seen his war against the Muslims as part of the duty of a Christian monarch. But the ideal to which he aspired was the return of a dimly remembered Visigothic past, of which the expulsion of Islam was a by-product. In the eleventh century, when the *Reconquista* began to become a reality, Christian kings fought and schemed against each other quite as much as against the taifa kings.

The relationship between the *Reconquista* and holy war as preached by the papacy elsewhere in Christendom has been understood by historians partly in the light of their own political preoccupations. An earlier generation of Spanish scholars, such as the literary historian Menendez Pidal, writing in the 1930s–50s, believed that the defeat of Islam in Spain was the enactment of a Spanish religious and national destiny, and that the *Reconquista* began almost seamlessly as resistance to the Islamic conquest of the early eighth century; in other words, that there was a constant and inevitable struggle between two forces in the Iberian peninsula (Linehan 1992: 1–21). This is now largely seen as part of a set of ‘essentialist views of a medieval neo-gothic past as origin of the Spanish nation’ (Garcia-Guijarro 2016: 168). Such views, although originally developed by liberal nationalists in the nineteenth century, were welcomed by Franco’s authoritarian regime during and after the Spanish Civil War, but were rejected by a subsequent generation of archivally trained historians such as José Goñi Gaztambide, writing in 1958. For Goñi Gaztambide, the *Reconquista* before the late eleventh century was a quintessentially Hispanic phenomenon, emerging out of the specific political and social conditions that applied in the Iberian peninsula. Only in the later eleventh century, when it absorbed the characteristics of papally mandated holy war, did the *Reconquista* come to share the same goals and to be expressed in similar ways to crusading (Garcia-Guijarro 2016: 165–8). This argument was rejected in a seminal study by Richard Fletcher, who downplayed the religious element in the pre-twelfth century *Reconquista*, insisting instead that Christian–Muslim conflicts before this period were simply territorial wars. Furthermore, according to Fletcher, they might have remained so had external influences in the shape of papal reform, and the Cluniac promotion of pilgrimage to the shrine of St James at Compostela among the French knighthood, not introduced trans-Pyrenean ideas of holy war that brought a new aggression to Iberian Christian attitudes to Muslims (Fletcher 1987: 31–47). Although highly influential, this view has now itself been modified, and it is now recognised

both that religious ideals did play a role in early resistance to the Muslims in Spain – not least through the development of saints’ cults around the martyrs of Cordoba – and that huge social changes in the northern Christian kingdoms of the peninsula, that came to maturity in the eleventh century, were just as important in changing the character of the *Reconquista* as external influences (O’Callaghan 2003). It has recently been claimed, indeed, that:

[T]he crusade . . . contributed to Christian military conquests only in a subsidiary way . . . papal bulls or passing references in chronicles should not lead historians to think that it became the main element which made possible the great conquests of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

(Garcia Guijarro 2016: 167)

A radically different view, taking an opposite position by considering not the effect of crusading on the *Reconquista* but the effect of *Reconquista* in contributing to the formation of crusading, argues that without pre-existing Christian–Muslim conflict in the Iberian peninsula there would, in effect, have been no First Crusade (Chevedden 2008: 191–8).

A particularly useful example in testing these arguments is the career of Rodrigo Diaz Vivar, known as the Cid. Menendez Pidal interpreted the *Poem of the Cid*, a late twelfth-century source, as though it bore witness to the conditions of the eleventh century. The Cid, in his hands, became an authentic national hero of the *Reconquista*. In reality, however, the Cid was an ambitious operator of a type particularly recognisable in the eleventh-century Mediterranean, comparable to Bohemond or Roger I of Sicily (Fletcher 1987: 36). Exiled from León–Castile by Alfonso VI for exceeding his authority, the Cid took service with the taifa king of Zaragoza before conquering and establishing himself as autonomous ruler of Valencia. His achievement was based on the ruthless manipulation of religious and political rivalries, coupled with a tactical brilliance in warfare. There is very little in the *Poem*, in fact, that suggests any religious inspiration behind the Cid’s self-advancement. He was an outstandingly successful warlord in a golden age for freebooters in Spain, and the wealth he amassed from war is admiringly described in a passage in the *Poem* where he filled a boot with gold and silver and sent it as a gift to Santa Maria, Burgos, for masses to be said for his soul (Merwin 1959: 94–5).

Nevertheless, the eleventh-century period of the *Reconquista* opened the way for a series of wars that did come to be defined by crusading language, ideals and methods. Geography helped in some respects. Jaca, in Aragon’s heartland, lay at the foot of the only pass in the western Pyrenees negotiable for pilgrims en route to Santiago de Compostela. Aragon and Catalonia in particular were open to cross-Pyrenean influence. Whether Cluny, through its network of daughter-houses along the pilgrim route, was really as responsible for promoting holy war ideals as historians once thought, is far

from certain (Cowdrey 1973: 285–311; Constable 1997: 179–93); however, there is no doubt that Christian Spanish rulers were susceptible to monastic reforming initiatives. As early as 1149–53, Fernando I granted 1,000 dinars annually to Cluny, while Saint Victor, Marseilles, was a beneficiary in Catalonia, and Saint Pons de Thomières in Aragon. Personal contacts were crucial: for example, Bernard, archbishop of Toledo after 1085, was a Cluniac monk, and Alfonso VI's second wife was the niece of Abbot Hugh of Cluny (Reilly 1992: 66–7; but Linehan 1992: 174–5, 260–1 is more sceptical). Roman influence may have been more critical. In 1068, Sancho Ramirez, while on pilgrimage to Rome, offered his crown to the pope in a gesture of vassalage, one result of which was the replacement of the Mozarab rite by the Roman in Aragon, to be followed eventually by the same process in León–Castile. Alongside reform came the influence of papal interest in holy war. Alexander II encouraged Norman participation at the siege of Barbastro in 1064; Gregory VII proposed an expedition to Spain to be led by Ebles, count of Roucy, whose sister Sancho Ramirez had married, in 1073; although this came to nothing, French knights, including Duke Odo of Burgundy, fought at Tudela in 1086, and the capture of Huesca, in the same year as the first crusaders left for the East, was aided by the presence of the archbishop of Bordeaux and other southern French bishops.

Whether in these cases papal exertions were a tipping-point in delivering success is another matter: Barbastro, Tudela and Huesca were essentially Iberian campaigns. Similarly, although French knights had been involved in the *Reconquista* for a generation before the First Crusade, no crusade as such was preached in Spain until 1118, and even then the campaign in question, the siege of Zaragoza, would have taken place in any case. The pattern of expansion of each of the northern Christian kingdoms followed its own strategic logic, and had little if any direction from external sources. It could be argued that the involvement of French knights is no more significant of proto-crusading ideals than the activities of Normans in southern Italy: there was land and booty to be won, and kinship loyalties to be observed (Bull 1993: 86–96). Urban II had made a crucial distinction between the plenary indulgence granted to participants on the crusade to the East (1095–9) and that offered to those crusading in Spain: in his letter to the Catalan counts in 1096, he specified that remission of sins was extended to those who died, rather than to all participants. But the participation at Zaragoza of knights such as Gaston of Béarn, who had been on the First Crusade, suggests that contemporaries increasingly saw the *Reconquista* as an equivalent exercise, while that of Rotrou of Perche, a Norman, shows that its appeal was more than regional. Indeed Gelasius II's bull of 1118, though probably issued too close to the eventual fall of Zaragoza to have any effect on recruitment, appeared to recognise equivalence. Calixtus II's bull of 1123, emphasising that the *Reconquista* was to be seen as identical to wars against the Muslims in the East, may have been intended to clarify confusion among contemporaries as to the status of the Spanish wars (Riley-

Smith and Riley-Smith 1981: 73–4). The presence of Spanish clergy at papal councils is as significant as that of French knights in Spain; particularly so in the case of Oleguer, bishop of Tarragona, who was at Toulouse and Rheims in 1119, First Lateran in 1123 and Clermont in 1130, and who instituted the Templars in Catalonia in 1134 (Fletcher 1987: 43). The link between crusading to the East and military action against the Muslims in Spain was articulated in rather enigmatic fashion by the archbishop of Santiago da Compostela, Diego Gelmírez, in 1125, when he was serving as papal legate. In a letter, he wrote that a shorter and less difficult way to the Holy Sepulchre lay through Spain. What he meant was not the literal journey from western Christendom to Jerusalem but the route by which crusaders could attain their own personal salvation (O'Banion 2008: 383–95). It was the Second Crusade, however, that located the *Reconquista* firmly within the wider crusading context. The 1140s were in any case years in which further aggression against Muslim rulers in the Iberian peninsula had been precipitated by the collapse of the Almoravid regime. Moreover, the archbishop of Toledo was in Rome in 1145 when news of the fall of Edessa arrived, and may have been at Vézelay in 1146 when Alfonso Jordan, count of Toulouse, who was Alfonso VII's half-brother, took the cross. Eugenius III named Iberia as a target for crusade preaching in 1147, and both León–Castile and Aragon–Barcelona sought Genoese help for the conquests of Almería in 1147 and Tortosa in 1148. But the most spectacular result of crusading in Iberia was the capture of Lisbon by Afonso Henriquez and a mixed group of Flemish, German and English crusaders. Historians have traditionally attributed it to the coincidence of crusaders en route to the East by sea arriving in Portugal and being persuaded by the bishop of Oporto to take service under the king, but Phillips (1997: 485–97; and see now Phillips 2007: 136–67) and Livermore (1990: 1–16) have shown that Afonso Henriquez's campaign had been endorsed by Bernard of Clairvaux, and that Bernard may have recruited crusaders from Flanders and Germany for this venture during his preaching tour in 1146. The eye-witness account of the siege, *De expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, uses language strikingly similar to that of Eugenius III's bull *Quantum praedecessores* in the regulations made for the conduct of crusaders, and Cistercian influence may be detected in the provisions for weekly confessions and chapters for each shipload (David 2001: 56–7). Not all historians are convinced: Tyerman, for instance, argues that the *De expugnatione* lacks ideological coherence and resorts to old Augustinian justifications for warfare (1998: 17). Such distinctions are important, for if we accept that the siege of Lisbon was an integral part of the crusade preached in 1146, then there is no reason not to see Bernard's preaching of the Danish campaign against the Wends in the same light, and we are thus presented with a three-pronged attack against the enemies of Christendom, of which the campaign to the East was only a part. This, in any case, was the effect that a contemporary, Herman of Bosau, observed (Constable 1953:

213–79), though there is room for scepticism about the extent to which such a strategy was planned by the papacy, rather than being the result of Christian rulers jumping on a crusading bandwagon. At the same time as the Lisbon campaign was getting under way, a coalition between Alfonso VII of Castile and the Genoese resulted in the capture of Almería in October 1147. Although a subsequent campaign to capture Jaén failed, a third crusading success was the seizure of Tortosa, in Catalonia, by Ramón Berenguer IV, count of Barcelona, with Genoese help, in December 1148.

The death of Alfonso VII (1157) and partition of his kingdom into two – León and Castile – after his death, the increasing involvement of Aragon–Barcelona in the Languedoc in the later twelfth century, and the rise of the Almohads in Spain meant that the *Reconquista* ran out of steam. The northern kingdoms underwent a period of dynastic in-fighting. Enough had been done in the previous hundred years, however, to ensure that the Christian kingdoms would remain dominant: Muslim forces of Islam could win battles but without being able to occupy territory, whereas the Christians could suffer losses without having to yield territory. By the last quarter of the twelfth century, the Iberian peninsula had its own Military Orders, notably those of Calatrava, Santiago and Alcántara, and these did much to consolidate and defend territorial gains, taking over responsibilities that the crowns of León and Castile were unable to maintain.

In the early thirteenth century, however, the papal crusading vision once again embraced the Iberian peninsula. This was initially prompted by Pope Celestine III's reaction to a heavy defeat suffered by Alfonso VIII at the hands of the Almohads in 1195. Celestine, as papal legate to Spain, had personally taken the cross in 1155, but the resultant campaign on the Guadalquivir had been a failure. Then, in 1211, the Almohads shocked Christian Spain by capturing the headquarters of the Order of the Knights of Calatrava in La Mancha. The response was a massive preaching campaign throughout western Christendom and a coalition of the Christian kingdoms. The Christian victory at Las Navas de Tolosa (1212), which assured Christian hegemony over the peninsula, was the military result of a preaching campaign in northern France, Italy and Germany as well as Spain and Provence, which recruited almost 70,000 non-Spanish crusaders (O'Callaghan 2003: 66–76). Besides Alfonso VIII of Castile himself, Sancho VII of Navarre, Peter II of Aragon, the lay rulers of Provence and the archbishops of Bordeaux and Narbonne also took the cross. The internationalism of the campaign, while on the surface locating the *Reconquista* firmly within the papal vision of crusading, also revealed the particularism of the Spanish wars against the Muslims and the different conception of the crusade by Spanish and northern crusaders. The French, applying the same rules to this campaign as to any crusade, were disgusted by the toleration shown by the Spanish to their defeated Muslim enemies and their possessions – in particular the refusal to allow them to plunder reconquered Calatrava – and deserted en masse before the final victory (O'Callaghan 2003: 71). The strategic importance of Las

Navas de Tolosa was probably not as important as its significance in refocusing the energies of the Christian kingdoms on the idea of struggle for Christendom. The victory was celebrated by contemporary chroniclers widely across Europe, and it enabled Alfonso VIII to be able to claim, as he did on his coins and in his charters, to be 'the defender of Christendom' (Linehan 1992: 292–5).

The dissension at Las Navas points to one distinctive feature of the *Reconquista*: it was a war of domination over, rather than extermination of, Islam in Spain. Christian rulers were always prepared to allow a degree of self-determination to the defeated Muslims, because their aim was never to kill or expel them, but to rule over them. On the whole, this was also true of the Franks who settled in the Levant, though not necessarily of western crusaders to the East. Territorial conquest brought with it new lands and new wealth from captured towns, but also new populations that had to be absorbed into unfamiliar structures – in twelfth-century Aragon, for example, Muslims comprised 30–35 per cent of the population (McKay 1977: 37). The *Reconquista* essentially was the victory of a small rural society based on a military aristocracy over a largely urban one. Despite its relatively large number of towns, Spain was lightly settled even in the thirteenth century. Unlike England and France, it did not experience a dramatic increase in population and therefore there was little incentive to bring marginal lands into cultivation or to develop more efficient farming methods so as to exploit more land. Because manpower was always short, rulers offered privileged conditions of settlement in newly conquered areas: in the 1170s, for example, settlers in the Ebro valley were offered exemption from taxation by the Aragonese crown. This meant that the *Reconquista* extended the conditions of a frontier society over increasingly large parts of the peninsula. Most of the colonists who settled in newly conquered regions, for example, were smallholders, and Spain thus retained the character of fairly small estates held 'in chief' of a lord without becoming fragmented by the demands of land shortage. The emergence of a Christian nobility in the north was also to some extent shaped by the demands of the frontier. Because war was endemic, military service was one route to nobility. One of the themes expressed in the *Poem of the Cid* is social mobility: after the fall of Valencia to the Cid, 'Those who had been on foot now became *caballeros*. And the gold and silver – who could count it?' (Merwin 1959: 128–9). The Cid himself, though of noble birth, was not of the highest nobility, but proved the greater value of knights who earned nobility through military service than worthless heirs of great families.

Just as the Crusader States in the East had their indigenous Christian populations, reconquered Spain had its Mozarabs – Christians who lived under Islamic rule. On the eve of the First Crusade, these greatly outnumbered those living in the Christian kingdoms. The Mozarabs, largely isolated from religious developments across the Pyrenees, had developed a monastic tradition, liturgy and art of their own. One aspect of the *Reconquista*

was the relentless imposition of the Roman rite on the Spanish Church, a process that accompanied military aid. By the 1070s León–Castile, Aragon and Catalonia had all accepted the Roman rite, and despite the resistance of the Mozarabs of Toledo, the appointment of a Cluniac, Bernard, to the archbishopric after its conquest by Alfonso VI made the further extension of Roman conformity inevitable. As the territorial expansion of the north into the rest of the peninsula acquired a more religious character, colonisation tended to be accented by the rhetoric of reform. Thus one of the beneficiaries of the cheap new lands available in the twelfth century was the Cistercian Order, whose first foundation at Fitero in 1140 was swiftly followed by two others in Catalonia and another in Portugal before 1153. The Cistercians, and likewise the Military Orders, who thrived as frontier settlers, were a conduit for the flow of papal influence, and thus for the absorption of the Mozarabs into mainstream Roman Christianity (Linehan 1992: 261–4).

The *Reconquista* continued to attract crusaders and crusading privileges until the end of the Middle Ages. Despite the virtual dominance enjoyed by James I of Aragon and Frederick III of Castile over the peninsula in the thirteenth century, the *Reconquista* remained incomplete. Quasi-feudal status was imposed on the remaining Muslim rulers of al-Andalus, a region that could not be subdued by military conquest until the fifteenth century. Indeed, al-Andalus remained well into the fourteenth century a foothold from which the Marinid rulers of North Africa could still cause concern in Spain, as for example in 1275, when Alfonso X of Castile was defeated by Abu Yusuf Ya'qub, and the siege of the Muslim city of Algeciras in 1342–4 attracted crusaders from all over Europe, at a time when recruitment for Crusades to the East was proving more difficult.

The 'political' Crusades of the thirteenth century

The label 'political crusade', though it enjoys widespread currency among crusader historians, begs certain questions about how we, and about how contemporaries, understand the term. As has been remarked, all Crusades were political, in so far as they all aimed at the conquest of territory (Strayer 1962: 343–4). Moreover, a sharp distinction between one 'type' of crusade and another is impossible for the period before crusading had an institutional apparatus. However, some holy wars preached or sponsored by the papacy from the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries were ostensibly 'political' in the sense that they had aims that could only by some rhetorical justification be said to fulfil the spiritual mission of the Church. Popes from Gregory VII onward sometimes made such justifications, and offered spiritual incentives for those who engaged in such wars on their behalf – what else, after all, could they offer? As the conceptual and legal apparatus of crusading developed, it was natural that those spiritual incentives should conform to the privileges offered to crusaders. It was not until the very end of the twelfth

century, however, that a pope for the first time made an explicit parallel between a war in defence of papal rights and war against the Muslims.

Popes, like all rulers, maintained their political position through a series of alliances. Throughout the twelfth century, they could normally count on the opposition of the emperor to the Norman kings of Sicily, whose legitimacy they denied. But Frederick Barbarossa had married his heir, Henry VI, to the king of Sicily's sister Constance. The match was probably intended as little more than a diplomatic gesture, but William II of Sicily died in 1189 and Henry pressed his claim to Sicily in his wife's name, a claim given greater weight by the birth of an heir, Frederick, in 1194. It must have looked in 1197 as though Henry's premature death had left all the cards in the hands of the papacy; but the emperor had shown great foresight. In a masterstroke of *realpolitik*, he left his heir as a ward of the papacy. By recognising that Sicily was a papal fief, he publicly forced Innocent to defend Frederick's interests, thus reversing the support that Innocent's predecessor had given to the rival claimant Tancred of Lecce. As Sayers has observed (1994: 83), Innocent had little choice but to behave as a feudal overlord, which meant mobilising armies in defence of his ward against Henry VI's regent, Markward von Anweiler. Markward invaded Sicily in 1199 and took the young heir under his protection – in fact, as a hostage against papal attempts to impose overlordship. It was in some ways analogous to the struggle between the papacy and Barbarossa in northern Italy in the 1160s–70s, in so far as the papal aim was to prevent the extension of imperial influence in Italy. In a letter of 1199, Innocent threw the weight of crusading rhetoric into the struggle, denouncing Markward as 'another Saladin' – on the grounds that he had won over the Muslims of western Sicily – and claiming that he was hindering efforts to mount a crusade to the East (Kennan 1971: 231–51). Some troops, under the leadership of the French noble Walter of Brienne, were recruited under a form of plenary indulgence. Although the expedition came to nothing in the end, an important precedent had been set in Innocent's willingness to apply the language of crusading to conflict in an arena that – despite his sophistry – really had nothing to do with the expeditions he had launched against the Muslims in 1198.

It is instructive to contrast the speed with which Innocent adopted crusading parallels in the campaign against Markward – even if in fact he used the 'barest minimum' of resources (Strayer 1962: 346) – with the length of time that elapsed before he preached a crusade against the Cathars and their supporters: in 1209, after all, the Cathar problem had been recognised for thirty years. Innocent regarded control over territory in Italy, and suzerainty over Sicily, as essential for the survival of the papacy as a political institution. The case of Markward, however, was more significant as a precedent than for anything it achieved; and that precedent was not to be followed for forty years.

Although Gregory IX in the 1230s raised armies to clear the papal territories of central Italy of ghibellines (imperial supporters), he stopped

short of using the same terminology as that for the crusade to the East, or even of offering the same indulgence. Frederick II was guilty of threatening the Church's liberty, and thus, in the papacy's view, lost his claim to the fidelity of its subjects, but the pope did not deny the emperor's right to rule over the lands for which he had been anointed. It is significant that the first mention of a crusade came only in 1240, when Frederick's army threatened Rome itself (Strayer 1962: 351). Crusade preachers were then commissioned in Milan and Germany, and in 1241, Gregory specified that the same indulgence be offered for those who took the cross against the Hohenstaufen as for those who went to the Holy Land. Hungarians who had taken the cross were even told not to go to the East, but to join the papal armies instead (Strayer 1962: 352) – surprisingly, perhaps, given that in 1238 Gregory had written to the king of Hungary and the archbishop of Esztergom emphasising the need to convert the pagan Cumans, and had granted limited indulgences for those who took part in war against them (Rist 2009: 81–3). The defence of Rome against an aggressive emperor could be identified as a crusade, because crusading rhetoric from Clermont onward, and canon law in its wake, had always seen the wars against the Muslims as essentially defensive wars to protect land that in theory belonged to Christians. If the Holy Land was the patrimony of Christ, Rome was the patrimony of St Peter. Both Gregory IX (1227–41) and Innocent IV (1243–54), moreover, argued that any lay ruler who hindered, or even refused to help, the 'business of the Holy Land', was guilty of a crime against Christian society itself (Weiler 2003: 9–10).

How did contemporaries receive such arguments? In England at least, there was opposition to papal demands for subsidies from clerical incomes to pay for the crusade, and the fact that arrears were still arriving several years later is as eloquent as Matthew Paris' reasoned rejection of the papal case against the emperor (Siberry 1985: 132–8). It is unlikely that the grant of a twentieth promised by the French clergy all reached its intended destination (Strayer 1962: 353), and in Germany, where crusade preaching was targeted most extensively, the emperor forbade the clergy to pay anything. At first sight it seems curious that crusade preaching was concentrated so heavily in Germany, but it was here that lay the papacy's best chance of loosening Frederick's grip on the imperial throne. After the First Council of Lyons (1245), the papal legate preached successfully in the north-west of the empire, where the anti-king William of Holland was active. Italian participation was determined by local and feudal relations, while Louis IX's crusade to Egypt, for which he took the cross in 1244, preoccupied potential crusaders from France.

At the root of the popes' problems throughout the 1240s, however, lay not so much opposition in principle – although this was certainly expressed by some – but rather the unwieldiness of the crusade as a means of winning the war against the Hohenstaufen. This was a war of attrition, in which Frederick had no intention of committing himself in the field against a papal

army, but preferred to reduce the guelf (papalist) towns in central and northern Italy one by one (Waley 1961: 142–53). Individual campaigns, such as William of Holland's capture of Aachen in 1248, featured *crucesignati*. But crusade preaching had always presupposed a campaign with clearly defined limits and a firm objective, and the war against the Hohenstaufen had neither. Moreover, Innocent IV wavered about the relative place of his war against Frederick in the wider context of crusading. Although canon lawyers regarded the crusade against internal enemies of the papacy as equally valid to those against Muslims (Russell 1975: 205; Tyerman 1998: 38), Innocent was reluctant to let crusading vows taken anywhere outside Germany – even by William of Holland's subjects in Frisia – be commuted to service against the Hohenstaufen.

The crusade launched by Innocent III against the Cathar heretics set a different precedent, but one that was to become relevant to 'political' Crusades. The Third Lateran Council of 1179, which sought to tackle the increasing problem of heresy, offered indulgences to those who defended Christendom against heretics (Tanner 1990: 216). The experience of the Albigensian Crusade taught the Church that it was easier to attack those who supported or provided a home for heretics than it was to identify and make war against heresy itself. Thus, for example, in 1212 Innocent III threatened the use of force against the Milanese on the grounds that they had let Cathars have free rein in the city, just as in the Languedoc the lands of lords who failed to prevent the spread of Catharism were subject to confiscation. In Italy, as Housley has observed, there was a strong link between heterodoxy and anti-papalism, with the result that heresy often had political overtones (1982a: 193–4). Heretics, persecuted by the Church, naturally found common cause with ghibelline opponents of the papacy, while in turn the imperial cause became identified by guelfs as 'heretical', or supportive of heresy, even though the Hohenstaufen themselves were entirely orthodox. The ghibelline Ezzelino of Romano, for example, pursued blatantly anti-clerical policies, seizing Church property and taxing the clergy. He also defied the Inquisition and harboured Cathars, though there is no evidence that he himself was a Cathar. But the pope could treat him as one on the grounds that whoever was not with him was against him (Housley 1982a: 199–200). In the 1230s indulgences were offered to groups of laity who had formed into anti-heretical confraternities, such as the Society of the Blessed Virgin in Milan, or the Militia of Jesus Christ in Parma. In Florence in 1245, the Dominican inquisitor turned his pursuit of Cathars to the political advantage of the papacy by citing the ghibelline *podestà* of the city as a defender of heretics; in defending him, a ghibelline mob thus aligned itself with the Cathars.

The crusade against the Hohenstaufen did not end with Frederick II's death in 1250, but it changed significantly in nature. After 1254, when Frederick's heir Conrad IV died, the focus of attention turned to Sicily, where the emperor's illegitimate son Manfred was proving to be an effective ruler.

Now it was possible to preach a crusade with a clear objective – the conquest of Sicily. Full crusading indulgences were extended to support the offer of the throne of Sicily to the junior members, first of the English, then the French royal houses. In 1255 Henry III was allowed to commute his crusading vow for the Holy Land to the campaign against Manfred. In the same year Pope Alexander IV preached a crusade against the ghibelline Ezzelino of Romano in Lombardy.

In contrast to the sparing use of the crusade indulgence by Gregory IX and Innocent IV, subsequent popes turned to it instinctively. Urban IV, who in the words of one historian ‘perfected the technique of the political crusade’ (Strayer 1962: 363), was particularly lavish. In 1263 he offered a full crusading indulgence to Charles of Anjou – and with it the fruits of a tenth on French clerical incomes – for his conquest of Sicily; in the same year he also preached Crusades against ghibellines in Sardinia, and against the Byzantine Empire. After Manfred’s death in battle against Charles in 1266, the crusade was preached once again in 1268 when Frederick II’s grandson Conradin tried to claim his Italian inheritance. Yet it is important to note that in the papal discourse promoting these campaigns, the Holy Land still has a central place. Even if it were treated as empty rhetoric – and it is far from certain that it was – Popes Alexander IV in 1255, 1259 and 1263, Gregory X in the 1270s and Boniface VIII in 1302 justified such use of the crusade indulgence in support of political protégés on the grounds that it benefited the cause of the recovery of the Holy Land (Weiler 2003: 10–11).

The extension of crusade privileges into the arena of secular politics made it possible for rulers to carry out their political ambitions under the guise of a crusade. Because a ruler who took the cross was granted a subsidy from clerical incomes in his kingdom, there was great incentive to do so. Charles of Anjou proved especially skilled at using crusading vows as an instrument of policy. From his conquest of Sicily in 1266 onward, he tried continually to use his crusade vow to mount an invasion of the restored Byzantine Empire. Between 1271 and 1280 his ambition was stifled by the insistence of Gregory X and Nicholas III that the Holy Land should take priority, but with the election of a French pope, Martin IV, in 1281, he was granted a crusading privilege for his conquest. Officially, this was for a war in defence of the Holy Land, but at least one contemporary observer, the Sicilian Bartholomew of Neocastro, was not convinced, sneering that the cross Charles bore was not Christ’s, but that of the unrepentant thief (Strayer 1962: 369–70).

Perhaps the most far-fetched use of the crusade privilege in support of a political objective came about as a result of the revolt against his rule, known as the Sicilian Vespers, that ended Charles’ dream of a new Mediterranean empire. The revolt, carried out by the largely Greek-speaking Sicilians, was fomented by a secret alliance between Michael VIII Paleologus, the Byzantine emperor, and Peter III of Aragon, who had a claim to the Sicilian throne through his marriage to Manfred’s daughter (Runciman 1958b:

201–13). In retaliation for the revolt, Pope Martin IV preached a crusade against Aragon, which was undertaken in 1285 – disastrously, as it turned out – by Philip III of France. The purpose of the crusade, from the papal point of view, was to prevent Peter from seizing the Sicilian throne, and thus to protect the papal protégé, Charles. The rationale was that only if his throne were secure could Charles' proposed crusade to the East be salvaged, and thus the crusade against Aragon was, indirectly, a contribution towards the longed-for crusade to save the Holy Land. But although Philip III seems to have taken the crusade quite seriously as a religious obligation, there was by 1285 no longer any prospect of an Angevin crusade to the Holy Land – if, indeed, there had ever been one – because all Charles' resources were needed in the attempt to save his throne.

The result of the papacy's use of the crusade to further its aims in Italy during the course of the thirteenth century must be analysed on different levels. The Sicilian Vespers produced a kingdom of Sicily partitioned between Angevins and Aragonese, with the result that there was no single power in Italy strong enough to threaten the papal states. Especially when combined with the turmoil that followed the end of Hohenstaufen rule in Germany, this was an outcome that would have satisfied papal policy since Innocent III. Financially, however, the 'political Crusades' were a disaster, for once the precedent had been set for kings who had taken the cross to collect subsidies from clerical incomes, there was nothing to prevent a king from taking the cross, collecting the tax and using it for whatever immediate purpose he needed, then regretting that he had run out of money and was unable to fulfil his vow. The original idea of funding Crusades through clerical taxation was sensible, but it depended for its credibility on transparency – not only kings, but popes also were prone to raising money for one purpose and spending it on another. More intangibly, papal authority was weakened as a result of popes' involvement in warfare in Italy. The 'political Crusades' recruited well on certain occasions, but they were generally unpopular if only because the cause of the Holy Land remained popular, and critics could see that the one detracted from the other. By c.1300 the German Empire could no longer claim leadership of Christendom, but its heir was the crown of France, not the see of St Peter. When attempts were made in the first half of the fourteenth century to launch Crusades against the Turks, it was the French king who pulled the strings.

The northern Crusades

The first indication that the papacy would come to regard the wars waged by Scandinavians and Germans against the pagan peoples of the Baltic coastal regions as Crusades came in 1147, when St Bernard persuaded Pope Eugenius III that the German campaign against the Wends was a holy war for the conversion of non-Christians and the extension of Christendom, and thus analogous to the situation in Spain. This was in effect the recognition

of a *fait accompli*. Bernard had found, while touring Germany to preach the crusade to the East, that the northern Germans were much more interested in the Wendish campaign than in Edessa, and the bull *Divina dispensatione*, issued in October 1146, thus looks rather like a rationalisation of the refusal of some Christian knights to toe the line, by finding a religious justification for a war of territorial conquest that would have taken place in any case. In many respects the bull echoed the words and ideas of *Quantum praedecessores*, the bull previously issued (in December 1145 and at Easter 1146) for the expedition to the East; certainly this seems to have been the case as far as spiritual benefits were concerned, although those taking the cross against the Wends did not enjoy the same temporal privileges. The main difference, however, was that *Divina dispensatione* overtly stated the conversion to Christianity of the pagans as an aim of the expedition. Most, though not all, historians have seen this as the proclamation of a 'missionary war', albeit one for the defence of Christendom (Fonnesberg-Schmidt 2007: 32–3; but see Lotter 1989: 268–306).


Such justifications were far from new; nor were the wars. Carolingian and Ottonian attempts at the conquest of pagans to their north-east had been accompanied by mass conversion of the defeated enemy. By the beginning of the twelfth century missions to convert the Wends had been established. The impetus for the conversion of the pagan Slavs of the Baltic owed much to monastic reforming impulses of the time (Fonnesberg-Schmidt 2007: 48–52). At the same time, raids into pagan territory continued, as part of the process by which the north German aristocracy sought new lands for exploitation. In 1140–3 a group of north German nobles drove the Wendish chieftain from his base, and a bishopric was established at Oldenburg. This was the first time that the traditional Wendish structures of authority had been displaced, and therefore marks the beginning of an era of conquest.

The Danes and Germans on whose behalf St Bernard obtained the bull may have been gratified to secure an indulgence for their expedition of 1148, but it is doubtful whether Bernard's exhortation to continue the crusade until all the pagans were converted or killed suited their intentions. They wanted to colonise and exploit the conquered lands and people, rather than devastate them. The crusade comprised four separate armies: those of Henry the Lion, duke of Saxony, which joined with a Danish contingent in attacking the Wendish stronghold, Dobin; an army led by Albert, count of Brandenburg, and a Polish contingent. The Saxon–Danish force forced the surrender of Dobin and the token baptism of Nyklot, the Wendish prince, and his warriors. The other force was less successful, besieging Demmim without success and raiding pagan lands. Nyklot seems to have returned to his native paganism soon after the departure of the crusaders.

Perhaps because the Wendish crusade of 1148 failed in the objective of conversion, the papacy appeared to lose interest in the northern wars against pagans. There was neither papal preaching nor indulgence for a generation, until Alexander III's bull *Non parum animus* (1172) placed the war against

the Estonian and Finnish pagans on the same level as that in the Holy Land. Even this may have been an initiative originating not with the papacy but with Eskil, the former bishop of Lund, who was at the time in exile in France (Fonnesberg-Schmidt 2007: 55–61). In some ways *Non parum animus* marked a step back from the Baltic by Alexander III, since he granted crusaders against the pagan Estonians only one year's remission of sin – the same as for a pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre – rather than the plenary indulgence granted in *Quoniam praedecessores*. Furthermore, temporal privileges for crusaders in the North did not match those for the East. Yet the subjugation of pagans by Saxons and Danes continued, and continued to be understood by contemporaries in religious terms. Saxo Grammaticus, the Danish chronicler, praised Absalom, bishop of Roskilde (1158–92) and Lund (1178–1202), for his military prowess, 'for it is no less religious to repulse the enemies of the faith than to uphold its ceremonies' (Christiansen 1980: 61). Self-defence, that necessary component of the just war, was another justification. Saxo's chronicle, the *Gesta Danorum* (1185–1215), which portrays the development of the Danish state as a product of an epic struggle with paganism, justifies King Valdemar's conquest of Rügen as retaliation for Wendish raids on Danish shipping. What may appear today as the cynical manipulation of pious sentiment was in fact more complex. It would be wrong to imagine, for example, that contemporaries thought their wars against non-Christians freed them from any concern about the fate of the Holy Land. Henry the Lion, duke of Saxony, made an armed pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1171 – only a year before Alexander III's bull recognised the Danish war in Estonia in *Non parum animus* (Phillips 1996: 214). Pope Celestine III (1191–98) showed considerable interest in the Livonian mission field, but for the chronicler Arnold of Lübeck (before 1210) this was to be linked with lack of opportunities in the East. Thus he attributed papal support for the expedition launched against the Livonians by Berthold, bishop of Üxküll (1197–8), to the breakdown of the projected German Crusade to the Holy Land of 1197, following the death of Emperor Henry VI (Fonnesberg-Schmidt 2007: 69–70).

One reason why the northern Crusades have received relatively little attention from crusader historians is that Scandinavian and Baltic historians themselves have until recently been reluctant to see them as part of the same impulse that governed the wars against Muslims in the Near East. The historiographical tradition has instead traditionally preferred socio-economic explanations for the conquest of the non-Christian Baltic, perhaps in reaction to earlier generations of German nationalist historians who saw in the northern Crusades the manifest destiny of a superior against inferior peoples (Johnson 1975: 547). In the past ten years, however, historians from Scandinavia, northern and eastern Europe have integrated the study of warfare, conversion and settlement in the medieval Baltic more deeply into crusading studies, with the result that the way the Crusades themselves are viewed has become enriched. One result is the reappraisal of the role of



Map 8.2 The Baltic Crusades.

conversion as a factor in the dealings of German and Scandinavian crusaders, preachers and settlers in the region (Murray 2001; Eihmane 2009: 37–52). Crusaders and settlers in the East were largely unconcerned about the conversion of Muslims who came under their rule, but the issues of conquest in the East were clearer because of the universally held conviction that the Holy Land was rightfully a Christian possession. Nobody could argue that the pagans of the Baltic had taken land that was rightfully Christian, which meant that vengeance, one of the justifications that has been identified with regard to crusading to the East (Throop 2011), had no place initially in the mentality of crusaders to the Baltic. Moreover, the theoretical justification for the conquest of pagan lands was unclear.

On the other hand, the conversion of pagan peoples provided a different kind of justification for conquest, and for the removal of authority from pagan rulers. In the hands of a prelate such as Archbishop Anders Sunesen of Lund (1201–22), conversion activities in the Baltic could plausibly be linked with the new energies inspiring the growth of pastoral theology and the regeneration of the faith of ordinary people in the pontificate of Innocent III. Innocent at first further refined the underlying justification for the crusade by articulating violence as – in the last resort – a necessity in defence of the mission and of new converts. By 1209, however, he was entrusting King Valdemar II of Denmark explicitly with the task of extirpating paganism and converting pagans. A further justification developed at the beginning of the thirteenth century with the claim that Livonia came under the protection of the Blessed Virgin Mary: a claim made and promulgated by the chronicler Henry of Livonia. One historian has argued that this claim enabled German and Danish crusaders to give the mission field the same status as the Holy Land (Jensen 2009: 147–8).

Crusading policy towards the defeated pagan leaders underwent changes. Henry the Lion had at first followed a policy of dispossessing the Wendish aristocracy in order to force the colonised people directly under Saxon rule, but a revolt in 1164 led to the establishment of a puppet ruler, Pribislav, who had converted to Christianity in 1160 (Christiansen 1980: 68–70). In contrast, King Valdemar I of Denmark, after his conquest of Pomerania in 1185, was content to leave the native prince of Riga in place as a tributary. Both missionary bishops and Christian rulers realised that the conversion of a pagan population was easier to accomplish if the local ruler of that population set the example. Once this happened, there was little incentive to undertake wholesale conversion. In this respect, the northern Crusades differed little from those in the East, or for that matter from the *Reconquista* in Spain. However, as the Christian presence in the Baltic lands increased in the thirteenth century and beyond, cracks in its unity opened up. Competition and rivalry between the major crusading powers, the Danes and Germans, and between the authority of the bishopric of Riga and the Military Orders, became a feature of the Christian establishment in north-eastern Europe. Just as the western settlers in the Levant were prone on occasion to employ

neighbouring Muslim powers as allies against Christian rivals, so pagans might be called upon as allies against one or other Christian power. This happened in the early fourteenth century, when the bishopric of Riga sought assistance from pagan Lithuanians in its struggle with the Teutonic Knights. Indeed, the notion of 'the Baltic pagans' as a single warring group opposing the crusaders, an idea that became popular among Baltic nationalist historians in the nineteenth century, is no longer sustainable (Eihmane 2009: 45–9). The beliefs, rites and languages of the indigenous Baltic people were regional, and there was thus no underlying unity linking them based on ideology or belief system. Furthermore, the crusaders' tactics of forced military mobilisation of pagans who had become subject to Christian rule – as happened to the Livs and Letts on many occasions between 1206 and 1226 (Eihmane 2009: 47) – served to split them further. In some respects as far as indigenous people were concerned, the crusaders became simply another factor in an already complex web of rivalries among Lithuanians, Livs, Letts and Estonians. Just as in the East and Iberia, the Military Orders established a strong presence in the Baltic. Their role here, however, was to be far more controversial. The Teutonic Knights, founded with the patronage of Henry VI from those German knights left in Palestine after the siege of Acre in 1191, were modelled on the Templars. Like the other large Military Orders, their primary commitment was to the Holy Land; unlike them, their strong links to the German imperial throne also drew them to Prussia and Livonia, where the German colonial presence was strong. It was not until the second half of the thirteenth century, however, that the Teutonic Knights began to focus on the north as an area of military activity, rather than simply as a resource from which men and income could be drawn and redirected towards the Holy Land. The shift in emphasis came about partly as the Crusader States in the East became more precarious, but also because of the composition of the Order. The recruits themselves were Germans, and as the frontiers of German-held territory spread to the east of the Elbe, so also did the catchment area from which the recruits were drawn. The Teutonic Knights were pre-empted, however, by two Orders specifically founded as the private armies of colonising bishops – the Sword Brothers in Riga, founded by Albert of Buxhövdén, bishop of Riga, in 1202, and the Knights of Dobrin, founded by the Cistercian Christian of Prussia in 1206. Both German and Danish military activity in the Baltic, particularly in the thirteenth century, was driven by commercial pressures. The defence of Riga, a German trading centre, lay at the heart of these Orders' activities. Above all, the Orders provided a permanent garrison of knights who could, as Christiansen observed, sit out the winter year after year (1980: 81). Both the Sword Brothers and the Knights of Dobrin were eventually absorbed by the Teutonic Knights. The Sword Brothers had acquired a particularly unsavoury reputation. In 1205–6, during the first phase of conquest, even a peaceful attempt to convert the Livs by performing a Nativity play failed when the natives were terrified by the realism of the scene telling the story of the

Massacre of the Innocents. In 1222 they were rebuked by Honorius III, and in 1230 the papal legate recommended that Gregory IX suppress them altogether, in retaliation for which the Brothers captured and imprisoned him (Christiansen 1980: 94, 102). Their methods in dealing with the local population were so harsh that the colonists they were supposed to be protecting were frequently threatened by revolt.

Between c.1200 and 1292, the territory added to Latin control in the Baltic had extended up to 300 miles east of its previous frontier at Danzig, and comprised as many as a million new inhabitants. The Livonians, who had been tributaries of the Lithuanians and the Russians of Novgorod, were conquered with the help of crusading indulgences offered in 1195 and 1198, initially by Hartwig, archbishop of Bremen, then by his nephew Albert of Buxhövden and his Sword Brothers. The mission to the Prussians, begun in c.1200, turned into conquest by the Teutonic Knights, but this was completed only by c.1272, and only after Urban IV had diverted a German crusade against the Mongols to help them. Further to the north, the conquest of Estonia was a Danish preserve. The crusading tradition of Valdemar I was followed by Cnut VI (1187–1202) and Valdemar II (1202–41), and in 1218 Honorius III granted the Danes whatever they could conquer from the Estonians. The key to Danish success, not only against the indigenous pagans but also in their rivalry with Sweden for the north-west coast, lay in their command of the Baltic Sea. Unlike German expansion to the east, Danish expeditions were controlled by the crown, and conquests treated as economic investments. There was little Danish settlement, and the purpose of Danish involvement was to secure trading privileges so as to control the supply of furs, amber and timber from the north-east (Jensen 2001: 164–79). Rivalry between German and Danish crusaders is evident throughout the pages of Henry of Livonia's chronicle. He was sceptical about Danish missionary efforts, accusing them of being content to let Albert of Buxhövden and his clergy do the hard work and then claiming the results themselves (Eihmane 2009: 40–1). In the thirteenth century, after Livonia had been largely converted, and the main focus of mission had moved to Lithuania, further causes of division arose from disagreements between the bishops, the Military Orders and the newly founded towns.

Swedish activity in the eastern Baltic, not unlike Danish, was a means of supplementing the crown's income. Swedes settled in western Finland throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but although Innocent III authorised the conversion of the Finns in 1209 and placed them under the guidance of the archbishop of Lund, it was impossible to find a suitable candidate as bishop. The Swedes also came up against the entrenched interests of Novgorod; in 1240 Alexander Nevsky defeated a Swedish crusade intended to assimilate the pagan Tavastians of eastern Finland by force. This was a blatantly economic conflict, as Novgorod sought to preserve its monopoly over the Karelian fur trade. Similarly, the Swedish kings Eric XI in 1249 and Birger I in 1292 secured indulgences for Crusades

whose intention was to protect Swedish trade routes. Swedish kings had little intention of occupying land, and unsurprisingly, the knighthood was disinclined to settle in lands so barren and frozen for much of the year. However, a religious principle was at stake, at least as far as the papacy was concerned. If the Russians succeeded in dominating the Finns, they would become absorbed into Orthodox Christianity, and linked by the great rivers via Novgorod and Kiev to Constantinople. This explains why popes were prepared to treat Swedish economic wars as Crusades, and why the mixed communities of Latins and Orthodox that had coexisted in Baltic trading centres such as Novgorod, Riga and Gotland became unsustainable. The logic that governed the dominance of the Greek Orthodox under Latin rule in the Mediterranean was also applied to the North; thus, in 1222 Honorius III forbade observance of the Greek rite in Latin-controlled regions. After the Byzantine reconquest of Constantinople in 1261, the lines were drawn even more clearly (Nielsen 2009: 227–52).

The character of the northern Crusades, particularly in Wendish Pomerania, Prussia and Livonia, was determined by the conviction that the continued existence of paganism was a genuine threat to Christianity. Pagans, just as much as Muslims, were the forces of darkness. This belief, which at the beginning of the crusading period appears largely eschatological, acquired increasingly theoretical justification in the hands of thirteenth-century canonists. If the lands and possessions of heretics were subject to confiscation by Christians, why not also those of pagans? By the mid-thirteenth century the canonist Hostiensis could argue that pagans, by their refusal to accept manifest truth, had lost their rights to liberty, and that it was the obligation of Christendom to subjugate them (Muldoon 1979: 15–18).

There were also practical and political reasons why, at certain times, the papacy found it convenient to offer indulgences or to sanction conquest in the North. Many Germans had taken the cross for a crusade to the Holy Land in the 1190s but were left stranded by the death of Henry VI; given the succession crisis in the empire, it was unlikely that their vows would be fulfilled unless they could be commuted to parallel service. Especially after the conflict with the Hohenstaufen intensified from the 1230s onward, the Teutonic Knights became the beneficiaries of the papacy's desire to outbid the emperor for their support. Although Prussia was claimed by the papacy in a bull of 1234, Gregory IX and his successors feared that the attempt to enforce it would alienate a powerful Order that could be enlisted by the emperor in Italy.

Innocent III's concept of papal primacy made intervention in the northern world irresistible. The thirteenth century saw not only Crusades against the pagans of the Baltic, but also the heightened activity of papal legates – among them James Pantaleon, legate to Prussia in 1247–9, who was later to become patriarch of Jerusalem and ultimately pope as Urban IV. Another of the most prominent legates was Baldwin of Aulne, a Cistercian sent to Livonia during the period 1231–4. As in frontier regions from Spain to Scotland to the

eastern Mediterranean, the foundation of Cistercian monasteries was a crucial feature of Latin expansion. The Cistercians, like the legates and the friars, were instruments of theocratic government, but conquest and mission did not always converge. Legates and friars all disputed the Military Orders' claims to sovereignty in conquered lands. The Teutonic Knights' suzerainty in Livonia was checked by the presence of the Dominicans and Franciscans; indeed, the Dominican Master-General Humbert of Romans urged the papacy to abandon all support for their conquests in 1274.

Although such disputes were aligned along institutional lines, this may be misleading. German settlement and colonisation in particular had a family character. The work of the initiator of the Livonian conquest, Hartwig of Bremen, was continued by his nephew, Albert, bishop of Riga, who from 1204 onward returned to Germany annually to recruit knights from his family's *mouvance*. One of Albert's brothers became abbot of a new Cistercian foundation in Livonia, a brother-in-law was enfeoffed with large estates in the region, and a cousin became bishop of Dorpat (Tartu). The Sword Brothers, whom Albert founded, were also recruited partly from among his kinship. In this respect, the character of the German settlement in the east Baltic shares much with the northern French and Lotharingian settlement of the kingdom of Jerusalem in the early twelfth century.

Contemporary attitudes to the northern Crusades are difficult to assess. There is a striking contrast between the idealism of Henry of Livonia's *Chronicle* of 1225/9, in which he argues that military conquest was meritorious provided that Christian rule gave the natives of the Baltic peace and prosperity in greater measure than they had known before, and the German *Livländische Reimchronik* of the end of the thirteenth century, which reflects bitterly that the only way to guarantee genuine conversion was at the point of the sword. Such attitudes reveal the despair of almost a century of failure in enforcing the subjugation of a people who took every opportunity to cling to what was left of their social, religious and political traditions. But contemporaries' horror at the brutality of some of the methods used to enforce conquest does not mean that they regarded the northern Crusades as less meritorious than those to the Holy Land. There were complaints about the diversion of subsidies to the northern Crusades, as there were also of Crusades against the Hohenstaufen. But participants doubtless took papal bulls that equated participation in the northern Crusades with the pilgrimage to Jerusalem at face value. It is true that Honorius III reminded the bishop of Riga of his continuing responsibility to donate to the proposed recovery of Jerusalem, but this suggests not so much that the northern Crusades were a 'second-best, cut-rate enterprise' (Christiansen 1980: 127) as that even outlying parts of Christendom were seen as linked to, and able to contribute to, the central cause. Interest in one variety of crusading did not necessarily mean a lack of concern for another. As a parallel example, the English crusaders who took Tortosa, in Catalonia, in 1148, were buried in a cemetery subsequently given to the

canons of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, and even in this Christian front-line against Islam, a strong link was maintained through regular donations to the Holy Sepulchre (Jaspert 2001: 90–110).

The northern Crusades were wars of expansion, conquest and colonisation. One historian has recently used the process of conquest and the organisation of a hierarchy of power in the Baltic to supply a definition of a more general movement, 'the expansion of Latin Christendom' (Bartlett 1993: 18). This process was made possible not only by superior military technology but also by the prevailing ideology of the crusade that placed at the disposal of the conquerors the full machinery of the Church – the ability to recruit through preaching, the offer of spiritual rewards for fighters and the administrative means to establish structures of government in conquered territories.

Frankish Greece

Following the conquest of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade, a substantial new Frankish presence was added to those in Syria, the Holy Land and Cyprus. Rule was established by those crusaders who remained in Constantinople over the city and adjoining territories, and those areas that had still been under the control of the Byzantine government – Thrace, Greece and the extreme north-west of Asia Minor, together with the Aegean and Ionian islands.

The new emperor was elected by a council comprising six Venetians and six Frankish crusaders. The choice of Baldwin, count of Flanders, rather than Boniface of Montferrat was a genuine surprise, at least to Boniface, but may be explained by Baldwin's more conciliatory approach to the Byzantines (Lock 1995: 43–5). Another committee decided upon the division of spoils. The Venetians retained one-eighth of the city of Constantinople, the Adriatic coast, the Ionian and Aegean islands (the latter of which were to become the Duchy of the Archipelago), Euboea (Negroponte) and Crete. They established a genuinely colonial maritime empire, ruled through a *podestà* by the Republic of Venice itself. Most of these possessions were lost to the Ottomans in the fifteenth century, though Crete remained in Venetian hands until 1669. The emperor received the rest of the city of Constantinople, together with Thrace, the north-west region of Asia Minor and the islands of Chios, Lesbos and Samos. He soon found, however, that he had exchanged his strongly centralised county in the West for little more than a glamorous title. Although the partition of fiefs was probably based on recent Byzantine tax registers (Oikonomides 1976: 3–28), Baldwin had little say in the distribution, which meant that he had no real opportunity to establish a dynastic base in support of his title. In recognition of his family's claim to titles held by his brother Renier before 1185, Boniface was granted the barony of Thessalonika. Central Greece and the Peloponnese were carved up between the Frankish crusaders, and eventually settled into



Map 8.3 Frankish Greece, 1204–61.

the two main power bases of the Principality of Achaia and the Duchy of Athens.

A narrative account of the fortunes of the Latin Empire makes unedifying reading. The empire faced enemies on three fronts: to the east and west, the two rival Byzantine successor states of Nicaea, ruled by the Lascarids (who also swallowed up the Komnenos state of Trebizond) and the Despotate of Epiros, ruled by the Angeloi; and the Bulgar kingdom to the north. Baldwin and Boniface were both killed fighting the Bulgars, in 1205 and 1207 respectively. Had the Franks been prepared to recognise the Bulgar kingdom, they might have been able to count on their help against their Byzantine rivals, but the emperor seems to have been deluded by his title into a false sense of his power. In 1208, his successor, Henry II (1206–16), married the daughter of the Bulgar tsar Kalojan, creating an alliance that gave him breathing space to concentrate on defending his empire against the Lascarids. In 1211 he won a victory in Asia Minor that secured his Asian possessions, and when he died in 1216 the Latin Empire was probably at its height.

The 1220s, however, proved disastrous. The ‘kingdom’ of Thessalonika, a Montferrat dynastic possession, fell to the Despotate of Epiros in 1224, despite the launch of a crusade from the West by William IV of Montferrat to save it. In 1225 the Nicene emperor, John III Vatatzes (1222–54), drove the Franks out of Asia Minor and was prevented from reconquering Constantinople itself only by the opposition of Epiros. A further stay of execution came in 1230 when Epiros itself was destroyed by the Bulgar tsar John II Asen (1218–41). The empire had a minor, Baldwin II (1228–61), at its helm, and even the appointment of the experienced former king of Jerusalem, John of Brienne, to the position of co-emperor in 1229 could not turn the tide. When John died in 1237, after an adventurous career that had included the captaincy of papal armies in Italy, marriage to the heiresses of Jerusalem and Armenia, and the leadership of a crusade, the Latin Empire consisted of little more than the city of Constantinople itself. The end came only in 1261, when the Nicene emperor, Michael VIII Paleologus (1259–82), realised just how weak the Franks were. By that stage, the unfortunate Baldwin II had been reduced to selling or pawning anything of value, including the remaining relics, the lead from the palace roof, and even his own son.

One corner of Frankish Greece, however, provided a model of strong and successful feudal colonisation. The Villehardouin dynasty established itself in Morea (Peloponnese) and between 1209 and 1259 enjoyed secure and peaceful rule over the Principality of Achaia. William II of Villehardouin (1246–78) conquered the whole of Morea, and made himself overlord of Negroponte, the duchies of Athens and the Archipelago. The constant warfare that weakened the emperors in the North also acted as a screen to protect the more remote Morea, with the result that the Villehardouin princes were able to consolidate centralised feudal authority with little

external threat. Alongside their Frankish fief-holders they also ruled over the remaining Byzantine *archontes* (landowners), using French feudal customs enshrined in a written code of law. After 1266, following the defeat of William II by the Lascarids in 1262, the Principality survived only as a vassal state of Charles of Anjou's Sicilian kingdom. In the fourteenth century it disintegrated under the growing strength of the new Palaeologan regime in Constantinople, and as a consequence of the seizure of the Duchy of Athens by the Catalan Company (1311), a group of mercenaries from northern Spain brought in by the Paleaologans (Hughes 2006). During its zenith, however, under Geoffrey II (1229–46) and William II, the Frankish court of Achaia enjoyed a reputation as a centre of traditional chivalric culture. William II, who participated in Louis IX's crusade in Egypt (1249–50), built a palace at Mistra whose grandeur can still be appreciated today.

The weakness of the Latin Empire must be seen in the context of wider collapse in the region. The victory of the crusaders in 1204 with a relatively small army (about 20,000) over the defences of the largest city in Christendom was a notable military achievement, but one that says as much about problems within the Byzantine military system as about Frankish military strength. Byzantine sources acknowledge that many of the ships in the imperial fleet were unseaworthy and that the land walls were in disrepair. The Byzantine Empire had suffered five changes in regime between 1182 and 1204; loyalty to the emperor in some regions was so loose by 1204 that the Greeks of Thrace were quite prepared to recognise a Latin as just another in a succession of emperors. The Franks in Greece never had sufficient military strength to control their territories effectively or defend them against their neighbours, nor could they mobilise western colonisation as the settlers in the Holy Land after 1099 had been able to. But if the Franks were hopelessly weak, their rivals were scarcely stronger. The Latin Empire was therefore 'an additional element in the regional mosaic of princelings' (Lock 1995: 55); they were distinguished only by their possession of the 'queen of cities' herself. The Latin Empire was a symptom of the breakdown in power in the north-east Mediterranean.

The Latin Empire may have been weak, but that does not mean it was unimportant in the political life of Europe. Popes until the mid-thirteenth century saw it as a vital component in the Crusader States. There is no reason to suppose that Innocent III's reference to the Frankish settlers after 1204 as 'pilgrims' was simply conventional phrasing: like Gregory IX (1227–41), he was probably sincere in the belief that the best hope for the Holy Land lay in securing a bridgehead to control the passage from West to East. Thus Gregory saw a crusade against Nicaea (1237–9), which never in fact materialised, as part of the wider effort to protect the Crusader States (Chrissis 2012: 123–46). Here the papacy seems to have been out of step with western opinion (Barber 1989: 111–28). Although individual rulers such as Charles of Anjou (1266–85) were prepared to invest in Frankish Greece, the cause of the Latin Empire had little resonance among potential crusaders.

Richard, earl of Cornwall, for example, resisted papal pressure to commute his vow for the Holy Land to the Aegean in 1239. The failure of the Latin Empire to appeal to western crusading instincts can also be seen in the large numbers of Franks who took service in the Byzantine armies of Nicaea or the Despotate of Epiros after 1204. Frankish mercenaries were prepared to commit horrifying acts of violence against the ruling Franks on behalf of their employers, as for example in 1210 when Adamée de Pofoy and a group of his knights were crucified in Thessaly by western knights fighting for the Despotate. Papal policy changed, perhaps to conform to public opinion, under Innocent IV (1243–54). Seeing that there would never be sufficient western interest in propping up the failing régime in Constantinople, he recognised the legitimacy of the Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople in exile, and initiated a more conciliatory policy towards Orthodox Christendom in general. This change in papal policy surely contributed to the revival of Byzantine authority and the eventual downfall of the Latin Empire.

Relations between Franks and the indigenous Greek population were, as may be supposed, often strained. Yet it may have been the confrontation with unfamiliar and – according to the Byzantine view – erroneous religious customs that proved most offensive to the Greeks. As in the Crusader States in the Levant, Orthodox monasteries and the parochial system continued to function. The difference between the twelfth-century Crusader States and the situation in Frankish Greece and Cyprus in the thirteenth century, as well as in Syria and the Holy Land, was the more intensive level of papal oversight. In part, this may have been caused by the suspicion that Greek monasteries were collaborating with the rival régimes of Nicaea and Epiros (Lock 1995: 227), but on the whole this changed situation reflected new directions in papal policy under Innocent III and his successors. Where the Latin Church in the twelfth-century Crusader States seems to have made little trouble over the observance of Orthodox customs that ran contrary to Latin norms, in Frankish Greece there was less tolerance of difference in customs relating to fasting, the Eucharist, consecration and holy orders. Latin oversight was aided by the arrival of new religious Orders, notably the Franciscans and Dominicans, who were valuable agents on behalf of papal policy. A dozen Cistercian monasteries and nunneries were also founded in Frankish Greece, reflecting the involvement of the Order in the Fourth Crusade (Brown 1958: 63–120; Panagopoulos 1979). Nevertheless, the number of Franks was always small compared with Greeks, and consequently there was little attempt outside Constantinople and Thessalonika to impose a Latin parochial system on conquered territory. This meant that there must often have been little alternative for isolated Frankish communities to sharing churches or even attending Orthodox services, and even in the early years of the settlement Pope Innocent III worried about Franks adopting Orthodox religious customs. By the fourteenth century, Venetians in Crete who ‘went native’ were a serious concern for the papacy. It is probably going too far to describe the Frankish settlement as a process of

acculturation. As one historian has observed, the occupation was too brief and too limited geographically to be 'anything other than a curdling, rather than a true intermingling' (Lock 1995: 266). Because Frankish and Greek communities lived largely separate, different existences, however, it does not follow that they were necessarily hostile to each other. Although historians, naturally enough, dwell on violent incidents such as the anti-Latin riots of 1182, and examine the polemical discourse against Latins in the Orthodox tradition, there is a danger in overplaying this type of evidence. There was little anti-Latin resistance in Frankish Greece in the thirteenth century, and although polemical writing continued to be produced in monasteries and schools, it was not representative of how the societies interacted. Once 'a caricature became a person with a face and a name, cooperation, friendship and conjugal fidelity were thought possible' (Lock 1995: 274).

We may even question the extent to which 1204 really marks a cataclysm in Byzantine history. For one thing, creeping 'westernisation' during the twelfth century had accustomed cosmopolitan Byzantines to the sight, sound and customs of Franks. It has been estimated that before the last quarter of the twelfth century there were between 10,000 and 20,000 western merchants and their families in Constantinople; marriage between Italian merchants and Byzantine women was, moreover, encouraged by imperial policy (Magdalino 1993: 27–108). At the middle and lower levels of society in particular, the Latin conquest offered possibilities of social and professional advancement, and it may be in this largely undocumented hinterland that something like a hybrid society developed. Even for those Greeks who were unwilling to cooperate actively, or in the provinces where Franks were thinly spread, the resentment against them may have been no greater than that felt for any ruling élite. In the provinces, land was redistributed, but the impact of this was greater for the pre-1204 élites than for those who actually worked on the land. The Frankish effect on institutional life was minimal. Although some French feudal terminology crept into every-day speech, few place names seem to have been changed. Debates over whether the Franks introduced feudal landholding arrangements have been inconclusive. The age-old Byzantine system of *pronoia* – a grant of land or privilege in return for services to the grantor – looks on the surface rather like western feudalism anyway, with the exception that the grant was typically for the lifetime of the recipient and not hereditary. After 1261, Emperor Michael VIII seems to have made some grants of *pronoia* hereditary, which may indicate residual Frankish influence. Even this, however, may simply have been a stage in the process of westernisation that can be seen in the twelfth century, in Emperor Manuel Komnenos' adoption of chivalric concepts such as the tournament and dubbing to knighthood. The Frankish occupation of Greece, therefore, may be seen as a stage in a process, rather than as the sole cause of the eventual decline of the Byzantine Empire.

9 Crusading and the Crusader States in the thirteenth century, 1217–74

Key Dates

1217	Fifth Crusade attacks Mt Tabor
1219	Fifth Crusade captures Damietta
1221	defeat of Fifth Crusade
1225	Emperor Frederick II marries Isabel II of Jerusalem, assumes title of king
1228	excommunication of Frederick II
1229	return of Jerusalem to Frederick II
1232	imperialist forces routed in Cyprus
1239–41	'Barons' crusade'
1244	Kharazmian Turks recapture Jerusalem; kingdom of Jerusalem suffers heavy defeat at La Forbie
1249	Louis IX captures Damietta
1250	battle of Mansurah; failure of Louis IX's crusade

Crusading saw some new departures in the thirteenth century, among which was a shift in the focus and target of large-scale expeditions. The Fifth and Seventh Crusades were launched against Egypt rather than the Holy Land, although the intention was still the recovery of Jerusalem. This shift represents both new military strategies and a more subtle change in the western perception of crusading. In this chapter, three crusading expeditions are examined in turn and the reasons for their varying fortunes analysed. The main themes that emerge are:


- conflicting interests of western crusaders and Frankish settlers in the East;
- the narrow margin between military success and failure;
- the continuing problem of dynastic succession in the Crusader States.

The challenge of Egypt: the Fifth Crusade, 1217–21

The crusade that Innocent III had announced in his bull *Quia maior* in 1213, and over the planning of which Fourth Lateran had taken such pains, did not begin until 1217. There were signs in the intervening years of the pope's frustration at the delay – almost to the point of ending the Albigensian Crusade in 1212 so that attention could be turned to the East. But Innocent died in 1216, and problems over leadership were to dog the progress of the crusade throughout.

Part of the difficulty, indeed one reason for the delay, was that the kingdom of Jerusalem had assured its immediate survival by negotiating a series of truces that expired only in 1217. Moreover, the very ability of the restored kingdom to occupy a place once again in the political society of the eastern Mediterranean may have made the cause that Innocent found so emotive – the recovery of Jerusalem – appear less immediate to Europeans. In 1217 there was no immediate challenge to the security of the kingdom, other than the fortification of Mt Tabor, in the Galilee, by the Muslims. As the patriarch of Jerusalem informed the new pope, Honorius III, the Ayyubids were in no position to repeat the successes of 1187–91. All but one of Saladin's heirs had been disinherited by their uncle, al-Adil. Although he was an experienced statesman who maintained a secure grip on Egypt and Syria, al-Adil was incapable of preventing the revival of the kingdom of Jerusalem between 1194 and 1217. Either as a result of his experiences in confronting the Third Crusade in 1191–2, or out of genuine disinclination for war, he largely left the Franks in the East alone. The arrival of John of Brienne in the Holy Land as king consort of Jerusalem in 1210 with a force of some 300 knights might have stung him into action, but in fact John was able to do little more than mount a raid on Egypt in 1211 to which al-Adil needed to make no response before it fizzled out (Perry 2013: 55–6). Above all, al-Adil lacked the moral authority that his brother had been accorded in the Islamic world, and was thus unable to form the alliances that had delivered such success to Saladin in 1187–91. Innocent III seems to have believed that he might even be willing to concede Jerusalem (Richard 1999: 297), and when the first phase of the crusade began, al-Adil's policy was one of withdrawal rather than confrontation.

The first contingents of crusaders arrived in the East as a trickle of national groupings rather than a series of coordinated armies. In part, this reflected the process of preaching and recruitment. The preaching campaign was more widespread and 'professional' than ever before. By the early thirteenth century, preachers such as Robert of Courçon, Fulk of Neuilly, Oliver 'Scholasticus' of Paderborn and James of Vitry had developed specialist crusade sermons. Following the Bernardine model of the mid-twelfth century, preachers focused their message on the responsibilities of individual Christians and the opportunities presented by the crusade for salvation (Powell 1986: 51–63; van Moolenbroek 1987: 251–72; Maier 2000: 82–99,



Map 9.1 Crusading in Egypt, 1217-21 and 1248-50

100–27, esp. 94–9). Alongside the ‘feudal’ message of recovery of the Holy Land there had always since 1095 also been another element in crusade preaching: the ideal of the imitation of Christ. Although increasingly evident in the twelfth century (Purkis 2008: 59–85), this came to the fore in the mouths of the thirteenth-century preachers. Moreover, Innocent III’s bull *Quia maior*, and the reforms in the organisation of recruitment during his pontificate, had the effect of widening participation in crusading. That this was effective is attested by a survey of named crusaders between 1217 and 1221 that includes counts and carpenters, bishops and porters, from France, Italy, England, Flanders, Frisia, Germany and Austria (Powell 1986: 209–46). Taking the cross was not only an increasingly formalised and ritual event, it was also more available to a wider range of people than ever before. In consequence, the Fifth Crusade was characterised by waves of recruitment and by the periodic arrival of fresh crusaders as earlier ones left from 1217 to 1221. This undoubtedly had an effect on the nature of the crusade itself, and perhaps also on its failure.

The Fifth Crusade marked a new departure in that the preaching extended to the Latin East itself. The king of Jerusalem, John of Brienne, King Hugh I of Cyprus and Bohemond IV of Antioch all took the cross, with many of their leading barons. Although this reflected Innocent III’s conception of the crusade as a penitential enterprise to be undertaken by the whole of Christendom, it was to raise thorny problems of leadership. Initially it seemed that the king of Hungary, Andrew II, assumed that he was the leader (Perry 2013: 91), but after the initial phase of campaigning in the Holy Land itself in autumn 1217, and the departure of Andrew, Bohemond IV of Antioch and King Hugh of Cyprus, John of Brienne was left as sole leader for the main phase of the campaign. John, a baron from Champagne, had become king of Jerusalem through marriage to Maria, the daughter of Isabel and Amalric II in 1210. Throughout the crusade, the aspirations of John and the native barons, centred as they were on the future health of the kingdom of Jerusalem, were to heighten tensions with the western crusaders. One reason may have been that, although he wore a crown, John of Brienne’s pedigree was less impressive than that of many of the western crusaders. Besides King Andrew of Hungary, the western crusaders numbered among them the dukes of Austria and Burgundy, the counts of Nevers and La Marche, the earl of Chester and the prince of Bavaria.

The first phase of the crusade, in which the Hungarians and Leopold of Austria’s Germans dominated, was inconclusive. The fortifications on Mt Tabor were assaulted, which removed the threat to Acre, and food and fodder stockpiled for the arrival of the host from the west. A raid further north, however, was less successful, and Andrew of Hungary returned home early in 1218, while Hugh of Cyprus died. Most assessments of the Fifth Crusade have been critical of the conduct of King Andrew and concluded that nothing was achieved in 1217–18, but in fact he may have helped to protect Frankish Antioch by marching his troops home overland (Tyerman

2006: 629); and it is possible that he might have achieved more in the East had the expected Rhenish–Flemish fleet not been detained by action in the Iberian peninsula (Powell 1986: 125–6).

Now the crusade turned its attention to Egypt, in the hope that an assault on the Ayyubid power base of Cairo would weaken al-Adil's hold on Jerusalem. In summer 1218 the siege of Damietta began. The city, which lay at the mouth of the Nile Delta, was guarded by an island tower that cut the mouth of the river into two channels, one of which was unnavigable, and the other barred by chains hung across it. In effect, the Tower of Chains, as it was called, protected all access upriver towards Cairo. The tower was eventually taken with the help of a siege engine designed – as he tells us himself in his *Historia Damiatana* – by Oliver of Paderborn (Peters 1971: 64–5). Al-Adil died soon after, leaving the Ayyubid territories in the hands of his three sons: al-Kamil in Egypt, al-Mu'azzam in Damascus and al-Ashraf in Mesopotamia. Damietta itself, however, held out for fourteen months, until early November 1219. During this period two new waves of crusaders had arrived, including in autumn 1218 the papal legate Pelagius, cardinal-bishop of Albano. Pelagius, described by one historian as a 'throwback to the days of . . . Adhemar of Le Puy', assumed control of the crusade by virtue of the forces he brought with him and, more important, his hold over the purse strings of the papal treasure amassed by Pope Innocent III (Perry 2013: 101). It was Pelagius' refusal to accept the negotiated settlement offered by al-Kamil in 1219, just before the capture of Damietta, and then repeated in mid-1221, that prolonged the crusade. Al-Kamil's offer of the return of almost all the territory lost to Saladin in 1187, including Jerusalem itself, looks in retrospect too tempting for the crusaders to have refused. At the time, however, Pelagius' attitude seemed prescient, for the way to Cairo lay open, al-Mu'azzam's assaults on Caesarea and Athlit proved to be unsuccessful, and Frederick II's imperial forces were finally being prepared for departure to reinforce the crusading army.

In the end, however, 1220 turned out to be a wasted year. Al-Kamil built a new fortification farther up the Nile at Mansurah to protect the route to Cairo. John of Brienne, who had enjoyed uncontested leadership before the arrival of Pelagius, returned to Acre to pursue his claim to the throne of Armenia, which looked precarious after the death of his second wife Stephanie. His departure looks like pique or, at the least, disagreement over who was really in charge, exacerbated by the dispute over al-Kamil's offer. More careful consideration of John's position, and that of the kingdom of Jerusalem, shows his actions in a more reasonable strategic light (Perry 2013: 111–16). The question of succession to the Cilician kingdom of Armenia was critical to the future of the northern Crusader States, as well as to John's personal position, and as long as the bulk of the kingdom of Jerusalem's forces were tied up in Egypt, the rump of the kingdom based on Acre, Tyre and the coastline continued to be vulnerable to Syrian counter-attack.

More crusaders arrived during the course of the year, including a Venetian fleet, but this only offset the departure of others. Meanwhile, prophecies relating to a mysterious Christian king of the East who, it was anticipated, would attack the Islamic world in unison with the crusaders, and circulated around Damietta by Pelagius, kept hopes of a decisive victory alive. The imperial forces, which only amounted to about 500 knights under the command of the duke of Bavaria, did not arrive until late spring 1221. Once again, disagreements broke out among the crusaders: should they wait for Frederick II to arrive with the bulk of his army, or begin offensive operations at once on Mansurah before the annual Nile floods rendered the Delta impassable for armies? Louis of Bavaria was anxious to fight, despite instruction from Frederick II to wait for him, but John of Brienne argued that there was insufficient time. Pelagius, whose reputation has suffered as a result (Mayer 1988: 218; Perry 2013: 118), refused to wait, and the army set off in mid-July. John's misgivings were proved right: the Nile swelled to the point where the Egyptians could use a secondary canal to encircle the crusaders and cut off all supplies from Damietta; then, opening the sluice gates, they flooded the countryside and trapped them on a narrow island of land opposite Mansurah. By the end of August, the crusaders' fighting retreat had been defeated, and Pelagius accepted a dishonourable peace. The crusaders were forced to leave Egypt altogether, surrendering Damietta, and to accept an eight-year truce. Everything achieved so painfully since 1218 had been lost.

It is easy to ascribe the defeat of the Fifth Crusade to a failure of military leadership, and in particular to blame Pelagius for the fateful decision to advance. Western ignorance of local geography and climate, and a refusal to listen to the advice of those who had local knowledge, certainly contributed. But, as at Hattin in 1187, the margin between defeat and victory was narrow – perhaps to be measured in terms of only a few weeks. The crusade had already wasted a year waiting for Frederick II, and Pelagius may have sensed the army's mood correctly when he insisted on decisive action rather than waiting out another summer in Damietta. It is curious that he should have left such a large portion of the troops available to him in Damietta, and this may indicate that the campaign of July 1221 was intended simply to drive al-Kamil from Mansurah, before the arrival of a fresh army made a larger-scale advance possible (Powell 1986: 184–5). In any case, although it is true that the Egyptians had been reinforced by the arrival of al-Mu'azzam from Syria, the defeat at Mansurah was not the result of superior forces. The leadership question is similarly thorny. Powell has pointed out that the decisions taken in July–August were not simply Pelagius' own, but represented the popular will among the crusaders (1986: 188–9); on the other hand, contemporary sources, including the Coptic *History of the Patriarchs* as well as letters by western crusaders, were aware that John maintained his opposition to these decisions even while going along with the majority (Perry 2013: 118).

The role of John of Brienne is not easy to evaluate. He certainly clashed with Pelagius over the negotiations in 1219, but his departure in 1220 can be explained on other grounds. For one thing, al-Mu'azzam was trying to divert attention from Egypt by threatening Caesarea. Besides, the insecurity of John's own position as king of Jerusalem – underlined by the fact that his wife Maria, through whom his claim was made, had died in 1212 – was exploited by Pelagius, who refused to recognise the king's claim of Damietta as part of his lordship. One source says that John returned to Acre to press a claim to Armenia through his second wife, Stephanie, the daughter of Leo II, who had died in 1219. Her death and that of their heir in 1220 cannot have helped his cause. John, who ended his life as Latin emperor of Constantinople, is an example both of the possibilities open in the East to resourceful but landless western knights, and of the limitations on their authority if the lineage on which their claims were based failed. That ultimate leadership of the crusade was never determined may reflect the wishes of Innocent III that crusading be the collective enterprise of Christendom; on the other hand, Honorius III seems to have placed his hopes on the arrival of Frederick II, and it can be argued that the emperor's failure to appear betrayed the crusade. Perhaps more action might have been taken in 1220 had the crusaders known that he would never in fact arrive.

In hindsight, the refusal to accept the terms offered by al-Kamil in 1219 – the exchange of Damietta for Jerusalem – was particularly frustrating. But this, too, is understandable if the interests of different parties are taken into account. John of Brienne and the barons of the crusader kingdom were in favour, naturally, because al-Kamil's offer would have restored the kingdom's territories to their extent before 1187, with the exception only of the Transjordan castles of Kerak and Montreal, for which compensation would be paid. Al-Kamil was even, by late August 1219, prepared to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem and to return the True Cross. But the Military Orders balked at the exception of the Transjordan castles, recognising that as long as Egypt and Syria were in alliance, the defence of Jerusalem hinged on them. Others had their own reasons: for the Venetians, for example, Damietta, with its potential to control the Red Sea trade, was the real prize, not Jerusalem. In any case, much of al-Kamil's offer may have been bluff. The location of the True Cross was unknown, perhaps even to al-Kamil, and in any case, his offer was empty without the compliance of al-Mu'azzam: what if he refused to play along with the return of the Holy Land?

The contemporary narratives of the crusade indicate a constant preoccupation with reinforcements. The fourteen-month siege of Damietta exhausted both sides, and by 1220 both money and troops were insufficient for further large-scale operations. The crusaders may have numbered as few as 3,000 knights. However, the numbers of fresh arrivals never compensated for those who departed, and after the autumn of 1219 the peak of new crusaders had passed (Powell 1986: 165–72). The total number of crusaders between 1217 and 1221 was high, but most had already arrived before the

end of 1218, and the effect of staggered contributions to the crusade was to stretch resources during crucial moments. The crusaders were simply unable to press home their advantage in 1220, when it might have counted. A comparison with the First Crusade may help make the point. The Fifth Crusade outlasted all save the First in length of time; both Crusades involved long sieges followed by periods of uncertainty and recuperation, but in 1099 the final assault on Jerusalem was made possible by the timely arrival of the Italian fleet, whereas in 1221 the expected reinforcements did not arrive.

The policy of attacking Egypt rather than pursuing the campaign in Syria in 1218 was ultimately a failure. As a strategy, however, it is understandable. As early as 1192, Richard I had questioned whether it was possible for a force that was to be in the East for a limited duration to recapture and secure Jerusalem. The objective of the Fifth Crusade was to strike at the heartland of Ayyubid power, and to recover the former extent of the kingdom of Jerusalem as a result of a decisive military victory. There was every reason to be hopeful of such an outcome: Richard and Henry of Champagne, after all, had shown in the 1190s what could be done. Crusade planners knew that if they wanted to engage the Ayyubids in such an encounter, they would have to find a target in the defence of which al-Adil and his sons would be prepared to risk everything. Jerusalem was not such a target: it might fall to the crusaders, but not at the cost of the Ayyubids' real military muscle. Moreover, by 1217 the Egyptian strategy was already traditional. Egypt had apparently been the intended target in 1204, and according to Oliver of Paderborn, the Fourth Lateran Council had determined an attack on Cairo as the policy of the new crusade (Peters 1971: 61). The first phase of the crusade in 1217 should thus be seen as a diversion with the limited intention of freeing Acre of the threat posed by the fortification of Mt Tabor. Significantly, even the disappointment of defeat did not undermine this strategy in the future. Although some Crusades in the future (in 1239–41 and 1270, for example) did target the Holy Land directly, the Fifth Crusade set a precedent for a wider military strategy that was to be adopted by most major expeditions from the West in future.

Frederick II and the kingdom of Jerusalem

Frederick II's failure to appear in Egypt in 1221 may have cost the crusade dearly, but it enabled both emperor and pope to avoid the potentially embarrassing question of authority. When Frederick did eventually fulfil his vow, in 1229, it was on his own terms, in pursuit of his own objectives and, ultimately, without the cooperation of the papacy. This was not how his crusade began, for it was initially Honorius III who took the initiative, by insisting that Frederick fulfil the vow taken in 1215 and persuading him to agree to a departure date in 1225. By the time he arrived in the East, however, there could be no doubting that the emperor alone was in charge of his crusade.

Frederick's status had materially altered since 1221. In 1225 he married the daughter of John of Brienne and Maria, Isabel II (also sometimes known as Yolanda) and thus gained precisely the same claim to the throne of Jerusalem through his wife as John had enjoyed in 1210. Although in the marriage negotiations it had been agreed that John of Brienne should remain king for life, once the marriage had been celebrated – by proxy – Frederick had himself crowned king of Jerusalem and insisted on the homage of the barons of the kingdom who had brought his bride to Sicily (Perry 2013: 122–6). John, in consequence, lost control of the kingdom of Jerusalem and spent the decade following the marriage in the West. Fulfilling his crusading vow would enable Frederick at the same time to exercise lordship over distant possessions, while also providing a triumphal accolade for the most powerful ruler in the West. To add Jerusalem, the symbolic centre of Christianity, to his imperial title was to wield a new kind of authority that combined the spiritual with the secular. Yet the marriage must have been at the very least approved by the pope, for Isabel, through her Montferrat ancestry, was a cousin of Frederick, and a dispensation was needed. Either Honorius was outmanoeuvred by an unexpectedly proprietorial attitude to the crown on Frederick's part, or he simply regarded John's fate as a necessary sacrifice for the future of the kingdom of Jerusalem. The luckless King John may have been the victim of his own ancestry, for his father, Walter, had fought to put Tancred of Lecce on the throne of Sicily instead of Frederick in 1198. He was now deprived of all but an empty title.

The situation in the Near East also changed in the decade following the Fifth Crusade. Al-Kamil and al-Mu'azzam fell out with each other, and when, in 1226, the sultan of Egypt courted Frederick as a lever against his brother, the emperor seized the opportunity to form an alliance. Al-Kamil doubtless knew that Frederick was planning a crusade, and wanted to ensure that it was directed against al-Mu'azzam in Syria rather than against Egypt. Frederick may, as some historians have argued, have approached the problem in the role of a king of Jerusalem rather than a crusader (Abulafia 1988: 171–2), but it did not take a strategic genius to realise that the best hope for crusading success lay in keeping the Ayyubids apart rather than united. The mutual jealousy of the sons of al-Adil presented the most encouraging opening for a crusade since the death of Saladin.

Frederick finally embarked in September 1227, but fell ill and turned back to recuperate on land. Gregory IX was furious at the further delay, caused by what he thought was Frederick's incompetence in embarking his troops before disease broke out in the camp, and promptly excommunicated him for breaking the treaty of 1225. It is unlikely that Frederick was dissimulating, for some of his barons, including the landgrave of Thuringia, died of illness at the same time. But the excommunication reveals the pope's frustration at the wider situation. Gregory's accusations of tyranny against the Sicilian Church, and his insistence that Sicily be governed as a papal fief, tell the real story of his fears of imperial domination. He now prohibited

Frederick from sailing for the East until he had been reconciled to the Church, and the conditions for reconciliation were set as the submission of Sicily to its feudal overlord, the papacy. These demands probably explain Frederick's further delay in setting sail, until June 1228: he wanted to allow sufficient time to come to reasonable terms. When this proved impossible, he surprised Gregory by setting out anyway. Different interpretations of the affair are possible. One can see Gregory as an excessively legalistic old man with a predetermined view of the dangers Frederick posed to the papacy (Abulafia 1988: 164–74). On the other hand, Frederick had delayed so long since 1215 over fulfilling his vow that the pope may genuinely have believed that this was yet another pretext. Once Frederick had been excommunicated, moreover, the pope had no choice but to insist on reconciliation to the Church before embarking on his expedition again, for to do otherwise would make the same mockery of the crusade as had occurred in 1202–3.

The delay, in fact, was not at all to Frederick's advantage, for in April 1228 – by which time he had expected to be firmly entrenched in his kingdom of Jerusalem – his constitutional claim to the throne disappeared with the death of his wife Isabel II. He was now, like John of Brienne before him, only regent for their infant son, Conrad. This was to prove damaging to Frederick's expectations of wielding real authority in the East. Moreover, Frederick's crusading strategy was jeopardised by the death of al-Mu'azzam. Al-Kamil had welcomed Frederick as an ally against his brother, but al-Mu'azzam's death, and the absence of an adult male heir, removed the need for the emperor's presence in the East. Indeed, it made his crusade an embarrassment to both Frederick and al-Kamil, for he now had nobody to fight for the recovery of Jerusalem but his ally.

Perhaps this is one reason why Frederick headed straight for Cyprus rather than the Holy Land. There was work to be done here, for since 1195 the island had technically been an imperial fief, and the king, Henry, was only a child. Frederick thus had every right to assure himself that the regency was in responsible hands. Moreover, according to western custom he, as suzerain, was due the revenues accrued during the regency, and he may have intended to use them to pay his soldiers (Riley-Smith 1973a: 161). In fact the real ruler of the island was not Alice, the king's mother, but John of Ibelin, lord of Beirut, whom she had appointed *bailli*. Like most of the higher nobility in the kingdom of Jerusalem, he also held lands in Cyprus. This was a potentially messy situation, because the two kingdoms were constitutionally separate. Because neither kingdom had an adult king in the 1220s, it was inevitable that the boundaries between the two should become rather fluid. In fact, Frederick seems to have become mired in a rivalry between competing noble families in Cyprus, represented on the one hand by the Ibelins, and on the other by Aimery Barlais and his adherents, who were largely the 'new' nobility created by the Lusignans on the island.

Frederick's solution to the problem posed by the overlap of power in the hands of barons such as John of Ibelin was to play the same game himself.

He bullied John into submission at Limassol, and threatened him with the seizure of his fief on the mainland. But here he blundered, for, as John pointed out, even if he had the authority to act as regent on behalf of his son Conrad, the matter had to go before the kingdom's High Court, and could not be decided by the emperor simply in his capacity as suzerain of Cyprus. The baronial view was that John's conduct in Cyprus, even if judged culpable, could not be punished by confiscation of his mainland inheritance, because the offence related to a different kingdom, and thus came under a different authority. Frederick seems to have been taken aback by the strength of resistance from the native barons of Jerusalem to his claims. Assuming that his imperial title was sufficient to make him appear as a universal secular ruler, he underestimated the gravity with which constitutional problems were treated in the kingdom of Jerusalem. The resistance of the Ibelins and their supporters to his attempt to throw his weight around masks the real question that he had raised in Cyprus – namely, the abuses of power and privilege by John of Ibelin as regent (Edbury 1997: 40).

On the mainland, Frederick was caught between the expectations of the barons and Military Orders on the one hand and the fear of what might be happening in Sicily on the other. Gregory had threatened seizure of Sicily if he defied the prohibition on leaving Italy without seeking reconciliation. But his army was not large enough to take on al-Kamil – most of the army that had sailed without him in 1227 had by now returned to Italy – and in any case Frederick did not like direct military confrontation if it could be avoided. He could hope only to extract from al-Kamil what had been promised in return for fighting al-Mu'azzam, but since there was no longer any fighting to be done, al-Kamil had no reason to give it to him. The fact that Frederick succeeded in persuading the sultan to restore anything at all represents something of a diplomatic triumph, in a situation in which he had no leverage over al-Kamil. In fact, as his rather triumphalist letter to Henry III of England makes clear, the territories regained were far from negligible (Peters 1971: 162–5). Besides Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and the narrow corridor linking them to the coast, Frederick also secured Nazareth and part of the Galilee, Toron and the immediate hinterland of Sidon. This meant that some of the most productive and populous areas of the old kingdom were back in Frankish hands. As Frederick pointed out, the return of Sidon, which had been split before 1228, was crucial for both commercial and strategic reasons. Frederick had succeeded through persistent pleading and a token show of strength – a march down the coast with his small army, followed by the Military Orders – where the meticulous planning and superior forces of the Crusades of 1189–92 and 1217–21 had failed.

Why, then, was everyone – the native barons, the Military Orders, the Church in the East and the papacy – so dissatisfied with the liberation of Jerusalem in 1229? Part of the reason is undoubtedly the same attitude that had been shown by Pelagius in 1219. Taking the cross was a penance that conferred immense spiritual privileges. Where was the penitential exercise

in Frederick's diplomacy; where the sacrifice and heroism? In his desperation to have something to show for his journey, Frederick had resorted in his diplomacy to compromising his own dignity and that of the holy city itself. All he wanted, he pleaded to al-Kamil, was an undefended and empty hill town with no strategic value, which happened to be the birthplace of Christianity; all he needed was some assurance that his reputation would not be lost. No matter how he dressed it up in his triumphant crown-wearing ceremony in Jerusalem in 1229, the whole affair looked to contemporaries shabby and rather pathetic. Besides, as his enemies were quick to point out, al-Kamil had lost very little. The Temple Mount, including the 'Templum Domini', was retained by the Ayyubids, for of course they would not give up the al-Aqsa or the Dome of the Rock. As al-Kamil reassured Muslims inclined to be critical of him, all he had given up were 'some churches and ruined houses', while Islamic worship continued as before in Jerusalem. There was disagreement over whether the terms of the treaty allowed Frederick to rebuild the city walls, but even with them, Jerusalem would be very difficult to defend without more territory, and especially without the Transjordan castles. Most devastating was al-Kamil's complacent assurance that once the ten-year truce was over, he would easily be able to retake the holy city at his leisure (Gabrieli 1984: 271). In the wider context of his ambitions to dominate Syria as his uncle had done, Frederick must have appeared to al-Kamil as a mere irritant.

The native barons and Military Orders were naturally disappointed that Frederick was unwilling to challenge al-Kamil for more than the return of a city they had long realised was only of symbolic importance. If the barons had been suspicious of his motives in Cyprus, they must now have realised that the emperor had no intention of extending the kingdom further; indeed, that he was interested in the crown primarily to advance his own authority in the West. Even the Galilean lands around Nazareth won back by the treaty were not restored to their former lords but given to the Teutonic Knights. Frederick might have expected the patriarch of Jerusalem, at least, to be pleased at the restoration of his church, but Gerold, who had studiously avoided him, followed the papal line (Peters 1971: 165–70, for translation of his account). He even placed an interdict on Jerusalem on the grounds that it had been polluted by the presence of the excommunicate emperor. If this sounds like cutting off one's nose to spite one's face, it demonstrated the contempt felt in the Church for Frederick's methods. Given the reports by the Arab chronicler Ibn Wasil about Frederick's favourable behaviour towards the Muslims in Jerusalem, it is hardly surprising that he did not win the confidence of the Church in Outremer. According to Ibn Wasil, Frederick told the Muslims of Jerusalem that his chief reason for going there was to hear the call to prayer from the al-Aqsa mosque, and he upbraided the clerical authorities for refraining from this out of misplaced respect for him (Gabrieli 1984: 271–3). Neither the patriarch nor the canons of the Holy Sepulchre, nor the monks and canons of St Mary Latin, Mt Sion

or Notre-Dame de Josaphat thought it worthwhile to return to Jerusalem during the period covered by the truce.

Frederick's crown-wearing – which was not a coronation at all but a ceremonial act such as occurred on great feasts – was designed to publicise his achievement. He wrote a boastful letter announcing his achievement to Henry III of England, but the main source from the Latin East, Philip of Novara, scarcely mentions the emperor's presence in Jerusalem. An Ibelin supporter, Philip did not regard him as eligible to wear the crown. Frederick's own letter to Henry suggests that the crown he wore was in fact the imperial one, which may indicate either that he was respectful of the constitutional niceties of his position, or that he saw no real difference between his role as universal emperor and as regent for his infant son in Jerusalem. The rest of the crusade was no less ignominious. Frederick was forced to give way to the High Court when the Ibelins threatened to withdraw their vassalage because the emperor had dispossessed another baron, Alice of Armenia. When he left Acre in May 1229, a riot broke out against him and he was pelted with offal in the market. The appointment of two native barons as his *baillis*, Garnier the German and Balian of Sidon, shows how far he had been forced to climb down since 1228.

The legacy of Frederick's crusade was a decade of civil war between those who upheld and those who rejected imperial claims to rulership of the kingdom of Jerusalem, in person or by proxy. Frederick cannot be blamed entirely for this. It is true that his own behaviour in 1227–9 was politically both naïve and heavy-handed. But the situation created by the failure of male succession to the throne was impossible. Fundamentally, this problem had been the same (with a hiatus in the mid-twelfth century) since the 1130s – the need to import from the West husbands as consorts for female heirs to the throne. Where such an import was, like John of Brienne, without prospects or ambitions in the West, he could identify his interests with those of the kingdom of Jerusalem. But Frederick never intended to rule personally in the East, and seems deliberately to have blurred the distinctions between his authority as regent in the kingdom of Jerusalem and imperial overlord in Cyprus. Moreover, both Frederick and Honorius III underestimated the implications of constitutional developments in the kingdom of Jerusalem since 1187. To understand why the barons of the kingdom took his feudal *faux pas* so seriously, we must turn aside to examine the internal workings of the kingdom since the 1180s.

Crown and barons in the kingdom of Jerusalem from Hattin to St Louis

The barons of the kingdom of Jerusalem in the thirteenth century have not, on the whole, had much sympathy from historians. They were, Riley-Smith concluded, a dislikeable lot: prone to 'donnish pedantry' and the 'mantling of political actions in self-justificatory and sometimes spurious legal

terminology' (1973a: 229). It is tempting to view them as argumentative and lacking the breadth of vision to suspend their constitutional jealousies for the greater good of the kingdom. A western observer, James of Vitry, bishop of Acre, was disgusted by the superficial rhetoric in which they indulged (Stewart 1895: 65). But it was this very quality of legal expertise and the ability to plead a case in court that the barons themselves prized. Ralph of Tiberias, for example, became a heroic figure among the thirteenth-century baronage for the constitutional grasp he showed in his resistance to Almeric II in 1198. Accused of plotting the murder of the king, and faced with the seizure of his fief, Ralph demanded that he be judged not by the king but by the kingdom's fief-holders in the High Court, as he was entitled by provision of the *Assise sur la ligece*, a law dating from the 1160s. When Almeric refused to grant him this right, the barons, persuaded by Ralph's oratory, withdrew their feudal service from the king. The fact that in the end Ralph's resistance was futile, and that he went into exile until Almeric's death, was less significant in baronial memories than the principle on which he had stood (Riley-Smith 1973a: 145–84; Loud 1985: 204–12; Reynolds 2002: 37–40). Historians have tended to see the legal disputes between crown and barons during the period between c.1192 and 1225 as evidence of declining royal power (Richard 1999: 248–50). Recently, however, it has been argued that what we see in the reign of John of Brienne, in particular, was simply the royal exercise of political patronage. The fact that John was able to retain his crown for thirteen years after the death of his wife, Maria, without serious challenge to his constitutional right to do so, has been taken as a sign of his ability to mould and deploy the baronage according to his will (Perry 2013: 63–71).

Significantly, the same principle was applied by John of Beirut in 1229 and 1231 when he persuaded many of the barons to withdraw their service from Frederick II, in the first case because of the arbitrary seizure of Alice of Armenia's fief, and in the second in response to the attempt by the imperial lieutenant Richard Filangieri to seize his fief of Beirut. The latter instance, however, showed how ineffective the recourse to twelfth-century law was in a case when the aggressor was not dependent in any case on the Palestinian barons but rather on the Italian army he had brought with him (Riley-Smith 1973a: 179–80).

Ralph of Tiberias was the stepson of Raymond of Tripoli, and after Hattin an adherent of Conrad of Montferrat; it is therefore not surprising to find him opposing the Lusignan king Almeric. In the early years of the thirteenth century he was an ally of the Ibelins. On the surface, his career appears to show how the alignments formed among the barons in the years before 1187 could continue in the next generation. This is misleading. Ralph's brother, Hugh, who had fought with Raymond of Tripoli at Hattin, became an adherent of the Lusignans in 1189–90 and later of Henry of Champagne (Edbury 1997: 25). Moreover his marriage to Margaret, the daughter of Balian of Ibelin and Maria Komnena, the widow of Amalric I, suggests that

baronial 'factionalism' was less significant than dynastic interests. In any case, however they pursued their interests, the barons' habits of resistance to the crown, formed in the late twelfth century when regalian rights were on the wane (Riley-Smith 1973a: 147), had already become traditional by the time of Frederick II's arrival in the East.

It was not only obstructionist opponents of the crown who took jurisprudence in the application of feudal law so seriously. Almeric I himself, and Bohemond IV of Antioch, were highly regarded for their detailed knowledge of the law; and another of the great feudal jurists of the 1220s and 1230s, Balian of Sidon, turned out to be an upholder of Frederick II's rights. Theoretical knowledge of feudal law, and the ability to turn it to practical use in the courts, seems to have been a fundamental requirement of the kingdom's barons in the thirteenth century. Moreover, the examples of Philip of Novara and Renier of Gibelet, a burgess, show how legal expertise could be a path to higher status in the kingdom. The second generation of 'lawyer-barons', such as Philip himself and John of Jaffa, the nephew of the lord of Beirut who opposed Frederick II, produced sophisticated theoretical treatises on the laws of the kingdom. By the 1260s, interest in the law had become the chief characteristic of a literate and cosmopolitan baronage in Jerusalem and Cyprus.

Why was study and application of feudal law so important, even to the point of apparently throwing away the possible advantages of western military support in 1228 and indulging in a damaging civil war from 1229 to 1243? First, it is important to note that the Palestinian barons were very unlike western lords in their manner of life. The primarily urban money economy and the fact that there were very few rural fiefs after 1187 meant that the barons tended to live much more like mercantile princes or senior clergy than like their counterparts in the West. The towns, larger and wealthier in any case than most western ones outside Italy, developed a literate aristocratic culture in which the barons played an important role. But the political conditions of the crusader kingdom also contributed to the legalistic character of its barons. The disaster of 1187 did more than remove political control of the Holy Land from the Frankish nobility. The loss or destruction of the body of written law that had developed since 1099 meant that in the thirteenth century the kingdom of Jerusalem followed a path diametrically opposite to that in western Europe. In England, for example, the period between c.1160 and 1260 is characterised by the steady growth of written assizes and a resulting body of case law to replace customary law. But the Palestinian barons had already constructed a body of written law before 1187, and its loss resulted in the reversion to customary law mediated by orally transmitted memory. Philip of Novara expressed this problem when he acknowledged that:

We know [the laws] rather poorly, for they are known only by hearsay and usage . . . and we think that an assize is something that we have

seen used as an assize . . . in the kingdom of Jerusalem [the barons] made much better use of the laws and acted on them more surely before the land was lost.

(Riley-Smith 1973a: 133–5)

As Philip realised, it was uncertainty about the law that led to overriding concern about how it was to be applied.

The reliance on orally transmitted legal custom naturally led to the creation of a mythical past in which the dimly remembered laws could take on a constitutional significance quite different from that which had originally been intended. For example, the *Assise sur la ligece*, which Amalric I had introduced in the 1160s in order to strengthen the crown by binding rear-vassals more closely to it, came to be interpreted as a measure to limit the crown's authority. The first step was the insistence that because all vassals had done homage directly to the king, they were thus all members of the High Court; the second was the argument that sovereign authority rested not in the king alone but in the king's judgement in consultation with the High Court – and thus with all fief-holders. In the case of the *Assise*, it was not only the dislocation of 1187 that made this development possible, but, perhaps even more important, the consistent failure of adult male succession in the kingdom from 1185 onward. From 1186 to 1286 kings of Jerusalem were either minors or enjoyed limited authority because they owed their title to marriage. In such circumstances, and particularly from 1225 onward, when there was no resident king, it is hardly surprising that the barons should have interpreted feudal law as they did. In fact, the idea that sovereignty rested with the king in the High Court was not so much a limitation of royal prerogative as an idealisation of it, and an attempt to prevent imperial *baillis* or regents from assuming the authority of the crown.

The crusade of Frederick II marked only the beginning of the attempt to impose direct rule on the kingdom of Jerusalem from the West. The Ibelins' refusal to accept the authority of Frederick's *baillis* led to the seizure of their estates in Cyprus; in retaliation John of Beirut led an invasion of Cyprus that succeeded in 1229–30 in restoring Ibelin control over the island. But in 1231 Frederick sent a fleet under Richard Filangieri, an imperial official, to the kingdom of Jerusalem. Richard's Italian army besieged Beirut and took control of Tyre, but the Ibelinist barons were able to retain control of Acre, and in 1232 formed a commune to protect their interests. Up to this point it was possible for most barons to remain, such as the imperial *bailli* Balian of Sidon, moderate supporters of Frederick's régime. But, just as in Cyprus in 1228, Frederick's aggression in attacking John of Beirut forced such moderates into the Ibelins' camp. There was now a principle at stake: what right had the emperor to destroy an individual baron, and if he could do this to one baron, why not to others? (Edbury 1997: 45). The Commune of Acre was thus more widely representative of baronial interests than John's personal resistance to Frederick had been.

The Commune acted as a surrogate parliament, in circumstances in which no High Court could be summoned – because for that a representative of the crown was needed – and in which withdrawing service from the crown, according to the baronial understanding of the *Assise sur la ligece*, was pointless in any case because Filangieri was using his Italian army rather than feudal service from the kingdom. Although it probably never exercised any governmental functions, the Commune did determine baronial policy until Conrad, Frederick's heir, came of age in 1243 (Prawer 1980: 54–76). During the 1230s, the kingdom remained divided between Filangieri's imperial régime in Tyre and Jerusalem, and the communards, who were loyal to Balian of Sidon and after 1239 his replacement Odo of Montbéliard. The situation would have been more dangerous had the Ayyubids not been bound by the truce of 1229.

Frederick II's truce with al-Kamil guaranteed the security of Jerusalem for ten years, ten months and ten days, which according to Islamic custom was the maximum length for a treaty with infidels. As early as 1234 Gregory IX began to alert western rulers and barons to the need to prepare to defend the holy city (Lower 2005: 17–21), and although some crusaders were diverted to the Latin Empire of Constantinople, Theobald, count of Champagne, together with the duke of Burgundy and a number of other Burgundian nobles, left for the Holy Land in 1239 (Weiler 2000: 192–206). They were followed in 1240 by an English expedition led by Richard, earl of Cornwall, the king's brother. The timing for a crusade was auspicious, because al-Kamil's death a year earlier had left the Ayyubid Empire divided between his sons as-Salih and al-Adil II. Despite a defeat near Gaza, Theobald's crusade succeeded in reinforcing the military presence in the kingdom, and between 1240 and 1242 Richard of Cornwall refortified Ascalon and negotiated a treaty with as-Salih to evict the Muslims from Jerusalem again. The treaty of 1241 reconstituted the kingdom of Jerusalem to its greatest extent since 1187: it now included the whole of the Galilee and the plain of Jaffa, and lacked only the Samaritan region between Jericho and Bethsan, the Judean desert and Transjordan, and the Gaza region. This represented, as the crusade's most recent historian has observed, 'a stunning territorial success' despite military failure and the inability of Theobald of Champagne to keep his forces united (Lower 2005: 158–9). Even more might have been accomplished had Richard, in particular, been able to count on the support of a united baronage and the Military Orders. Whether this surprising outcome was, as one historian has expressed it, 'a miracle visited upon fools' (Painter 1969: 463–4), the result of Theobald's dogged cleverness (Jackson 1987: 32–60), or dependent on events in the Ayyubid Empire rather than any action undertaken by the crusaders (Tyerman 2006: 766), depends on one's point of view. One reason for the crusade's apparent success, as Lower has pointed out, may be that it was precisely the kind of tough political bargaining in intractable military circumstances that was needed in 1239–41 with which French and English barons were familiar

from their domestic wranglings with each other and their kings (Lower 2005: 159–160). Part of the difficulty faced by the crusaders of 1239–41 in their dealings with the barons of Outremer was that Richard of Cornwall was Frederick II's brother-in-law and seems to have been regarded by both as the emperor's representative in the East. Certainly the Palestinian barons felt hard done by when the most important of the newly acquired territories, Ascalon, was handed over to Filangieri, strengthening his hand in the kingdom. If they had expected anything to change when Conrad entered his majority in 1243, they were disappointed, for Frederick continued to grant rights and privileges as though still king. They now developed a new constitutional argument, namely that since the rightful king – Conrad – had not come to claim his throne, he should still be regarded as a minor, and as represented through the regency of Alice, the daughter of Henry of Champagne and Isabel, who was the next in line to the throne after him. This was in fact the same claim that Raymond of Tripoli had made in claiming the regency in 1174.

Briefly the barons seemed to have gained the upper hand, when in 1243 they wrested Tyre away from the Italians and entered Jerusalem. For the first time since 1187, the Templum Domini was restored to the kingdom, through an alliance with Damascus. At the same time Galilee and the lordship of Sidon were resettled, and the future must have looked promising. But the barons' policy of alliance with Damascus, though understandable, proved tactically disastrous. In a sense they were caught on the wrong side. Their resistance to Frederick meant that as-Salih had no need to observe any treaty, because, as he told the pope, he was bound only by treaty made with the imperial representative. As soon as the barons exercised their autonomy from the emperor, therefore, they lost his protection against the Egyptians. As-Salih, moreover, was strengthened by his own alliance with a central Asian Turkish people recently displaced by the Mongols, the Khwarasmians. As-Salih employed them as paid allies in his attempt to govern Syria, and in late summer, as part of a sweeping series of raids across the region, the Khwarasmians sacked defenceless Jerusalem and behaved with considerable savagery towards the Christian population and the holy places. The Franks, in order to counter this, joined forces with Damascus. In October 1244 the Egyptian–Khwarasmian army destroyed the Damascene–Frankish forces at La Forbie, near Gaza. Many of the territories gained by the treaty of 1241 were now reoccupied by as-Salih. The battle of La Forbie, though less famous today than Hattin, was no less important. The slaughter was far more comprehensive, and the battle marked the last occasion on which the kingdom's nobility was able to operate as an effective military force. Of the Military Orders, only thirty-six out of 348 Templars, twenty-six out of 351 Hospitallers and three out of 400 Teutonic knights escaped alive. The patriarch of Jerusalem put the total losses at 16,000 men (Richard 1999: 329–30). Frederick II blamed the recalcitrant barons and the Templars, but in fact even a baronage united

behind the new imperial *bailli*, Thomas of Accerra, might have been similarly defeated, and a continued policy of non-engagement with the Ayyubids was probably no longer realistic.

St Louis, the 'king over the water'

Louis IX became king of France as a boy of seven in 1226, but the regency of his mother Blanche, and the early years of his personal rule, were shaped by internal upheavals arising from the acquisition of vast new territories by the crown since 1204. Louis may have taken the cross after hearing the news of the devastation of Jerusalem by the Khwarasmians, but the defeat at La Forbie was not yet known in the West, and it seems equally likely that his vow, taken in December 1244, was the result of his recovery from serious illness. In hindsight the crusade looks like the obvious means by which Louis could enact his ideology of Christian kingship. Already known for a singular piety, Louis had in 1239 acquired the crown of thorns, a relic symbolising Christ's kingship.

Despite the gravity of the situation in the kingdom of Jerusalem, it was by no means easy to recruit for a new crusade after 1244. The pope, while approving Louis' vow, tried to persuade him to fulfil it by joining the crusade he preached against Frederick II at the Council of Lyons in 1245, rather than in recovering Jerusalem. Louis managed to walk a tightrope between the two, sending forces to defend the papacy but at the same time reminding the pope of the limits of papal power in France. He remained on cordial terms with the emperor while letting him know, in a letter of 1247, that he refused to enter into any agreement about the restoration of any territories that might be conquered in the East to the kingdom of Jerusalem, as Frederick, who still styled himself king of Jerusalem, had demanded (Jackson 2009: 41–2). Rather petulantly, Henry III of England at first refused to allow the crusade to be preached in England, before giving way in the face of baronial enthusiasm. Simon de Montfort, earl of Leicester, himself the grandson of a crusader, and Henry's two half-brothers (both of them, confusingly, with identical names to twelfth-century crusaders, William Longsword and Guy of Lusignan) took the cross (Tyerman 1988: 108–10). Elsewhere in Europe there was less enthusiasm: Haakon of Norway, despite having already taken the cross, declined to join Louis, and neither Frederick II himself nor the pope was keen for German barons to enlist (Richard 1999: 340). In fact, Frederick warned the sultan of Egypt about the impending attack on him.

The result was that Louis' crusade was largely a French affair, in which the organisation and financing was undertaken by the French royal government (Jordan 1979: *passim*). Louis was given authority to tax ecclesiastical revenues to pay for the crusade, and in addition he imposed a tax of his own on the French towns. A new port, Aigues-Mortes, was built on the south coast specifically for embarkation, so that all aspects of preparation and

logistics could be undertaken on territory controlled by the French crown. The financial preparations for the crusade, based on a successful governmental machine, were thorough enough to ensure that Louis could afford to take into his household nobles and their retinues who, like Jean de Joinville, seneschal of Champagne, had run out of their own money (Smith 2008: 179). Louis financed his expedition through taxation of towns and a tithe of one tenth on the French Church, and credit was handled by the Templars and Italian bankers. As Joinville would point out in 1250, up to that point Louis had not spent any of his own money on the crusade, but rather what he had secured in loans and through taxation (Smith 2008: 250).

Louis sailed in August 1248 and arrived in Cyprus in September. One of the puzzles in his strategy is why, instead of making straight for the Holy Land, he delayed so long that he had to over-winter on the island. Not all of his forces had been able to leave at the same time; his brother Alphonse of Poitiers, who had encountered difficulties in recruiting, did not leave France until August 1249. It is also possible that he was as yet undecided about the best strategy to adopt; certainly his preferred option of a frontal assault on Egypt was only one of a number offered by the Cypriot and Palestinian barons (Richard 1992: 117–19). But Ayyubid power was still, as in 1218, based in the heartland of Egypt. Louis realised, moreover, that there were many ways in which his forces could be frittered away in alliances with this or other rulers in Syria, but that the best hope of lasting success lay in inflicting a single decisive military blow to the rulers in whose control the Holy Land lay. If this coincided with Louis' own traditional view of what a crusade ought to be, it was still first of all a strategically sound policy.

The seizure of Damietta, which thirty years earlier had taken fourteen months, was accomplished in 1249 in a single beachhead landing. Joinville, whose autobiographical memoir of his king provides the fullest and most vivid account of the campaign, captures the excitement and intensity of the occasion. The arrival of John of Ibelin, count of Jaffa, evidently impressed him. As for Louis, at his first sight of the enemy on disembarking, he was fully prepared to charge at them (Smith 2008: 183). In the event, there was scarcely any need for a fight, for the Egyptians simply abandoned Damietta. News had spread of the sultan's illness, and it was assumed that he was already dead. The crusade could scarcely have had a more auspicious beginning.

Because it was already June, there was no time to continue towards Cairo before the Nile flooded. Louis consolidated his position in Damietta, first beating off an attempt to recapture it, then securing its future as a French conquest. Louis seems to have regarded it as a personal – or perhaps a national – conquest; there was certainly no thought either of annexing it to the kingdom of Jerusalem or (as al-Kamil had attempted in 1219) of using it as a bargaining counter with the sultan for the return of Jerusalem. A Frenchman was appointed archbishop and the cathedral, founded in 1220 during the Fifth Crusade, was restored. Louis, indeed, seems to have regarded French colonisation and settlement in conquered parts of Egypt as an

inherent part of his crusade, and, according to Matthew Paris, had even brought with him supplies of ploughs, harrows and other agricultural equipment (Richard 1976: 197–208). Joinville was troubled by the king's insistence on retaining control over all captured property, including food supplies, rather than dividing it up according to crusading custom among the army (Smith 2008: 186–7). Louis was adopting the same fundamental view as Pelagius had in 1219, that territories conquered by crusaders were within the gift of crusaders. But because he was the undisputed leader of his crusade, there was no repetition of the infighting that had followed the capture in 1219. This makes it easy to miss the significance of what he was doing. Throughout crusading, a fault-line ran through crusaders' perceptions of the status of conquered territories. On the Second Crusade, Louis VII's intention to enfeoff his own vassal with Damascus lost him the support of the Palestinian barons; the proposed conquest of Egypt in 1177 may have foundered for the same reasons, and the disagreements between Richard I and his followers and the native barons over the fate of restored territory jeopardised the success of the Third Crusade.

It was still not decided whether Louis would follow the exact route of the Fifth Crusade. The more cautious strategy of first seizing Alexandria, the other Ayyubid access to the Mediterranean, was favoured by most of the barons. But the king's brother, Robert of Artois, attacked this plan on the grounds that it was better to attack the head rather than the tail of the serpent (Smith 2008: 190), and Louis favoured this advice. Joinville leaves little doubt that fraternal affection played a role in the decision, but in fact Robert's advice was sound: it made sense to attack Cairo while the sultan was still ailing, and besides, the route south from Alexandria led through desert, so the army would have had to return to Damietta in any case before marching south. Louis' decision was consistent with his preference for as immediate a confrontation as possible with an Ayyubid army.

The problem with such a strategy, however, is that it required for success not only a measure of luck but good generalship. Louis' previous campaigning experience in Poitou had been largely successful, but there he was up against the inept Henry III and on his own ground; he may have been a competent soldier but he was certainly no Lionheart in his grasp of tactics. Even Joinville, whose *Life of Louis* was written as part of the evidence put forward by the Capetian dynasty for Louis' sanctity, portrays him as a courageous and enthusiastic fighter rather than as a strategist or tactician (Gaposchkin 2008: 185–8). The route south to Cairo led first to the fortress of Mansurah, built by al-Kamil in 1219. The crusaders reached this in mid-December 1249, but they found their way ahead by river blocked by a fleet, and Egyptian forces to their east. The only way forward was now to cross an arm of the Nile and attack the fortress. Louis, who must have known this, had his engineers build a bridge and causeway to cross the river, but this had to be abandoned in the face of fierce resistance. Several weeks passed in static warfare as the Egyptians tried to prevent the crusaders' crossing of

the river by destroying their *chats-châtel*s (defensive towers to protect the engineers who were attempting to build the bridge). At the same time the Egyptians also dug away the ground on their side so as to widen the river. Finally, in early February 1250, the army learned from one of the Bedouin about an alternative crossing place where they could ford the river without the need for a bridge.

The fording place eventually chosen for the crossing was not ideal, because it entailed splitting the army. Instead of waiting for the king with the bulk of his troops, Robert, leading the vanguard, stormed the Egyptian camp outside Mansurah and, emboldened by easy success, blundered into the town itself. Neither the Grand Master of the Templars – who was incensed that Robert, rather than he, had been given the honour of leading the army across the ford – nor the king could stop him. In the narrow streets of Mansurah, Robert, with William Longsword and many of the English, were slaughtered.

At this point the crusade might yet have achieved something: indeed, they had won a minor victory in crossing the Nile, even though they had not forced the Egyptians out of Mansurah. Moreover, as-Salih had died in November 1249, and the new sultan, not yet secure in his inheritance, was clearly unnerved by the presence of a Frankish army in the Delta. But the crusaders' losses were too great for them to continue the assault, especially after an Egyptian counter-attack had been repulsed with further losses. While Louis was trying to enter negotiations with the sultan, however, the Egyptians outmanoeuvred the crusaders by navigating the lower reaches of the Nile and depriving them of fresh supplies from Damietta. Disease, according to Joinville caused by eating the river fish that had themselves fed off corpses, spread rapidly through the camp, until perhaps only a few hundred knights remained in fighting condition. A strategic withdrawal to Damietta followed, in the hope of gathering their forces and perhaps sending for reinforcements. The retreat, in early April, was hampered both by the illness of the king himself and by simple mistakes – the failure to cut bridges behind them, for example, made the Egyptians' pursuit easier. A day short of Damietta, the crusaders capitulated. Louis himself was captured. The humiliation of the crusade was complete. Damietta was given up as ransom for Louis himself, and the figure of 800,000 bezants set for the army. The course of the whole campaign, including the terms agreed for the ransom, was summarised in a letter sent back by Louis to the people of France in the summer of 1250 (Jackson 2009: 108–14). This may have stimulated the popular reaction that gave rise to the movement known as the 'Shepherds' Crusade'. In the spring of 1251, groups of people from rural areas of north-east France and Flanders began to gather and converged on Paris in a penitential procession. Their purpose was to shame the nobility, both those who had failed on the crusade and those who had not taken the cross. Like the Children's Crusade of 1212, the peasants were probably sincere in reflecting religious sensibilities that were well known from crusade

preaching. In this respect, their hope of accomplishing victory as an underclass where the great and powerful had failed echoed central features of the Gospel. At the same time, however, they wanted the regency government, under Louis' mother, Blanche of Castile, to take action in the East. Although Blanche was initially sympathetic, eventually the movement dispersed into lawless gangs running wild throughout the country (Barber 1984: 1–23).

Louis' failure was all the more disappointing because the preparations had been so meticulous and the conditions so generally favourable. Despite superficial similarities with the Fifth Crusade, the military campaign failed for different reasons. There was no precipitate dash for Mansurah ahead of the floods, no division in the leadership. Louis' strategic decisions were, on the whole, eminently sensible. It was at the tactical level, rather, that mistakes were made. Joinville, out of loyalty for his lord, declined to blame the one figure whom the ample evidence of his chronicle accuses for the débâcle at Mansurah, Robert of Artois. As a soldier, Joinville knew that a commander was only as good as his subordinates, and the ultimate blame for failure to control his army must rest with Louis himself. But the assault on Mansurah had been compromised even before Robert had forded the Nile, by the failure to cross in a position where the whole army could operate together. Despite his foresight in bringing engineers to build a causeway, Louis was defeated by the geography and topography of the Nile. The final defeat was the result of being trapped without supplies between an army in Mansurah and a fleet between themselves and the safety of Damietta. The great irony of Louis' failure was that the final débâcle took place against the background of the collapse of the Ayyubid régime in Egypt. As-Salih's successor, Turanshah, was murdered by his own Mamluks just days before the king was released from captivity, probably because they resented the fact that he had brought advisers with him from Baghdad. The political union between Egypt and Syria forged by Saladin in the last quarter of the twelfth century was broken; the Ayyubids were henceforth limited to Syria, while the Mamluks kept Egypt. This situation naturally benefited the kingdom of Jerusalem, and Louis remained in the East for a further four years in order to guide its affairs. To an extent this was forced on him by the need to extricate something from the crusade; he had left most of his army in captivity when he sailed to Acre in May 1250, and only managed to arrange their release by a new treaty with the Mamluks in 1252. His presence in Acre made him *de facto* ruler of the kingdom of Jerusalem; that he was recognised as such by neighbouring states is evidenced by the Ayyubid invitation that he should join them in the reconquest of Egypt in July 1250. At one point it looked as though Louis might have been able to restore Jerusalem as the price of his alliance with the new Mamluk régime against Ayyubid Damascus. But he was understandably cautious, and the chance was lost when the khalif patched up the Mamluk/Ayyubid division in 1253. Louis spent his time in refortifying the kingdom's towns, notably Jaffa, Caesarea, Sidon and Acre.

A further ten-year-and-ten-month truce was agreed for most of the kingdom, excluding Jaffa, before Louis returned to France in 1254. One of the most significant results of the crusade was the permanent presence of a small force of knights paid by the French crown, under the command of Geoffrey de Sergines, who became seneschal of the kingdom. This was to be a commitment maintained until Louis' death in 1270.

Crusading resources between the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and the Second Council of Lyons (1274) were overwhelmingly directed against Egypt. There were good strategic reasons for this, both in the long and the short term. Egypt, though subject to violent changes of régime in 1171 and 1250, was fundamentally a politically stable country. Its geographical isolation from the other centres of power in the Islamic world meant that its conquest would not necessarily involve the defence of difficult frontiers: if it was difficult to conquer, it would also be comparatively easy to defend. Moreover it was agriculturally self-sufficient, because of the natural fertility of the Nile Delta. The spice trade from the Indian Ocean, and the flow of gold from West Africa, fetched up in Alexandria and Damietta before being filtered to western European markets. Economically, Egypt was a rich prize. In both 1218 and 1248 Egyptian campaigns also made political sense. Al-Adil's refusal to give battle in Palestine in 1217–18 forced the crusaders into a diversionary attack. In 1248, as-Salih's war with Aleppo offered the prospect of stretched Ayyubid resources, and the sultan's decline and death in 1249 only confirmed this judgement.

It should not be forgotten, however, that during the period up to 1274 Crusades were still launched to other destinations than Egypt. Frederick II's crusade and that of 1239–41, which was a natural consequence of the treaty of 1229, showed that a role was evolving in crusading policy for a balance of defensive warfare and diplomacy in Palestine. In the 1260s, indeed, the Mamluk's assault on the Crusader States under Baibars returned the Holy Land to the forefront of crusade policy. In 1265 Pope Urban IV announced to the barons of the kingdom of Jerusalem that he was already preaching a new crusade, and after the defeat of Frederick II's heir in Sicily, Manfred, in 1266, both preaching and recruitment resumed with new vigour across western Europe under Pope Clement IV. The crusade was to be a consortial alliance of western forces. The death of Clement in 1268, however, led to a three-year vacancy in the papal office. As has recently been pointed out, this expedition shows that it was possible to launch a crusade without a pope (Baldwin 2014: 35), but its fate may also be said to show how badly things could go wrong without a directing presence. In particular, there was no one with sufficient authority or influence to harness misguided ambition of Louis IX himself to lead another crusade.

James I of Aragon set sail for Acre with high hopes in 1269, but turned back when he fell sick, and the few hundred of his knights who reached the Holy Land were able to do little more than help in the defence of Acre against Baibars. Edward, the heir to Henry III of England, also landed in

Acre in 1271, but his force by itself was so small that he dared not risk battle and contented himself with a raid or two and the repair of Acre's walls. Both James' and Edward's campaigns were intended to link up with a larger force led by Louis IX. A combination of Louis' own strategic misjudgement and, perhaps, his conception of crusade as marching hand-in-hand with conversion, diverted the French expedition to Tunis, where in August 1270, before the walls of the city he was trying to besiege, Louis died. According to William de Nangis' *Life of Saint Louis*, the king had been persuaded that the emir of Tunis was prepared to consider converting to Christianity (Richard 1992: 320–1). One theory is that Louis, either through alliance with the emir or through conquest of Tunis, intended to use the emirate's considerable resources to pay for the upkeep of the kingdom of Jerusalem. Another theory, current since the aftermath of the expedition, is that Louis was persuaded by his brother, Charles of Anjou, now king of Sicily, to divert his forces to the conquest of Tunis in order to further his ambitions in north Africa. More than a hundred years earlier Roger II of Sicily had briefly conquered Tunis and attempted to create a north African appendage to the kingdom of Sicily, but by the late 1260s the geopolitical situation was very different, and Charles' interests would not, in fact, have been served by the conquest of Tunis. In fact, he was far more concerned with the prospect of conquests in the eastern Mediterranean than north Africa. If Tunis had indeed been Charles' preferred destination, it is inexplicable that he did not begin preparing to attack it in conjunction with Louis before the summer of 1270 (Richard 1992: 321–2).

In the event Charles made the most of the situation by patching up a truce with the emir and packing up the siege. The crusade splintered: only Edward determined to carry on to the Holy Land, but he was powerless to achieve much, and an anticipated alliance with the Mongols failed. The opportunity to recover what Baibars had conquered was squandered. Although western Europeans would have been surprised had they known, it would prove to be the last chance before the final sunset fell over the mainland Crusader States.



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10 Crusading and the Holy Land in the later Middle Ages

Key Dates

1258	Mongols sack Baghdad
1258–62	War of St Sabas
1260	Mongols capture Damascus
1261	Mamluks under Baibars defeat Mongols at Ain Jalud
1268	Mamluks capture Antioch
1270	failure of Louis IX's Tunis Crusade; Louis dies at Tunis
1271	fall of Krak des Chevaliers to Mamluks
1274	Second Council of Lyons: the first recovery treatises; papal bull <i>Cum pro negotio</i> establishes centralised system for collecting tithes for Crusades
1277	disputed succession in kingdom of Jerusalem; Charles of Anjou assumes royal title
1291	Mamluks capture Acre; fall of kingdom of Jerusalem
1314	Templars suppressed by Council of Vienne
1333	Franciscans return to Jerusalem; 'recovery' of holy places
1336	collapse of Philip VI's proposed crusade
1365	Peter I of Cyprus sacks Alexandria
1396	Franco-Burgundian-Hungarian crusade of Nicopolis defeated by Ottomans
1444	crusade of Varna defeated by Ottomans
1453	Ottoman capture of Constantinople
1570	Ottoman capture of Cyprus
1571	alliance of Christian powers defeats Ottoman fleet at Lepanto

The later Crusades, 1274–1336

Why did crusading fail so often in its military aims, and what did Europeans make of such failure? The period from 1274 is distinguished by a deep level of reflection about crusading and how to make it work; yet in the end the fall of Acre in 1291 brought no response comparable to the Third Crusade

after Hattin. In this chapter the final disintegration of the Crusader States is set against a background of continuing failures in papal attempts to organise Crusades. The new genre of 'recovery treatises' is used to examine some of the structural flaws in crusade planning in the late-thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Crusading activities and sensibilities by the end of the fourteenth century had been realigned to meet a different kind of challenge. Recovery of the Holy Land seemed a rather circumscribed and limited aim in the face of the mobility and reach of the Ottomans, and in the fifteenth century and beyond, the challenge for Christian Europe was defence against this new Islamic power.

Mongols, Mamluks and the Crusader States

Even while wintering in Cyprus in 1248, St Louis had looked farther afield, to the world beyond Islam. By the time he arrived in the East, the military threat posed to the civilised world by the Mongols was well known. Matthew Paris, the chronicler of St Albans, captured the mood of apprehension in northern Europe when he reported that in 1239 even the annual Baltic herring fleets did not put in at Yarmouth for fear that the Mongols were on the move, hundreds of miles to the east (Luard, vol. III 1876: 488). Like many contemporaries, he believed that the Mongols were the descendants of the hordes of Gog and Magog, who according to tradition had been confined to the frozen wastes of Asia by Alexander the Great. Whoever they were, they were a sufficient threat for the heir to the German throne, Conrad IV, to mobilise a German army to defend northern Europe against them in the spring of 1241, and German bishops began to preach a crusade against the Mongols (Jackson 1991: 1–18). In that year, after sweeping in an arc of destruction through southern Russia, Poland and Hungary, a Mongol army stood poised to seize Vienna, before abandoning the European campaign because of the lack of sufficient pasture and the need to elect a new khan. In 1243 a separate Mongol force defeated the Seljuqs of Asia Minor, and tribute was demanded of both Aleppo and Antioch. The pope, alerted to the threat to the Christian lands of the East, sent an embassy to the new khan, Guyuk, in Karakorum, in 1245. Innocent IV asked by what authority the Mongols attacked the lands of Christians who had offered them no threat. The reply was chilling. 'We do not understand your words', Guyuk told the pope's Franciscan envoy, John of Plan Carpino, and he continued, 'Through God's power, all lands, from east to west, have been granted to us' (Dawson 1955: 85–6). The khan demanded nothing less than the total submission of all rulers, temporal and spiritual, Christian and Muslim, to himself as universal world ruler.

From what had been observed so far of Mongol military capability, this was a very real threat. But it was also logical to those Europeans who had been tempted to identify the Mongols with the mythical Christian ruler of the East, 'Prester John'. The tradition of a powerful eastern ruler who would

march west to smash the forces of Islam from behind had been alive since the Second Crusade. After a period of dormancy, expectations had been revived in 1220 during the Fifth Crusade, when contact had actually been made with the Mongols, albeit inadvertently, for the first time. The experience of the 1240s seemed to support the legend's claims of the might of this new power in the East, but not necessarily of its goodwill towards western Christendom. In fact the expectation that the Mongols might be sympathetic to Christendom was more than wishful thinking. The Church of the East, which began to spread throughout Persia in the sixth century when the followers of the heretical patriarch of Constantinople, Nestorius, were exiled from the Byzantine Empire, had for centuries successfully proselytised in central Asia, and some of the tribes who made up the Mongol federation were members of this Church. At the time of Louis' capture of Damietta, rumours spread as far as England of the conversion of the khan by an Indian monk (Luard 1880: 87). The Syrian chronicler Bar Hebraeus believed that Guyuk was himself a Christian. One of the wives of Mongka, who became khan in 1255, was Christian, and hopes were high that he would himself convert. Both the pope's envoys in the 1240s, John of Plan Carpino and Andrew of Longjumeau, and the Dominican sent by Louis from Acre in 1253, William of Rubruck, pursued the conversion of the Mongols alongside their request for alliance. According to Joinville, William even took with him a specially designed portable chapel decorated with pictures representing the Annunciation and other tenets of the faith (Smith 2008: 178). The Mongols regarded this as, at best, puzzling, at worst, insulting: they had their own perfectly good religious traditions, and besides – remembering eastern Europe – why should they adopt the faith of people whom they had conquered so easily? But the Mongol khans were shrewd enough to recognise that their own ambitions of conquering the Near East would be enhanced by acting in concert with Islam's western enemies, and in 1262 Hulagu, the Mongol leader in the Near East, offered an alliance to Louis IX. An uneasy series of temporary alliances with the Mongols followed in the second half of the thirteenth century, but it was always an unequal relationship, and nothing substantial came of any of them.

The Mongol project of world domination began formally in 1253, with the targeting of three arenas of conquest – Europe, China and the Near East. Hulagu, the il-khan responsible for the conquest of the Near East, caused tremors throughout the East by his sack of Baghdad in 1258. The Abbasid khalifate, which had been in existence since the eighth century, was abolished. Early in 1260 Aleppo and Damascus were conquered: Ayyubid Syria seemed to have been destroyed in a single short campaign. While Pope Alexander IV and the Franks in the East watched nervously, Bohemond VII of Antioch and Hethoum I of Armenia, his father-in-law, both submitted to the Mongols: Antiochenes even took part as allies in the sack of Damascus, thereby finally achieving what had been intermittently attempted since the beginning of the Crusader States. The pragmatic attitude of

Antioch, though deplored by the patriarch of Jerusalem, was rewarded by the restoration of former territories taken by the Ayyubids. But any hopes of accomplishing the restoration of the Holy Land on the backs of the Mongol cavalry were dashed in September 1260 at one of the most decisive battles to take place in the Near East since the first Arab invasion in the seventh century. At 'Ain Jalud, in Galilee, the Mamluks of Egypt routed Kitbuqa, Hulagu's general, and the Mongols were forced to withdraw across the Euphrates. Those Christians who had sided with the Mongols would pay dearly for choosing the wrong side.

The architect of Mamluk success during the 1260s was Baibars, who not only reconfigured the territorial empire fashioned by Saladin a hundred years earlier, but rediscovered the religious zeal of the later twelfth century (Thorau 1995). His victories were built on the foundation of governmental reform in Egypt that delivered ultimate power to a military élite, the Mamluks, or slaves, usually Christians from Asia Minor, who were educated in Islam and given military training and their freedom. In 1263 he failed to take Acre, but succeeded in pillaging Nazareth and Mt Tabor, signalling his deep-rooted hostility to Christianity. The balance of power that had been created between al-Kamil and Frederick II, and renewed by the treaty of 1241 and by the diplomacy of Louis IX, was upset. The Franks of Outremer were caught off guard by this new political configuration, but in any case the barons of the kingdoms of Jerusalem and Cyprus, the Antiochenes and the Military Orders lacked the resources to deal with an enemy who had no other distractions and who was determined to put an end to western settlement in Outremer. In 1265 Caesarea and Arsuf fell; in 1266 Safed, the great Templar castle in Galilee. Equally worrying was the destruction of an Armenian army, which left Antioch defenceless, and two years later the city itself fell amid scenes of anti-Christian savagery. Baibars himself boasted of the massacre of monks and priests, and the firing of the cathedral of St Peter (Gabrieli 1984: 310–12). The destruction was so complete that the city was never again to amount to anything more than a provincial village. To the south, Jaffa surrendered in the same year, and the process of reducing the Military Orders began with the seizure of their castles: Krak des Chevaliers and Montfort both fell in 1271. The fall of the greatest of crusader castles, Krak des Chevaliers, signalled not so much the Hospitallers' inability to defend it as the futility of maintaining a castle that had once been the centre of a powerful and prosperous lordship but which, as the last quarter of the century approached, no longer reflected the Order's influence or reach. The systematic nature of Baibars' conquest is demonstrated by the destruction of everything that he did not intend to reuse himself; he left no room for accommodation because he was not interested in coming to terms with the Franks. It is also significant that he treated the indigenous Christian population in the same way as he did the Franks, massacring the peasantry near Acre and the inhabitants of Qara, near the Orontes. Perhaps the only thing that saved the Franks in Outremer for another twenty years was that

Baibars was as virulently anti-Mongol as anti-Christian, and during the last few years before his death in 1277 he concentrated on trying to reduce their power in the Near East.

Just as in 1190–2, the Franks were unable to put aside constitutional wrangles even at times of extreme danger. The ‘War of St Sabas’ (1258–62) developed out of a struggle between two commercial colonial powers, the Venetians and Genoese, over jurisdictions and privileges in Acre, but dragged in the Military Orders and local baronage, and spilled over into other towns in what became a civil war. Then, at least, the external threat had been less grave. In 1277, however, the Franks ‘managed to make things infinitely worse for themselves by indulging in the luxury of two kings’ (Mayer 1988: 271). This was because the crown was disputed between two descendants of the daughters of Isabel I – Hugh III of Cyprus, the grandson of Alice, daughter of Isabel by her marriage to Henry of Champagne, and Maria of Antioch, Isabel’s granddaughter from her final marriage to Amalric II of Jerusalem. Most barons preferred Hugh’s claim, doubtless in part because he was a man, but also on the principle that he was descended from the more senior line of Isabel. In 1277, however, Maria, realising she would get nowhere with her claim, sold it to Charles of Anjou, king of Sicily. Although the Hohenstaufen line had finally been extinguished in 1268, Charles seemed to regard the claim to the crown of Jerusalem as belonging to the kingdom of Sicily, which he had been granted by the pope, rather than to a particular dynasty. Charles never attempted to claim what was left of the kingdom in person, but recent research in the archives of the Angevin administration in Sicily has shown the previously under-appreciated extent of his interest in it. Charles was sending subsidies and supplies to the Hospitallers in the Holy Land from soon after his conquest of Sicily in 1266 (Baldwin 2014: 106–12). Following Hohenstaufen policy since 1229, he sent a *bailli*, Roger of San Severino, to represent him. In the event, Charles was unable from a distance to command the loyalties of the remaining barons. The Templars aligned themselves behind Charles and prevented Hugh III from entering Acre; when he returned to Cyprus the kingdom was left once more effectively kingless.

By the time that Charles’ administration collapsed in 1282, in the wake of the ‘Sicilian Vespers’ – the revolt against his rule in Sicily – individual barons had already begun to make separate treaties with the Mamluks for their own security. Palestine and Syria were returning to the situation of c.1099–1110, albeit one in which Christian and Muslim positions were reversed, with individual lordships preserving a precarious autonomy for as long as possible in the face of a heavy military superiority. Division of territories was common: for example, at Chateau Pèlerin, on the coast south of Haifa, the town and its fortifications, with their cultivable land, gardens and vineyards and sixteen surrounding villages, remained Frankish, while eight villages belonged to the sultan Qalawun and the remainder of the lordship was divided between Franks and Muslims (Richard 1999: 444).

The notion of divided ownership required a joint Frankish and Mamluk administration to collect revenues and give justice. Although the odds were weighed heavily in favour of the Mamluks, who insisted on Frankish neutrality in such areas in the event of a crusade, it was the best that the remaining Franks could hope for.

The death of Abaga, the strong pro-western Mongol commander in the Near East, in 1285, left the way open for a fresh assault on the last Frankish lordships. This began in the North, with the seizure of the Hospitaller castle of Margat in 1285 and Latakia in 1287. Qalawun's campaign was aided by chronic warfare between Pisa and Genoa, in which Venice joined the Pisan side. Italian possessions in the Levant were dragged into the war, with the result that in 1289 Tripoli, from which the Genoese had expelled the comital administration, fell to Qalawun. The city was completely destroyed and the population either killed or enslaved; naturally, the smaller towns on the coast fell in their turn or capitulated. Amid concern over the fate of Acre, western help began to arrive, and Pope Nicholas IV launched a crusade early in 1290. Promises of immediate contingents for the city's defence were secured from James II of Aragon and Edward I of England. The truce covering Acre was broken at Easter when Qalawun used the killing of some Muslim merchants by a group of Italian crusaders as a reason for assaulting the city (Little 1986: 177). Even Qalawun's death in the summer of 1290 could hardly slow the preparations now clearly under way for a massive Mamluk assault on Acre.

Acre had been the heart of the Frankish presence in the East for more than a century. The population, which had probably doubled in the thirteenth century, stood at around 20,000 – easily the largest in the Crusader States. The walls had recently been reinforced, and the city could be supplied with extra manpower and food from the sea. Moreover, the kingdom at last had an adult male king whose authority was unquestioned – Henry II, son of Hugh III of Cyprus, whose coronation in 1286 had been fêted with two weeks of festivities in Acre. Henry arrived in the city early in May with a detachment from Cyprus and defiantly refused the sultan's terms of surrender. But his confidence was misplaced. By the middle of May the Mamluk sappers had undermined a tower in the outer wall, and the Templar Grand Master William of Beaujeu was killed in the fighting. The evacuation of non-combatants began as the fighting spilled into the streets, and resistance coalesced around the Military Orders' fortified bases. Towards the end of May the Templars' keep fell; the Franciscans, Dominicans and Claresses were massacred and many women and children who had not been able to leave with King Henry were enslaved; others, including the patriarch of Jerusalem, drowned when the boats used to evacuate them were overloaded and sank in the harbour (Crawford 2001: 113–15). A moving description by Ricoldo of Monte Croce, the Dominican missionary in Baghdad, of lines of prisoners being led off into slavery brings us full circle from the crusaders' massacre of the inhabitants of Jerusalem in 1099 (Röhrich 1884: 258–96; Shagrir 2012: 1107–20).

Tyre, Beirut and Sidon, observing from afar the carnage at Acre, saw no point in resistance; not only could they expect no immediate help from the West, but the Mamluks' siegecraft was simply too effective to withstand. The Frankish and Syrian Christian population of Cyprus expanded hugely from refugees, but very many Franks simply disappeared into the Mamluk labour force. In 1303 while he was in Egypt the Franciscan pilgrim Angelo of Spoleto was still visiting Christians taken prisoner at Acre, and the diplomatic exchanges between James II of Aragon and the sultan indicate that there were Templars in captivity as late as the 1320s (Jotischky 2004). Angelo also reported the presence of 'renegade Christians' – some of them friars who had converted to Islam.

The Mamluk campaign against the Frankish settlements, begun by Baibars in the 1260s, was not simply a continuation of the intermittent warfare between western Christians and Muslims that had characterised the region since 1098. Baibars and his successors Qalawun and al-Ashraf succeeded in accomplishing what, uniquely before them, only Saladin had attempted – the utter eradication of a Frankish power on the mainland. From 1099 until 1187, and then from 1193 to the accession of Baibars, Muslim military leaders – whether Seljuq, Ayyubid or Mamluk – had been prepared to acknowledge the reality of Frankish settlement in the Levant. But the destruction of captured towns such as Antioch, Acre, Sidon and Tripoli was a deliberate policy to ensure that even the physical memory of the Franks would disappear. It may also have reflected Mamluk fear over the superiority of western naval power: destruction of the ports and their fortifications ensured that this would not play to the advantage of any future crusade (Barber 2014: 193). As a result, the continuity of an urban coastal civilisation in west Asia that stretched back into antiquity was disrupted. The Franciscan pilgrim Leopold von Suchem, travelling in the Holy Land in the 1330s, describes wandering along a desolate coastline where once cities and palaces had stood (Stewart 1895: 49–50, 60, 63).

The papacy, crusading and the Holy Land, c.1274–91

It is tempting to assume that because no major expedition landed in the East between 1249 and the fall of Acre, the West lost interest in crusading. This would be entirely mistaken. Particularly from 1274 onward, papal attention on the fate of the Crusader States in the second half of the thirteenth century was intensive, and major expeditions were either planned or launched in 1269–70, 1276 and 1290. That none of them had the intended result was due to a combination of bad luck and divided strategic interests, but above all to the much greater complexity of European politics in the second half of the thirteenth century. Paradoxically, the period from 1274 onward was also one of increased clarity and articulacy in the planning and theorising about Crusades, both in the development of a canonical underpinning for crusading and in the wide-ranging practical measures designed to enable

Crusades to become more effective. Moreover, it is difficult to see any lessening of appetite for crusading among the lay nobility in this period.

One outcome of the failed crusade of 1270 was the election of a pope who would once more put the Holy Land, rather than either national interest or the problems of Italy, at the heart of his policy. The installation of the papally backed Charles of Anjou, brother of Louis IX, in Sicily, his conquest of the Hohenstaufen kingdom in 1266 and execution of the last Hohenstaufen heir, Conradin, in 1268, had offered the hope of a Mediterranean unity that might make a joint crusade possible. It was a hope to be dashed by Louis' ill-considered diversion to Tunis, and the inability to coordinate Aragonese and English forces: both factors exacerbated in their effect by the failure of the cardinals to elect a new pope for three years after the death of Clement IV in 1268. Tedaldo Visconti was in the Holy Land with the Lord Edward's forces when he was elected pope as Gregory X in 1271. Like Innocent III, Gregory saw the crusade as the pinnacle of papal policy, to be supported by a substructure of institutional reform within Christendom. The Second Council of Lyons, summoned by Gregory in 1274, was self-consciously modelled on Fourth Lateran. But the very breadth of his vision, which included the reunion of Latin and Orthodox Churches, may have distracted the energies of Christendom from the single-minded pursuit of the crusade to the East. Gregory saw no merit in hurrying into a crusade; instead he sent out requests for discussion papers to be tabled at the council so that the wise heads of Christendom could tackle the underlying organisational problems that had so beset the 1270 expedition. This approach was to signal the arrival of a new literary genre – the 'recovery treatises', or proposals for the best way to recover the Holy Land.

Some of these treatises were couched as complaints, like that of an anonymous Franciscan who wrote a *Compilation of the Scandals of the Church* (Throop 1940: 69–104). Others were more balanced. The Dominican Master-General, Humbert of Romans, introduced his proposal (*The Opus Tripartitum*, or 'Three-Part Work') by reviewing current criticism of crusading (Throop 1940: 147–83; Schein 1991: 28–36). Such documents give us insights into why contemporaries thought crusading was failing – for example, poor leadership, abuses of the taxation of clerical income, and God's disfavour towards the use of violence – but they do not tell us how widespread or representative such views were. Scepticism about crusading is certainly more widespread in the sources in the later thirteenth century: there is evidence of criticism of some kind against most thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Crusades (Tyerman 1985: 105–6). But, as Humbert's memorandum shows, fundamental doubts about the merits of crusading were mixed with displeasure at the policies that had led to defeat and to general despair that God had abandoned the crusading ideal. A good deal of the thirteenth-century criticism of crusading really consisted of complaints about how they were financed, which is not the same thing as scepticism about the project itself (Siberry 1985: 111–49). Although

attitudes to crusading had certainly developed over the course of 170 years, it is far from clear that the lay nobility as a class was less enthusiastic about it as an endeavour. Part of the difficulty in assessing general levels of enthusiasm, or evaluating the intensity of crusade-orientated piety, lies in the nature of the evidence about this social class, which is both more plentiful and on the whole more articulate than had been the case in the late eleventh century (Smith 2006). It may be that the practical expressions of piety in the form of taking the cross, about which we know so much in the second half of the thirteenth century, represented only a narrow group among the western knighthood. Even so, the self-awareness and the growing sophistication of crusading discourses in this period do not suggest a practice in decline.

One of the problems that had dogged Crusades since the early thirteenth century, and that the Second Council of Lyons was designed to address, was the diffusion of targets. According to Matthew Paris, Richard of Cornwall's crusaders took a public oath to set out for the Holy Land, '[L]est they be prevented from fulfilling their vows by the delaying tactics of the Roman Church, or turned aside from their vows to shed the blood of Christians in Greece or Italy' (Luard 1876: 620). Gregory IX had in 1239 authorised a crusade against the Byzantine 'empire of Nicaea', in order to protect the failing Latin Empire of Constantinople. In 1245, Innocent IV tried to persuade Louis IX to fulfil his crusading vow in the papal crusade against Frederick II, rather than going to Egypt. To popes, there was no conflict of interest here. For one thing, the war against the Hohenstaufen could be rationalised as a necessary action to bring about the unified conditions in the West in which a crusade to the East could succeed. Besides, it was a matter of the logical application of the principle of a justifiable war for the defence of the Church. But to the English crusaders in 1239 – or perhaps to Matthew Paris – it looked as though their sense of priorities – in which the Holy Land represented the height of crusading – was not shared by the papacy.

Some of the doubters, such as William of Tripoli, the Dominican provincial in the Holy Land, whose tract *The State of the Holy Land* advocated peaceful conversion instead of war, represented a minority view among friars. Roger Bacon, the English Franciscan natural philosopher, had as early as 1250 argued that war would never succeed in recovering the Holy Land because each crusade simply instilled greater resentment among a new generation of Muslims, and thus contributed to an endless spiral of violence (Siberry 1985: 207–8). This was itself a reflection of the fundamental critique of crusading in Ralph Niger's *Military Affairs* (1187), but by the mid-thirteenth century Ralph's gloominess had been succeeded by a more positive alternative approach to crusading through conversion. If Roger's views seem hauntingly prescient today, they did not command sufficient respect in 1274. Humbert's response was that, desirable though the peaceful conversion of Muslims would be, it was impossible without securing territory first. The

thirteenth-century kingdom of Jerusalem, lacking the rural hinterland as far east as the Jordan, where the Muslims had largely lived before 1187, had a much higher proportion of Christians to Muslims. Conversion, therefore, could only take place through missionary work in hostile territory, and the experience of Franciscans and Dominicans was that this led to the martyrdom of the missionaries (Siberry 1983: 103–10).

Against this general background of conflicting priorities and mixed signals about the purpose and efficacy of military expeditions to the East, Gregory X attempted to place Jerusalem once more at the forefront of crusading policy (Schein 1991: 20–50). The crusade was preached and revenues collected throughout Christendom, from Frankish Greece to Greenland. But familiar problems arose: Philip III of France was still fighting the king of Castile in 1275, while the new German emperor-elect, Rudolph, did not succeed in defeating the rival claim of the king of Bohemia until 1278. The novel feature of Gregory's crusade was to have been an alliance with the Mongols in the Near East, cemented in an embassy sent to the Council of Lyons. One of the Mongols' ambassadors was a Dominican missionary, David of Ashby, who had first-hand knowledge of their military tactics. From the surviving portions of a treatise he wrote for the pope, it is probable that the alliance was premised – from the Mongols' perspective – on western forces fighting under Mongol command and following Mongol strategy (Richard 1949: 291–7).

Gregory X's crusade, had it ever been launched, had every chance of success in inflicting a military defeat on Baibars (Baldwin 2104: 168–219), but this alone would not have saved the Crusader States. A more permanent commitment to the Frankish remnant in the East was needed. Some strategists, including the heads of the Military Orders, recommended abandoning the traditional 'massed crusade' in favour of smaller, more focused and short-term strategic expeditions that would accomplish specific aims. This kind of crusade, which in the fourteenth century would come to be called the *passagium particulare* as opposed to the *passagium generale*, has of course always been part of the history of the Crusader States. In 1110, the capture of Sidon had been made possible by the armed pilgrimage of the king of Denmark; in 1122, the Venetians had rendered similar service in the siege of Tyre, and the expeditions of Henry the Lion in 1170 and Philip of Flanders in 1177 also fall into this category. St Louis' policy of funding a small permanent force of knights in the Holy Land from 1254 onward (Riley-Smith 2002b: 45–62) provided a model for William, patriarch of Jerusalem, to demand in 1267 the commitment of European rulers to a standing army in the East (Schein 1991: 18). The experience of trying to coordinate different national forces, all leaving at different times, which had proved unmanageable in 1270, doubtless added weight to such opinion. There is evidence that the policy was tried, but although small contingents were sent east in 1272, 1273 and 1275, Gregory regarded these as holding forces to prepare the way for his *passagium generale*.

Gregory's death in 1276, and the succession of a series of short-lived popes over the next ten years, put paid to his *passagium generale*. The collection of tithes for Gregory's crusade continued, but papal policy, whether by design or accident, once again subordinated the needs of the Franks in the East to the Church in the West. Nicholas III (1277–80) was accused of spending the Lyons tithes on rebuilding the Vatican (Schein 1991: 57), while Martin IV (1281–5), himself a Frenchman, openly colluded with the French king Philip III's war against first Castile and then Aragon, which both king and pope were disposed to view as a crusade, on the specious grounds that it was a war fought in order to defend the French kingdom from an external threat that otherwise prevented an expedition to the East. Another obstacle to the realisation of Gregory's crusade was the ambition of Charles of Anjou, king of Sicily. The revolt against his rule in Sicily in 1282, known as the 'Sicilian Vespers', resulted in a flurry of crusading activity, but all directed against Christians – the Byzantine emperor Michael VIII Paleologus, who had fomented trouble among the Greek-speaking population of Sicily, and Peter III of Aragon, who took advantage of the revolt to invade the island.

The Vespers themselves were the consequence of Charles' own ambitions. Determined to create a Mediterranean empire on the axis of Sicily and Constantinople, he persuaded Martin IV to authorise a crusade in 1281 against the 'schismatics and usurpers' of the Byzantine Empire. Martin's nationalist chauvinism thus overturned the policy espoused at Second Lyons of pursuing union between Latin and Orthodox Churches. If we look at the complicated situation from Martin's perspective, it is possible to credit him with believing that Charles really would use his imperial ambitions for the good of the Crusader States – why else, after all, had he bought the title of king of Jerusalem in 1277? Moreover, as we have seen, Charles had supported the Military Orders in the kingdom of Jerusalem financially since the late 1260s. Perhaps Martin was in fact far-sighted enough to realise that the only hope for the kingdom of Jerusalem was the protection that could be offered by a single Christian ruler holding sway throughout the Mediterranean. This, in effect, was what Honorius III had hoped for back in 1225 when he sanctioned the marriage of Frederick II to Yolanda. But in the 1280s it all went spectacularly wrong. Michael VIII responded to the threat of the crusade against him by precipitating the Sicilian revolt, and in January 1283 the crusade was preached against the Sicilian rebels. In 1285 Philip III died leading his disastrous French 'crusade' against Aragon.

Even after the fall of Tripoli in 1289, the new pope Nicholas IV (1288–92) was still issuing indulgences for the Sicilian crusade while making plans for the defence of Acre. Anti-papal sentiment at the diffusion of crusading policy showed its disgust in the speech put into the mouth of a Templar ambassador to the West by the Sicilian chronicler Bartholomew of Neocastro: 'You could have saved the holy land [by using] the might of kings . . . but instead you chose to attack a Christian king and the Christians of Sicily, arming kings against a king to recover the island' (Housley 1982b: 77). It would

be unjust, however, to blame Capetian interests or papal policy alone for delaying a crusade to the East. Edward I of England, asked by Martin IV in 1284 to lead a crusade, frustrated papal attempts to levy a tithe until 1288, and then became embroiled in wars in Wales and Scotland. As Housley has observed, crusading could not take place, either in the minds of planners or in reality, in a political vacuum (1995: 262). Kings always had other commitments, and part of the responsibility of popes had always been, since the 1170s if not earlier, to help to sort out dynastic and territorial conflicts so that the business of crusading could continue.

In fact Nicholas IV was to prove more effective than any pope since Gregory X in organising a *passagium generale* for the Holy Land. In summer of 1290 he sent a small force of Italians to assist in defending Acre; the following spring, the crusade itself was proclaimed for 1293. As in 1270 and 1274–6, this was to be an international enterprise, involving Edward I, Alfonso III of Aragon and his brother James of Sicily, and Charles II of Anjou. Plans for the crusade continued to proceed after the fall of Acre in May 1291. As far as western Christendom was concerned, all that had changed was the need for a new military strategy, since no bridgehead remained from which an attack on Qalawun could be launched. Promised participation widened even further, with the expectation of an end to the Venetian–Genoese war. Of the major western powers, only Philip IV of France refused to become involved. But his stance had a knock-on effect on the crusade, for the threat he posed to English Gascony meant that Edward could not afford to leave the West. Even lobbying by the Grand Master of the Templars could not persuade him. Coincidental deaths also spoiled the pope's plans. Rudolph of Habsburg, Alfonso III and the Mongol il-khan Arghun all died in 1291: there would be no single successor in Germany until 1298, while the accession of James of Sicily to the throne of Aragon meant the eruption of the Sicilian–Angevin war once again, and Arghun's death meant that the opportunity to use Mongol military power in the East, so tantalising a possibility since 1264, had disappeared. In 1292, Nicholas IV himself died. Although he achieved nothing, he was widely recognised at the time, and has been by modern historians, as a crucial figure in the history of crusading (Atiya 1938a: 45–6; Schein 1991: 90–1). The policy he pursued during his pontificate – notably the economic blockade of Egypt and the attempt to reform the Military Orders – not only stemmed directly from the recovery treatises, but were to form the basis for crusade planning in the fourteenth century.

The difficulties of crusading in the fourteenth century

Briefly, in the early months of 1300, it looked as though Jerusalem might be recovered for Christendom. The Mongol il-khan, Ghazan, won a dramatic victory over the Mamluks at Homs, in northern Syria. When the news reached the West, diplomatic efforts were launched to revive the

Frankish–Mongol alliance, this time with Armenian help. This was the best opportunity for recovering the holy city since the 1240s, and it seemed particularly apt that in 1300, the year proclaimed by Pope Boniface VIII as a ‘Jubilee Year’ for Christendom, Christian forces – albeit Armenians rather than Franks – should have entered Damascus and Jerusalem in triumph (Schein 1979: 805–19). According to western chroniclers, Ghazan wrote asking for westerners to come and resettle the Holy Land. Henry II of Cyprus, eager to press the advantage, sent sixteen galleys to raid Alexandria, while Amaury of Tyre and a force made up from the Military Orders tried to occupy Tortosa. In fact, they maintained a small garrison off the island of Ruad, only a few hundred metres from the shore, for eighteen months, before a Mamluk fleet overcame them (Crawford 2001: 157). But if the Mongol victory showed that it was possible to defeat the Mamluks in battle, its aftermath demonstrated how ephemeral the results of such victories were in reality. After a brief and largely symbolic occupation of Jerusalem, Ghazan withdrew to Persia, and a year later was unable to coordinate his forces with the Cypriots. In 1303 he once again invaded Syria, but this time he was defeated by the Mamluks, and a year later he died. In fact, what looked in western chronicles like an apocalyptic liberation through the instrument of God was nothing more than an episode in the long-running struggle between Mongols and Mamluks for mastery of the Levant (Schein 1991: 167–75). The irony is that the instrument of God, Ghazan, had in 1295 converted to Islam. His ‘conquest’ was motivated by territorial rather than religious aspirations. Moreover, the kingdom of Cyprus, though a valuable asset as a potential base for a crusade, did not have the military resources to initiate an assault on the mainland, and in the early years of the fourteenth century the internal politics of the kingdom were not conducive to such activity. The installation of the Military Orders on the island gave rise to tensions that Henry II (1285–1324) was unable to calm; indeed, between 1306 and 1310 he lost his throne to his brother in an outbreak of dynastic civil war (Edbury 1991: 101–40).

Crusade planning continued regularly throughout the first half of the fourteenth century, but it became increasingly difficult to put well-conceived projects for the recovery of the Holy Land into practice. In part, this was the inevitable consequence of the passage of time, for the longer the Holy Land was in Muslim hands, the easier it was for Christendom to become accustomed to the idea of not having possession of its spiritual treasures. By 1336, when the last serious attempt by the French monarchy to launch a crusade collapsed, only people in middle age could remember a time when any part of the Holy Land had been in western possession, and one would have had to be elderly to recall a flourishing state in the Levant. And of course, the Mongols’ failure to dominate western Asia as they did eastern, and the collapse of Armenian Cilicia as an effective independent power, meant increasingly that all the work of conquest would have to be done



Figure 10.1 The Cathedral of St Nicholas in Famagusta, consecrated in 1326, dates from the period in which the city's population was growing after the loss of the mainland Crusader States, and the port was becoming increasingly important as a trading centre with the West.

Source: © Andrew Jotischky.

from the West. This had been the case also in 1095, but the First Crusade advantage of a moment of unique dislocation in the political climate of the Near East – and it had also been singularly lucky in succeeding even in such conditions. Turkish political unity more or less since the collapse of Fatimid Egypt in 1169–71 meant that those conditions were never again repeated.

There were also reasons quite external to the politics of the Near East why Crusades never reached far beyond the planning stage in the fourteenth century. The political society of the West was more complex than it had been in the late eleventh century; and although governmental bureaucracy, both ecclesiastical and secular, was far more effective, this did not mean that it was easier either for Clement V (1305–14) or John XXII (1316–34) to launch a crusade than it had been for Urban II, or for kings or great lords to respond to an appeal. It is true that financing and recruitment of crusading, which had been haphazard in 1095–1101, was in contrast efficient and well organised by the 1270s. But the process that had made such efficiency possible was the growth of political bureaucracies that had their own ideologies and their own national interests. The increased power of

European sovereign states made it less likely that Christendom could react spontaneously or with any degree of unity. Moreover, the papacy itself had changed. The long struggle against the Hohenstaufen in Italy and the subsequent entanglement of the popes from the 1260s onward with the Sicilian succession had the effect of making the institution appear unable to rise above the interests of national politics in the way in which an Urban II, Eugenius III or Innocent III had done. The domination of the office by French prelates, and from 1305 the residence of the popes themselves in Avignon, only exacerbated such perceptions. This is not to say that the Avignon papacy was uninterested in crusading (Housley 1986), but rather that its voice was less universally heard than had been the case up to the late thirteenth century.

It may appear paradoxical that a system of financing Crusades that had become better organised since 1274 should have been correspondingly unable to deliver results in respect of armies in the field. Thirteenth-century popes realised that the best way of ensuring a steady income stream to pay for crusading was to tax clerical incomes. Despite attempts in England and France, the imposition of a regular tax on the laity on the model of the 'Saladin tithe' of 1188 proved impossible to enforce. Taxing the Church, however, was a way of taxing the whole of Christian society, because clerical incomes were made up, at the lowest level, of the tithes paid to their parish by every parishioner. Moreover, taxing clerical incomes was also a means of retaining control of crusading by the Church: according to Innocent III's doctrine, what was the business of the Church ought to be organised by the Church. Gregory X's bull *Cum pro negotio* (1274) laid down the way tithes were to be assessed and collected throughout Christendom. Although setting up an institutional strategy does not guarantee that the money will flow in, the fact that money from tithes was spent by popes from the 1270s to c.1300 on a variety of crusading projects is testimony to the effectiveness of the system. Sources reflecting both those taxed and those implementing taxation indicate the level of the practical problems to be overcome. First, there was the difficulty of assessing levels of taxation. Since each bishopric had a different income, which was made up from a variety of sources and would fluctuate yearly, this was a complex matter. Then there were the practical problems of collection. In 1277, the papal collectors in England found that travelling around the country to do their job was dangerous because of the brigandage that increased whenever the king was fighting outside the kingdom. There was evasion on a massive scale: from delays, appeals and claims of exemption by monastic and other institutions to open defiance. Some clergy were even claiming that after Gregory X's death in 1276 they were no longer under any obligation to pay. The most telling part of the letter from which these complaints are taken is the statement 'We see no way in which this can be remedied other than by calling on the assistance of the secular arm' (Lunt 1917: 66–9; Housley 1996: 21–5).

Even when the correct amount was finally collected, it had to be accounted for. At one level, this meant record-keeping on a huge scale; at another, the far more difficult process of ensuring that the money collected was actually spent on crusading. As we have seen, opinions about the most legitimate use of tithes could be fiercely critical of papal policy, but a more serious problem in the fourteenth century was the difficulty of holding crusading kings to their vows so that tithes collected under the terms of their vow were indeed spent on the crusade and not on some other purpose. For example, when Charles IV succeeded his brother Philip V as king of France in 1322, the pope took up with him the crusade project that Philip had been pursuing. Philip had been granted a tax of one-tenth in 1321 in addition to some of the proceeds from the one-tenth levied for six years at the Council of Vienne (1314), but Charles found that this had already been spent. Pope John XXII's reply more or less accuses the French crown of only feigning interest in crusading as a pretext for enjoying the fruits of clerical taxation (Housley 1980: 166–9). A king could take the cross, receive a grant of tithes – and perhaps an additional papal subsidy – then find reasons for delaying an expedition, all the while using the money to fund other projects – as, for example, James II of Aragon had done from 1305 onward when he used the tithes granted him by Clement V to fund his conquest of Sardinia and Corsica. This is why, in 1321, John's negotiations with Philip V involved the clause that the king should agree to go on crusade in person before a set date, rather than sending a proxy commander in his place.

Ten years later, in 1331, the boot was on the other foot, as Philip VI accused John XXII of spending money set aside for the Holy Land on other purposes. Now the pope had to defend not only his specific conduct – the use of the money for the defence of the Church against schism (in this case the imperialist anti-pope Nicholas V in 1328) – but also the more general principle that tithes and subsidies for crusading could in emergencies be spent on other campaigns. He gave as instances the cases of Philip IV and Philip V in France, and implied that since 1295 the practice had been widespread (Housley 1996: 64–7). He might also have mentioned that even forces raised for crusading were diverted for service elsewhere: in 1319, for example, the ten war galleys equipped at papal expense for a *passagium particulare* by Philip V were instead lent to Robert, king of Naples, when bad weather prevented them from sailing to the East. What such examples indicate is that popes and kings alike, as figures on an international stage, had finite resources that had to be deployed to meet immediate demands. This does not necessarily mean that they were insincere in their concern for the fate of the Holy Land, or more generally of the Christians in the East. But the very processes that made the collection of taxes possible in England, France or Castile, for example – in other words, more effective governmental methods – also made it less likely that rulers would allow those taxes to be used by other kings who might be rivals. Philip IV clashed with Boniface VIII when he refused to allow French tithes to be used by the king

of England, with whom he was at war – for how was Philip to know that they would not be used to finance a campaign in Gascony, rather than a genuine crusade?

National interests may have prevailed in different ways over the desire to reconquer the Holy Land. Yet nationalist ambitions and crusading were no less incompatible in the fourteenth century than they had been for St Louis. The last attempt to mount a 'traditional' crusade for the recovery of the Holy Land was the projected expedition of Philip VI in 1336 (Tyerman 1985: 25–52). The preaching began in France at the end of 1331, but it took a further sixteen months (February 1332–July 1333) before the details of who was to go, how much money was to be collected and how, and what indulgence was offered, were agreed. Philip wanted control of tithes collected outside France, which was impossible for the pope to deliver. By the summer of 1336, the pope was complaining that there was no evidence that even a single galley had been built. In fact a fleet was amassed, but when the crusade was eventually cancelled, the sailors waiting in Marseilles staged a mock sea-battle in which they hurled oranges at each other (Tyerman 1985: 47). Philip would not leave until a safe peace had been concluded with Edward III of England over the future of Gascony, England's last Angevin possession. It is easy to accuse Philip of insincerity in his planning, but the diversion of crusading taxes to the start of war against England (1336–7) in fact represented the failure of French policy. Philip knew that his political aspirations would have been better served by going on crusade than by fighting the English.

Other national interests than those of defence could also interfere with crusading plans. James II of Aragon (1291–1327) declared his intent to go on crusade in *c.*1289–91, and in 1293 launched a diplomatic mission to construct alliances in the East to prepare the way for a crusade. During the 1290s he was seen by the papacy as the natural leader of a crusade because of Aragon's maritime power (Schein 1991: 151–2, 188–92). But although he periodically remembered his vow – in 1296, in 1300 and in 1305, for example – he also exchanged friendly embassies with an-Nasir, the sultan of Egypt, on five occasions between 1303 and his death in 1327 (Atiya 1938a, 1938b: 510–17). Flouting Nicholas IV's ban on trade with Egypt – for which he was excommunicated by Boniface VIII – James' embassies sought to establish commercial relations with the most important power in the eastern Mediterranean. In fact, although James legislated in his own kingdom against trade with Egypt in 1302, this law was never enforced, and in 1326 he was remitting fines against illegal traders in return for payoffs to the crown (Housley 1986: 203).

On the surface, it looks as though James simply paid lip-service to commitments expected of him, while pursuing a policy diametrically opposed to the interests of crusading. But it would be simplistic to assume that there was an equation of 'either the crusade or commerce'. In the first place, James was certainly not opposed to crusading in itself; in 1305 he

linked the recovery of the Holy Land with a crusade against the Muslims of Granada, and Ramon Lull, the influential Dominican crusade planner, was impressed by the king's zeal (Schein 1991: 190). Besides, James would have been more than willing to bring about the recovery of the Holy Land if it could be achieved without jeopardising the profitable relations with Egypt that were so important to all Mediterranean maritime powers. As we shall see, his interest in the Holy Land and the fate of eastern Christians was profound. Aragonese policy in this regard was similar to that of Genoa and Venice; and James' successor Alfonso IV continued to play the same hand, to the extent that Aragon was later accused by the French of sabotaging the mission of Peter de Palud, the patriarch of Jerusalem, to Egypt in 1329–30 (Dunbabin 1991: 164–73).

Problems of finance and national policy provide two fundamental and interlinked reasons why plans for the recovery of the Holy Land never materialised into action in the fourteenth century. A third is the nature of warfare in general, and of the specific form of warfare required in the eastern Mediterranean in particular. Urban II and his twelfth-century successors saw participation in Crusades as a voluntary activity, albeit one in which a strong sense of moral obligation ought to figure. We cannot assume that even in 1095 this meant that every *crucesignatus* made entirely individual decisions: recruitment always followed patterns set by family interests, networks of patronage and political alliances. Even in the mid-thirteenth century, recruitment to Crusades seems to have been governed by such patterns and rhythms. The process described by Joinville, for example, does not seem to have differed far from that in the chronicles of the First Crusade: lords formed individual military households by taking vassals with them, and if they ran short of the means to support them, they and their knights had to hope they could be taken on by a greater lord (Smith 2008: 173–4, 178). But by 1291 most European kings no longer recruited armies according to older feudal patterns. Charles IV and Philip VI, for example, negotiated the terms of their proposed Crusades with the papacy on the assumption that they would provide given numbers of ships and men. These quotas could not be met by the haphazard method of sending out preachers and waiting for crusade vows to yield manpower and money. Instead, taxation of clerical income brought with it, by the end of the thirteenth century, a more systematic method of contractual recruitment. If a king knew roughly how much he could expect to raise for his crusade from the grant of a tithe or a papal subsidy, he could estimate the numbers of knights, foot soldiers and archers that could be supported by that amount, and for how long.

This more streamlined and efficient process of raising armies ought perhaps to have made it easier for kings to implement their vows. At least it ensured that something like the fiasco of 1202, when an over-estimate of manpower scuppered the crusade, was less likely to occur. But at the same time it created a distance between vow and participation. Crusading vows were still made, but except in the case of those at the top of society, they

had little effect in determining the shape or nature of an expedition. Popes could no longer, like Innocent III, expect to create little communities of Christendom to recover the Holy Land; even Gregory X realised that the knighthood was no longer in a position to direct crusading, and that he had to deal with kings. The real value of the crusading vow, by the end of the thirteenth century, was to raise extra money through redemptions sold to people who would never in any case have been participants. But should this necessarily have meant that Crusades to the East were less likely to take place? The benefits of central organisation of recruitment and financing by royal governments are undoubted; conversely, however, greater systemisation resulted in a narrowing of the executive authority that could make crusading actually take place. Royal governments were more likely to recruit and finance successfully, but they were also more prone to subordinate the crusade itself to national policy. The centralisation of political life in the West may have made a crusade for the recovery of the Holy Land more effective if it ever took place; the problem was that it was by the same measure less likely ever to take place.

Crusading and the Holy Land at the end of the Middle Ages

Just as methods of finance and recruitment became more efficient from 1274 onward, so also military and geopolitical strategy took a leap forward through the 'recovery treatises'. The problem of the Holy Land was now seen in a fuller economic and political context. The treatises dating from after the fall of Acre, in particular, are characterised by, on the one hand, a high level of theoretical abstraction, and on the other, a profound knowledge of the political and military problems to be overcome (Leopold 2000: *passim*). In the first category belong those written by public servants such as Pierre Dubois (c.1306–7) and William of Nogaret (1310–11); in the second, those by the Armenian prince Hethoum (1307), the Hospitaller Grand Master Fulk of Villaret (1305), the Venetian merchant Marino Sanudo Torsello (1309), Henry II of Cyprus (1310–11), and the Dominican missionary William Adam (1316–17 and 1332). Fidenzio of Padua, the Franciscan provincial in the Holy Land at the fall of Acre, belongs in both categories, because although he makes practical recommendations, his work is rooted in a moral paradigm of sinfulness and judgement. Ramon Lull's work is so voluminous, and even his practical writing so coloured by philosophical interests, that it is difficult to fit him into any category.

One effect of the recovery treatises, taken as a whole, was to diffuse the western view of crusading through a wider lens. Even after the fall of Acre, the goal of a crusade was by no means clear. Fidenzio, writing before the fall of Acre, wanted to link an amphibious assault on the Holy Land to an economic blockade of Egypt. This strategy, which was to prove highly influential (it was also adopted by Ramon Lull, Marino Sanudo and Hethoum, among others) was a continuation of the 'Egyptian policy' of

thirteenth-century Crusades, in so far as it was based on the idea that Egypt was the key to Mamluk power. But it also demanded the subjection to western Christendom and its interests of Asia Minor, Syria and North Africa. Marino Sanudo, Dubois and Henry II concurred: if the Holy Land was to be not only recovered but held for Christendom, it was not just the Mamluks, but Islam in general, that had to be defeated.

This thread had been unravelling almost since crusading began. The Egyptian policy, whether it involved invasion or blockade, was an implicit rejection of the narrow focus of Urban II's crusade for the recovery of a specific holy place, the shrine of the Lord. The widening of crusading during the twelfth century acknowledged a conceptual link between the holy places and the more intractable problem of Islam. Even when the recovery of the Holy Land was the target, by the early thirteenth century other strategic imperatives either took priority – as for Richard I in 1191–2, for the Military Orders in 1219 and St Louis in 1249 – or, as in some of the recovery treatises, subsumed Jerusalem in a wider geopolitical dimension. From 1274 onward, alliances with Mongols and Armenians, the problem of Sicily, reunion with the Orthodox Church, the remnants of Frankish Greece and the future of Cyprus all featured in crusade planning.

One way in which the thread unravelled was through the evolution of a papal theory on non-Christian peoples. From the pontificate of Gregory IX (1227–41) onward, popes developed a canonical position in which Muslims were seen as occupying the same relationship to Christendom as schismatics and Jews. It is no coincidence that the popes who initiated the mendicant missions in the Near East and to the Mongols – Gregory himself and Innocent IV (1243–54) – were also those who thought most deeply about the theoretical implications of crusading. Innocent IV developed a justification of the crusade starting from Christendom's right to the ownership of certain property – the holy places – and concluding that Christians could also legally seize lands other than the Holy Land from Muslims. At the heart of this thesis was the question of whether infidels could have *dominium* – legal lordship – over any territory. Innocent IV thought that they could, because they enjoyed the rights of natural law. On the other hand, he argued that they were in theory subject above all to Christ's *dominium*, and thus to the pope's authority. This was a relatively conservative position, compared to that of the canonist Hostiensis (c.1270–1), who argued that those who rejected Christ lost the right to *dominium* altogether (Muldoon 1979: 5–7, 15–17, 47–8). Even the more conservative position might be taken to justify the defeat of Islam as a whole, rather than simply the recovery of the Holy Land.

Such ambitious theories of Christendom's entitlement over Islam were a long way from reality. Islam might, as far as Christian theologians were concerned, lack authority as a religion, but its armies were mighty. Fidenzio of Padua, on the eve of the fall of Acre, conceded that an invasion of Egypt was implausible because the Mamluks were simply too strong. But a growing

perception of crusading as a war against Islam and Muslims rather than simply for the recovery of a specific territory was necessitated precisely by the imbalance of forces in the eastern Mediterranean. In 1318, John XXII recognised that the recovery of the Holy Land had to be secondary to the defence of Cyprus and Armenia (Housley 1980: 168) and a fleet was collected for that purpose in 1319. The Armenian–Mamluk truce of 1323 may have resolved the problem temporarily, but it also revealed European impotence. The background to Philip VI's crusade preparations of the 1330s was Turkish raiding on Venetian island possessions in the Aegean, and Philip's reluctance to be diverted from his *passagium generale* by such side-issues only demonstrates the widening gap between western crusading aspirations and the needs of the Christians in the eastern Mediterranean (Tyerman 1985: 36–7, 52). The advance of the Ottoman Turks from the 1330s onward changed crusading utterly. The second half of the fourteenth century saw specific expeditions to defend territory under threat – most famously the disastrous Nicopolis crusade of 1396 – but no more general Crusades for the recovery of the Holy Land were planned after 1336.

This does not mean, however, that the holy places themselves were forgotten. In the 1360s a final attempt to interest western European powers in the recovery of the Holy Land was made by the French noble Phillipe de Mézières who, as chancellor of the kingdom of Cyprus, visited France, northern Italy and Germany in 1362 to drum up support for a new crusade. Under the influence of the Carmelite papal legate Peter Thomas, he encouraged Peter I of Cyprus to launch an attack on Egypt that succeeded in sacking Alexandria in 1365 (Edbury 1977: 90–105). In 1366, however, even Pope Urban V advised that Cyprus would be better served by a peace treaty with the sultan of Egypt than by trying to recapture the lost kingdom of Jerusalem; a treaty concluded in 1370, after which the Holy Land finally slipped from the view of crusade planners.

A quite different approach to the Muslim occupation of the holy places was 'peaceful liberation'. In 1322 James II of Aragon, during the course of one of the regular embassies he sent to Egypt, asked Sultan an-Nasir to entrust the custody of the Holy Sepulchre to a group of Aragonese Dominican friars who would take up residence in Jerusalem. Although the sultan agreed readily, the Dominicans stayed only a year before returning to the West. Undeterred, James asked for the same concession for the Franciscan Order in 1327. This time, an-Nasir prevaricated, and James' own death stalled the plan. The project was revived, however, by Robert the Wise, king of Naples, and his queen, Sancia. In 1333 a group of Franciscans from Provence, led by Roger Garin, occupied the site of the Cenacle on Mt Zion, where they built a priory, and from which they provided a permanent Latin staff for the Holy Sepulchre. Queen Sancia funded all of this activity. The Franciscan 'custody of the Holy Land', as it became known, soon extended to the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem and the tomb of the Blessed Virgin in the garden of Gethsemane.

James' approach to an-Nasir did not come out of the blue. As early as 1300 he had pressed the sultan to grant access to Christian pilgrims to the holy places; in 1303 he asked for churches in Egypt to be reopened; while in 1305 and 1314 he presented himself as the protector of all Christians under Mamluk rule. Alongside these demands he secured the release of prisoners of war, presumably from the fall of Acre or Ruad (1302) (Atiya 1938b: 18–33). James' diplomacy operated in parallel to his and other rulers' plans for crusading. In 1327 his embassy to Cairo coincided with that of Charles IV of France, who had papal authority to negotiate with the sultan. But whereas French dealings with an-Nasir between 1327 and 1331 were full of thinly veiled bombast about a crusade, James never coupled his requests with the threat of force. The return of the holy places was to him, and to the Angevins of Naples in the 1330s, a separate matter from the more general problem of Islam.

Jerusalem and the Holy Land did not cease to appeal to western Christians even when hopes of their recovery must have dimmed. The Franciscan custody made western pilgrimage easier, but accounts of pilgrimages, mostly by friars, survive from 1302, 1320, 1322–3, 1327 and 1330–1, as well as from 1335, 1336, 1345, 1346–7 and 1384. The liveliest of these, for example those by James of Verona (1335) and Niccolo da Poggibonsi (1346–7), fully demonstrate the emotions that could still be raised in western Christians by being in the presence of the Holy Sepulchre. Pilgrimage to Jerusalem continued to be popular in the fifteenth century and even beyond, though by this time an element of antiquarian curiosity can be seen merging with an older devotional tradition (Sumption 1975: 257–302).

Yet, precisely because it was so iconic in western piety, the Holy Land had long been present in Europe. Relics of the Passion were located in the West; for example through the discovery of the holy blood of Mantua in 1048, or the Oviedo relics, including bread from the Last Supper, in 1075 (Morris 2000: 95–6). The Lateran palace itself housed an impressive collection of relics from the Holy Land on the eve of the First Crusade (Cowdrey 1997: 69–70). More remarkably, symbolic representations of the Holy Sepulchre were constructed in western churches. In the Carolingian Church these served a purely liturgical purpose for Easter celebrations, and were not intended to be architectural copies. But by the eleventh century, a new wave of 'precise architectural reminiscences' of the Holy Sepulchre swept across Europe (Morris 2005: 153–64). Perhaps the most ambitious example before the First Crusade is San Stefano in Bologna, but many others were built as a result of the Crusades, such as Holy Trinity (the 'Round Church') in Cambridge, the Temple Church in London, or the Holy Sepulchre in Eichstätt (Morris 2005: 219–51). These constructions were an attempt to confer some of the spiritual charge of the original through a reproduction of certain elements, such as shape, proportion or decoration. Pilgrims returning from the Holy Land, similarly, might build models of the shrines at which they had worshipped, in an attempt to evoke emotional

experiences of the Holy Land. Entire urban landscapes could be configured to represent pilgrimages in the Holy Land, as for example in Suzdal in Russia (Price 2000: 255–7). London was decked out to represent Jerusalem in Henry V's victory parade after the battle of Agincourt (Housley 2000: 239).

Such cultural translations originally had the effect of rendering the Holy Land a place 'where no Christian could be a foreigner' (Smail 1977:38). But they could have a different effect when the holy places themselves were no longer in Christian hands. Already in the thirteenth century – the period in which, according to one historian, 'the recovery of the Holy Land . . . pervaded the minds of men . . . [it was] inseparable from the air they breathed' (Powicke 1962: 80) – the Holy Land was being allegorised by followers of the apocalyptic tradition of Joachim of Fiore. According to some Joachites, St Francis, who was 'another Christ', had made Italy a new 'holy land' (Wessley 2000: 181–91). In a different vein, Clement V's bull *Rex glorie* (1311) proclaimed that France enjoyed a status in Christendom similar to that of the Holy Land. This bull, issued under extreme pressure from Philip IV, shows how the self-assurance of the French crown might be theorised into an abstract statement of divine favour on the nation. Emerging concepts of national identity brought with them notions of the special quality, even holiness, of the national homeland. Where did this leave the Holy Land itself? One of the most thoughtful of the recovery theorists, Pierre Dubois (c.1306–7), suggested that, once reconquered, it ought to be divided up among the western nations who had assisted in the conquest (Brandt 1956: 84–5). As Housley has observed, this was a far cry from Fulcher of Chartres' perception of the Holy Land as a new *ratio* forged in the fires of migration, conquest and settlement (Murray 1995: 59–73; Housley 2000: 241).

Crusading as an activity had also become a cultural concept by the end of the fourteenth century. Chaucer's knight, the model of late fourteenth-century chivalric ideals, had served on a crusade; indeed, crusading was part of his chivalric credentials. But his crusade was not for the recovery of the Holy Land, or even the defence of the Christian Mediterranean against the Turks. Like Henry IV of England, Duke Albert III of Austria, Gaston-Phoebus, count of Foix, Henry, duke of Lancaster and many others, Chaucer's knight had been a guest of the Teutonic Knights on one of their perpetual expeditions against the pagans in Prussia. Here, in the frozen terrain of the north, the European knighthood acted out its ideals and fantasies in a drama of hunts and elaborate feasts that enlivened the often inconclusive fighting (Keen 1984: 172–4). One result of such activities was the strengthening sense of a common chivalric culture among the knightly classes that cut across national identities. English knights met their counterparts from France, Germany and Bohemia, and engaged with them on a common cause that linked them, however tenuously, to the great crusading expeditions to the East of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In this vein, Froissart tells the story of two French knights trapped in a siege during the

Hundred Years War who were rescued from a dishonourable death at the hands of English crossbowmen by a party of English knights whom they recognised from an expedition they had shared with the Teutonic Knights only a few years previously (Jolliffe 1967: 134–5).

A readiness to embark on a crusade against the Turks was a mark of chivalric virtues among fifteenth-century knights. Crusading vows came to have a symbolic quality, as for example when Henry V took the cross in grave illness in 1422. He may have been echoing St Louis' vow of 1244; more likely he was simply making a gesture that had long been customary. Even when vows were part of a genuine plan for crusading, as in Duke Philip of Burgundy's intended rescue of Constantinople from the Turks in 1453, they were set in a lavish ceremonial that evoked and glorified individual martial prowess above all. The vow of the *crucesignatus* had evolved into a complex and formulaic culture that represented the more general knightly ideals of the day. It was not only in knightly culture that crusading continued to exercise its appeal. The popular 'consumption' of crusading and crusading imagery increased and widened its hold as a consequence of the invention of printing and the ability to disseminate images and words quickly and cheaply. Among the earliest books that Caxton printed in England was an English translation of William of Tyre, and throughout Europe books on the Turks and holy war, as well as pamphlets advocating the defence of Christendom, and woodcuts illustrating supposed Turkish atrocities, were staples of the presses (Tyerman 2011: 37–43).

Nor was crusading itself only a symbolic activity in the fifteenth century. Some popes, such as Eugenius IV (1431–47), continued to use the crusade as an instrument of policy. It was especially needed in order to defend Constantinople. A French–Burgundian force was raised to join King Sigismund of Hungary in an attack on the Ottomans on the Danube at Nicopolis (1396), but – partly because of the refusal of the western Europeans to take local advice about fighting the Turks – it was heavily defeated, leaving Constantinople virtually defenceless. That it did not fall before 1453 was largely due to the brief rise of Tamerlane in Central Asia and his attack on the Ottomans from the East. By the 1430s Murad II (1421–51) was ready to turn Ottoman attentions to Europe again. He was kept at bay by the military skill and energy of the Hungarian governor of Transylvania, John Hunyadi, and the support of the Franciscan preacher John of Capistrano in 1441 and 1442, while Eugenius IV preached a new crusade against the Turks. A proposed Venetian naval assault on the Ottomans in the Dardanelles failed to coordinate with the Polish–Hungarian attack by land, and the land forces were routed by the Ottomans at Varna, on the Black Sea, in 1444. It was the final attempt to prevent what must have seemed inevitable to contemporaries: the Ottoman capture of Constantinople in 1453.

Papal bulls for recovery Crusades were issued in 1453, 1458 and 1463, and Pope Calixtus III even established a separate arm of papal administration, the *camera sanctae cruciatae*, to coordinate recruitment and financing of

Crusades. But the lack of coordinated response to bulls, and lack of any outcome from the crusade councils organised by popes in 1459 and 1490, exposed the impossibility of adequate crusade planning at a time of deep and growing internal divisions in western Christendom. The French invasion of Italy in the 1490s presented a more immediate set of priorities for the Roman Church. A further anti-Ottoman crusade was preached by Pope Leo X in 1513, but even the traditional indulgences offered in 1517 could not provoke a response. The failure to coordinate a successful response to the Ottoman threat, however, did not necessarily mean that crusading as an instrument had lost either its effectiveness or its attractions. Secular rulers continued to see the political usefulness of crusading mechanisms in the fifteenth and even sixteenth centuries. Eugenius was at first reluctant to grant the Portuguese a crusading privilege for their expansionist activities in west Africa, but he eventually bowed to pressure from King Duarte and recognised this as a crusade (although Alexander VI, in 1493, declined to let the Spanish wage a war of annihilation in the New World using the crusade as a pretext). Popes found it difficult to deny a logic that had tied Christian expansion and colonisation to holy war since the twelfth century.

The Reformation of the Church in the sixteenth century, and the redrawing of the religious map of Europe, did not bring to an end the waging of holy war. An alliance of Catholic powers in 1571, in response to the fall of Venetian-controlled Cyprus to the Ottomans a year earlier, resulted in the decisive naval victory at Lepanto, in the waters of south-western Greece. But over the course of the late-fifteenth and first half of the sixteenth centuries, the Ottomans had come to be treated less as an existential threat to be dealt with by holy war, and more as a power whose threat could be met by the tools of statecraft, which might include war but which certainly also encompassed diplomacy. By 1580 the three major Mediterranean powers, France, Spain and Venice, had all concluded truces with the Ottomans. Genoa, Venice's great rival, had in fact been an Ottoman ally more than a hundred years earlier, at the time of the Crusade of Varna.

In a sense, the revolution brought about by Urban II was complete. In 1095, warfare against the Turks had been offered to knights by the Church as one among many acceptable forms of the penance required of all knights. At the close of the Middle Ages, declaring a readiness to fight the Turks had not only been adopted by the knighthood as a necessary part of chivalric culture, but was accepted by Catholic and Protestant powers alike as a political necessity in order to safeguard Christendom. Whether Urban II would have recognised his intention in the festivities at Philip of Burgundy's Feast of the Pheasant in Lille, we can only speculate.



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Index

- Abu Ghosh 160
Acre 135; Commune of 244–5;
 Italian quarters in 164; siege of
 (1189–91) 170; siege of (1291)
 260
Adhemar, bishop of Le Puy 55
Afonso Henriquez 206
Agnes of Courtenay 101
Aimery of Limoges, patriarch of
 Antioch 146, 154
‘Ain Jalud, battle of 258
Al-Adil 175, 230, 233
Alberic of Trois-Fontaines 189–90
Albert of Aachen 50
Albert of Buxhövdén 219, 220, 222
Albigensian Crusade 11, 186–9
Alexander II, Pope 26, 205
Alexander Nevsky 220
Alexios III Angelos 181–2
Alexios IV Angelos 177–8, 180, 182
Alexios Komnenos 30, 43, 46, 51,
 57–8, 60
Alexios ‘Murtzuphlos’ 182
Al-Fadil 126
Alfonso I, king of Aragon 202
Alfonso VI, king of León-Castile 200–1
Al-Hakim 158
Alice of Antioch 80–1
Al-Kamil 233–5, 237–40
Almería 206, 207
Almohads 207
Almoravids 200
Al-Mu’azzam 233–5, 237
Amalric I, king of Jerusalem 99–101,
 108
Ambroise 174
Andrew II, king of Hungary 232
Anna Komnena 57, 59
An-Nasir, sultan of Egypt 275–6
Antioch: principality established 71–3;
 sack of 258; siege of 58–60
Aragon 202–3
Armenians 136, 140–1
Arnald-Amaury, abbot of Cîteaux 186
Arnulf of Choques 144–5, 151
As-Salih, Ayyubid sultan 246, 250
As-Salih, Nur ad-Din’s son 125
As-Sulami 113
Arsuf, battle of 173
art, in Crusader States 157–61
assimilation 134–5, 228; *see also*
 Crusades, and colonialism
Assise sur la ligece 108, 242, 244
Audita tremendi 168

Bacon, Roger 263
Baha ad-Din ibn Shaddad 125–6, 130
Baibars 258–9, 261
Balaq 115–16
Baldric of Bourgeuil 50, 52
Baldwin, count of Flanders 182, 223
Baldwin I, count of Edessa
 (1097–1100), king of Jerusalem
 (1100–18) 60, 66–70
Baldwin II, king of Jerusalem 70,
 78–81, 116
Baldwin III, king of Jerusalem 95, 97–9
Baldwin IV, king of Jerusalem 101–6
Baldwin V, king of Jerusalem 106–7
Baldwin of Le Bourcq *see* Baldwin II,
 king of Jerusalem
Baltic Crusades 4, 11, 198, 214–23,
 277–8
Barcelona 202
Bernard of Clairvaux 85, 89, 92, 151,
 214–15
Bethlehem, Church of the Nativity in
 158–9

- Bohemond 8, 14, 50, 58, 61, 71–2
 Bohemond IV 243
 Boniface of Montferrat 177–80, 182, 223
 Byzantine Empire 43–7, 176–83;
 see also Fourth Crusade
- castles 19
 Cathars *see* heresy, Crusades against
 Celestine III 207
 Charles of Anjou, king of Sicily
 213–14, 253, 262, 265
 charters, crusaders' 15, 31, 53
 Children's crusade 189–90
 Cid (Rodrigo Diaz) 204, 208
 Cistercians, in Crusader States 151; in
 the Baltic 222; in Spain 209
 Clermont, council of 24, 49–55
 Compostela 203
 Conrad III, Emperor 93
 Conrad IV, king of Jerusalem 246
 Conrad of Montferrat 9, 129–30,
 171–2
 Constance of Antioch 81, 98
 Constantinople, capture of (1203–4)
 181–3; Latin Empire of 223–8;
 threatened by Turks 278
 conversion, of pagans 218
Cour de la fonde 139
crucesignati 187, 193
 Crusades, and colonialism 16–22;
 definition 7–12; historiography of
 5–21; motivation 12–16
 Cyprus, kingdom of 3, 238, 244;
 captured on Third Crusade 170
- Daimbert, archbishop of Pisa 145
 Damascus 79, 95–6, 117, 119
 Damiatta, 233, 235, 248
 Dandolo, Enrico 178
 Daniel, Russian abbot 154
 David of Ashby 264
 Diego Gelmírez 206
Divina dispensatione 215
 Dome of the Rock 150
 Dominicans, in Holy Land 146–7
 Dorylaeum, battle of 13
 Dubois, Pierre 277
- Edessa 73–4; fall of 82–3, 117, 140
 Edward I, king of England 253, 266
 Egypt, invasion of 100; as crusading
 target 236, 248–52; *see also* Fifth
 Crusade; Louis IX, king of France
- Elias of Narbonne 152
 Emich of Leiningen 56–7
 Ernoul 142
 Eugenius III, Pope 8, 91–2, 206
 Eugenius IV, Pope 278–9
 Ezzelino of Romano 212–13
- factionalism, in kingdom of Jerusalem
 103–4
 Fatimid khalifate 43, 114–15;
 suppressed 124
fideles sancti Petri 26
 Fidenzio of Padua 273, 274
 Field of Blood, battle of 73, 115
 Fifth Crusade 230–6
 Filangieri, Richard 242, 244
 financing, of Crusades 269–70;
 see also taxation, for Crusades
 First Crusade 9, 55–63
 Fourth Crusade 176–83
 Fourth Lateran Council 5, 11, 192–5,
 236
 Franciscans, in Holy Land 146, 275
 Frederick Barbarossa, Emperor 172
 Frederick II, Emperor 211–12, 229,
 234–5, 236–41, 244, 247
 Fulcher of Chartres 50, 52, 58, 134
 Fulk V, count of Anjou, king of
 Jerusalem 79
- Georgians 136, 141
 Gerard of Nazareth 137, 151, 153
 Gerard of Ridefort 89, 109
 Gerold of Lausanne, patriarch of
 Jerusalem 146
Gesta Francorum 50
 Ghazan 266–7
 Godfrey of Bouillon 14, 50, 61, 66
 Greek Orthodox, Latin relations with
 29; Church in Holy Land 134, 137,
 145, 152–7
 Gregory VII, Pope 25–30, 205
 Gregory IX, Pope 11, 211, 226, 237,
 263
 Gregory X, Pope 262, 264, 269
 Guibert of Nogent 30–1, 32–3, 38, 50
 Gunther of Pairis 179, 182
 Guy of Lusignan 105–6, 109, 129,
 170–1
- Hattin, battle of 109–10, 129
Haute Cour *see* High Court, in
 kingdom of Jerusalem
 Hebron, shrine of patriarchs at 149

- Henry II, king of England 169
 Henry II, king of Jerusalem and Cyprus 260, 267
 Henry II, Latin emperor of Constantinople 225
 Henry III, king of England 213, 247
 Henry IV, emperor 25
 Henry VI, emperor 191
 Henry, count of Champagne 174–5, 191
 Henry the Lion 216, 218
 Henry of Livonia 218, 220
 heresy, Crusades against 11, 184–9, 212
 hermits, in Crusader States 151–2
 High Court, in kingdom of Jerusalem 241, 242, 244
 Holy Land 35–6; Christians of 133–44; Latin Church in 144–52
 Holy Sepulchre, Church of 34–6, 147–8, 157–8; copies of 276; Easter fire liturgy 152
 Honorius III, pope 221–2, 235, 236
 Hospitallers, of St John 83–85, 87–8, 126, 173
 Hostiensis 221
 Hugh I, count of Troyes 90
 Hugh de Payen 84
 Hulagu 257
 Humbert of Romans 222, 262

 Ibn al-Athir 117, 121
 Ibn Jubair 138
 Ibn Wasil 240
 icons, in crusader States 160
 Ignatius II, Syrian Orthodox patriarch of Antioch 154
 Il-Ghazi 115
 Imad ad-Din al-Isfahani 121, 125
 indulgence, for Crusades 54, 192, 194, 205, 279
 Innocent III, Pope 11, 146, 180, 183–9, 191–5, 210, 212, 230
 Innocent IV, Pope 11, 147, 154, 211–12, 263, 274
 Isaac II Angelos 178
 Isabel, queen of Jerusalem 171, 174
 Isabel II, queen of Jerusalem 237
 Italians, in Crusader States 162–5

 Jacobites *see* Syrian Orthodox
 James I, king of Aragon 252
 James II, king of Aragon 270, 271–2, 275–6

 James of Vitry 135–7, 150, 153, 242
 Jerusalem, pilgrimage to 34–7; captured by Saladin 129; conquered by Khwarasmians 246; and jihad 122; patriarchate of 144–6; ‘peaceful liberation’ of 275; occupied by Mongols 267; recovery by Frederick II 239–40; siege of (1099) 61–2; as target of first crusade 53
 Jews, attacks on 56
jihad 113–14, 121–2, 125–8
 John of Brienne, king of Jerusalem, Latin emperor of Constantinople 225, 230, 232–5, 237
 John of Ibelin, lord of Beirut 238–9, 242, 244
 John of Ibelin, lord of Jaffa 139, 243
 John Komnenos 81
 John Phokas 154, 155
 John XXII, Pope 268, 270
 Joinville, Jean de 16, 248–51
 Jubin, monastery of 151

 Khwarasmians 246
 Krak des Chevaliers 258

 La Forbie 246
 Las Navas de Tolosa 207
 Latin Church, in kingdom of Jerusalem 144–52
 law, in kingdom of Jerusalem 138–9, 242–4
 León-Castile 198–202
 Lepanto, battle of 279
 Lisbon 93, siege of 206
 liturgy, of crusading 6, 148, 168; in Greek manuscripts 156
Livländische Reimchronik 222
 Livonia 218
 Louis VII, king of France 91, 94–7
 Louis IX, king of France 247–52, 253
 Lyons, Second council of 262

 madrasas 119, 121
 Mamluks 251–2, 258–61
 Mansurah 249–50
 Manuel Komnenos, Emperor 94–5, 99, 157
 manuscripts, in Greek monasteries 156–7; illuminated 158–60
 Manzikert, battle of 42, 44
 Markward von Anweiler 210
 Mar Sabas, monastery of 144

Martin, abbot of Pairis 13, 180
 Martin IV, Pope 265
 Matilda, countess of Tuscany 27
 Matthew Paris 256
 Melfi, council of 51
 Melisende Psalter 159–60
 Melisende, queen of Jerusalem 79–80
 Michael VII Dukas, Emperor 44
 Military Orders 240; *see also*
 Hospitallers, of St John; Templars;
 Teutonic Knights
 Mongols 256–8, 264, 267
 Mont Gisard, battle of 105
 Montlhéry 68
 Mozarabs 208–9
 Mt Sion, monastery of 150
 Muslims, in Crusader States 137–44

 Nablus, council of 140
 Nicaea, siege of 58
 Nicholas IV, Pope 260, 265–6
 Nicopolis, Crusade of 278
 Notre-Dame de Josaphat, monastery
 150
 Nur ad-Din 95–7, 99, 101, 119–23

 Oliver of Paderborn 233, 236
 Otto of Deuil 94
 Otto of Freising 94
 Ottomans 275, 278–9

 papacy, reform of 25
 parias 200
 Paschal II, Pope 145
 Patarini 26
 Peace of God 37–8
 Pelagius, cardinal bishop of Albano
 233–4
 Peter Capuano 176, 180, 194
 Peter of Castelnau 186
 Peter the Hermit 40, 56
 Peter I, king of Cyprus 275
 Peter the Venerable 34, 149
 Philip, count of Flanders 104
 Philip, duke of Swabia 180–1
 Philip II, king of France 169, 190
 Philip V, king of France 270
 Philip VI, king of France 270–1
 Philip of Novara 241, 243
 Piacenza, council of 51
 pilgrimage, to the Holy Land 34–7,
 276; to Compostela 204–5
 preaching, of crusade 187
 Prester, John 256–7

Qalawun 260
Quia maior 193–5, 232

 Ralph, bishop of Bethlehem 146
 Ralph of Caen 31, 61
 Ralph Glaber 34
 Ralph of Tiberias 242
 Raymond of Aguilers 50, 62
 Raymond III, count of Tripoli 102–6
 Raymond IV, count of Toulouse 14,
 50, 58, 66, 74
 Raymond VI, count of Toulouse 185–6
 Raymond of Poitiers, prince of Antioch
 81, 96
 Reconquista 11, 13, 37, 198–209
 recruitment, for Crusades 272–3
 recovery treatises 262–4, 273–4
 relics 182
 Reynald of Châtillon 98–9, 105, 128
 Richard, earl of Cornwall 227, 245–6
 Richard I, king of England 130–1,
 170–5, 191, 236
 Robert of Artois 249–50
 Robert of Clari 178–9
 Robert, duke of Normandy 14
 Robert Guiscard 44
 Roger of Howden 168
 Robert of Rheims 50
 Roger of Salerno, prince of Antioch 73
 rural settlement, in kingdom of
 Jerusalem 142–3, 161–2

 St Anne, monastery of 150
 St Catherine, monastery of 155
 St Elias, monastery of 157
 St Euthymius, monastery of 144, 155
 St Mary Latin, monastery of 150
 St Sabas, monastery of 155, 157
 Saladin 100, 107, 109, 123–31, 173–4
 ‘Saladin tithe’ 169
 Sancia, queen of Naples 275
 Saxo Grammaticus 216
 Sebastia 150
 Second Crusade 91–7
 Seljuqs 41
 Shepherds’ Crusade 250–1
 Shirkuh 100, 122–3
 Sibyl, queen of Jerusalem 104–5
 Sicilian Vespers 213–14, 265
 Simon de Montfort, earl of Leicester
 247
 Spain 4, 199–209
 Stephen, count of Blois 60
 Sword Brothers 219–20, 222

- Sweden, and crusading 220–1
 Symeon II, patriarch of Jerusalem 54, 144, 152
 Syrian Orthodox 140–1; Church in Crusader States 154

 Tancred 60, 71, 75
 Tatikios 58, 60
 taxation, for Crusades 194, 211, 269–70
 Templars 84–90, 126
 Temple Mount 240
 Teutonic Knights 89, 219–21
 Theobald, count of Champagne 245
 Third Crusade 130–1, 168–75
 Third Lateran Council 187, 212
 Thomas of Marle 38–9
 Toledo 200
 Tortosa 206, 207, 222
 Tripoli, county of 74
 Tunis 253
 Tyre, defence of 129; *Pactum Warmundi* 163–4

 Unur 96, 119
 Urban II, Pope 2–3, 6, 16, 24, 30, 32, 49–55, 198

 Urban IV, pope 213, 252
 Usama ibn Munqidh 138, 140

 Valdemar I, king of Denmark 218
 Venice: and Fourth Crusade 176–83; quarters in Crusader States 163–5
 Villehardouin, Geoffrey de 176, 178–9; Villehardouin dynasty 225–6
 visions, on First Crusade 62–3

 Walter Sans-Avoir 56
 War of St Sabas 259
 Wendish Crusade 215
 William, marquis of Montferrat 103–4
 William of Rubruck 257
 William of Tripoli 146, 263
 William of Tyre 96, 100–1, 105, 126
 women, as crusaders 193

 Yolanda *see* Isabel II

 Zara 179–80
 Zaragoza 202
 Zengi 81–3, 116–19